{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32023002NOPV","title":"SOUTHERN STAR CENTRAL GAS PIPELINE, INC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2023-01-18","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.493, 192.605(c)(1)(v).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32023002nopv.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32023002nopv.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32023002nopv","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32023002NOPV","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving SOUTHERN STAR CENTRAL GAS PIPELINE, INC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.493,  192.605(c)(1)(v). The case was opened on 2023-01-18 and is reported as closed as of 2024-01-16. Proposed civil penalty: $445,008. Assessed civil penalty: $445,008. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32023002NOPV_Closure Letter_01162024_(21-202836).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32023002NOPV/32023002NOPV_Closure%20Letter_01162024_(21-202836).pdf\n\n32023002NOPV_Closure Letter_01162024_(21-202836)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32023002NOPV/32023002NOPV_Closure%20Letter_01162024_(21-202836)_text.pdf\n\n32023002NOPV_Final Order_12202023_(21-202836).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32023002NOPV/32023002NOPV_Final%20Order_12202023_(21-202836).pdf\n\n32023002NOPV_Final Order_12202023_(21-202836)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32023002NOPV/32023002NOPV_Final%20Order_12202023_(21-202836)_text.pdf\n\n32023002NOPV_Operator Response to Notice (Part 1)_03202023_(21-202836).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32023002NOPV/32023002NOPV_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20(Part%201)_03202023_(21-202836).pdf\n\n32023002NOPV_Operator Response to Notice (Part 2)_03202023_(21-202836).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32023002NOPV/32023002NOPV_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20(Part%202)_03202023_(21-202836).pdf\n\n32023002NOPV_PCP PCO_01182023_(21-202836).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32023002NOPV/32023002NOPV_PCP%20PCO_01182023_(21-202836).pdf\n\n32023002NOPV_PCP PCO_01182023_(21-202836)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32023002NOPV/32023002NOPV_PCP%20PCO_01182023_(21-202836)_text.pdf\n\n32023002NOPV_Final Order_12202023_(21-202836)_text.pdf\n\nDecember 20, 2023\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: shawn.patterson@southernstar.com\nShawn L. Patterson\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nSouthern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.\n4700 State Route 56\nP.O. Box 20010\nOwensboro, Kentucky 42301\nRe: CPF No. 3-2023-002-NOPV\nDear Mr. Patterson:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a civil penalty of $445,008, and specifies actions that need to be taken by\nSouthern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc. to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The\npenalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and\nthe terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this\nenforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the\ndate of transmission and acknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Gregory A. Ochs, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMs. Susan A. Olenchuk, Counsel for Southern Star, Van Ness Feldman, LP,\nsam@vnf.com\n\n\n\nMr. Charles Crews, Executive Vice President and Chief Operations Officer, Southern\nStar Central Gas Pipeline, Inc., charles.crews@southernstar.com\nMr. Craig Thomas, Manager, Integrity Management & PHMSA Compliance, Southern\nStar Central Gas Pipeline, Inc., craig.thomas@southernstar.com\nMr. Mark Luckett, Lead Attorney, Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.,\nmark.luckett@southernstar.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nSouthern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc., ) CPF No. 3-2023-002-NOPV\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom February 26 to February 28, 2021, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), investigated Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline Inc.’s (Southern Star) Line FM incident\nnear Joplin, Missouri. Southern Star operates over 5,000 miles of gas transmission pipelines in\nColorado, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming.\nAs a result of the investigation, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated January 18, 2023, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that Southern Star had committed two violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192\nand proposed assessing a civil penalty of $445,008 for the alleged violations. The Notice also\nproposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nAfter requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond, Southern Star responded to the\nNotice by letter dated March 20, 2023 (Response). Southern Star contested one of the\nallegations and offered additional information in response to the Notice. After the Director filed\na recommendation for final action pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), Southern Star submitted a\nsupplemental response on June 9, 2023 (Supplemental Response). The Director filed a\nsupplemental recommendation for final action on June 12, 2023. Respondent did not request a\nhearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.493, which states:\n\n\n\n§ 192.493 In-line inspection of pipelines.