{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32022005WL","title":"SUMMIT MIDSTREAM PARTNERS, LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2022-01-03","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.404(c)(3), 195.452(l)(1)(ii).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022005wl.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022005wl.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022005wl","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32022005WL","body":"Warning Letter involving SUMMIT MIDSTREAM PARTNERS, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.404(c)(3),  195.452(l)(1)(ii). The case was opened on 2022-01-03 and is reported as closed as of 2022-01-03. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32022005WL_Warning Letter_01032022_(21-199716).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022005WL/32022005WL_Warning%20Letter_01032022_(21-199716).pdf\n\n32022005WL_Warning Letter_01032022_(21-199716)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022005WL/32022005WL_Warning%20Letter_01032022_(21-199716)_text.pdf\n\n32022005WL_Warning Letter_01032022_(21-199716)_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: heath.deneke@summitmidstream.com and\nMStratmann@summitmidstream.com\nJanuary 3, 2022\nMr. Heath Deneke\nPresident/CEO\nSummit Midstream Partners, LLC (SMP)\n910 Louisiana Street, Suite 4200\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 3-2022-005-WL\nDear Mr. Deneke:\nFrom March 23, April 26 to 29, May 10 to 12 and June 8 to 10, 2021, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of\n49 United States Code (U.S.C.) inspected your procedures, records and field assets virtually and\nin Epping, North Dakota.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that Summit Midstream Partners (SMP) have\ncommitted probable violations of the Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal\nRegulations (CFR). The items inspected and the probable violations are:\n\n\n\n1. §195.404 Maps and records.\n(a)…\n(c) Each operator shall maintain the following records for the periods specified;\n(3) A record of each inspection and test required by this subpart shall be maintained\nfor at least 2 years or until the next inspection or test is performed, whichever is\nlonger.\n§195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at intervals\nnot exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the case of pipelines\nused to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7½ months, but at least\ntwice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve,\npressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is\nfunctioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from the\nstandpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in which it is used.\n(b) In the case of relief valves on pressure breakout tanks containing highly volatile\nliquids, each operator shall test each valve at intervals not exceeding 5 years.\n(c) Aboveground breakout tanks that are constructed or significantly altered according to\nAPI Std 2510 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3) after October 2, 2000, must have\nan overfill protection system installed according to API Std 2510, section 7.1.2. Other\naboveground breakout tanks with 600 gallons (2271 liters) or more of storage capacity\nthat are constructed or significantly altered after October 2, 2000, must have an overfill\nprotection system installed according to API RP 2350 (incorporated by reference, see §\n195.3). However, an operator need not comply with any part of API RP 2350 for a\nparticular breakout tank if the operator describes in the manual required by § 195.402\nwhy compliance with that part is not necessary for safety of the tank.\n(d) After October 2, 2000, the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section for\ninspection and testing of pressure control equipment apply to the inspection and testing of\noverfill protection systems.\nBased on a July 9, 2021 data response, SMP failed to produce records showing that overfill\nprotection devices for all five tanks were tested in 2019. Furthermore, the 2020 data was not\nprovided for the two surge tanks (Little Muddy and Stampede).\n2\n\n\n\n2. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a)…\n(l) What records must an operator keep to demonstrate compliance?\n(1) An operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At a minimum, an\noperator must maintain the following records for review during an inspection:\n(ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications,\njustifications, deviations and determinations made, variances, and actions taken, to\nimplement and evaluate each element of the integrity management program listed in\nparagraph (f) of this section.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity management\nprogram begins with the initial framework. An operator must continually change the\nprogram to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn from results of the integrity\nassessments, and other maintenance and surveillance data, and evaluation of\nconsequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An operator must include, at\nminimum, each of the following elements in its written integrity management program:\n(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high\nconsequence area;\nBased on a July 9, 2021 data response, SMP failed to provide the assumptions used in their water\ntransport analysis covering all the jurisdictional pipelines in the Polar Divide unit. Specifically,\nSMP provided the results, but not the assumptions as required. Also, another July 9, 2021 data\nresponse failed to address whether buffer zones were used and if so, the criteria and assumptions\nset forth for buffer zones application.\n3. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a)…\n(l) What records must an operator keep to demonstrate compliance?