{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32022074CAO","title":"TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2022-12-08","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022074cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022074cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022074cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32022074CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2022-12-08 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32022074CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_03072023_(22-261792).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022074CAO/32022074CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(Amended)_03072023_(22-261792).pdf\n\n32022074CAO_Corrective Action Order_12082022_(22-261792).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022074CAO/32022074CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_12082022_(22-261792).pdf\n\n32022074CAO_Corrective Action Order_12082022_(22-261792)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022074CAO/32022074CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_12082022_(22-261792)_text.pdf\n\n32022074CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_03072023_(22-261792).pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nMarch 7, 2023\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: richard_prior@tcenergy.com\nRichard Prior\nTC Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc.\n700 Louisiana Suite 700\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 3-2022-074-CAO\nDear Mr. Prior,\nEnclosed please find an Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO or Amended Order) issued\nby the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), in the above-referenced case. It requires TC Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc., to take\ncertain additional corrective actions with respect to the pipeline failure that occurred on\nDecember 7, 2022, on the 36-inch Keystone pipeline three miles east of Washington, Kansas.\nService of the ACAO by electronic mail is effective upon the date of transmission and\nacknowledgment of receipt as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of\nthis Amended Order are effective upon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nALAN KRAMER\nMAYBERRY\nDigitally signed by ALAN\nKRAMER MAYBERRY\nDate: 2023.03.07\n09:16:39 -05'00'\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: ACAO\ncc: Mr. Gregory Ochs, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nTC Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc., ) CPF No. 3-2022-074-CAO\n)\nRespondent. )\n)\n____________________________________)\nAMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO or Amended Order) is being issued by the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, to require TC Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc. (TC\nOil or Respondent), to take necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from potential hazards associated with the December 7, 2022 crude oil pipeline\nfailure that occurred on the 36-inch Keystone pipeline, approximately three miles east of\nWashington, Kansas (Failure).\nThe Keystone pipeline is a 2,687-mile hazardous liquid pipeline system between Hardisty,\nAlberta, Canada, and Patoka, Illinois, and Port Arthur, Texas.1 The 1,025 miles of TC Oil’s 30-\ninch diameter mainline pipe was Phase 1 of the Keystone pipeline. It spans from the US-\nCanadian border at Cavalier County, North Dakota, traverses the states of South Dakota,\nNebraska, Kansas, and Missouri to Wood River, Illinois. The 36-inch diameter Cushing\nExtension was Phase 2 of the Keystone pipeline. The Cushing Extension begins in Steele City,\nNebraska and goes to Cushing, Oklahoma, and is approximately 291 miles long. The maximum\noperating pressure (MOP) of both pipelines is 1,440 pounds per square inch gauge (psig), and\nthey operate under special permit PHMSA-2006-26617.\nAt approximately 09:01 PM CST, a leak detection alarm (volume imbalance) was received\nindicating a potential loss of commodity from the pipeline. An Emergency-Line Trip alarm was\nreceived 6-minutes later. The pipeline was subsequently shut down and isolation valves were\ncommanded closed at 09:08 PM CST. The location of the Failure is Cushing Extension, Mile\nPoint (MP) 14. The segment of the pipeline containing the Failure spans from Steele City pump\nstation (MP 0.0) to Hope pump station (MP 95.7, approximately). Upon receiving the leak\n1 See Overview, TC ENERGY, https://www.tcenergy.com/operations/oil-and-liquids/keystone-pipeline-system/ (last\naccessed March 6, 2023)\n\n\n\nalarms, TC Oil personnel were dispatched and identified a crude oil odor north of U.S. Highway\n36. The Failure location was subsequently confirmed to be approximately two miles north of the\nhighway crossing. Crude oil from the pipeline impacted Mill Creek, at approximate coordinates\nof 39-degrees, 50-minutes, 33-seconds, and -96-degrees, 59-minutes, 44-seconds.2\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA initiated an investigation of the Failure. investigation of the Failure is ongoing.