{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32026003CAO","title":"TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2026-01-18","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32026003cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32026003cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32026003cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32026003CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2026-01-18 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32026003CAO_Corrective Action Order (AMENDED)_02062026_(26-362613).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32026003CAO/32026003CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(AMENDED)_02062026_(26-362613).pdf\n\n32026003CAO_Corrective Action Order (AMENDED)_02062026_(26-362613)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32026003CAO/32026003CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(AMENDED)_02062026_(26-362613)_text.pdf\n\n32026003CAO_Corrective Action Order (AMENDED)_02232026_(26-362613).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32026003CAO/32026003CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(AMENDED)_02232026_(26-362613).pdf\n\n32026003CAO_Corrective Action Order (AMENDED)_02232026_(26-362613)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32026003CAO/32026003CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(AMENDED)_02232026_(26-362613)_text.pdf\n\n32026003CAO_Corrective Action Order_01182026_(26-362613).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32026003CAO/32026003CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_01182026_(26-362613).pdf\n\n32026003CAO_Corrective Action Order_01182026_(26-362613)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32026003CAO/32026003CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_01182026_(26-362613)_text.pdf\n\n32026003CAO_Corrective Action Order (AMENDED)_02062026_(26-362613)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nFebruary 6, 2026\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: Scott.Hallam@bwpipelines.com\nScott Hallam\nPresident and CEO\nTexas Gas Transmission, LLC\n9 Greenway Plaza, Suite 2800\nHouston, Texas 77046\nRe: CPF No. 3-2026-003-CAO\nDear Mr. Shindle,\nEnclosed please find an Amended Corrective Action Order (“ACAO” or “Order”) issued by the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS). The ACAO requires Texas Gas Transmission, LLC, to take certain corrective actions with\nrespect to the pipeline failure that occurred on January 17, 2026, on the 20-inch diameter SHC 20-\n1 pipeline near DeBerry, Texas.\nService of the ACAO by electronic mail is effective upon the date of transmission and\nacknowledgment of receipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this\nOrder are effective upon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: ACAO\ncc: Mr. David Barrett, Acting Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nBrad Shindle, VP Asset Performance, TGT, Brad.Shindle@bwpipelines.com\nTina Baker, Manager, Compliance Services, TGT, Tina.Baker@bwpipelines.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nTexas Gas Transmission, LLC, ) CPF No. 3-2026-003-CAO\n)\nRespondent. )\n)\n____________________________________)\nAMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), is issuing this Amended Corrective Action Order (“ACAO” or “Order”)1 pursuant\nto the authority provided in 49 U.S.C. § 60112. The ACAO requires Texas Gas Transmission,\nLLC (TGT),2 to take certain necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from the potential hazards associated with the continued operation of the SHC 20-1\nCarthage to Sharon Compressor station pipeline. The SHC 20-1 is a 20-inch gas transmission\nline that originates in Carthage, Texas, and runs northeast towards the Sharon Compressor\nstation. The line passes through portions of Panala County, Texas; Caddo Parish, Louisiana;\nBossier Parrish, Louisiana; Webster Parish, Louisiana; Claiborne Parish, Louisiana; and Lincoln\nParish, Louisiana.\nAt approximately 3:04 p.m. CST on January 17, 2026, TGT’s control room personnel received\nSCADA alarms for a possible incident and notified field personnel. TGT subsequently confirmed\nthat a failure occurred, resulting in the ejection of a portion of the 20-inch diameter pipe onto the\npipeline right-of-way. There were no reported injuries, fatalities, or evacuations, and there was\nno ignition of the escaping gas.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the failure. The\npreliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\n1 To the extent this ACAO is modified from the original CAO issued to Respondent under CPF No. 3-2026-003-\nCAO on January 18, 2026, this ACAO supersedes and replaces the original CAO. To the extent this ACAO is\nunmodified from the original CAO, this ACAO retains the full force and effect of the original CAO. All deadlines\nnoted in the order which refer to the date “this Order is issued” or “receipt of this Order” refer to the issuance of the\noriginal CAO on January 18, 2026.\n2 Texas Gas Transmission pipeline system consists of approximately 6,000 miles of natural gas transmission\npipelines transporting gas from the Louisiana Gulf coast up through Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, and\nKentucky, to supply gas to Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio.\n\n\n\nPreliminary Findings\nJanuary 17, 2026 Incident\n• At approximately 3:04 p.m. CST on January 17, 2025, TGT’s control room personnel\nreceived SCADA alarms for a possible incident and notified field personnel.\n• At 4:12 p.m. CST, field personnel confirmed that a rupture occurred on the SHC 20-1 20-\ninch pipeline. At 4:20 p.m., the failure location was isolated by closing Valves SHC-7\nand SHC-8. At 4:50 pm, the line segment was completely blown down to zero pressure.\n• The failure occurred at mile post (MP) 88+3571 on TGT’s SHC 20-1 Carthage to Red\nRiver pipeline segment in Panala County, Texas.\n• TGT notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the failure on January 17, 2026, at\napproximately 4:29 pm CST (NRC Incident Report #1452961).