\nWhen conducting in-line inspections of pipelines required by this part,\nan operator must comply with API STD 1163, ANSI/ASNT ILI–PQ, and\nNACE SP0102, (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7). Assessments may\nbe conducted using tethered or remotely controlled tools, not explicitly\ndiscussed in NACE SP0102, provided they comply with those sections of\nNACE SP0102 that are applicable.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.493 by failing to follow American\nPetroleum Institute Standard 1163, In Line Inspection Systems Qualification Standard (API Std\n1163). The Introduction to API Std 1163 states that “Inspection procedures [must be] followed,\nbefore, during and after the inspection.”1 Specifically, the Notice alleged that Southern Star\nfailed to follow sections 7.2.1, 7.3.3, and 8.3.7 of its integrity management program (IMP),\nIMP.E2.ASMT.02, for the running of an inline inspection (ILI) tool on February 26, 2021, which\nresulted in a pipeline incident and significant injury to an employee.\nFirst, the Notice alleged that Southern Star failed to develop an ILI plan “for running the tool and\ncontrolling gas flow” that included “[d]etails on the valves to manipulate to run tool and control\nspeed,” and a process to manage a stuck or lodged ILI tool in accordance with section 7.2.1.\n2\nSecond, the Notice alleged that Southern Star failed to “[e]nsure any and all changes in geometry\nor planned operating conditions are disclosed to the ILI vendor if they differ from the\ninformation previously provided,” when it failed to disclose that the gas flow was lower than\nreported (3.5 mmcf/d actual versus 5 mmcf/d predicted) in accordance with section 7.3.3.3\nThird, the Notice alleged that Southern Star failed to “verify that the operating parameters\nrequired by the tool specifications are achievable” in accordance with section 8.3.7.4\nThe Notice alleged that these failures caused a malfunction of an ILI tool, a Circumferential\nMagnetic Flux Leakage (MFL-C) tool, on February 26, 2021. During the ILI run on February\n26, 2021, the MFL-C tool became lodged. Southern Star attempted to dislodge the tool by\napplying differential pressures. The tool eventually dislodged at a high speed (estimated\nbetween 110-243 mph) and ejected from the pipe causing a rupture at the next pipe bend (i.e., an\nelbow configuration). The impact resulted in the pipeline and the MFL-C tool separating into\nmultiple fragments. There was an estimated 76 thousand cubic feet (Mcf) of natural gas released\nas a result of this incident. A Southern Star employee sustained injuries requiring overnight\nhospitalization and surgery as a result of the incident.\n1 API Standard 1163, “In-Line Inspection Systems Qualification,” at vi (2d ed. Aug. 2018).\n2 “Develop a plan for running the tool and controlling gas flow while running the inspection tools. Include the\nfollowing: Detailed plan for loading, running, and retrieving the caliper/geometry tool and inline inspection tools[.]\nDetails on the valves to manipulate to run tool and control speed.” Response, Attach. 1, Integrity Management\nProcedure, IMP.E2.ASMT.02, at section 7.2.1 [hereinafter IMP].\n3 “Ensure any and all changes in geometry or planned operating conditions are disclosed to the ILI vendor if they\ndiffer from the information previously provided.” IMP at section 7.3.3.\n4 “Verify pipeline operating parameters required by the tool specifications are achievable. If not, make\narrangements with Gas Control to establish flow conditions agreeable to both Pipeline Integrity Technical Specialist\nand Service Provider.” IMP at section 8.3.7.\n\n\n\nSouthern Star commissioned Kiefner and Associates, Inc. to perform a metallurgical analysis and\nprepare a Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA) of the incident.5 The RCFA included a\ncomprehensive factual narrative of the incident, identified contributing factors, causal factors,\nand root causes of the incident, and included several recommendations to address the causal\nfactors and root causes of the incident. In summary, the RCFA identified the following as\ncontributing factors6 to the incident: 1) misalignment at the east 90° elbow girth weld; 2) Line\nFM operating pressure did not meet ILI tool specification minimums; 3) Southern Star launched\nthe MFL-C tool with conditions out of the range reported to the ILI vendor; 4) Southern Star\nlaunched the tool using an undocumented valve sequence; 5) the tool configuration of the\nreplacement tool was notably different from the original tool; and 6) the presence of a double\nbend at the line break location.7\nThe RCFA identified the following as root causes of the incident: 1) Southern Star had no\nprocedures, guidelines, or minimum requirements for how to manage a stationary ILI tool in a\npipeline; 2) the development of contingency plans in the pigging plan was not sufficient; and 3)\nexisting Southern Star requirements for the preparation and execution of ILI assessments were\nnot enforced and were not sufficient. On the third root cause, the RCFA concluded that Southern\nStar failed to follow sections 7.2.1, 7.3.3, and 8.3.7 of its IMP.