{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32022035NOA","title":"NAVAJO NATION OIL AND GAS COMPANY — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2022-03-01","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.446(a), 195.446(b)(5), 195.446(c)(2), 195.446(d), 195.446(d)(1), 195.446(e)(1), 195.446(e)(2), 195.446(e)(6), 195.446(g)(1), 195.446(h), 195.446(h)(6).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022035noa.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022035noa.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022035noa","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32022035NOA","body":"Notice of Amendment involving NAVAJO NATION OIL AND GAS COMPANY. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.446(a),  195.446(b)(5),  195.446(c)(2),  195.446(d),  195.446(d)(1),  195.446(e)(1),  195.446(e)(2),  195.446(e)(6),  195.446(g)(1),  195.446(h),  195.446(h)(6). The case was opened on 2022-03-01 and is reported as closed as of 2023-09-08. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32022035NOA_Closure Letter_09082023_(21-201004).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022035NOA/32022035NOA_Closure%20Letter_09082023_(21-201004).pdf\n\n32022035NOA_Closure Letter_09082023_(21-201004)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022035NOA/32022035NOA_Closure%20Letter_09082023_(21-201004)_text.pdf\n\n32022035NOA_Notice of Amendment_03012022_(21-201004).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022035NOA/32022035NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_03012022_(21-201004).pdf\n\n32022035NOA_Notice of Amendment_03012022_(21-201004)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022035NOA/32022035NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_03012022_(21-201004)_text.pdf\n\n32022035NOA_Operator Response to Notice_05242022_(21-201004).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022035NOA/32022035NOA_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_05242022_(21-201004).pdf\n\n32022035NOA_Notice of Amendment_03012022_(21-201004)_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: jmcclure@nnogc.com and jrobertson@nnogc.com\nMarch 1, 2022\nMr. James McClure, CEO\nNavajo Nation Oil and Gas\nPO Box 4439\nWindow Rock, AZ 86515\nCPF 3-2022-035-NOA\nDear Mr. McClure:\nFrom May 24 to 28, 2021, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected Navajo\nNation Oil and Gas (NNOG Running Horse Pipeline or NNOG-RHPT) procedures for Control\nRoom Management in Montezuma Creek, Utah.\nOn the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the apparent inadequacies found within\nNNOG-RHPT plans or procedures, as described below:\n1. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a controller\nworking in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written\ncontrol room management procedures that implement the requirements of this\nsection. The procedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate\nwith the operator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and responsibiliites\nof a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating conditions. To\nprovide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to operating conditions,\nan operator must define each of the following:\n(5) The roles, responsibiliites and qualifications of other who have the authority to\ndirect or supersede the specific technical actions of controllers.\n\n\n\nNNOG Running Horse Pipelines procedure RHPT-500: Control Room Management Plan\nVersion 3 April 2021 (CRM Plan) was inadequate because it did not provide guidance for the\ncontroller or Control Room Supervisor, who was authorized to direct or supersede the\ntechnical actions of a controller, when the control room supervisor implemented their\nauthority, as required by Section §195.446(b)(5). Section 500-2.2.3, of the CRM Plan, states\n“[T]he Control Room Supervisor has sole authority to direct or supersede specific technical\nactions of a Controller when necessary to protect people, property or environment.” It did\nnot provide conditions where directing or superseding would be considered or warranted,\nhow is it communicated that the action would be taken and how is the action would be\ndocumented.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to provide more structure around the conditions,\ncommunication, and documentation for directing and superseding a controller.\n2. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written control\nroom management procedures that implement the requirements of this section. The\nprocedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate with the\noperator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with the\ninformation, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to carry out\nthe roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each of the\nfollowing:\n(2) Condtuct a point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and related field\nequipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that affect\npipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays;\nNNOG Running Horse Pipeline's CRM Plan was inadequate because it did not provide\ndirections to conduct and document a thorough point-to-point verification. Procedure 500-\n3.2 in the CRM plan was high level and was supported by procedure 507-1. However,\nprocedure 507-1 was not referenced and different forms were referenced to document the\npoint-to-point verification. Section 500-3.2 references Calibration Check Form IC-002 used\nfor annual calibration set point and alarm descriptor verification. The operator presented\nduring inspection Form 500.4, which is referenced in procedure 507-1. Form IC-002, while\nadequate for documenting annual calibrations and changes described in §195.446(e)(3),\ndoes not meet the requirements for new or relocated field equipment verifications described\nin §195.446(c)(2). Form RHPT-500.4 did not provide elements to capture information\nrequired for a thorough point-to-point verification. Form 500-4 does not require verification\nof screens, alarm set point presentations at the right set point and with the correct priority,\ncolor, and description. The form also did not include who performed the verification, if the\ntest failed or encountered problems, and if there was resolution to a successful verification.