{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32026023CAO","title":"AMOCO OIL CO — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2026-08-03","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32026023cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32026023cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32026023cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32026023CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving AMOCO OIL CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2026-08-03 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32026023CAO_Corrective Action Order_08032026_(26-379109).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32026023CAO/32026023CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_08032026_(26-379109).pdf\n\n32026023CAO_Corrective Action Order_08032026_(26-379109)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32026023CAO/32026023CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_08032026_(26-379109)_text.pdf\n\n32026023CAO_Corrective Action Order_08032026_(26-379109)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E.\nWashington, D.C. 20590\nAugust 3, 2026\nVIA EMAIL TO: lori.knutson@bp.com; chris.vodicka@bp.com; jim.bruen@bp.com;\njames.fraleyjr@bp.com\nLori Knutson\nVice President\nAMOCO Oil Co.\n501 Westlake Park Boulevard\nHouston, Texas 60606\nCPF 3-2026-023-CAO\nDear Ms. Knutson:\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The CAO\nrequires Amoco Oil Company (Amoco) to take certain corrective actions with respect to the\npipeline failure that occurred on July 29, 2026, on the 12-inch Rouge Pipeline that transports\nrefined petroleum products from Whiting Refinery in East Chicago, Indiana, to River Rouge,\nMichigan.\nService of the CAO by email is effective upon the date of transmission and acknowledgment of\nreceipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nKeith Coyle\nGeneral Counsel\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration\n\n\n\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: AJ McKean, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nRyan McClure, Attorney Advisor, PHMSA, ryan.mcclure@dot.gov\nChris Vodicka, Vice President, Amoco, chris.vodicka@bp.com\nJim Bruen, DOT Compliance Lead, Amoco, jim.bruen@bp.com\nJames Fraley, Amoco, James.FraleyJr@bp.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nAmoco Oil Company, ) CPF No. 3-2026-023-CAO\n)\nRespondent )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) pursuant to the authority\nprovided in 49 U.S.C. § 60112. The CAO requires Amoco Oil Company (Amoco or\nRespondent), a BP subsidiary, to take certain necessary corrective actions to protect the public,\nproperty, and the environment from the potential hazards associated with the continued operation\nof the Rouge Pipeline. The Rouge Pipeline is a 12-inch pipeline that transports refined petroleum\nproducts from Whiting Refinery in East Chicago, Indiana, to River Rouge, Michigan.\nOn July 29, 2026, Amoco reported to the National Response Center a suspected leak on its\nRouge Pipeline near the BP Whiting Refinery in East Chicago, Indiana, after discovering a pool\nof diesel fuel directly above the pipeline (hereinafter the Failure). The Failure resulted in a three-\nfoot diameter pool of diesel directly above the pipeline. At this location, the pipeline runs\nbetween two railroad tracks. Amoco isolated the segment and dispatched personnel to excavate\nand expose the pipeline. Respondent found the source of the leak on its pipeline August 2, 2026.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The\npreliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\n● The Rouge Pipeline is a 12-inch, 0.344-inch wt, seamless, X42 grade, coal tar coated, 1953\nvintage interstate pipeline. In certain locations, the pipeline is encased in concrete. Amoco\ndoes not know the manufacturer at this time. In the area of the Failure, the pipeline runs\nbetween two railroad tracks and then has a bend of approximately 90 degrees where it\ncrosses under the west track owned by the Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad (IHBR). This\ncrossing is a cased pipeline. The other track is owned by the Canadian National Railroad\nand was inactive at the time of the accident. The pipeline does not cross the Canadian\nNational Railroad.\n\n\n\n2\n● On July 29, 2026, a railroad worker reported a diesel odor near the intersection of Canal\nStreet and Dock Street in East Chicago, Indiana.\n● After receiving the report, Amoco initiated an investigation. Amoco personnel discovered\na three-foot diameter pool of diesel directly above the Rouge Pipeline. Amoco isolated a\nthree-mile long section of the pipeline to allow its personnel to excavate and expose the\npipeline.\n● Amoco notified the National Response Center (NRC 1469300) on July 29, 2026, at 6:38\npm.\n● The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline is 1439 psig and the actual\noperating pressure was 1175 psig at the time the Failure was discovered. As of August 2,\n2026, the pipeline pressure is 6.2 psig as a result of product in the line.\n● A separate pipeline operated by Linde that transports nitrogen is located beneath the Rouge\nPipeline.\n● Rail traffic on the active IHBR track was stopped until personnel could be dispatched to\nensure safe passage of trains by the excavation site. Restricted rail traffic has resumed\nalthough pipeline repair activities may further restrict or stop rail traffic.