{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32024023NOA","title":"ENBRIDGE STORAGE (CUSHING) L.L.C. — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2024-05-10","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.446(a), 195.446(b)(5), 195.446(c)(2), 195.446(d)(1), 195.446(g)(1)(i), 195.446(h).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32024023noa.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32024023noa.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32024023noa","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32024023NOA","body":"Notice of Amendment involving ENBRIDGE STORAGE (CUSHING) L.L.C.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.446(a),  195.446(b)(5),  195.446(c)(2),  195.446(d)(1),  195.446(g)(1)(i),  195.446(h). The case was opened on 2024-05-10 and is reported as closed as of 2024-12-10. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32024023NOA_Closure Letter_12102024_(23-264643).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32024023NOA/32024023NOA_Closure%20Letter_12102024_(23-264643).pdf\n\n32024023NOA_Closure Letter_12102024_(23-264643)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32024023NOA/32024023NOA_Closure%20Letter_12102024_(23-264643)_text.pdf\n\n32024023NOA_Notice of Amendment_05102024_(23-264643).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32024023NOA/32024023NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_05102024_(23-264643).pdf\n\n32024023NOA_Notice of Amendment_05102024_(23-264643)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32024023NOA/32024023NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_05102024_(23-264643)_text.pdf\n\n32024023NOA_Operator Response to Notice_06072024_(23-264643).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32024023NOA/32024023NOA_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_06072024_(23-264643).pdf\n\n32024023NOA_Closure Letter_12102024_(23-264643)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: kevin.ruffatto@enbridge.com; stacy.soine@enbridge.com\nDecember 10, 2024\nKevin Ruffatto\nVP, US Operations\nEnbridge Storage Cushing, LLC\n915 N Eldridge Parkway, Suite 1100\nHouston, TX 77079\nRE: CPF 3-2024-023-NOA\nDear Mr. Ruffatto:\nFrom September 18 to September 28, 2023, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code\n(U.S.C.), conducted an on-site inspection of Enbridge Storage Cushing, LLC (Enbridge Cushing)\nprocedures for Control Room Management (CRM) in Cushing, Oklahoma. As a result of the\ninspection, Enbridge Cushing was issued a Notice of Amendment on May 10, 2024, which\nproposed amendment of your procedures\nEnbridge Cushing submitted its amended procedures on December 6, 2024. My staff reviewed\nthe amended procedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of\nAmendment have been corrected.\nThis letter is to inform you that no further action is necessary, and this case is now closed.\nThank you for your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Stacy Soine, Advisor Regulatory Compliance, Enbridge Cushing, stacy.soine@enbridge.com\n\n32024023NOA_Notice of Amendment_05102024_(23-264643)_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: kevin.ruffatto@enbridge.com & eric.anderson@enbridge.com\nMay 10, 2024\nKevin Ruffatto\nVP, US Operations\nEnbridge Storage Cushing, LLC\n915 N Eldridge Parkway, Suite 1100\nHouston, TX 77079\nCPF 3-2024-023-NOA\nDear Mr. Ruffatto:\nFrom September 18 to September 28, 2024, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code\n(U.S.C.), conducted an on-site inspection of Enbridge Storage Cushing, LLC (Enbridge Cushing)\nprocedures for Control Room Management (CRM) in Cushing, Oklahoma.\nAs a result of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the apparent inadequacies found within\nEnbridge Cushing’s plans or procedures. The items inspected, and the inadequacies identified are\ndescribed below:\n1. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section. . . .\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller's prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following.\n(1) . . . .\n\n\n\n(5) The roles, responsibilities and qualifications of others who have the authority to\ndirect or supersede the specific technical actions of controllers.\nEnbridge Cushing’s “Cushing CCO Control Room Management Plan Version 8.2,” dated July\n13, 2023 (CRM Plan), was not adequate to define the roles, responsibilities and qualifications of\nothers who have the authority to direct or supersede the specific technical actions of controllers.\nSpecifically, CRM Plan sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 prohibited Operators and Senior Advisors from\ndirecting the actions of operators except to shut down and bring the system to a safe state. It\nfurther limited this action to “referencing documented procedures, training or technical\ninformation rather than specific operational instructions.” One console did not have a designated\nSenior Advisor and the Senior Advisors for the other consoles, while qualified, were not trained\nand authorized to operate the console that lacked a designated Senior Advisor. Also, while the\nSenior Advisors were, in practice, trained and qualified, the procedure did not contain a\nrequirement for Senior Advisors to be trained and qualified, nor did the procedure state\nqualifications related to experience requirements for the position that would relate to being\ncompetent to direct or supersede the technical actions of a controller. Additionally, the procedure\ndid not address how the required conditions or actions to direct or supersede a controller must be\ntaken, or how to document the event necessitating directing or superseding a controller. While\nthe procedure prohibited the directing of controllers, the procedure was silent on whether\nsuperseding the technical actions of a controller was permissible. As written, the procedure\nlanguage was unclear regarding whether someone was authorized to direct or supersede a\ncontroller.