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to reference the appropriate supporting procedures, the\ncorrect form(s) for the correct process and all information required to be documented for a\nsuccessful test and the compliance record. The amendment also needs to include the forms\nto match the requirements of the procedure.\n\n\n\n3. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written control\nroom management procedures that implement the requirements of this section. The\nprocedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate with the\noperator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following methods to reduce\nthe risk associated with controller fatigue that could inhibit a controller’s ability to\ncarry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined:\n(1) Establish shift lengths and schedule rotations that provide controllers off-duty time\nsufficient to achieve eight hours of continuous sleep;\nNNOG Running Horse Pipeline’s CRM Plan was inadequate because it did not include a\nprocess to track and monitor controllers’ time worked on shift and other to to show that shift\nlengths and schedule rotations are adequate to provide controllers off-duty time sufficient to\nachieve 8 hours of continuous sleep as required by §195.446(d)(1). The operator was only\nreviewing payroll cards to evaluate and approve overtime. They were not evaluating hours\nspent responding to alarm calls or monitoring the system after hours or on weekends. They\nindicated the only work hours considered, after normal hours, were those where the\ncontroller went to the office to respond to a pipeline condition, which was considered\novertime pay.\nThere was no process to look forward or review history to ensure compliance with the\nregulation. Therefore, the procedure needs to be amended to document and review all hours\nworked, on shift and other, to show that shift lengths and schedule rotations are adequate to\nprovide controllers, and those who can control, off-duty time sufficient to achieve 8 hours of\ncontinuous sleep.\n4. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written control\nroom management procedures that implement the requirements of this section. The\nprocedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate with the\noperator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(d)Each operator must implement the following methods to reduce the risk associated\nwith controller fatigue that could inhibit a controller’s ability to carry out the roles ad\nresponsibilities of the operator…\nNNOG Running Horse Pipeline's CRM Plan, procedure 500-4.5.1 was inadequate to review\nthe fatigue program identified in §195.446(d) for effectiveness as required by\n§195.402(c)(13) because processes had not been developed to collect, analyze and review the\ncriterion defined to determine effectiveness. Also, Form RHPT-500.2, referenced in the\nprocedure, was a sleep log and not designed to document the findings to determine\n\n\n\neffectiveness.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to support the review and analysis of the established\ncriteria to determine effectiveness of the fatigue program. The procedure also needs to\nrequire that deficiencies identified from the review must be documented and implemented.\n5. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written control\nroom management procedures that implement the requirements of this section. The\nprocedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate with the\noperator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(e) Alarm Management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(1) Review SCADA safety-related alarm operations using a process that ensures alarms\nare accurate and support safe pipeline operations;\nNNOG Running Horse Pipeline's procedure RHPT-501: Alarm Management Plan, Version\n3 April 2021(AMP), was inadequate in defining safety related points as required in\n§195.446(e)(1) because the operator did not have a process for alarm rationalization which\nwould support identification of safety-related points and associated alarms. Section 501-3.1\nalso stated, “[C]ontrollers and Control Room Supervisor will review all the data points\ncollected by the SCADA system to determine if they are safety-related based on the\npotential consequence for inaction.” There was no procedure to define how this was to be\ndone. It was determined that the SCADA database and system was installed and developed\naround 2008 and not much work to rationalize new alarms has been done post\ncommissioning.\nFail safe points/alarms were identified in section 501-3.1 and safety related points were\nidentified in Table 1 of Section 501-3.1.2 of the AMP. It appeared the points in Table 1 was\na sub-set of the points in Section 501-3.1. Safety-related points are separately listed in\nprocedure 507-1 Point to Point Procedure Version 2 November 2020. There was not a clear\ntie between the points identified in the AMP and procedure 507-1. They appeared to be\nindependently considered.