\n• PHMSA launched an investigation, with investigators arriving on January 18, 2026.\n• The pipe at the failure location is 20-inch diameter pipe, 0.281-inch wall thickness\nconstructed in 1949 with API 5L X46 direct current electric resistance welded (DC-\nERW) longitudinal seam manufactured by Youngstown. DC-ERW pipe of this vintage is\nknown to present certain integrity risks.\n• On the Carthage to Red River pipeline segment, TGT reports that there is approximately\n42,572 feet of DC-ERW pipe. On the Red River to Sharon Compressor station pipe\nsegment, TGT reports that there is approximately 26,209 feet of DC-ERW pipe.\n• In 2024, 2017, 2010, and 2004, TGT ran inline inspection (ILI) tools through the pipeline\nat the location of the failure, including magnetic flux leakage (MFL), deformation, and\ninertial mapping tools.\n• The maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the pipe at the failure site is 931\npounds per square inch gauge (psig). The operating pressure at the time of the failure was\napproximately 785 psig as measured at the Carthage #3 Mark West, which is\napproximately 2.5 miles upstream of the failure location.\nAmended Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\n\n\n\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the\npopulation density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is\nlocated; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under\nanother law; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the\ncharacteristics of the pipeline, the nature of the failure; the hazardous nature of the material\ntransported; the existing and potential additional impacts to property, the environment, and\nwildlife; it is hereby determined that continued operation of the Affected Segment of the TGT\nSHC 20-1 pipeline, as defined below, without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to\nlife, property, or the environment, and that failure to issue this Order expeditiously would result\nin the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nDefinitions\nAffected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means the 20-inch diameter SHC 20-1 20”\npipeline from the start of the mainline at the Carthage facility (M.P. 96 + 2140 ft.) to the Sharon\nCompressor Station (MP 0.000).\nIsolated Segment – The “Isolated Segment” means the 20-inch diameter SHC 20-1 20” pipeline\nbetween mainline valves SHC-7 and SHC-8.\nDirector – The “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region.\n1. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, TGT must develop and\nsubmit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\n\n\n\na. The Restart Plan must include a Repair Plan for the Director’s approval.\nb. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally, including the Repair Plan,\nwithout approving the entire plan.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\nd. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling and sufficient surveillance of\nthe Isolated Segment during the restart process to ensure that no leaks are present\nwhen operation of the line resumes.\ne. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance communications\nwith local emergency response officials.\n2. Operating Pressure Restriction. TGT must reduce and maintain a twenty percent (20%)\npressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected\nSegment, such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segment will not exceed\neighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the\nfailure on January 17, 2026.\na. This pressure restriction must remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the\nDirector.\nb. Within 10 days of issuance of the Order, TGT must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of each compressor station and each main line pressure regulating\nstation on the Affected Segment at the time of failure and the reduced pressure\nrestriction set-points at these same locations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to be\nadjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, TGT must take into account any\nin-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected Segment to\nprovide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are completed.\ne. TGT must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating pressure\ndata. TGT must take into account any ILI features or anomalies present in the Affected\nSegment and immediately reduce the operating pressure to maintain the safe\noperations of the Affected Segment, if warranted by the monthly review. TGT must\nsubmit the results of the monthly review to the Director. The results must include, at a\nminimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional pressure\nreductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points.\nf. TGT may request approval from the Director to increase the operating pressure on\nindividual segments on the Affected Pipeline based on an engineering analysis or other\njustification that the segment does not pose a safety risk.\n3. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, TGT\nmust complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,\nincluding an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and\nanalysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section\nand other evidence from the failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and\nthe proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\n\n\n\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with\nthe scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS representative\nto witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports (whether draft or final) in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to TGT.\n4. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, TGT must\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to\nthe Director. The RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an independent third-party\nacceptable to the Director and must document the decision making process and all factors\ncontributing to the failure. The final report must include findings, and any lessons learned\nand whether the findings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within\nTGT’s pipeline system. The independent third-party must distribute all RCFA reports\n(whether draft or final) in their entirety to the Director at the same time they are made\navailable to TGT provide all versions of the RCFA\n5. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 120 days following receipt of this Order, TGT must submit a Remedial Work\nPlan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial\nmeasures TGT will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment. It must address\nall known or suspected factors and causes of the January 17, 2026 failure. TGT must\nconsider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to\ndevelop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Affected Segment.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the January 17, 2026 failure.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test\nfailures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written report containing all the\navailable information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, RCFA, and other corrective\nactions required by this Order with all relevant pre-existing operational and\nassessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-existing operational data includes,\nbut is not limited to, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior\nmetallurgical analyses, and any third party consultation information. Pre-existing\nassessment data includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure\ntesting, direct assessments, close interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the failure on January 17,\n2026, are likely to exist elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the failure\non January 17, 2026, and other failures from the failure history (see [(e)(ii)]\nabove) or any other integrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected\nSegment. At a minimum, this process must consider all failure causes and specify\nthe use of one or more of the following:\n\n\n\n1) ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the pipeline system\nbased on the cause of failure on January 17, 2026, and that can reliably detect and\nidentify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Close-interval surveys,\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in\ncoordination with other utilities (e.g. underground utilities, overhead power lines,\netc.) in the area,\n5) Coating surveys,\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys,\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and,\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the\nfailure causes.\nNote: TGT may use the results of previous tests, inspections, assessments, and\nevaluations if approved by the Director, provided the results of the tests,\ninspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard to the factors\nknown or suspected to have caused the January 17, 2026 failure.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria TGT will use to prioritize, excavate,\nevaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified integrity threats.\nInclude a description of how any defects will be graded and a schedule for repairs or\nreplacement.\nvii. Describe the methods TGT will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective\nmeasures to remediate the conditions associated with the pipeline failure on January\n17, 2026, and to address other known integrity threats along the Affected Segment.\nThe repair, replacement, or other corrective measures must meet the criteria\nspecified in [1(d)(vi)] above.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification measures\nto ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment considering the results\nof the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective measures undertaken\npursuant to the Order.\nf. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\ng. TGT must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate modifications required\nby the Director.\ni. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\nii. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\niii. Any and all revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO\nDocumentation Report (CDR).\nh. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to the\nplan.\n6. CAO Documentation Report (CDR). TGT must create and revise, as necessary, a CAO\nDocumentation Report (CDR). When TGT has concluded all the items in this Order it will\nsubmit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to complete\na thorough review of all actions taken by TGT with regards to this Order prior to approving\nthe closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities and\ndocumentation associated with this Order in one document.\n\n\n\na. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire CDR.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nc. The CDR must include but not be limited to:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. Summary of the pipeline failure of January 17, 2026, and the response activities;\niii. Summary of pipe data/properties and all prior assessments of the Affected\nSegment;\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis required\nby the Order;\nv. Summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by the Order;\nvi. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nvii. Documentation of all actions taken by TGT to implement the RWP, the results of\nthose actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever\nnecessary to incorporate new information obtained during the failure investigation\nand remedial activities;\nix. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\nx. A path forward describing specific actions TGT will take on its entire pipeline\nsystem as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order; and\nxi. Appendices (if required).