\nThe procedure needs to be modified to provide a definition for the terms “direct” and\n“supersede”. The procedure needs to include a clear statement of Enbridge Cushing’s policy\nrelated to these actions. If there are individuals who are authorized to direct or supersede a\ncontroller, then Enbridge Cushing must (1) identify those individuals and (2) define the\nqualifications of the individual(s) who can direct or supersede the technical actions of a\ncontroller in the CRM Plan. The procedure must also include the roles and responsibilities of\nindividuals when taking the action to direct or supersede a controller as well as the\ndocumentation required for such an event.\n2. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section. . . .\n(b) . . . .\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with\nthe information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to\ncarry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each\nof the following:\n(1) . . . .\n\n\n\n(2) Conduct a point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and related field\nequipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that\naffect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays.\nEnbridge Cushing’s CRM Plan, Alarm Management Plan Version 6.1, dated February 9, 2023\n(AMP), and Alarm and Event Philosophy Version 8.1, dated August 22, 2023 (Alarm Event\nPhilosophy), procedures were not adequate to clearly define which points affect pipeline safety.\nThese procedures contained descriptions of how safety related alarms were designated in the\nIconics and RTap SCADA systems. From these descriptions, PHMSA inspectors deduced that\nthe related points were safety related. However, after reviewing the safety related points list from\nthe master data base for Iconics and RTap, the safety related points were not consistent between\nthe two SCADA systems. While there are safety related points accepted by the industry to be\nsafety related, the operators must still review their operation, identify points within their system\nthat may affect safety, and then implement those points in their SCADA data base, to include\nconsistency between SCADA systems.\nAdditionally, in the Iconics SCADA system, safety related alarms were considered a critical\nevent with a priority of 1000 and a color of purple. During the inspection, Enbridge Cushing\nindicated that there were two leak alarms that were considered safety related, but have a severity\nof 500 which, per Table 6 of the Alarm Event Philosophy, carried an event designation of\nMedium/Alert and a color of yellow. The Alarm and Event Philosophy explained that in the\nIconics SCADA system a \"Medium/Alert [is assigned a severity of 500] has black text on yellow\nbackground and is the lowest priority.\" Section 5.4.1.a.i of the Safety Related Device Procedure\nfor the Iconics System stated \"Safety-Related alarms in Iconics are identified by: Alarm Priority\n1000.\" A review of the Iconics SCADA Master Database indicated that the two leak alarms were\nin fact established a priority of 500 when they should have been assigned 1000. The Iconics\nSCADA system was new as of September 2021 to the control room. Therefore § 195.446(c)(1) is\napplicable and the operator would need to demonstrate that certain provisions of API RP 1165\nare not practical for the SCADA system used.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to identify and define safety related points and associated\nsafety related alarms to provide consistency between the two SCADA systems and support\ncompliance. If it is not practical, then the operator needs to amend their procedure to state why it\nis not practical for the SCADA system used.\n3. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section. . . .\n(b) . . . .\n(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following methods to\nreduce the risk associated with controller fatigue that could inhibit a controller's\nability to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined:\n\n\n\n(1) Establish shift lengths and schedule rotations that provide controllers off-duty\ntime sufficient to achieve eight hours of continuous sleep.\nEnbridge Cushing’s procedures were not adequate to address the rotating on-call schedule for the\nthree Senior Advisors. While Enbridge Cushing indicated that after-hours calls were rare, the\nqualified controllers could be pressed into service on short notice due to controller absence and\nconsole coverage needs. Enbridge Cushing did not have any procedures related to (1) how to\nhandle the after-hour calls if sleep is disrupted and (2) how to address the requirement for eight-\nhours of continuous sleep and time off after hours worked. The Senior Advisors have 10-hour\nshifts, Monday through Friday, but Enbridge Cushing also required a rotating call shift. While the\non-shift hours of service (HOS) rules apply to all, there also needs to be considerations for the on-\ncall rotating shift and maximum limits for hours-of-service, as required by § 195.446(d)(4).\nThe procedure needs to be amended to provide additional considerations and rules for the Senior\nAdvisors regarding maximum hours of service which may provide for emergency deviations and\nprovide off duty on-call controllers sufficient time to achieve eight hours of continuous sleep.