\nThe AMP section 501-3.5 identified priority levels as low, medium, high and urgent, but the\nUCOS SCADA database identified priority levels as 1, 2, 3 with no identified 4. The\nprocedure did not correlate the priority naming conventions. The procedure did not reflect\nthe database and there is no definition of which is more urgent; a 1 or a 3.\nThe procedure also failed to provide how the safety related alarms were to be distinguished\nin the SCADA master database to make them identifiable from other alarms or points to the\ncontrollers.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to include a process for alarm rationalization and how\nthe points and alarms will be identified in the master SCADA database. An outcome of\nalarm rationalization should be criteria to determine safety related points the associated\nsafety related alarms. Since RHPT operates a failsafe system, fail safe alarms should also be\n\n\n\na consideration of the alarm rationalization process.\nAlso, because rationalization should define priority levels for alarm response, the operator\nalso needs to amend the procedure to define alarm priority levels and then the SCADA\ndatabase must match those defined alarm levels. Alarm levels need to include the associated\ncolor and messaging. Additionally, procedures need to address alarm handling\nrequirements to train controllers on their roles and responsibilities when alarms present.\n6. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written control\nroom management procedures that implement the requirements of this section. The\nprocedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate with the\noperator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(e) Alarm Management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(2) Identify at least once each calendar month points affecting safety that have been\ntaken off scan in the SCADA host, have had alarms inhibited, generated false alarms,\nor that have had forced or manual valves for periods of time exceeding that required\nfor associated maintenance or operating activities;\nNNOG Running Horse Pipeline's CRM Plan procedure was inadequate to identify, record,\nreview and analyze, monthly, points affecting safety that have been taken off scan, have had\nalarms inhibited, generated false alarms, or that have had forced or manual values for periods\nof time exceeding that required for associated maintenance or operating activities as required\nby §195.446(e)(2). Section 501-3.2 of the AMP roughly paraphrases the regulation. The\nprocedure did not describe how they would perform the review. It describes documenting\nthe review on form 500.9, which was also identified in 501-3.1.2 Handling Stale Data and\n501-3.7 Off-Scan Points 501-3.1.1 Process for Handling/Reviewing Alarms, all which were\nto be used for the monthly review.\nWhile Roles and Responsibilities in Section 500-2.2.1 (Controllers) and 500-2.2.1\n(Supervisor) states, \"[i]dentifying points that have been taken off-scan, have alarms inhibited,\nhave generated false alarms, or have had manual values,\" there was no further instructions on\nhow to document false alarms, inhibited alarms or manual/forced points identified for\nmonthly review or analysis.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to provide details on how the monthly review analysis\nand documentation of points affecting safety that have been taken off scan, have had alarms\ninhibited, generated false alarms, or that have had forced or manual values for periods of\ntime exceeding that required for associated maintenance or operating activities will be\ncompleted. The procedure also needs to include how the data for review will be collected\nalong with the identification and documentation of false alarms.\n\n\n\n7. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written control\nroom management procedures that implement the requirements of this section. The\nprocedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate with the\noperator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(e) Alarm Management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(6) Address deficiencies identified through the implementation of paragraphs (e)(1)\nthrough (e)(5) of this section.\nNNOG Running Horse Pipeline’s CRM Plan was inadequate because they did not have a\ndurable tracking method to address deficiencies identified in implementing § 195.446(e)(1)\nthrough § 195.446(e)(5) have been resolved, as required by §195.446(e)(6). The operator’s\npractice is to document everything in either the logbook or emails; this makes it difficult to\ntrack issues and the follow-up to verify whether issues are resolved. Their SCADA system is\nmaintained by a third party (UCOS) and changes to SCADA points or alarms require an\nMOC, which was easier to track.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to establish a tracking method to address deficiencies\nidentified through the implementation of § 195.446(e)(1) through § 195.446(e)(5) to verify\nthey have been resolved and provide an audit trail for analysis and compliance.\n8. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written control\nroom management procedures that implement the requirements of this section. The\nprocedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate with the\noperator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(g) Operating experience. Each operator must assure that lessons learned from its\noperating experience are incorporated, as appropriate, into its control room\nmanagement procedures by performing each of the following:\n(1) Review accidents that must be reported pursuant to § 195.50 and 195.52 to\ndetermine if control room actions contirbtued to the event…\nNNOG Running Horse Pipeline’s CRM Plan was inadequate because it failed to identify how\nit evaluates if control room actions contributed to a reportable event as required by\n§195.446(g)(1). The Form RHPT-ADM 6 Accident Investigation Form failed to address\ncontroller fatigue, SCADA configurations. SCADA performance, and control room\nprocedures.