\nPHMSA’s Accident Investigation Division prepared a Failure Investigation Report (FIR) on this\nincident.8 The FIR included a detailed factual narrative and concluded that, among other items,\nSouthern Star’s “ILI procedure did not specify how to dislodge a stuck ILI tool” and that\nSouthern Star “did not launch the tools at velocities reported on the ILI vendor questionnaire.\nThere were no details on launch sequences in the Line FM Pigging Plan and there was no\nverification the operating conditions required by the tool were achievable.”9\nIn its Response, Southern Star contested this alleged violation. Southern Star argued that it\nfollowed sections 7.2.1, 7.3.3, and 8.3.7 of its IMP in conducting the ILI run on February 26,\n2021. Each section is addressed below.\nSection 7.2.1\nThis section required that Southern Star “[d]evelop a plan for running the tool and controlling\ngas flow while running the inspection tools. Include the following: Detailed plan for loading,\nrunning, and retrieving the caliper/geometry tool and inline inspection tools[.] Details on the\n5 See Pipeline Safety Violation Report, Exh. A, PHMSA AID Failure Investigation Report, App’x D Root Cause\nFailure Analysis (Mar. 14, 2021) [hereinafter RCFA].\n6 “The contributing factors to the incident are defined as those events or circumstances that are underlying reasons\nfor why a causal factor occurred, but they are not sufficiently fundamental to be a root cause.” RCFA, at 2.\n7 RCFA, at 2-4.\n8 See Pipeline Safety Violation Report, Exh. A, PHMSA AID Failure Investigation Report (Mar. 14, 2021)\n[hereinafter FIR].\n9 FIR, at 17-18.\n\n\n\nvalves to manipulate to run tool and control speed.”10\nWith respect to section 7.2.1, Southern Star stated that it was following an ILI plan approved on\nFebruary 21, 2021, and that this plan had two options to address a lodged ILI tool, either through\ncut out or by “[i]ncreas[ing] differential to flip cups to allow for gas to bypass.”11 Southern Star\nincluded the plan as Attachment 1 to its Response. Southern Star also stated that this plan\nincluded a detailed description of Line FM, including the maximum allowable operating pressure\n(MAOP), expected pressure range, expected flow range, differential required to launch,\nestimated run time, and estimated run speed.\n12\nHaving considered the evidence, I find that Southern Star failed to include certain information in\nits ILI plan as required by section 7.2.1. As noted in the RCFA, the ILI plan failed to “include a\nlaunch sequence and details on the valves to be used during the tool run.”13 Notably, ILI plans\nfor other Southern Star ILI runs did include detailed launch sequences.14 The plan also failed to\n“include any details regarding actions by Spire Energy (Spire) to influence the gas flow in Line\nFM, or quantifiable objectives for these actions.”15 Southern Star did not argue it included a\nwritten launch sequence, details on the valves to be used, or details regarding influencing the gas\nflow in its ILI plan in either its Response or Supplemental Response.\n16 While Southern Star did\nhave an ILI plan, which included relevant information as noted in the Response, the plan failed\nto include information required by section 7.2.1 to safely operate the ILI tool and failed to\ninclude details routinely included in plans for previous ILI runs.\nSection 7.3.3\nThis section required that Southern Star “[e]nsure any and all changes in geometry or planned\noperating conditions are disclosed to the ILI vendor if they differ from the information\npreviously provided.”17 The Notice alleged that Respondent failed to communicate critical\noperating parameters to its contractors to ensure proper control of the ILI tool. At the time of the\nlaunch and operation of the ILI tool, the gas flow rate in Line FM was 3.25 mmcf/d, which was\nlower than the predicted 5 mmcf/d reported in the tool vendor questionnaire. The Notice alleged\nthe reduced gas flow rate was not communicated or disclosed to the ILI vendor.\n10 IMP, at section 7.2.1.\n11 Response, at 6 (citing attach. 1, at 5, 12).\n12 Response, attach. 1, at 2, 3.\n13 RCFA, at 5.\n14 RCFA, at 5.\n15 RCFA, at 5.\n16 Southern Star changed the launch sequence prior to the February 26 launch “to improve the data quality” but\nfailed to provide an updated launch sequence. FIR, at 7.\n17 IMP, at section 7.3.3.\n\n\n\nWith respect to section 7.3.3, Southern Star stated that it provided “all necessary operating\nparameters, including flow rates, minimum and maximum pressures, and MAOP” to the ILI\nvendor.18 Southern Star reported the flow rate as from 5 – 12 mmcf/d.19 After the ILI tool\nmalfunctioned due to a faulty sensor wire two days before the incident, Southern Star, “[t]o\nmitigate the risk of another speed excursion during the second run,” lowered the flow rate to 3.25\nmmcf/d.20 Southern Star stated that a ILI vendor representative agreed with this decision.21\nSouthern Star’s failure to follow section 7.3.3 of its IMP rests on one question: whether Southern\nStar informed the ILI vendor that the February 26, 2021 MFL-C tool would run at 3.25 mmcf/d,\nwhich is below the reported range of 5 – 12 mmcf/d. For several reasons, I find that Southern\nStar failed to adequately inform the ILI vendor of this change in the flow rate.