\n4. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section. . . .\n(b) . . . .\n(g) Operating experience. Each operator must assure that lessons learned from its\noperating experience are incorporated, as appropriate, into its control room\nmanagement procedures by performing each of the following:\n(1) Review accidents that must be reported pursuant to §195.50 and §195.52 to\ndetermine if control room actions contributed to the event and, if so, correct, where\nnecessary, deficiencies related to:\nEnbridge Cushing’s procedure was not adequate to:\n(i) Controller fatigue.\nEnbridge Cushing’s CRM Plan, Cushing CCO Fatigue Risk Management Plan Version 5.1,\ndated January 7, 2015 (FRMP), and CCO Incident Investigation Process and Enbridge Incident\nInvestigation Process Version 4.0, dated April 16, 2022 (CCO Process), were not adequate to\ndefine how Enbridge Cushing would review accidents that must be reported to determine if\ncontrol room actions contributed to the event and to correct deficiencies related to Controller\nfatigue. Specifically, during the inspection, Enbridge Cushing explained a practice that sounded\nadequate, but was not formalized in its procedures. A review of the Enbridge Incident\nInvestigation Process Version 4.0, dated April 16, 2022 (Incident Investigation Process),\nrevealed that the process failed to include fatigue review. CRM Plan section 8.4 only\nparaphrased the regulation, referencing a review of Operator fatigue, but failed to actually detail\na process for fatigue review.\n\n\n\nThe procedure needs to be amended to provide a process that defines what will be considered\nwhen reviewing incidents to determine if the controllers’ actions contributed to the incident. At\nthe very least the process should include a review of the controllers work schedule that includes\noff duty hours and a review of the SCADA event log to evaluate alarms and controller response.\n5. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section. . . .\n(b) . . . .\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator's program\nmust provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities\ndefined by the operator. In addition, the training program must include the\nfollowing elements:\nEnbridge Cushing’s CRM Plan section 9.4 was not adequate to demonstrate compliance that\nEnbridge Cushing had reviewed the training program content to identify potential improvements.\nSpecifically, CRM Plan section 9.4 mentioned “program reviews” with goals of “determining\nresources required (i.e., number of training days to be scheduled for each Cushing CCO\nOperator, budget submissions for major expenditures, or additional expertise required for\ntraining development, design, or administration)” and to “identify gaps in knowledge or skills,\nerroneous past or informal training, resulting in supplemental training for all Cushing CCO\nOperators.” There was also a brief statement that, “Cushing CCO specific content is reviewed\neach calendar year, not to exceed 15 months, as part of the CRMP annual review.” All of which\ndoes not provide (1) what content will be reviewed, (2) how the content will be reviewed to\ndetermine whether it meets the requirements to provide for training each controller to carry out\nthe roles and responsibilities defined by the operator. An assessment of the 2022 Training Plan\nReview, dated February 3, 2022, and Training Meeting Minutes, dated December 7, 2022,\ndemonstrated that much Enbridge Cushing’s review was focused on reviewing the procedure\nand/or the plan’s language. Simply reviewing the procedure was not adequate to demonstrate\ncompliance. The procedure and records did not demonstrate what content was reviewed and what\nchanges were implemented or recommended, even if none were made.\nThe procedure needs to be amended to provide more detail on how and what content will be\nreviewed to demonstrate that Enbridge Cushing’s program provides for training each controller\nto carry out the roles and responsibilities defined by the operator.\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as\npart of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\n\n\n\nEnforcement Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under § 190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in\nthis Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your\nplans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend\nyour plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not\ncontesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within\n30 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good cause.\nOnce the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended procedures, this\nenforcement action will be closed.\nIt is requested that Enbridge Cushing maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs\nassociated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision of plans, procedures)\nand submit the total to Gregory A. Ochs, Director, Central Region, Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration. In correspondence concerning this matter, please refer to CPF\n3-2024-023-NOA and, for each document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format\nwhenever possible.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Eric Anderson, Sr. Compliance Advisor, Audits and Inspections, US Pipeline Compliance,\neric.anderson@enbridge.com\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings","truncated":false,"body_characters":19499}