# TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC — Corrective Action Order

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 32022074CAO
- **title:** TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC — Corrective Action Order
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** current
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2022-12-08
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** OPEN corrective action order.
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- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022074cao.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32022074cao
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32022074CAO
**body:**

Corrective Action Order involving TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2022-12-08 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

32022074CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_03072023_(22-261792).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022074CAO/32022074CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(Amended)_03072023_(22-261792).pdf

32022074CAO_Corrective Action Order_12082022_(22-261792).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022074CAO/32022074CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_12082022_(22-261792).pdf

32022074CAO_Corrective Action Order_12082022_(22-261792)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022074CAO/32022074CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_12082022_(22-261792)_text.pdf

32022074CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_03072023_(22-261792).pdf

U.S. Department
of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety
Administration
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590
March 7, 2023
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: richard_prior@tcenergy.com
Richard Prior
TC Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc.
700 Louisiana Suite 700
Houston, TX 77002
Re: CPF No. 3-2022-074-CAO
Dear Mr. Prior,
Enclosed please find an Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO or Amended Order) issued
by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline
Safety (OPS), in the above-referenced case. It requires TC Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc., to take
certain additional corrective actions with respect to the pipeline failure that occurred on
December 7, 2022, on the 36-inch Keystone pipeline three miles east of Washington, Kansas.
Service of the ACAO by electronic mail is effective upon the date of transmission and
acknowledgment of receipt as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of
this Amended Order are effective upon completion of service.
Sincerely,
ALAN KRAMER
MAYBERRY
Digitally signed by ALAN
KRAMER MAYBERRY
Date: 2023.03.07
09:16:39 -05'00'
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure: ACAO
cc: Mr. Gregory Ochs, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
TC Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc., ) CPF No. 3-2022-074-CAO
)
Respondent. )
)
____________________________________)
AMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
Purpose and Background
This Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO or Amended Order) is being issued by the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, to require TC Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc. (TC
Oil or Respondent), to take necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the
environment from potential hazards associated with the December 7, 2022 crude oil pipeline
failure that occurred on the 36-inch Keystone pipeline, approximately three miles east of
Washington, Kansas (Failure).
The Keystone pipeline is a 2,687-mile hazardous liquid pipeline system between Hardisty,
Alberta, Canada, and Patoka, Illinois, and Port Arthur, Texas.1 The 1,025 miles of TC Oil’s 30-
inch diameter mainline pipe was Phase 1 of the Keystone pipeline. It spans from the US-
Canadian border at Cavalier County, North Dakota, traverses the states of South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri to Wood River, Illinois. The 36-inch diameter Cushing
Extension was Phase 2 of the Keystone pipeline. The Cushing Extension begins in Steele City,
Nebraska and goes to Cushing, Oklahoma, and is approximately 291 miles long. The maximum
operating pressure (MOP) of both pipelines is 1,440 pounds per square inch gauge (psig), and
they operate under special permit PHMSA-2006-26617.
At approximately 09:01 PM CST, a leak detection alarm (volume imbalance) was received
indicating a potential loss of commodity from the pipeline. An Emergency-Line Trip alarm was
received 6-minutes later. The pipeline was subsequently shut down and isolation valves were
commanded closed at 09:08 PM CST. The location of the Failure is Cushing Extension, Mile
Point (MP) 14. The segment of the pipeline containing the Failure spans from Steele City pump
station (MP 0.0) to Hope pump station (MP 95.7, approximately). Upon receiving the leak
1 See Overview, TC ENERGY, https://www.tcenergy.com/operations/oil-and-liquids/keystone-pipeline-system/ (last
accessed March 6, 2023)



