{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32022046NOA","title":"DTM BIRDSBORO PIPELINE, LLC — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2022-05-12","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 192.631(a)(1), 192.631(b), 192.631(b)(5), 192.631(c)(1), 192.631(e)(1), 192.631(e)(6), 192.631(f)(1), 192.631(f)(2), 192.631(h).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022046noa.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022046noa.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022046noa","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32022046NOA","body":"Notice of Amendment involving DTM BIRDSBORO PIPELINE, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.631(a)(1),  192.631(b),  192.631(b)(5),  192.631(c)(1),  192.631(e)(1),  192.631(e)(6),  192.631(f)(1),  192.631(f)(2),  192.631(h). The case was opened on 2022-05-12 and is reported as closed as of 2023-04-19. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32022046NOA_Closure Letter_04192023_(21-201425).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022046NOA/32022046NOA_Closure%20Letter_04192023_(21-201425).pdf\n\n32022046NOA_Closure Letter_04192023_(21-201425)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022046NOA/32022046NOA_Closure%20Letter_04192023_(21-201425)_text.pdf\n\n32022046NOA_Notice of Amendment_05122022_(21-201425).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022046NOA/32022046NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_05122022_(21-201425).pdf\n\n32022046NOA_Notice of Amendment_05122022_(21-201425)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022046NOA/32022046NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_05122022_(21-201425)_text.pdf\n\n32022046NOA_Operator Response to Notice_09132022_(21-201425).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022046NOA/32022046NOA_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_09132022_(21-201425).pdf\n\n32022046NOA_Notice of Amendment_05122022_(21-201425)_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: david.slater@dtmidstream.com;\nphilip.coleman@dtmidstream.com\nMay 12, 2022\nMr. David Slater\nDTE Midstream Appalachia, LLC\nPresident/CEO\n50 Woodward Avenue, Suite 2900\nDetroit, MI 48226\nCPF 3-2022-046-NOA\nDear Mr. Slater:\nFrom August 23 to August 27, 2021, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected\nDTE Midstream Appalachia Birdsboro Pipeline, LLC’s (DTM) procedures for Control Room\nManagement (CRM) procedures and records in Detroit, Michigan.\nOn the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the apparent inadequacies found within\nDTM CRM plans or procedures, as described below:\n1. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) General.\n(1) This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a controller\nworking in a control room who monitors and controls all of part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written\ncontrol room management procedures that implement the requirements of this\nsection, except that for each control room where an operator’s activities are limited\nto either or both of: . . . .\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following: . . . .\n\n\n\nDTM procedures were inadequate to define the limit of a controller’s roles and responsibilities in\nthe operation of systems presented on the various consoles. The procedures defined console\nasset and facility assignments. However, when a controller logged in to SCADA he had access\nto all control room console assets, in addition to the one he is assigned to work. The Principal or\nSenior Controller has access to view all alarms and monitor all systems. While the controllers\n\"understood\" they are to only operate the systems on their assigned console, either language\nneeds to be added to disallow controllers from operating or responding to alarms on another\nconsole, or the SCADA system needs to be set up to disallow access beyond the assigned\ncontroller console.\n2. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) General.\n(1) This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a controller\nworking in a control room who monitors and controls all of part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written\ncontrol room management procedures that implement the requirements of this\nsection, except that for each control room where an operator’s activities are limited\nto either or both of: . . . .\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:\n(1) . . . .\n(5) The roles, responsibilities and qualifications of others with the authority to direct\nof supersede the specific technical actions of a controller.\nDTM’s procedure GCCRM-305 Rev 1.4 5/6/2021 and CRM Plan July 19, 2021 Version 3.2 was\ninadequate because it stated “No individual has the authority to supersede the Senior/Principle\nGas controller on shift. The Gas Controller who has worked the longest as a Senior or higher in\nDTM’s Gas Control has ultimate authority.” The procedure was silent on the controllers who are\nnot senior or principle levels. It does not address whether anyone can supersede them. Nor does\nthe procedure address whether the Senior/Principle Controller can supersede the lower level\ncontrollers. There is no indication that consideration has been given to who can supersede or\ndirect the controller. The operator indicated that the procedure assumes the senior can supersede\nor direct the controller.\nAdditionally, the procedure left the assumption that the senior/principle controller is qualified.\nThe procedure did not include the events that would lead or require superseding a controller or\nhow that would be documented.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to clearly define who can supersede the specific technical\nactions of all controllers, their qualifications, conditions under which these actions can occur,\nand how the events will be documented.\n2\n\n\n\n3. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) General.