\n● The Failure occurred in a largely industrial area east of a PHMSA-regulated breakout tank\nfacility owned by Buckeye and north of a residential neighborhood. No property damage\nor evacuations were reported beyond the immediate location of the Failure.\n● On August 1, 2026, excavators unearthed the 90-degree pipeline bend. The exposed\npipeline has 16 clocksprings (i.e., composite repair wraps) that were installed in 2012.\nAmoco installed the clocksprings to remediate corrosion identified during an in-line\ninspection.\n● During the excavation, heavy rain impeded the initial determination of the leak location.\nAs of August 2, 2026, Amoco believes it found the source of the leak along the bend that\nwas repaired with clocksprings in 2012.\n● The upstream pipeline extending north of the bend is surrounded by concrete for buoyancy\ncontrol.\n● PHMSA dispatched an accident investigator on July 30, 2026. The investigator arrived on-\nsite on July 31, 2026. PHMSA’s investigation is ongoing.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\n\n\n\n3\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the\npopulation density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is\nlocated; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another\nlaw; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the\ncharacteristics of the pipeline, including the number of repairs made to the pipe at this location;\nthe nature of the Failure, which appears to have originated along the pipeline bend previously\nrepaired with composite repair wraps; the hazardous nature of the material transported (diesel fuel\npresents fire, health and environmental hazards); the location of the Failure near industrial and\nresidential areas, train infrastructure, and other pipeline infrastructure; and the existing and\npotential additional impacts to life, property, or the environment; it is hereby determined that\ncontinued operation of the Affected Segment of the Rouge Pipeline, as defined below, without\ncorrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment, and that failure\nto issue this Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider an amended order. To\nthe extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nCorrective Measures\nDefinitions\nAffected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means the approximately 70-mile pipeline\nsegment between Whiting Pump Station and South Bend Pump Station on the Rouge Pipeline.\nIsolated Segment – The “Isolated Segment” means the approximately 9,150-feet pipeline\nsegment from Whiting Pump Station to Gate 23 on the Rouge Pipeline. The Isolated Section has\n8,354 feet of concrete coated pipe out of the total 9,150 feet of pipeline in this section.\nFailure – The “Failure” means the leak reported on July 29, 2026, near the intersection of Canal\nStreet and Dock Street in East Chicago, Indiana.\n\n\n\n4\nDirector – The “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, OPS Central Region.\n1. Shut Down. Amoco must not operate the Isolated Segment until authorized to do so by the\nDirector.\n2. Operating Pressure Restriction. Amoco must reduce and maintain a twenty percent\n(20%) pressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the\nAffected Segment such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segment will not\nexceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to\nthe Failure.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from\nthe Director.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Amoco must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of each pump/compressor station and each main line pressure\nregulating station on the Affected Segment at the time of failure and the reduced\npressure restriction set-points at these same locations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to\nbe adjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, Amoco must take into\naccount any in-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected\nSegment to provide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions\nare completed.\ne. Amoco must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating\npressure data. Amoco must take into account any in-line inspection (ILI) features\nor anomalies present in the Affected Segment and immediately reduce the operating\npressure to maintain the safe operations of the Affected Segment, if warranted by\nthe monthly review. Amoco must submit the results of the monthly review to the\nDirector. The results must include, at a minimum, the current discharge set-points\n(including any additional pressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at\ndischarge set-points.\n3. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, Amoco must develop\nand submit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\na. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the\nentire plan but the Isolated Segment cannot resume operation until the Restart Plan\nis approved in its entirety.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference\ninto this Order.\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate ground patrolling of the Isolated\nSegment during the restart process and must include incremental pressure increases\nduring start up, with each increment to be held for at least 2 hours.