\nPHMSA’s\nOn December 8, 2022, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO). As a result of the\ncontinued investigation and additional information received, PHMSA is issuing this ACAO to\nprescribe additional corrective actions to the Affected Segment, Keystone Pipeline Phase 1, and\nKeystone Pipeline Phase 2, as defined below. This ACAO amends and supplements the\npreliminary findings and the corrective actions prescribed in the CAO. The preliminary findings\nof the Agency’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\nPreliminary Findings\nSpecial Permit\n PHMSA issued a special permit, PHMSA-2006-26617, to TC Oil for construction and\noperation of Keystone pipeline Phase 1 and Phase 2 (the Cushing Extension) on April 30,\n2007, to allow the pipeline to be operated at a stress level of 80 percent of the steel pipe’s\nspecified minimum yield strength (SMYS). Without a special permit, operating pressure\nfor the hazardous liquid pipeline would be no greater than 72 percent of SMYS.3 The\nspecial permit contained 51 conditions and was designed to provide for a level of safety\nequal to, or greater than, the applicable regulations by requiring TC Oil to more closely\ninspect and monitor the pipeline over its operational life than similar pipelines installed\nwithout a special permit.\nDecember 2022 Accident\n On December 7, 2022, at approximately 09:01 PM CST, a leak detection alarm (volume\nimbalance) was received. An Emergency-Line Trip alarm was received 6-minutes later.\n The pipeline was shut down and isolation valves were commanded closed at 09:08 PM\nCST.\n Upon receiving notification of the Failure, TC Oil personnel were dispatched and\nidentified a crude oil odor north of U.S. Highway 36. The Failure location was\nsubsequently confirmed approximately two miles north of the highway crossing.\n The location of the Failure is Cushing Extension, MP 14. The pipeline segment\ncontaining the Failure spans from Steele City pump station (MP 0.0) to Hope pump\nstation (MP 95.7, approximately).\n2 The actual reported spill volume is 12,937 barrels.\n3 See 49 C.F.R. § 195.106.\n\n\n\n Crude oil from the pipeline impacted Mill Creek crossing, at approximate coordinates of\n39-degrees, 50-minutes, 33-seconds, and -96-degrees, 59-minutes, 44-seconds.\n The initial estimated spill volume was approximately 14,000 barrels of crude oil. The\nactual reported spill volume is 12,937 barrels of crude oil.\n Per TC Oil, the source of the December 7, 2022 rupture near Washington, Kansas was a\nfailed girth weld. Based on observations by PHMSA investigators, the failed weld was a\ntransition weld that joined the 36-inch diameter pipe to a thicker wall thickness butt-\nwelded fitting.\n The established MOP of the 36-inch Phase 2 pipeline at the point of failure on December\n7, 2022, was 1,440 psi. At the time of the rupture, the actual operating pressure at the\npoint of failure was 1,153 psig.\n PHMSA understands TC Energy was monitoring this failure location for geohazards and\nland movement prior to the failure. TC Energy was required to implement a\nmonitoring/mitigation plan to monitor for and mitigate issues of unstable soil and ground\nmovement as part of Condition 41 of the special permit, PHMSA-2006-26617.\n Onsite personnel observed the failed segment move vertically as overburden was\nremoved, indicating the pipeline was under improper loading and stress. It is not clear\nwhether the pipe segment has been under stress since construction or if land movement in\nthe area may have more recently induced or increased stress.\n The investigation is on-going, and information could change. This ACAO may be\namended based on further findings during the investigation.\n Following receipt of the CAO issued December 8, 2022, TC Oil completed and submitted\nthe results of prior in-line inspection (ILI) reviews as required by the CAO. TC Oil has\ncompleted the mechanical and metallurgical testing required by the CAO. TC Oil has\nensured that the testing laboratory distributed all reports, whether draft or final, in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they were made available to TC Oil. The final\nreport was received on February 7, 2023.\nKeystone Pipeline Phases 1 and 2\n The 1,025 miles of TC Oil’s 30-inch diameter mainline pipe was Phase 1 of the Keystone\npipeline. Construction of Phase 1 was completed in June 2010. Phase 1 spans from the\nUS-Canadian border at Cavalier County, North Dakota, traverses the states of South\nDakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri to Wood River, Illinois.\n The approximately 291 miles of TC Oil’s 36-inch diameter Cushing Extension was Phase\n2 of the Keystone pipeline. Construction of Phase 2 was completed in February 2011.\nPhase 2 begins in Steele City, Nebraska and goes to Cushing, Oklahoma.\n\n\n\n Multiple wall thicknesses of pipe were used in the construction of Keystone pipeline\nPhase 1 and Phase 2. For the 30-inch diameter Phase 1 pipeline, pipe wall thickness\nincludes, but is not limited to: 0.386-inch, 0.437-inch, 0.515-inch, and 0.622-inch. For\nthe 36-inch diameter pipeline used in Phase 2 (the Cushing Extension), pipe wall\nthickness includes, but is not limited to: 0.465-inch, 0.512-inch, 0.572-inch, and 0.615-\ninch.\n The section of the Phase 2 pipeline subject to the December 7, 2022 Failure was on the\n36-inch diameter, 0.465-inch wall thickness, Grade X-70 pipe manufactured by Evraz.\nThe MOP was 1,440 psig. The most recent failure had a wall thickness transition from\n0.515 inch pipe to approximately 0.80 inch elbow fitting (30 degree).\n Keystone pipeline traverses several high consequence areas (HCAs) and navigable rivers.