\n(1) This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a controller\nworking in a control room who monitors and controls all of part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written\ncontrol room management procedures that implement the requirements of this\nsection, except that for each control room where an operator’s activities are limited\nto either or both of: . . . .\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with\nthe information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to\ncarry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each\nof the following:\n(1) Implement sections 1, 4, 8, 9, 11.1, 11.3 of API RP 1165 (incorporated by\nreference, see §192.7) whenever a SCADA system is added, expanded or replaced,\nunless the operator demonstrates that certain provisions of sections 1, 4, 8, 9, 11.1\nand 11.3 of API RP 1165 are not practical for the SCADA system used.\nDTM’s CRM Plan Section 402 was not adequate because it did not define addition, expansion,\nor replacement of a SCADA system that would require implementing the required sections of\nAPI RP 1165 in § 192.631(c)(1). The language of this section restated the regulation. Three\nexamples provided were : upgrade to a different operating system that affects display parameters,\nreplace/addition of workstations that effect display parameters, new drawing tool for displays\nthat affect display parameters. When DTM acquired AGS/SGG they employed a different\nSCADA system. DTM chose to design the new screens for the acquired assets and add them to\ntheir SCADA system rather than bring the different SCADA system and screens into their\ncontrol room. Their examples did not cover this type of event nor others that have nothing to do\nwith display parameters.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to include definitions of add, expand and replace in addition\nto examples of these events.\n4. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) General.\n(1) This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all of part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section, except that for each control room where an operator’s activities are\nlimited to either or both of: . . . .\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(1) Review SCADA safety-related alarm operation s using a process that ensures\nalarms are accurate and support safe pipeline operations;\n3\n\n\n\nDTM’s procedures were inadequate because they did not have a specific process to define when\nand how to identify and correct inaccurate or malfunctioning alarms. In practice they utilized the\nDefect Log to track SCADA related alarm issues once identified. The Training Plan section\n1600 described that this log should be used, however, there are no other instructions or\nprocedures on how to manage the content of the log. The log had an indicator for whether the\nissue was resolved or not. There were several entries that did not indicate they were\nresolved. Due to the observed unresolved issues, the operator was asked if they periodically\nreview the outstanding issues. The operator answered they “do not look at this as often as they\nshould.\n” It was unclear if there was a connection back to Birdsboro Pipeline to track the\n\"tickets\" created from the control room to their maintenance group. DTM’s control room, in\npractice, is using the Defect Log. Birdsboro and DTM’s field maintenance groups may use JIRA\nand Gensuite, respectively, for field tracking.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to include a process to handle inaccurate and malfunctioning\nalarms, as well as other deficiencies, to make sure they are identified and corrected. The\nprocedure needs to include the logging requirement, as well as any connection to the field\nmaintenance work ticket process and follow-up reviews to ensure issues and deficiencies are\nidentified corrected as quickly as possible.\n5. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all of part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section, except that for each control room where an operator’s activities are\nlimited to either or both of:….\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(1) Review SCADA safety-related alarm operation using a process that ensures\nalarms are accurate and support safe pipeline operations;\nDTM’s procedures were inadequate because, while they stated in the Roles and Responsibilities\nsection, to what degree controllers could change alarm limits or set points, inhibit alarms, or take\npoints off-scan, the procedure did not include how a controller would suggest, submit or request\nchanges if they thought it was necessary to ensure alarms are accurate and support safe pipeline\noperations, as well as managing the changes to pipeline alarm configurations.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to include a method of requesting and documenting change\nrequests to alarm configurations outside those changes authorized by procedure.\n6. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) General.\n(1) This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all of part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\n4\n\n\n\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section, except that for each control room where an operator’s activities are\nlimited to either or both of: ….\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(1) . . . .\n(6) Address deficiencies identified through the implementation of paragraphs (e)(1)\nthrough (e)(5) of this section.\nDTM’s CRM Plan was inadequate because there was no process for management review of the\nAlarm Response Log which documents various alarm deficiencies to verify remediation in a\ntimely manner.\nSection 603 of the CRM plan stated,\n“[A]larms classified as safety related shall be reviewed for\nstale or unreliable indication to Gas Control and an action plan for remediation to be created\nimmediately upon discovery.” TP-1 Section 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 2.0 and 3.0 related to actions required\nfor various types of Loss of Communication. Section 603 does not reference TP-1 to tie stale\nand inaccurate alarms to loss of communication action. It is not clear if the “action plan for\nremediation” is defined by TP-1.