\nThe procedures need to be amended to include guidelines to review the required items and\ninclude them in form RHPT-ADM6.\n\n\n\n9. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written control\nroom management procedures that implement the requirements of this section. The\nprocedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate with the\noperator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months...\nNNOG Running Horse Pipeline's CRM Plan was inadequate in defining a process to review\nthe training content to identify potential improvements at least once each calendar year, but\nat intervals not to exceed 15 months, as required by §195.446(h). Rather than providing\nrequirements for the review, procedure 500-8.5 roughly restates the regulation.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to provide a fully developed process to review the\ntraining program content once each calendar year, at intervals not to exceed 15 months.\n10. 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written control\nroom management procedures that implement the requirements of this section. The\nprocedures required by this section must be integrated, as appropriate with the\noperator’s written procedures required by § 195.402…\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator’s program must\nprovide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities defined\nby the operator. In addition, the training program must include…\n(6) Control room team training and exercises that include both controllers and other\nindividuals, defined by the operator, who would reasonably be expected to\noperationally collaborate with controllers (control room personnel) during normal,\nabnormal, or emergency situations…\nNNOG Running Horse Pipeline’s CRM Plan in procedure 500-8.4 was inadequate because it\ndid not address when initial Team Training occurred for new controllers and those who\nwould be reasonably expected to operationally collaborate with controllers, as required by\n§195.446(h)(6). The procedure indicated Team Training was conducted every three years.\nAdditionally, the procedures did not include requirements to include content to be covered\nduring team training sessions. There were no requirements for lessons learned from internal\nand industry events, soft skills, abnormal operations, etc.\n\n\n\nThe procedure needs to be amended to provide when initial Team Training needs to be\nprovided as well as training content.\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as part\nof this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance\nProceedings.\nPlease refer to this document and note the response options. Be advised that all material you submit\nin response to this enforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe\nthat any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C.\n552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document\nwith the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why\nyou believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice\nand authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice\nwithout further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your plans or\nprocedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend your plans\nor procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not contesting this\nNotice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within 30 days of receipt\nof this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good cause. Once the\ninadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended procedures, this enforcement\naction will be closed.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that NNOG – NNOG Running Horse Pipeline maintain\ndocumentation of the safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment\n(preparation/revision of plans, procedures) and submit the total to Gregory A. Ochs, Director,\nCentral Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence\nconcerning this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2022-035-NOA and, for each document you submit,\nplease provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Joseph Robertson, Director of Pipeline Operations jrobertson@nnogc.com\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings\n\n32022035NOA_Closure Letter_09082023_(21-201004)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: drubenking@nnogc.com; jrobertson@nnogc.com\nSeptember 8, 2023\nMr. David Rubenking, Acting CEO\nNavajo Nation Oil and Gas\nPO Box 4439\nWindow Rock, AZ 8651\nRE: CPF 3-2022-035-NOA\nDear Mr. Rubenking:\nFrom May 24 to 28, 2021, a representative from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted an on-\nsite pipeline safety inspection of Navajo Nation Oil and Gas’ (NNOG) procedures in\nFarmington, New Mexico. As a result of the inspection, NNOG was issued a Notice of\nAmendment on March 1, 2022, which proposed amendment of your procedures.\nNNOG submitted its amended procedures on September 7, 2023. My staff reviewed the\namended procedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of Amendment\nhave been corrected.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you\nfor your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Joseph Robertson, Director of Pipeline Operations jrobertson@nnogc.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":26156}