\nBoth Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Keystone pipeline, including the Cushing Extension,\ntraverse could affect HCAs. According to the 2021 Annual Report submitted by TC Oil,\nthe following number of miles on Phase 1 and Phase 2, combined, that could affect HCAs\nwas reported as: Illinois – 22.52 miles, Kansas – 65.29 miles, Missouri – 46.7 miles,\nNebraska – 100.17 miles, North Dakota – 14.3 miles, Oklahoma – 42.73 miles, and South\nDakota – 14.11 miles.\nAdditional Accidents\n Since 2009, the Keystone pipeline has experienced three failures on girth welds and\nadditional non-girth weld related accidents.\n On September 21, 2009, the 30-inch Phase 1 Keystone pipeline in Kingsbury County,\nSouth Dakota, leaked during hydrostatic testing. The source of the leak was determined\nto be a girth weld joining 0.386-inch w.t. (wall thickness) pipe and a 0.515-inch w.t. pipe.\nButt welds joining unequal thickness of material (e.g., pipe, fittings, and other\nappurtenances) may also be known as “transition welds.”\n On May 7, 2011, a reportable, non-girth weld related accident occurred on pump station\npiping on Phase 1 Keystone crude oil pipeline at the Ludden Pump Station. On May 29,\n2011, a second reportable failure incident occurred on piping at the Severance Pump\nStation also in Phase 1. On June 3, 2011, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order\n(CAO) requiring Respondent to take corrective actions (CPF No. 3-2011-5006H). On\nJune 13, 2011, Respondent submitted a response to this CAO requesting a hearing.\nFollowing informal discussions between Respondent and PHMSA, based on the most up-\nto-date information, PHMSA agreed to make minor changes and clarifications to the\noriginal CAO in an Amended CAO issued June 28, 2011. The Amended CAO was\nclosed on January 13, 2015, after TC Oil had completed all the required corrective\nactions.\n On April 2, 2016, a reportable accident due to a leak in a cracked tie-in weld occurred on\nthe Phase 1 Keystone pipeline on the 48.1-mile segment between Freeman (Pump Station\n23) and Hartington (Pump Station 24). Per the “Accident Report – Hazardous Liquid\nPipeline Systems, Form PHMSA F 7000-1” submitted by TC Oil, approximately 20,400\n\n\n\ntons of solid materials were removed from the spill site, and 1,170 tons of liquid wastes\nwere disposed. On April 9, 2016, PHMSA issued a CAO requiring Respondent to take\ncorrective actions (CPF No. 3-2016-5002H). The CAO was closed on March 30, 2017,\nafter TC Oil had completed all the required corrective actions.\n On November 16, 2017, an incident occurred on Phase 1, due to a fracture that initiated at\nan area of previous mechanical damage, resulting in crude oil release. On November 28,\n2017, PHMSA issued a CAO (CPF No. 3-2017-5008H) to TC Oil addressing this\nincident to require Respondent to take corrective actions. This CAO was closed on\nJanuary 29, 2019, after Respondent completed all the required corrective actions.\n On October 30, 2019, a reportable non-girth weld accident occurred on the 41.9-mile\nPhase 1 Keystone pipeline segment that runs between the Edinburg Pump Station and the\nNiagara Pump Station, near Niagara, North Dakota. This failure exhibited characteristics\nof fatigue from pressure cycles. On November 5, 2019, PHMSA issued a CAO requiring\nRespondent to take corrective action (CPF No. 3-2019-5023H). The CAO was closed on\nFebruary 3, 2022, after TC Oil had completed all the required corrective actions.\n On October 14, 2022, PHMSA issued a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (CPF No. 3-2022-025-NOPV) following a\nspecial inspection of TC Oil’s Lucas delivery facility in Beaumont, Texas following a\ncrude oil spill that occurred on the Keystone Gulf Coast system on May 7, 2020. The\nproceeding remains open at this time.\n The spills of 2011, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, and 2022 which resulted in reported releases\nof 400, 400, 6,592, 4,515, 442, 12,937 barrels of crude oil, respectively, show a tendency\nor pattern in recent years of increasingly frequent incidents resulting in larger releases.\nRegulations and Advisory Bulletins\n Per 49 C.F.R. §195.106, the anticipated external loads and external pressures that are\nconcurrent with internal pressure must be considered in the pipe design. After\ndetermining the internal design pressure, the nominal wall thickness of pipe must be\nincreased as necessary to compensate for these concurrent loads and pressures. Different\nwall thickness of pipe can be necessary in various locations along a pipeline depending\non operating pressure and external loadings, such as: road crossings, water crossings,\nrailroad crossings, above ground piping, etc.\n On March 24, 2010, PHMSA published an advisory bulletin, ADB 2010-03, “Girth Weld\nQuality Issues Due to Improper Transitioning, Misalignment, and Welding Practices of\nLarge Diameter Line Pipe.”4 The advisory bulletin notified pipeline operators of large\ndiameter natural gas pipeline and hazardous liquid pipeline systems of the potential for\ngirth weld failures. The advisory bulletin also described how issues with girth weld\nquality may cause in-service leaks and ruptures at pressures well below 72 percent\nSMYS. It described that metallurgical testing results of failed girth welds in pipe wall\n4 75 Fed. Reg. 14,243 (March 24, 2010).\n\n\n\nthickness transitions found pipe segments with line pipe weld misalignment, improper\nbevel and wall thickness transitions, and other improper welding practices that occurred\nduring construction. A number of the failures were located in pipeline segments with\nconcentrated external loading due to support and backfill issues.