\nTP-1 requires the controller to document in the Alarm Response Log several types of alarms that\nmay be encountered. The Training Plan, in section 2c, included a requirement for discussion of\nthe Alarm Response Log. However, there was no process for management review of the Alarm\nResponse Log information to review the status for repair or remediation, frequency or length of\ntime for repairs.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to include how the Alarm Response Log, or other methods,\nsupports the action plan for remediation of alarms reported to the Log. It must also include roles\nand responsibilities to define who is responsible to review the logs on a periodic basis to ensure\nremediation is scheduled and completed. The procedure also needs to include the name of the\nperson responsible to document the completion of a remediation task. This process also needs to\nbe included in the training program.\n7. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) General.\n(1) This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a controller\nworking in a control room who monitors and controls all of part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written\ncontrol room management procedures that implement the requirements of this\nsection, except that for each control room where an operator’s activities are limited\nto either or both of: . . . .\n(f) Change management. Each operator must assure that changes that could affect\ncontrol room operations are coordinated with the control room personnel by\nperforming each of the following:\n5\n\n\n\n(1) Establish communications between control room representatives, operator’s\nmanagement, and associated field personnel when planning and implementing\nphysical changes to pipeline equipment or configurations.\nDTM’s procedures were inadequate to ensure changes in field equipment that could affect\ncontrol room operations are coordinated with the control room personnel. Procedure BG-ENG-\nSO33F SWI Management for Change Request Instructions and Form did not include\nrequirements to consider whether the change affected control room operations. The Control\nCenter was not a choice in the list of affected groups.\nDTM’s Management Change Procedure needs to be modified to include consideration of the\ncontrol room when changes are proposed.\n8. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) General.\n(1) This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a controller\nworking in a control room who monitors and controls all of part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system Each operator must have and follow written\ncontrol room management procedures that implement the requirements of this\nsection, except that for each control room where an operator’s activities are limited\nto either or both of: ….\n(f) Change management. Each operator must assure that changes that could affect\ncontrol room operations are coordinated with the control room personnel by\nperforming each of the following:\n(1) ….\n(2) Require its field personnel to contact the control room when emergency\nconditions exist and when making field changes that affect control room operations;\nDTM’s Field Procedures were inadequate because Procedure 739 Pressure Control Inspection\ndid not indicate to call Gas Control prior to starting work. Other procedures did include\nrequirements to call the control room: Procedure 745 Valve Inspection, Procedure 739 OPP\nMaintenance, the ESD procedure, and Fire Alarm and Gas Atmosphere procedures.\nDTM needs to amend all field maintenance procedures, and any other procedures (measurement,\nSCADA, etc.), to include requirements to call the control room prior to start of work.\n9. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) General.\n(1) This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a controller\nworking in a control room who monitors and controls all of part of a pipeline\nfacility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow written\ncontrol room management procedures that implement the requirements of this\nsection, except that for each control room where an operator’s activities are limited\nto either or both of: . . . .\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and\nreview the training program content to identify potential improvements at least\n6\n\n\n\nonce each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator’s\nprogram must provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and\nresponsibilities define by the operator . . . .\nDTM’s training program was not adequate to provide a structure approach to train each\ncontroller to carry out the roles and responsibilities define by the operator.\nDTM’s training program identified the training content in section 200, which included computer-\nbased courses, field visits, classroom training, reading lists, tabletop exercises, and on the job\ntraining (OJT) of control. The controller was provided an on-boarding packet that included the\nRequired Reading Checklist and the Discussion Checklist. The Reading Checklist required a\nsign off when complete, and the Discussion Checklist is a combination of interrogatories related\nto system operations and procedures and task completions such as remotely open/close\nvalve. Both must be completed for the controller to be considered ready for the next phase of\ntraining. This second phase of training focused on operating and monitoring the pipeline systems\nthrough a SCADA console and took approximately one year, at which point the trainee was\neligible to take the OQ test.\nWhat was missing from the training plan was a structured approach to training on the consoles.\nThere was no plan for the controller to learn each unique system in a structured approach. For\nexample, keeping a controller on one console until competency was achieved and then moving\nto the next. The controller was put into the operating mix with a 1:2 span of control mentoring\nand only a large operating document to reference some system operations related to alarm\nhandling and select operations. The controller shift rotation rotated the controller through the\nvarious consoles. He may spend only two days on a console, then off two days then three days on\nanother console. This training method leaves interpretation of how to develop critical knowledge\nof each system up to the controller.