alarms, TC Oil personnel were dispatched and identified a crude oil odor north of U.S. Highway
36. The Failure location was subsequently confirmed to be approximately two miles north of the
highway crossing. Crude oil from the pipeline impacted Mill Creek, at approximate coordinates
of 39-degrees, 50-minutes, 33-seconds, and -96-degrees, 59-minutes, 44-seconds.2
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA initiated an investigation of the Failure. investigation of the Failure is ongoing.
PHMSA’s
On December 8, 2022, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO). As a result of the
continued investigation and additional information received, PHMSA is issuing this ACAO to
prescribe additional corrective actions to the Affected Segment, Keystone Pipeline Phase 1, and
Keystone Pipeline Phase 2, as defined below. This ACAO amends and supplements the
preliminary findings and the corrective actions prescribed in the CAO. The preliminary findings
of the Agency’s ongoing investigation are as follows:
Preliminary Findings
Special Permit
 PHMSA issued a special permit, PHMSA-2006-26617, to TC Oil for construction and
operation of Keystone pipeline Phase 1 and Phase 2 (the Cushing Extension) on April 30,
2007, to allow the pipeline to be operated at a stress level of 80 percent of the steel pipe’s
specified minimum yield strength (SMYS). Without a special permit, operating pressure
for the hazardous liquid pipeline would be no greater than 72 percent of SMYS.3 The
special permit contained 51 conditions and was designed to provide for a level of safety
equal to, or greater than, the applicable regulations by requiring TC Oil to more closely
inspect and monitor the pipeline over its operational life than similar pipelines installed
without a special permit.
December 2022 Accident
 On December 7, 2022, at approximately 09:01 PM CST, a leak detection alarm (volume
imbalance) was received. An Emergency-Line Trip alarm was received 6-minutes later.
 The pipeline was shut down and isolation valves were commanded closed at 09:08 PM
CST.
 Upon receiving notification of the Failure, TC Oil personnel were dispatched and
identified a crude oil odor north of U.S. Highway 36. The Failure location was
subsequently confirmed approximately two miles north of the highway crossing.
 The location of the Failure is Cushing Extension, MP 14. The pipeline segment
containing the Failure spans from Steele City pump station (MP 0.0) to Hope pump
station (MP 95.7, approximately).
2 The actual reported spill volume is 12,937 barrels.
3 See 49 C.F.R. § 195.106.



 Crude oil from the pipeline impacted Mill Creek crossing, at approximate coordinates of
39-degrees, 50-minutes, 33-seconds, and -96-degrees, 59-minutes, 44-seconds.
 The initial estimated spill volume was approximately 14,000 barrels of crude oil. The
actual reported spill volume is 12,937 barrels of crude oil.
 Per TC Oil, the source of the December 7, 2022 rupture near Washington, Kansas was a
failed girth weld. Based on observations by PHMSA investigators, the failed weld was a
transition weld that joined the 36-inch diameter pipe to a thicker wall thickness butt-
welded fitting.
 The established MOP of the 36-inch Phase 2 pipeline at the point of failure on December
7, 2022, was 1,440 psi. At the time of the rupture, the actual operating pressure at the
point of failure was 1,153 psig.
 PHMSA understands TC Energy was monitoring this failure location for geohazards and
land movement prior to the failure. TC Energy was required to implement a
monitoring/mitigation plan to monitor for and mitigate issues of unstable soil and ground
movement as part of Condition 41 of the special permit, PHMSA-2006-26617.
 Onsite personnel observed the failed segment move vertically as overburden was
removed, indicating the pipeline was under improper loading and stress. It is not clear
whether the pipe segment has been under stress since construction or if land movement in
the area may have more recently induced or increased stress.
 The investigation is on-going, and information could change. This ACAO may be
amended based on further findings during the investigation.
 Following receipt of the CAO issued December 8, 2022, TC Oil completed and submitted
the results of prior in-line inspection (ILI) reviews as required by the CAO. TC Oil has
completed the mechanical and metallurgical testing required by the CAO. TC Oil has
ensured that the testing laboratory distributed all reports, whether draft or final, in their
entirety to the Director at the same time they were made available to TC Oil. The final
report was received on February 7, 2023.
Keystone Pipeline Phases 1 and 2
 The 1,025 miles of TC Oil’s 30-inch diameter mainline pipe was Phase 1 of the Keystone
pipeline. Construction of Phase 1 was completed in June 2010. Phase 1 spans from the
US-Canadian border at Cavalier County, North Dakota, traverses the states of South
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri to Wood River, Illinois.
 The approximately 291 miles of TC Oil’s 36-inch diameter Cushing Extension was Phase
2 of the Keystone pipeline. Construction of Phase 2 was completed in February 2011.
Phase 2 begins in Steele City, Nebraska and goes to Cushing, Oklahoma.