\n On June 2, 2022, PHMSA published an advisory bulletin, ADB 2022-0063, “Potential for\nDamage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological\nHazards.”5 The advisory bulletin reminds owners and operators of gas and hazardous\nliquid pipelines of the potential for damage to those pipeline facilities caused by earth\nmovement in variable, steep, and rugged terrain and terrain with varied or changing\nsubsurface geological conditions. The advisory bulletin noted that geohazards, including\nland movement, can pose a threat to the integrity of pipeline facilities if those threats are\nnot identified and mitigated.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the hazardous liquid pipeline facility is located to environmentally\nsensitive areas; (5) the population density and population and growth patterns of the area in\nwhich the pipeline facility is located; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation\nSafety Board made under another law; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as\nappropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the\ncharacteristics of the pipeline, including the prior and most current failures of the pipeline; the\nhazardous nature of the material (crude oil) transported; the existing and potential additional\nimpacts to property, the environment, and wildlife; the indications that TC Oil’s operating,\nmaintenance, and/or integrity management programs may be inadequate to address the\nrepetitious pattern of failures related to the original design, manufacture, and construction of\nKeystone pipeline Phase 1 and Phase 2; the tendency of flaws to grow from operating pressure\ncycles; the tendency or pattern of girth weld failures in large diameter pipelines on the Keystone\npipeline; the occurrence of girth weld in-service leaks and ruptures at pressures below 72 percent\nSMYS, suggesting issues with girth weld quality; the increasing severity of spills in recent years;\n5 87 Fed. Reg. 33,576 (June 2, 2022).\n\n\n\nthe possibility of future failures caused by a combination of factors similar to those involved in\nthe 2022 and prior failures, including transition welds and the potential for earth movement; and\nthe possibility that the same condition(s) that may have caused the Failure remain present and\ncould lead to additional failures in Keystone pipeline Phase 1 and Phase 2; I find that continued\noperation of the Affected Segment, Keystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2, as\ndefined below, without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the\nenvironment, and that failure to issue this Amended Order expeditiously would result in the\nlikelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Amended Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Amended\nOrder are effective upon completion of service.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Amended Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held\nas soon as practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing,\nwith a copy to the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be\nheld in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nDefinitions\nAffected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means the approximately 96 miles of TC Oil’s\nKeystone pipeline, which is a part of Keystone Pipeline Phase 2, that contains the 36-inch\ndiameter pipe from Steele City pump station (MP 0.0) to Hope pump station (MP 95.7,\napproximately), which was subject to the December 7, 2022 Failure. The Affected Segment\ntraverses the following counties: Jefferson County, Nebraska, Washington County, Kansas, Clay\nCounty, Kansas, and Dickinson County, Kansas.\nKeystone Pipeline Phase 1 – “Keystone Pipeline Phase 1” means the approximately 1,025 miles\nof TC Oil’s Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 that contains the 30-inch diameter mainline pipe from the\nUS-Canadian border at Cavalier Country, North Dakota, traverses the states of South Dakota,\nNebraska, Kansas, and Missouri to Wood River, Illinois and Patoka, Illinois.\nKeystone Pipeline Phase 2 –\n“Keystone Pipeline Phase 2” means the approximately 291 miles of\nTC Oil’s Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 that contains the 36-inch diameter pipe from Steele City,\nNebraska through Kansas to Cushing, Oklahoma.\nDirector – The “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, I hereby order TC Oil to take the following corrective actions:\n\n\n\n1. Operating Pressure Restriction.\na. TC Oil must continue to reduce the operating pressure along the length of\ntheAffected Segment to the previously agreed upon 923 psig limit. This pressure\nrestriction is to remain in effect until Items 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 have been completed as\nspecified below. Following completion of the aforementioned Items and upon\nreceipt of written approval by the Director, TC Oil may increase the operating\npressure along the Affected Segment to no more than 72 percent SMYS.\nb. TC Oil must reduce and maintain pressure reduction in the actual operating\npressure along the remainder of Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 such that the operating\npressure will not exceed 72 percent SMYS, consistent with 49 C.F.R. § 195.406.\nThis pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from\nthe Director.