\nWhile Southern Star stated it informed the on-site ILI vendor representative of the change in\nflow rate, the context of that “on-the-ground” conversation must be considered. On February 26,\n2021, there had already been two issues with the MFL-C tool. The initial tool sent by the ILI\nvendor was defective, so a replacement MFL-C tool was sent, which “was longer, had more\nmodules and the cup type and spacing in the pulling module were different (L-cups were used\ninstead of U-cups).”22 L-cups are not as effective at navigating pipeline misalignments as U-\ncups, and due to their larger size cannot navigate bends as easily as U-cups. On February 24,\nusing the replacement MFL-C tool, a pinched wire prevented the tool from obtaining all of the\nrequired data and the tool experienced one known speed incursion. Two days later, on February\n26, Southern Star decided to lower the flow rate to 3.25 mmcf/d to mitigate the risk of another\nspeed incursion on the third attempted run. Then, through a verbal conversation only, Southern\nStar informed an ILI vendor representative of the change and that person agreed with the change.\nThus, the ILI vendor representative was in the unfortunate position of either agreeing to the\nchange in flow rate or risking a third delay in running this tool. Southern Star provided no\ninformation on the setting of this conversation, which could have happened right before the tool\nwas scheduled to run. An adequate notification to the ILI vendor would have been in writing and\nallowed for the ILI vendor to carefully consider the change.\nThe RCFA echoed this conclusion by stating that Southern Star’s failure to notify the ILI vendor\n“project management” of the change in flow rate was a root cause of the incident.23 Southern\nStar failed to note the position of the on-site ILI vendor representative, and whether that person\nwas the appropriate person, or had the authority, to approve deviations to the flow rate. It is\nunclear if the on-site ILI vendor representative was made aware of prior issues with speed\nincursions and whether the representative was aware that the previous reported flow rate was\n18 Response, at 5 (citing attach. 3, at 8-9)\n19 Response, at 3 (citing attach. 3, at 8).\n20 Response, at 2.\n21 Response, at 5.\n22 FIR, at 2.\n23 RCFA, at 5-6.\n\n\n\nbetween 5 and 12 mmcf/d.\nIn writing, Southern Star informed the ILI vendor that the flow rate would be between 5 – 12\nmmcf/d. Southern Star never informed the ILI vendor, in writing, of any change in the flow rate.\nWhile written notification was not explicitly required by the procedures at that time,24 Southern\nStar had already experienced one speed incursion, had a history of issues running ILI tools on\nthis pipeline,25 and was using a different sized MFL-C tool than initially planned.26 It is unclear\nif the collective impact of these factors were considered by the ILI vendor representative.\nTherefore, I find Southern Star failed to follow section 7.3.3 of its IMP.\nSection 8.3.7\nUnder section 8.3.7, Southern Star was required to “[v]erify pipeline operating parameters\nrequired by the tool specifications are achievable. If not, [Respondent was required to] make\narrangements with Gas Control to establish flow conditions agreeable to both Pipeline Integrity\nTechnical Specialist and Service Provider.”27 The Notice alleged Respondent failed to verify the\noperating conditions on Line FM would achieve the tool specifications. The MAOP of Line FM\nwas 400 psig, but the minimum operating pressure for the ILI tool was 500 psig as provided by\nthe tool specifications.\nWith respect to section 8.3.7, Southern Star argued it had verified that the minimum operating\npressure required by the MFL-C tool was achievable on Line FM. Specifically, Southern Star\nstated that it had informed the ILI vendor that the minimum and maximum pressure range on\nLine FM was 325 psig to 400 psig.28 The ILI vendor’s representative was present during the tool\nrun and agreed with running the tool at a flow rate of 350 psig.29 Respondent also noted that it\nran the MFL-C tool two days earlier on February 24, 2021, at 350 psig without any stoppage, and\ntherefore had verified “that passage of that ILI tool was achievable at an operating pressure\nbelow Line FM’s MAOP.”30\n24 In the Supplemental Region Recommendation, the Director acknowledged that section 7.3.3.1 was erroneously\nreferenced in the recommendation for final action. This provision was added after the incident and required written\nagreement from an ILI vendor if there are any changes in geometry or planned operating conditions. This final\norder does not address any allegation related to section 7.3.3.1.\n25 FIR, at 4 (“Southern Star had experienced previous issues running ILI tools on Line FM, including stoppages that\noccurred during their 2010 ILI runs and cleaning pig runs of 2021.”).\n26 “During the ILI run which resulted in the pipeline rupture, the MFL-C ILI tool configuration had been modified\nfrom what was previously run through the line. The replacement tool was longer, had more modules and the cup\ntype and spacing in the pulling module were different (L-cups were used instead of U-cups). The original MFL-C\ntool used U-cups because they are suitable for a wide range of pipeline conditions and misalignments. The L-cups\nhave smaller face angles and larger section thickness making it harder for the tool to navigate the bends.” FIR, at 2.\n27 IMP, at section 8.3.7.\n28 Response, at 3.\n29 Response, at 5.\n30 Response, at 6.