 Multiple wall thicknesses of pipe were used in the construction of Keystone pipeline
Phase 1 and Phase 2. For the 30-inch diameter Phase 1 pipeline, pipe wall thickness
includes, but is not limited to: 0.386-inch, 0.437-inch, 0.515-inch, and 0.622-inch. For
the 36-inch diameter pipeline used in Phase 2 (the Cushing Extension), pipe wall
thickness includes, but is not limited to: 0.465-inch, 0.512-inch, 0.572-inch, and 0.615-
inch.
 The section of the Phase 2 pipeline subject to the December 7, 2022 Failure was on the
36-inch diameter, 0.465-inch wall thickness, Grade X-70 pipe manufactured by Evraz.
The MOP was 1,440 psig. The most recent failure had a wall thickness transition from
0.515 inch pipe to approximately 0.80 inch elbow fitting (30 degree).
 Keystone pipeline traverses several high consequence areas (HCAs) and navigable rivers.
Both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Keystone pipeline, including the Cushing Extension,
traverse could affect HCAs. According to the 2021 Annual Report submitted by TC Oil,
the following number of miles on Phase 1 and Phase 2, combined, that could affect HCAs
was reported as: Illinois – 22.52 miles, Kansas – 65.29 miles, Missouri – 46.7 miles,
Nebraska – 100.17 miles, North Dakota – 14.3 miles, Oklahoma – 42.73 miles, and South
Dakota – 14.11 miles.
Additional Accidents
 Since 2009, the Keystone pipeline has experienced three failures on girth welds and
additional non-girth weld related accidents.
 On September 21, 2009, the 30-inch Phase 1 Keystone pipeline in Kingsbury County,
South Dakota, leaked during hydrostatic testing. The source of the leak was determined
to be a girth weld joining 0.386-inch w.t. (wall thickness) pipe and a 0.515-inch w.t. pipe.
Butt welds joining unequal thickness of material (e.g., pipe, fittings, and other
appurtenances) may also be known as “transition welds.”
 On May 7, 2011, a reportable, non-girth weld related accident occurred on pump station
piping on Phase 1 Keystone crude oil pipeline at the Ludden Pump Station. On May 29,
2011, a second reportable failure incident occurred on piping at the Severance Pump
Station also in Phase 1. On June 3, 2011, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order
(CAO) requiring Respondent to take corrective actions (CPF No. 3-2011-5006H). On
June 13, 2011, Respondent submitted a response to this CAO requesting a hearing.
Following informal discussions between Respondent and PHMSA, based on the most up-
to-date information, PHMSA agreed to make minor changes and clarifications to the
original CAO in an Amended CAO issued June 28, 2011. The Amended CAO was
closed on January 13, 2015, after TC Oil had completed all the required corrective
actions.
 On April 2, 2016, a reportable accident due to a leak in a cracked tie-in weld occurred on
the Phase 1 Keystone pipeline on the 48.1-mile segment between Freeman (Pump Station
23) and Hartington (Pump Station 24). Per the “Accident Report – Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Systems, Form PHMSA F 7000-1” submitted by TC Oil, approximately 20,400