\ni. Within seven days of receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must provide the\nDirector the planned pressure set-points at all pump stations and facilities\nnecessary to limit the operation of Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 to 72\npercent SMYS.\nii. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm\nlimits, software programming set-points or control points, and mechanical\nover-pressure devices to be adjusted accordingly.\niii. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, TC Oil must take\ninto account any ILI) features or anomalies present in Keystone Pipeline\nPhase 2 to provide for continued safe operation as required by 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.401 and the anomaly evaluation and repair requirements of special\npermit PHMSA-2006-26617.\niv. Adequate controls and protective equipment must be in place to maintain\npressure within the limit required by 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b) during\nsurges and other variations from normal operations.\nv. Within 30 days of receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must provide the Director\ndocumentation that all set-points to maintain a maximum operating\npressure of 72 percent SMYS for Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 have been\nimplemented, including any necessary updates or changes to controls and\nprotective equipment.\nvi. TC Oil must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the\noperating pressure data, taking into account any ILI features or anomalies\npresent in Keystone Phase 2. TC Oil must immediately reduce the\noperating pressure further to maintain the safe operations of Keystone\nPhase 2, if warranted by the monthly review. Further, TC Oil must\nsubmit the results of the monthly review to the Director including, at a\n\n\n\nminimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional\npressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points.\nSubmittals may be made quarterly, in accordance with Item 13 below.\nc. TC Oil must reduce and maintain pressure reduction in the actual operating\npressure along the entire length of Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 such that the\noperating pressure along its entire length will not exceed 72 percent of SMYS,\nconsistent with 49 C.F.R. § 195.406. This pressure restriction on Keystone Pipeline\nPhase 1 is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the pressure above\n72 percent SMYS is obtained from the Director.\ni. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. 2. Within seven days of receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must provide the\nDirector the planned pressure set-points at all pump stations and facilities\nnecessary to limit the operation of Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 to 72\npercent SMYS.\nThis pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm\nlimits, software programming set-points or control points, and mechanical\nover-pressure devices to be adjusted accordingly.\nWhen determining the pressure restriction set-points, TC Oil must take\ninto account any ILI features or anomalies present in Keystone Pipeline\nPhase 1 to provide for continued safe operation as required by 49 C.F.R. §\n195.401 and the anomaly evaluation and repair requirements of special\npermit PHMSA-2006-26617.\nAdequate controls and protective equipment must be in place to maintain\npressure within the limit required by 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b) during surges\nand other variations from normal operations.\nWithin 30 days of receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must provide the Director\ndocumentation that all set-points to maintain a maximum operating\npressure of 72 percent SMYS for Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 have been\nimplemented, including any necessary updates or changes to controls and\nprotective equipment.\nTC Oil must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the\noperating pressure data, taking into account any ILI features or anomalies\npresent in Keystone Phase 1. TC Oil must immediately reduce the\noperating pressure further to maintain the safe operations of Keystone\nPhase 1, if warranted by the monthly review. Further, TC Oil must\nsubmit the results of the monthly review to the Director including, at a\nminimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional\npressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points.\nSubmittals may be made quarterly, in accordance with Item 13 below.\nReview of Prior In-line Inspection (ILI) Results.\n\n\n\na. The CAO issued December 8, 2022, required TC Oil to conduct a review of any\nprevious ILI results of the Affected Segment. In its review, TC Oil had to re-\nevaluate all ILI results from the past 10 calendar years, including a review of the\nILI vendors' raw data and analysis. TC Oil had to determine whether any features\nwere present in the failed pipe joints from the December 7, 2022 Failure. Also,\nTC Oil had to determine if any features with similar characteristics are present\nelsewhere on the Affected Segment. TC Oil was required to submit\ndocumentation of this ILI review to the Director within 45 days of receipt of the\nCAO, with the following:\ni. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs;\nii. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific\nlocation of all ILI features present in the failed joint and other pipe\nremoved;\niii. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific\nlocation of all ILI features with similar characteristics present elsewhere\non the Affected Segment; and\niv. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the\nreevaluation.\nb. In compliance with the CAO terms, TC Oil submitted this review to PHMSA on\nJanuary 20, 2023, and it is currently under review.\n3. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing.\na. The CAO issued December 8, 2022, required TC Oil to complete mechanical and\nmetallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including an analysis\nof soil samples and any foreign materials. Mechanical and metallurgical testing\nhad to be conducted by an independent third-party acceptable to the Director, and\nhad to document the decision-making process and all factors contributing to the\nfailure. TC Oil was required to complete the testing and analysis as follows:\ni. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed\npipe section and other evidence from the failure site;\nii. Within 10 days of receipt of the CAO, develop and submit the testing\nprotocol and the proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior\napproval;\niii. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow\nfor an OPS representative to witness the testing; and\n\n\n\n4. 5. iv. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in\ntheir entirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to\nTC Oil.\nb. In compliance with the CAO terms, TC Oil submitted this report to PHMSA on\nFebruary 7, 2023, and it is currently under review.\nRoot Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA).\na. Within 45 days following receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must complete a root\ncause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the\nDirector.\nb. The RCFA must be supplemented or facilitated by an independent third-party\nacceptable to the Director and must document the decision-making process and all\nfactors contributing to the failure.\nc. The RCFA must be comprehensive, including but not limited to: consideration of\npipe and fitting design, specification and manufacture of materials, material\nacquisition, material quality assurance & quality control, fabrication and\nconstruction history, girth weld joint design, welding procedures and\nqualification, previous non-destructive examinations and testing, inline inspection\nhistory, operating parameters and pressure cycling, external loading, previous\nevaluations of land movement, and any prior remediation or repairs.\nd. The final report must include findings and any lessons learned and whether the\nfindings and lessons learned are applicable to other locations within TC Oil’s\npipeline system.\nEvaluation of Geohazard Program (EGP).\na. Within 60 days of issuance of the ACAO, TC Oil must complete an independent\nevaluation of TC Oil’s geohazard and land movement program and submit the\nfinal report, to include findings and any lessons learned, and submit to the\nDirector.\nb. The evaluation must utilize an independent third-party, acceptable to the Director,\nto assess TC Oil’s geohazard/land movement program. The third-party must not\nhave been involved with the development or implementation of TC Oil’s\ngeohazard/land movement program that was in place prior to the Failure of\nDecember 7, 2022.\nc. The evaluation must determine if land movement may have contributed to the\nloading and stresses on the pipeline at the failure location. The evaluation must\ninclude a review the processes and implementation of the geohazard/land\nmovement program.\n\n\n\nd. The final report must include a plan and schedule to apply the lessons learned to\nthe remainder of TC Oil’s pipeline system to determine if other land movement\nareas could be imposing stress on the pipeline elsewhere along the system.\n6. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. b. c. d. e. Within 60 days of completion of the RCFA, TC Oil must submit a remedial work\nplan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nThe Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire\nRWP.\nOnce approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Amended Order.\nThe RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and\nremedial measures TC Oil will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment.\nIt must address all known or suspected factors and causes of the December 7,\n2022 Failure. TC Oil must consider the risks and consequences of another failure\nto develop a prioritized schedule for RWP- related work along the Affected\nSegment.\nThe RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the December 7, 2022 Failure, including\nthe age and manufacture of the entire length of the Affected Segment.