\nOther Requirements:\n7. Approvals. With respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of\nthe Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve\nthe submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any\ndeficiencies; (d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent\nmodify the submission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval,\napproval upon conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to\ntake all action required by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the\nDirector disapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all\ndeficiencies within the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n8. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\n9. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and\nresults of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress\nof the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due\non April 30, 2026, covering the period through March 31, 2026. The Director may change\nthe interval for the submission of these reports.\n10. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of\nthe costs associated with implementation of this CAO. Include in each monthly report\nsubmitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including\n\n\n\nrepairs, replacements, and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if\napplicable.\nBe advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies\nfor confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document\nyou must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 3-2026-003-CAO” and for\neach document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The\nactions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply\nto Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 CFR Parts 190 through 199, under any other order\nissued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision\nof Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for\nPipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral\nto the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49\nU.S.C. § 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR\n§ 190.5.\n_____________________________ __________________________\nLinda Daugherty Date Issued\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n32026003CAO_Corrective Action Order_01182026_(26-362613)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nJanuary 18, 2026\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: Scott.Hallam@bwpipelines.com\nScott Hallam\nPresident and CEO\nTexas Gas Transmission, LLC\n9 Greenway Plaza, Suite 2800\nHouston, Texas 77046\nRe: CPF No. 3-2026-003-CAO\nDear Mr. Shindle,\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (“CAO” or “Order”) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The CAO\nrequires Texas Gas Transmission, LLC, to take certain corrective actions with respect to the\npipeline failure that occurred on January 17, 2026, on the 20-inch diameter SHC 20-1 pipeline near\nDeBerry, Texas.\nService of the CAO by electronic mail is effective upon the date of transmission and\nacknowledgment of receipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this\nOrder are effective upon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: Mr. David Barrett, Acting Director, Central Region, OPS, PHMSA\nBrad Shindle, VP Asset Performance, TGT, Brad.Shindle@bwpipelines.com\nTina Baker, Manager, Compliance Services, TGT, Tina.Baker@bwpipelines.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nTexas Gas Transmission, LLC, ) CPF No. 3-2026-003-CAO\n)\nRespondent. )\n)\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (“CAO” or “Order”) pursuant to the\nauthority provided in 49 U.S.C. § 60112. The CAO requires Texas Gas Transmission, LLC\n(TGT),1 to take certain necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from the potential hazards associated with the continued operation of the SHC 20-1\nCarthage to Sharon Compressor station pipeline. The SHC 20-1 is a 20-inch gas transmission\nline that originates in Carthage, Texas, and runs northeast towards the Sharon Compressor\nstation. The line passes through portions of Panala County, Texas; Caddo Parish, Louisiana;\nBossier Parrish, Louisiana; Webster Parish, Louisiana; Claiborne Parish, Louisiana; and Lincoln\nParish, Louisiana.\nAt approximately 3:04 p.m. CST on January 17, 2026, TGT’s control room personnel received\nSCADA alarms for a possible incident and notified field personnel. TGT subsequently confirmed\nthat a failure occurred, resulting in the ejection of a portion of the 20-inch diameter pipe onto the\npipeline right-of-way. There were no reported injuries, fatalities, or evacuations, and there was\nno ignition of the escaping gas.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the failure. The\npreliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\n1 Texas Gas Transmission pipeline system consists of approximately 6,000 miles of natural gas transmission\npipelines transporting gas from the Louisiana Gulf coast up through Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, and\nKentucky, to supply gas to Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio.\n\n\n\nPreliminary Findings\nJanuary 17, 2026 Incident\n• At approximately 3:04 p.m. CST on January 17, 2025, TGT’s control room personnel\nreceived SCADA alarms for a possible incident and notified field personnel.\n• At 4:12 p.m. CST, field personnel confirmed that a rupture occurred on the SHC 20-1 20-\ninch pipeline. At 4:20 p.m., the failure location was isolated by closing Valves SHC-7\nand SHC-8. At 4:50 pm, the line segment was completely blown down to zero pressure.\n• The failure occurred at mile post (MP) 88+3571 on TGT’s SHC 20-1 Carthage to Red\nRiver pipeline segment in Panala County, Texas.\n• TGT notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the failure on January 17, 2026, at\napproximately 4:29 pm CST (NRC Incident Report #1452961).\n• PHMSA launched an investigation, with investigators arriving on January 18, 2026.\n• The pipe at the failure location is 20-inch diameter pipe, 0.281-inch wall thickness\nconstructed in 1949 with API 5L X46 low frequency electric resistance welded (LF-\nERW) longitudinal seam manufactured by Youngstown. LF-ERW pipe of this vintage is\nknown to present certain integrity risks.