\n(1) An operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At a minimum,\nan operator must maintain the following records for review during an\ninspection:\n3\n\n\n\n(ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications,\njustifications, deviations and determinations made, variances, and actions taken, to\nimplement and evaluate each element of the integrity management program listed in\nparagraph (f) of this section.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity management\nprogram begins with the initial framework. An operator must continually change the\nprogram to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn from results of the integrity\nassessments, and other maintenance and surveillance data, and evaluation of\nconsequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An operator must include, at\nminimum, each of the following elements in its written integrity management program:\n(6) Identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high consequence\narea (see paragraph (i) of this section);\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the high\nconsequence area?\n(1) General requirements. An operator must take measures to prevent and mitigate the\nconsequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high consequence area. These\nmeasures include conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline segment to identify additional\nactions to enhance public safety or environmental protection. Such actions may include,\nbut are not limited to, implementing damage prevention best practices, better monitoring\nof cathodic protection where corrosion is a concern, establishing shorter inspection\nintervals, installing EFRDs on the pipeline segment, modifying the systems that monitor\npressure and detect leaks, providing additional training to personnel on response\nprocedures, conducting drills with local emergency responders and adopting other\nmanagement controls.\n(4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator determines that an\nEFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high consequence area in the event of\na hazardous liquid pipeline release, an operator must install the EFRD. In making this\ndetermination, an operator must, at least, consider the following factors—the swiftness of\nleak detection and pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type of commodity carried, the rate\nof potential leakage, the volume that can be released, topography or pipeline profile, the\npotential for ignition, proximity to power sources, location of nearest response personnel,\nspecific terrain between the pipeline segment and the high consequence area, and benefits\nexpected by reducing the spill size.\nBased on the inspection interview, there are no records of EFRD studies on the Polar and Divide\npurchased assets or on the Little Muddy pipeline built by SMP. Specifically, the record of the\nSMP EFRD study on the Polar Divide system is missing. See the SMP data response below:\n4\n\n\n\nSummit purchased the Polar 10” and Divide 8” from Bear Tracker. No EFRD study was\nperformed by Bear Tracker prior to construction of these pipelines. However, Summit\ninstalled remote control valves (RCVs) at Epping station for the Polar 10” at the inlet of\nthe station and at the outlet of the station to Colt Hub. The Divide 8” has a RCV at the\noutlet of Divide station and at the inlet of the DAPL valve yard. Summit built the Little\nMuddy pipeline in three phases in 2014 and 2015. A check valve was not considered\nbecause the line is bi-directional. A remote control valve is located at the inlet of the\nLittle Muddy station. Summit’s control room in Houston operates the RCVs. An EFRD\nanalysis has been performed and implemented by Summit’s Engineering team but an\nofficial document or record of the EFRD study cannot be located.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to\nexceed $225,134 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of\n$2,251,334 for a related series of violations. For violation occurring on or after January\n11, 2021 and before May 3, 2021, the maximum penalty may not exceed $222,504 per\nviolation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,225,034 for a related\nseries of violations. For violation occurring on or after July 31, 2019 and before January\n11, 2021, the maximum penalty may not exceed $218,647 per violation per day the\nviolation persists, up to a maximum of $2,186,465 for a related series of violations. For\nviolation occurring on or after November 27, 2018 and before July 31, 2019, the\nmaximum penalty may not exceed $213,268 per violation per day, with a maximum\npenalty not to exceed $2,132,679. For violation occurring on or after November 2, 2015\nand before November 27, 2018, the maximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per\nviolation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,090,022.\nWe have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents involved in this case,\nand have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment\nproceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the items identified in this letter.\nFailure to do so will result in Summit Midstream Partners, LLC being subject to\nadditional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please\nrefer to CPF 3-2022-005-WL. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this\nenforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any\nportion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C.\n552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of\nthe document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted\nand an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential\ntreatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\n5\n\n\n\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nCC: Mr. Matthew Stratmann, Senior Director, Integrity and Health & Safety, Summit\nMidstream Partners, LLC, 910 Louisiana Street, Suite 4200, Houston, TX 77002,\n(MStratmann@summitmidstream.com)\n6","truncated":false,"body_characters":12138}