tons of solid materials were removed from the spill site, and 1,170 tons of liquid wastes
were disposed. On April 9, 2016, PHMSA issued a CAO requiring Respondent to take
corrective actions (CPF No. 3-2016-5002H). The CAO was closed on March 30, 2017,
after TC Oil had completed all the required corrective actions.
 On November 16, 2017, an incident occurred on Phase 1, due to a fracture that initiated at
an area of previous mechanical damage, resulting in crude oil release. On November 28,
2017, PHMSA issued a CAO (CPF No. 3-2017-5008H) to TC Oil addressing this
incident to require Respondent to take corrective actions. This CAO was closed on
January 29, 2019, after Respondent completed all the required corrective actions.
 On October 30, 2019, a reportable non-girth weld accident occurred on the 41.9-mile
Phase 1 Keystone pipeline segment that runs between the Edinburg Pump Station and the
Niagara Pump Station, near Niagara, North Dakota. This failure exhibited characteristics
of fatigue from pressure cycles. On November 5, 2019, PHMSA issued a CAO requiring
Respondent to take corrective action (CPF No. 3-2019-5023H). The CAO was closed on
February 3, 2022, after TC Oil had completed all the required corrective actions.
 On October 14, 2022, PHMSA issued a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (CPF No. 3-2022-025-NOPV) following a
special inspection of TC Oil’s Lucas delivery facility in Beaumont, Texas following a
crude oil spill that occurred on the Keystone Gulf Coast system on May 7, 2020. The
proceeding remains open at this time.
 The spills of 2011, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, and 2022 which resulted in reported releases
of 400, 400, 6,592, 4,515, 442, 12,937 barrels of crude oil, respectively, show a tendency
or pattern in recent years of increasingly frequent incidents resulting in larger releases.
Regulations and Advisory Bulletins
 Per 49 C.F.R. §195.106, the anticipated external loads and external pressures that are
concurrent with internal pressure must be considered in the pipe design. After
determining the internal design pressure, the nominal wall thickness of pipe must be
increased as necessary to compensate for these concurrent loads and pressures. Different
wall thickness of pipe can be necessary in various locations along a pipeline depending
on operating pressure and external loadings, such as: road crossings, water crossings,
railroad crossings, above ground piping, etc.
 On March 24, 2010, PHMSA published an advisory bulletin, ADB 2010-03, “Girth Weld
Quality Issues Due to Improper Transitioning, Misalignment, and Welding Practices of
Large Diameter Line Pipe.”4 The advisory bulletin notified pipeline operators of large
diameter natural gas pipeline and hazardous liquid pipeline systems of the potential for
girth weld failures. The advisory bulletin also described how issues with girth weld
quality may cause in-service leaks and ruptures at pressures well below 72 percent
SMYS. It described that metallurgical testing results of failed girth welds in pipe wall
4 75 Fed. Reg. 14,243 (March 24, 2010).



thickness transitions found pipe segments with line pipe weld misalignment, improper
bevel and wall thickness transitions, and other improper welding practices that occurred
during construction. A number of the failures were located in pipeline segments with
concentrated external loading due to support and backfill issues.
 On June 2, 2022, PHMSA published an advisory bulletin, ADB 2022-0063, “Potential for
Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological
Hazards.”5 The advisory bulletin reminds owners and operators of gas and hazardous
liquid pipelines of the potential for damage to those pipeline facilities caused by earth
movement in variable, steep, and rugged terrain and terrain with varied or changing
subsurface geological conditions. The advisory bulletin noted that geohazards, including
land movement, can pose a threat to the integrity of pipeline facilities if those threats are
not identified and mitigated.
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing
Section 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline
facility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood
of serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective
action, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,
replacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an
opportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.
In deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the
characteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,
manufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the
equipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and
deteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the
pressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline
facility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the
proximity of the area in which the hazardous liquid pipeline facility is located to environmentally
sensitive areas; (5) the population density and population and growth patterns of the area in
which the pipeline facility is located; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation
Safety Board made under another law; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as
appropriate.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the
characteristics of the pipeline, including the prior and most current failures of the pipeline; the
hazardous nature of the material (crude oil) transported; the existing and potential additional
impacts to property, the environment, and wildlife; the indications that TC Oil’s operating,
maintenance, and/or integrity management programs may be inadequate to address the
repetitious pattern of failures related to the original design, manufacture, and construction of
Keystone pipeline Phase 1 and Phase 2; the tendency of flaws to grow from operating pressure
cycles; the tendency or pattern of girth weld failures in large diameter pipelines on the Keystone
pipeline; the occurrence of girth weld in-service leaks and ruptures at pressures below 72 percent
SMYS, suggesting issues with girth weld quality; the increasing severity of spills in recent years;
5 87 Fed. Reg. 33,576 (June 2, 2022).