\n• On the Carthage to Red River pipeline segment, TGT reports that there is approximately\n42,572 feet of LF-ERW pipe. On the Red River to Sharon Compressor station pipe\nsegment, TGT reports that there is approximately 26,209 feet of LF-ERW pipe.\n• In 2024, 2017, 2010, and 2004, TGT ran inline inspection (ILI) tools through the pipeline\nat the location of the failure, including magnetic flux leakage (MFL), deformation, and\ninertial mapping tools.\n• The maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the pipe at the failure site is 931\npounds per square inch gauge (psig). The operating pressure at the time of the failure was\napproximately 785 psig as measured at the Carthage #3 Mark West, which is\napproximately 2.5 miles upstream of the failure location.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\n\n\n\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the\npopulation density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is\nlocated; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under\nanother law; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the\ncharacteristics of the pipeline, the nature of the failure; the hazardous nature of the material\ntransported; the existing and potential additional impacts to property, the environment, and\nwildlife; it is hereby determined that continued operation of the Affected Segment of the TGT\nSHC 20-1 pipeline, as defined below, without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to\nlife, property, or the environment, and that failure to issue this Order expeditiously would result\nin the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nDefinitions\nAffected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means the 20-inch diameter SHC 20-1 20” pipeline\nfrom the start of the mainline at the Carthage facility (M.P. 96 + 2140 ft.) to the Sharon\nCompressor Station (MP 0.000).\nIsolated Segment – The “Isolated Segment” means the 20-inch diameter SHC 20-1 20” pipeline\nbetween mainline valves SHC-7 and SHC-8.\nDirector – The “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region.\n\n\n\n1. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, TGT must develop and\nsubmit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\na. The Restart Plan must include a Repair Plan for the Director’s approval.\nb. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally, including the Repair Plan,\nwithout approving the entire plan.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\nd. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling and sufficient surveillance of\nthe Isolated Segment during the restart process to ensure that no leaks are present\nwhen operation of the line resumes.\ne. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance communications\nwith local emergency response officials.\n2. Operating Pressure Restriction. TGT must reduce and maintain a twenty percent (20%)\npressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected\nSegment, such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segment will not exceed\neighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the\nfailure on January 17, 2026.\na. This pressure restriction must remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the\nDirector.\nb. Within 10 days of issuance of the Order, TGT must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of each compressor station and each main line pressure regulating\nstation on the Affected Segment at the time of failure and the reduced pressure\nrestriction set-points at these same locations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to be\nadjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, TGT must take into account any\nin-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected Segment to\nprovide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are completed.\ne. TGT must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating pressure\ndata. TGT must take into account any ILI features or anomalies present in the Affected\nSegment and immediately reduce the operating pressure to maintain the safe\noperations of the Affected Segment, if warranted by the monthly review. TGT must\nsubmit the results of the monthly review to the Director. The results must include, at a\nminimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional pressure\nreductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points.\nf. TGT may request approval from the Director to increase the operating pressure on\nindividual segments on the Affected Pipeline based on an engineering analysis or other\njustification that the segment does not pose a safety risk.\n3. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, TGT\nmust complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,\nincluding an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and\nanalysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section\nand other evidence from the failure site.\n\n\n\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and\nthe proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with\nthe scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS representative\nto witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports (whether draft or final) in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to TGT.\n4. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, TGT must\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to\nthe Director. The RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an independent third-party\nacceptable to the Director and must document the decision making process and all factors\ncontributing to the failure. The final report must include findings, and any lessons learned\nand whether the findings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within\nTGT’s pipeline system. The independent third-party must distribute all RCFA reports\n(whether draft or final) in their entirety to the Director at the same time they are made\navailable to TGT provide all versions of the RCFA\n5. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 120 days following receipt of this Order, TGT must submit a Remedial Work\nPlan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, ","truncated":true,"body_characters":74398}