\nOnce the controller completed an 8-week training/orientation program they were assessed by the\nDiscussion Checklist. Successful completion of this assessment moves the unqualified controller\ntrainee into the shift rotation to operate one of the four consoles. There were no “how to” guides,\nalarm handling guidelines or operating procedures to support the controller training how to\nperform their roles and responsibilities under normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions. The\ncontroller training was unstructured OJT. One point of concern was that the operator did not\nhave procedures for starting and stopping compressor stations remotely. It was shared that some\ncompressor stations are manned and require the control room to start and stop compressors\nthrough direction to field employees. Other stations were capable of remote start and stop.\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605 (a)(7) requires operators to have written procedures for “[S]tarting,\noperating, and shutting down compressor units.” The operator did not develop procedures to\naddress compressors. While for the local start and shut down stations it could be argued that the\nlocal field personnel have those procedures, the same argument cannot be made for the remote\noperated compressor stations. Adequate procedures would consider the different configurations\nof stations, types of compressors, and operating conditions to support the controller’s roles and\nresponsibilities when starting and stopping those facilities.\nThe procedures did not provide guidance for alarm handling that could be used as a training\nreference for controllers’ consistent safe response to alarms. Instruction for this activity was\ndelivered orally by the qualified controller trainer.\n7\n\n\n\nThe training plan Required Reading Checklist did not include DTM/Birdsboro Pipeline\nEmergency Plan which is different from DTM’s emergency plan.\nDuring the inspection, the operator shared a PowerPoint that reviewed storage summer mode\noperations and various winter settings, including max withdrawal. There was nothing in the\ntraining to help the controller refer to this information; controllers relied on Senior Controllers to\nprovide this information.\nThe procedure must be amended to provide a structured training plan for each console operating\nsystem(s), as well as assessments for the controller on each console. Procedures must be\ndeveloped and controllers trained, that address compressor start up, operation, and shut down for\nboth manual starts/stops and remote starts/stop. Procedures also need to be developed to provide\nthe controller training and guidance in alarm handling, especially considering that safety-related\nalarms can present as different priorities.\nThe operator indicated they were in the process of developing tests or assessments for each\nconsole to support evaluating the controller’s progress. A procedure was also developed to\naddress alarm handling.\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as\npart of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings.\nPlease refer to this document and note the response options. Be advised that all material you\nsubmit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you\nbelieve that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5\nU.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of\nthe document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an\nexplanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment\nunder 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in\nthis Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your\nplans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend\nyour plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not\ncontesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within\n30 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good\ncause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended\nprocedures, this enforcement action will be closed.\nIt is requested that DTM maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated\nwith fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision of plans, procedures) and submit\nthe total to Gregory A. Ochs, Director, Central Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration. In correspondence concerning this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2022-046-NOA\nand, for each document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever\npossible.\n8\n\n\n\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Philip Coleman, Director Codes & Regulatory philip.coleman@dtmidstream.com\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings\n9\n\n32022046NOA_Closure Letter_04192023_(21-201425)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: david.slater@dtmidstream.com/\nphilip.coleman@dtmidstream.com\nApril 19, 2023\nMr. David Slater\nDTE Midstream Appalacia, LLC\nPresident/CEO\nDetroit, MI 48226\nRE: CPF 3-2022-046-NOA\nDear Mr. Slater:\nFrom August 23 to August 27, 2021, a representative from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted\nan on-site pipeline safety inspection of DTE Midstream Appalachia, LLC (DTM Birdsboro\nPipeline, LLC)(DTE/DTM) procedures in Detroit, Michigan. As a result of the inspection,\nDTE/DTM was issued a Notice of Amendment on May 12, 2022, which identified inadequacies\nand requested amendment of your procedures.\nDTM Birdsboro Pipeline, LLC submitted its amended procedures on April 11, 2023. My staff\nreviewed the amended procedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of\nAmendment have been corrected.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you\nfor your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Philip Coleman, Director Codes and Regulatory philip.coleman@dtmidstream.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":26353}