the possibility of future failures caused by a combination of factors similar to those involved in
the 2022 and prior failures, including transition welds and the potential for earth movement; and
the possibility that the same condition(s) that may have caused the Failure remain present and
could lead to additional failures in Keystone pipeline Phase 1 and Phase 2; I find that continued
operation of the Affected Segment, Keystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2, as
defined below, without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the
environment, and that failure to issue this Amended Order expeditiously would result in the
likelihood of serious harm.
Accordingly, this Amended Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously
without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Amended
Order are effective upon completion of service.
Within 10 days of receipt of this Amended Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held
as soon as practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing,
with a copy to the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be
held in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may
identify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any
additional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order.
To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a
hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.
Definitions
Affected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means the approximately 96 miles of TC Oil’s
Keystone pipeline, which is a part of Keystone Pipeline Phase 2, that contains the 36-inch
diameter pipe from Steele City pump station (MP 0.0) to Hope pump station (MP 95.7,
approximately), which was subject to the December 7, 2022 Failure. The Affected Segment
traverses the following counties: Jefferson County, Nebraska, Washington County, Kansas, Clay
County, Kansas, and Dickinson County, Kansas.
Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 – “Keystone Pipeline Phase 1” means the approximately 1,025 miles
of TC Oil’s Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 that contains the 30-inch diameter mainline pipe from the
US-Canadian border at Cavalier Country, North Dakota, traverses the states of South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri to Wood River, Illinois and Patoka, Illinois.
Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 –
“Keystone Pipeline Phase 2” means the approximately 291 miles of
TC Oil’s Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 that contains the 36-inch diameter pipe from Steele City,
Nebraska through Kansas to Cushing, Oklahoma.
Director – The “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region.
Required Corrective Actions
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, I hereby order TC Oil to take the following corrective actions:



1. Operating Pressure Restriction.
a. TC Oil must continue to reduce the operating pressure along the length of
theAffected Segment to the previously agreed upon 923 psig limit. This pressure
restriction is to remain in effect until Items 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 have been completed as
specified below. Following completion of the aforementioned Items and upon
receipt of written approval by the Director, TC Oil may increase the operating
pressure along the Affected Segment to no more than 72 percent SMYS.
b. TC Oil must reduce and maintain pressure reduction in the actual operating
pressure along the remainder of Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 such that the operating
pressure will not exceed 72 percent SMYS, consistent with 49 C.F.R. § 195.406.
This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the
pressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from
the Director.
i. Within seven days of receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must provide the
Director the planned pressure set-points at all pump stations and facilities
necessary to limit the operation of Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 to 72
percent SMYS.
ii. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm
limits, software programming set-points or control points, and mechanical
over-pressure devices to be adjusted accordingly.
iii. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, TC Oil must take
into account any ILI) features or anomalies present in Keystone Pipeline
Phase 2 to provide for continued safe operation as required by 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.401 and the anomaly evaluation and repair requirements of special
permit PHMSA-2006-26617.
iv. Adequate controls and protective equipment must be in place to maintain
pressure within the limit required by 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b) during
surges and other variations from normal operations.
v. Within 30 days of receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must provide the Director
documentation that all set-points to maintain a maximum operating
pressure of 72 percent SMYS for Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 have been
implemented, including any necessary updates or changes to controls and
protective equipment.
vi. TC Oil must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the
operating pressure data, taking into account any ILI features or anomalies
present in Keystone Phase 2. TC Oil must immediately reduce the
operating pressure further to maintain the safe operations of Keystone
Phase 2, if warranted by the monthly review. Further, TC Oil must
submit the results of the monthly review to the Director including, at a



minimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional
pressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points.
Submittals may be made quarterly, in accordance with Item 13 below.
c. TC Oil must reduce and maintain pressure reduction in the actual operating
pressure along the entire length of Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 such that the
operating pressure along its entire length will not exceed 72 percent of SMYS,
consistent with 49 C.F.R. § 195.406. This pressure restriction on Keystone Pipeline
Phase 1 is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the pressure above
72 percent SMYS is obtained from the Director.
i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. 2. Within seven days of receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must provide the
Director the planned pressure set-points at all pump stations and facilities
necessary to limit the operation of Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 to 72
percent SMYS.
This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm
limits, software programming set-points or control points, and mechanical
over-pressure devices to be adjusted accordingly.
When determining the pressure restriction set-points, TC Oil must take
into account any ILI features or anomalies present in Keystone Pipeline
Phase 1 to provide for continued safe operation as required by 49 C.F.R. §
195.401 and the anomaly evaluation and repair requirements of special
permit PHMSA-2006-26617.
Adequate controls and protective equipment must be in place to maintain
pressure within the limit required by 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b) during surges
and other variations from normal operations.
Within 30 days of receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must provide the Director
documentation that all set-points to maintain a maximum operating
pressure of 72 percent SMYS for Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 have been
implemented, including any necessary updates or changes to controls and
protective equipment.
TC Oil must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the
operating pressure data, taking into account any ILI features or anomalies
present in Keystone Phase 1. TC Oil must immediately reduce the
operating pressure further to maintain the safe operations of Keystone
Phase 1, if warranted by the monthly review. Further, TC Oil must
submit the results of the monthly review to the Director including, at a
minimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional
pressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points.
Submittals may be made quarterly, in accordance with Item 13 below.
Review of Prior In-line Inspection (ILI) Results.