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and\npressure test failures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written report\ncontaining all the available information such as the locations, dates, and\ncauses of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis,\nand other corrective actions required by this Amended Order with all\nrelevant pre-existing operational and assessment data for the Affected\nSegment. Pre-existing operational data includes, but is not limited to,\ndesign, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior\nmetallurgical analyses, and any third-party consultation information. Pre-\nexisting assessment data includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs,\nhydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close interval surveys, and\nDCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Failure on\nDecember 7, 2022, are likely to exist elsewhere on the Affected Segment,\nKeystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2.Conduct\nadditional field tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations to determine\n\n\n\nv. vi. vii. whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the Failure on\nDecember 7, 2022, other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii) above),\nor any other integrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected Segment,\nKeystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2. At a minimum,\nthis process must consider all failure causes and specify the use of one or\nmore of the following:\n1) ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the pipeline\nsystem based on the cause of failure on December 7, 2022, and that\ncan reliably detect and identify anomalies;\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing;\n3) Close-interval surveys;\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in\ncoordination with other utilities (e.g., underground utilities, overhead\npower lines, etc.) in the area;\n5) Coating surveys;\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys;\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for\nthe failure causes.\nNote: TC Oil may use the results of previous tests, inspections, assessments,\nand evaluations if approved by the Director, provided the results of the tests,\ninspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard to the\nfactors known or suspected to have caused the December 7, 2022 Failure.\nDescribe the inspection and repair criteria TC Oil will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\nintegrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be graded\nand a schedule for repairs or replacement.\nBased on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment, describe\nthe methods TC Oil will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective\nmeasures to remediate the conditions associated with the Failure on\nDecember 7, 2022, and to address other known integrity threats along the\nAffected Segment, Keystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase\n2. The repair, replacement, or other corrective measures must meet the\ncriteria specified in (e)(v) above.\nImplement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\n\n\n\nf. g. measures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment,\nKeystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 considering the\nresults of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective measures\nundertaken pursuant to the CAO as amended by this ACAO.\nInclude a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\nTC Oil must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information\nobtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the\nresults of actions undertaken pursuant to this Amended Order, and to incorporate\nmodifications required by the Director.\ni. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\nii. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\niii. All revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Amended Order will be fully described and documented\nin the ACAO Documentation Report.\nh. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to\nthe plan.\n7. Integrity Threat Assessments (ITAs).\na. b. Within 30 days of completing the RCFA required by this Amended Order, TC Oil\nmust submit to the Director a prioritized schedule for submitting Integrity Threat\nAssessments (ITAs) of Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2\nto the Director. The prioritized schedule of ITAs shall be based on all threats,\nknown or suspected, and the consequences of failure in each section of Keystone\nPipeline Phase 1 and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2. Threats considered must\ninclude all factors that caused or contributed to the December 7, 2022 Failure, in\naddition to all facts identified or suspected in previous failures (hydrotest and in-\nservice). Along with schedule, provide a listing of all the threat and consequence\nfactors along with the methodology used to establish the prioritized schedule for\ncompleting and submitting ITAs.\nEach ITA shall evaluate the integrity of each assessment section of Keystone\nPipeline Phase 1 and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 to assure long-term operational\nreliability and safe operation of the section. The ITAs shall include the\nintegration of the results of the failure analyses and other actions required by this\nAmended Order with all relevant operating data, including all historical repair\ninformation, construction, operating, maintenance, testing, metallurgical analysis,\nweather-related and outside force damage information (e.g., mechanical damage,\ngeohazards, third-party activity, etc.), or other third-party consultation\ninformation, and assessment data for sections of Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 and\nKeystone Pipeline Phase 2.\n\n\n\nc. Each ITA must include a predicated remaining life for operation at both 72\npercent SMYS and 80 percent SMYS for: (1) flaws that would have survived the\nconstruction hydrostatic test and subject to operating pressure cycles, and (2)\nflaws conceivably pr","truncated":true,"body_characters":78958}