\n\n\n\nHaving considered the evidence, I find that Southern Star failed to “[v]erify that the operating\nparameters required by the tool specifications are achievable.” According to the plain language\ndefinition of “verify,” Southern Star was required to “make sure or demonstrate that (something)\nis true, accurate, or justified.”31 Synonyms of verify include substantiate, validate, corroborate,\nand confirm, among others. In other words, Southern Star was required to do more than simply\ninform the ILI vendor of the operating pressure. That is only the first step. Once that basic\ninformation is transmitted, section 8.3.7 requires Southern Star to proactively verify that the tool\nis suitable for its pipeline.32 Southern Star failed to provide evidence it made any such\nverification prior to running the tools. In fact, the RCFA noted that Southern Star was aware of\nthe discrepancy in operating pressure requirements but failed to verify that this would not be an\nissue.33 The FIR supports this conclusion, as it stated that “Southern Star did not verify if the\nreplacement tool was compatible with Line FM’s operating conditions.”34 Likewise, the RCFA\nconcluded that a root cause of the incident was Southern Star’s failure to make the requisite\nverification.35\nSouthern Star suggested that it can satisfy section 8.3.7 through a “trial and error” approach\nwhere it can make this verification while running the ILI tool. Such a strategy exposes the\npublic, environment, and operator personnel to unnecessary risk. The purpose of section 8.3.7 is\nto ensure safe and successful ILI runs before they occur.36 Section 8.3.7 cannot be satisfied\nduring or after a tool run.\nSection 8.3.7 also stated that if Southern Star cannot verify the operating parameters required by\nthe tool are achievable, then it must “make arrangements with Gas Control to establish flow\nconditions agreeable to both Pipeline Integrity Technical Specialist and Service Provider.”\nSouthern Star did not state it made such an arrangement, and no evidence in the record suggests\nsuch an arrangement was made.\n31 Oxford English Dictionary, “verify,”\nhttps://www.google.com/search?sca esv=591232086&rlz=1C1GCEA enUS1068US1068&q=verify&si=ALGXSlZ\ns yOcjbcvFwhB4E04oe9YV5zjHZ0-HEwTZtReYWGdI0rXOK-vwEB5298AeAiO-\nFTrSijrjT Z1IeZe9XQtw2DUv4McA%3D%3D&expnd=1&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwit4Jq23ZGDAxXWMjQIHexIA\nDcQ2v4IegQICBAT&biw=1920&bih=919&dpr=1.\n32 Section 7.1.1 of Southern Star’s IMP requires it Star to complete the “ILI questionnaire.” Completion of the ILI\nquestionnaire does not also satisfy section 8.3.7, which further requires verification “that the operating parameters\nrequired by the tool specifications are achievable.”\n33 “[Southern Star] did not identify that the minimum operation pressure of the tool was above Line FM's capability.\n[Southern Star] did not question [the ILI vendor] on the implications of this operating condition during the tool run.”\nRCFA, at 95.\n34 FIR, at 4.\n35 RCFA, at 6.\n36 Section 8 of Southern Star’s IMP sets forth a chronological process for performing an in-line inspection. The\nverification is required in section 8.3.7, which is chronologically before insertion of the tool into the launcher in\nsection 8.3.11.\n\n\n\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.493 by failing to follow API Std 1163 through its failure to follow sections 7.2.1, 7.3.3,\nand 8.3.7 of its IMP.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(c)(1)(v), which states:\n§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) . . . .\n(c) Abnormal operation. For transmission lines, the manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety when operating design limits have been exceeded:\n(1) Responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of:\n(i) . . . .\n(v) Any other foreseeable malfunction of a component, deviation from\nnormal operation, or personnel error, which may result in a hazard to\npersons or property.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(c)(1)(v) by failing to have and\nfollow procedures to correct the cause of a foreseeable malfunction during an ILI run on the Line\nFM natural gas transmission line near Brick School House Meter Station on February 26, 2021.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Southern Star lacked procedures for dislodging an ILI tool\nand had not “[d]evelop[ed] contingency plans for the possibility of a lodged tool,” as required by\nSouthern Star procedure IMP.E2.ASMT.02 Section 7.1. In its Response, Southern Star did not\ncontest Item 2.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.605(c)(1)(v) by failing to have and follow procedures to correct the cause of a foreseeable\nmalfunction during an ILI run on the Line FM natural gas transmission line near Brick School\nHouse Meter Station on February 26, 2021.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.37\nIn determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I\nmust consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,\nincluding adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history\nof Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue\n37 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223 for adjusted amounts.\n\n\n\ndoing business; the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety\nregulations; and self-disclosure or actions to correct a violation prior to discovery by PHMSA.\nIn addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction\nbecause of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice\nproposed a total civil penalty of $445,008 for the violations cited above.