a. The CAO issued December 8, 2022, required TC Oil to conduct a review of any
previous ILI results of the Affected Segment. In its review, TC Oil had to re-
evaluate all ILI results from the past 10 calendar years, including a review of the
ILI vendors' raw data and analysis. TC Oil had to determine whether any features
were present in the failed pipe joints from the December 7, 2022 Failure. Also,
TC Oil had to determine if any features with similar characteristics are present
elsewhere on the Affected Segment. TC Oil was required to submit
documentation of this ILI review to the Director within 45 days of receipt of the
CAO, with the following:
i. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs;
ii. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific
location of all ILI features present in the failed joint and other pipe
removed;
iii. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific
location of all ILI features with similar characteristics present elsewhere
on the Affected Segment; and
iv. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the
reevaluation.
b. In compliance with the CAO terms, TC Oil submitted this review to PHMSA on
January 20, 2023, and it is currently under review.
3. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing.
a. The CAO issued December 8, 2022, required TC Oil to complete mechanical and
metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including an analysis
of soil samples and any foreign materials. Mechanical and metallurgical testing
had to be conducted by an independent third-party acceptable to the Director, and
had to document the decision-making process and all factors contributing to the
failure. TC Oil was required to complete the testing and analysis as follows:
i. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed
pipe section and other evidence from the failure site;
ii. Within 10 days of receipt of the CAO, develop and submit the testing
protocol and the proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior
approval;
iii. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the
Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow
for an OPS representative to witness the testing; and



4. 5. iv. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in
their entirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to
TC Oil.
b. In compliance with the CAO terms, TC Oil submitted this report to PHMSA on
February 7, 2023, and it is currently under review.
Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA).
a. Within 45 days following receipt of the ACAO, TC Oil must complete a root
cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the
Director.
b. The RCFA must be supplemented or facilitated by an independent third-party
acceptable to the Director and must document the decision-making process and all
factors contributing to the failure.
c. The RCFA must be comprehensive, including but not limited to: consideration of
pipe and fitting design, specification and manufacture of materials, material
acquisition, material quality assurance & quality control, fabrication and
construction history, girth weld joint design, welding procedures and
qualification, previous non-destructive examinations and testing, inline inspection
history, operating parameters and pressure cycling, external loading, previous
evaluations of land movement, and any prior remediation or repairs.
d. The final report must include findings and any lessons learned and whether the
findings and lessons learned are applicable to other locations within TC Oil’s
pipeline system.
Evaluation of Geohazard Program (EGP).
a. Within 60 days of issuance of the ACAO, TC Oil must complete an independent
evaluation of TC Oil’s geohazard and land movement program and submit the
final report, to include findings and any lessons learned, and submit to the
Director.
b. The evaluation must utilize an independent third-party, acceptable to the Director,
to assess TC Oil’s geohazard/land movement program. The third-party must not
have been involved with the development or implementation of TC Oil’s
geohazard/land movement program that was in place prior to the Failure of
December 7, 2022.
c. The evaluation must determine if land movement may have contributed to the
loading and stresses on the pipeline at the failure location. The evaluation must
include a review the processes and implementation of the geohazard/land
movement program.