\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $222,504 for Respondent’s violation of 49\nC.F.R. § 192.493, for failing to follow API Std 1163. Respondent did not separately contest the\nproposed civil penalty. Accordingly, for the reasons above, I assess Respondent a civil penalty\nof $222,504 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.493.\nItem 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $222,504 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605(c)(1)(v), for failing to have and follow procedures to correct the cause of a\nforeseeable malfunction during an ILI run on the Line FM natural gas transmission line near\nBrick School House Meter Station on February 26, 2021. Respondent neither contested the\nallegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying elimination of the proposed\npenalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I\nassess Respondent a civil penalty of $222,504 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(c)(1)(v).\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the\nItems cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $445,008.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days after receipt of this Final Order.\nFederal regulations (49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer\nthrough the Federal Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S.\nTreasury. Detailed instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire\ntransfers should be directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation\nAdministration, Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City,\nOklahoma 79169. The Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.\nFailure to pay the civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate in\naccordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to those\nsame authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if payment\nis not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty may result\nin referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district court of the\nUnited States.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Item 2 in the Notice for a violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605I(c)(1)(v). Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the\ntransportation of gas or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the\napplicable safety standards established under chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to\nensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 192.605(c)(1)(v) (Item 2), Respondent must\n\n\n\ndevelop and incorporate into its procedural manual for operations, maintenance\nand emergencies an appropriate procedure for notification, documentation, and\nremedial actions when removing a stuck internal device, i.e. an ILI tool, within 90\ndays of receipt of the Final Order.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nPHMSA requests that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs\nassociated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the Director. It is\nrequested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated with\npreparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated with\nreplacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nnot to exceed $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (see 49 C.F.R. § 190.223), for each violation for\neach day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a\ndistrict court of the United States.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final\nOrder to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey\nAvenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of\nChief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. The written petition must be received no later than\n20 days after receipt of the Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a\nstatement of the issue(s) and meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a\npetition automatically stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the\norder, including corrective action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon\nrequest, grants a stay.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\nDecember 20, 2023\n___________________________________ __________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n32023002NOPV_Closure Letter_01162024_(21-202836)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: shawn.patterson@southernstar.com;\ncraig.thomas@southernstar.com\nJanuary 16, 2024\nMr. Shawn L. Patterson\nPresident/CEO\nSouthern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.\n4700 State Route 56\nBox 20010\nOwensboro, KY 42301\nRE: CPF 3-2023-002-NOPV\nDear Mr. Patterson:\nOn December 2, 2023 the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc. (Southern Star) a Final Order in the above-\nreferenced case. This Order included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based\non our review of the documentation provided by your office and confirmation of payment of the\ncivil penalty, it has been determined that Southern Star has complied with the terms of this Final\nOrder.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Craig Thomas, Manager, Integrity Management & PHMSA Compliance\n(craig.thomas@southernstar.com)","truncated":false,"body_characters":34359}