d. The final report must include a plan and schedule to apply the lessons learned to
the remainder of TC Oil’s pipeline system to determine if other land movement
areas could be imposing stress on the pipeline elsewhere along the system.
6. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).
a. b. c. d. e. Within 60 days of completion of the RCFA, TC Oil must submit a remedial work
plan (RWP) to the Director for approval.
The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire
RWP.
Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into
this Amended Order.
The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and
remedial measures TC Oil will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment.
It must address all known or suspected factors and causes of the December 7,
2022 Failure. TC Oil must consider the risks and consequences of another failure
to develop a prioritized schedule for RWP- related work along the Affected
Segment.
The RWP must include a procedure or process to:
i. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the
contributing factors identified for the December 7, 2022 Failure, including
the age and manufacture of the entire length of the Affected Segment.
ii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and
pressure test failures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written report
containing all the available information such as the locations, dates, and
causes of leaks and failures.
iii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis,
and other corrective actions required by this Amended Order with all
relevant pre-existing operational and assessment data for the Affected
Segment. Pre-existing operational data includes, but is not limited to,
design, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior
metallurgical analyses, and any third-party consultation information. Pre-
existing assessment data includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs,
hydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close interval surveys, and
DCVG/ACVG surveys.
iv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Failure on
December 7, 2022, are likely to exist elsewhere on the Affected Segment,
Keystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2.Conduct
additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations to determine



v. vi. vii. whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the Failure on
December 7, 2022, other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii) above),
or any other integrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected Segment,
Keystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2. At a minimum,
this process must consider all failure causes and specify the use of one or
more of the following:
1) ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the pipeline
system based on the cause of failure on December 7, 2022, and that
can reliably detect and identify anomalies;
2) Hydrostatic pressure testing;
3) Close-interval surveys;
4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in
coordination with other utilities (e.g., underground utilities, overhead
power lines, etc.) in the area;
5) Coating surveys;
6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys;
7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and
8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for
the failure causes.
Note: TC Oil may use the results of previous tests, inspections, assessments,
and evaluations if approved by the Director, provided the results of the tests,
inspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard to the
factors known or suspected to have caused the December 7, 2022 Failure.
Describe the inspection and repair criteria TC Oil will use to prioritize,
excavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified
integrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be graded
and a schedule for repairs or replacement.
Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment, describe
the methods TC Oil will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective
measures to remediate the conditions associated with the Failure on
December 7, 2022, and to address other known integrity threats along the
Affected Segment, Keystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase
2. The repair, replacement, or other corrective measures must meet the
criteria specified in (e)(v) above.
Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification



f. g. measures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment,
Keystone Pipeline Phase 1, and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 considering the
results of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective measures
undertaken pursuant to the CAO as amended by this ACAO.
Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.
TC Oil must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information
obtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the
results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Amended Order, and to incorporate
modifications required by the Director.
i. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.
ii. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.
iii. All revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by
reference into this Amended Order will be fully described and documented
in the ACAO Documentation Report.
h. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to
the plan.
7. Integrity Threat Assessments (ITAs).
a. b. Within 30 days of completing the RCFA required by this Amended Order, TC Oil
must submit to the Director a prioritized schedule for submitting Integrity Threat
Assessments (ITAs) of Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2
to the Director. The prioritized schedule of ITAs shall be based on all threats,
known or suspected, and the consequences of failure in each section of Keystone
Pipeline Phase 1 and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2. Threats considered must
include all factors that caused or contributed to the December 7, 2022 Failure, in
addition to all facts identified or suspected in previous failures (hydrotest and in-
service). Along with schedule, provide a listing of all the threat and consequence
factors along with the methodology used to establish the prioritized schedule for
completing and submitting ITAs.
Each ITA shall evaluate the integrity of each assessment section of Keystone
Pipeline Phase 1 and Keystone Pipeline Phase 2 to assure long-term operational
reliability and safe operation of the section. The ITAs shall include the
integration of the results of the failure analyses and other actions required by this
Amended Order with all relevant operating data, including all historical repair
information, construction, operating, maintenance, testing, metallurgical analysis,
weather-related and outside force damage information (e.g., mechanical damage,
geohazards, third-party activity, etc.), or other third-party consultation
information, and assessment data for sections of Keystone Pipeline Phase 1 and
Keystone Pipeline Phase 2.



c. Each ITA must include a predicated remaining life for operation at both 72
percent SMYS and 80 percent SMYS for: (1) flaws that would have survived the
construction hydrostatic test and subject to operating pressure cycles, and (2)
flaws conceivably pr
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