\n\n\n\n5\nd. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials.\ne. The Restart Plan must provide for a review of the Isolated Segment for conditions\nsimilar to those of the Failure including a review of construction, operating and\nmaintenance (O&M), and integrity management records such as in-line inspection\n(ILI) results, hydrostatic tests, root cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial\nand ground patrols, corrosion, cathodic protection, excavations, and pipe\nreplacements. Amoco must address any findings that require remedial measures to\nbe implemented prior to restart.\nf. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all\nmandated actions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural\nmodifications are incorporated into Amoco’s operations and maintenance\nprocedures manual.\n4. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, Amoco may return the\nIsolated Segment to service but the operating pressure must not exceed eighty percent\n(80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the Failure on July\n29, 2026 in accordance with Item 2 above.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification\nof the pressure restriction upon a written request from Amoco demonstrating that restoring\nthe pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering\nanalysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known defects,\nanomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.\n6. Temporary Modification of Pressure Restrictions. The Director may allow the\ntemporary removal or modification of the pressure restrictions upon a written request from\nAmoco demonstrating that temporary mitigative and preventive measures are implemented\nprior to and during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The\nDirector's determination will be based on the Failure cause and provision of evidence that\npreventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide for the safe operation of\nthe Affected Segment during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director in this regard will be decided by the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n7. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, Amoco\nmust complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,\nincluding an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials, and submit the results to\nthe Director for review. Amoco must submit the completed final report of this testing and\nanalysis to the Director for review and approval. Amoco must ensure that all reports,\nwhether draft or final, are made available in their entirety to the Director at the same time\nthey are made available to Amoco. Soil analysis and mechanical and metallurgical testing\nmust be conducted by an independent third-party approved by the Director prior to\ncommencing testing and must document the decision-making process and all factors\ncontributing to the failure. Respondent must complete the testing and analysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the Failure site.\n\n\n\n6\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and\nthe proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the soil analysis and mechanical and metallurgical testing,\nprovide the Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to\nallow for an OPS representative to witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to Amoco.\n8. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, Amoco\nmust complete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA\nto the Director for review and approval. No later than 30 days following receipt of this\nOrder, Amoco must provide the scope and protocol of the RCFA to the Director for review\nand approval. The RCFA must be conducted by an independent third-party, different from\nthe independent third-party performing the mechanical and metallurgical testing required\nin paragraph 7 above, approved by the Director prior to commencing the analysis, and must\ndocument the decision-making process and all factors contributing to the failure. Amoco\nmust direct the third-party to engage in once-a-week calls with PHMSA to provide updates\nas to the progress of the RCFA. These calls shall be done virtually and continue until the\nRCFA has been submitted to the Director. Amoco must ensure that all reports, whether\ndraft or final, are made available in their entirety to the Director at the same time they are\nmade available to Amoco. The final report must include findings, and any lessons learned\nand whether the findings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within\nAmoco’s pipeline system.\n9. Records Verification. As recommended in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06, Amoco\nmust verify the records for the Affected Segment to confirm the maximum operating\npressure. Amoco must submit documentation of this record verification to the Director\nwithin 15 days of receipt of this Order.\n10. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 60 days of approval of the RCFA required above, Amoco must submit a\nRemedial Work Plan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire\nRWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and\nremedial measures Amoco will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment.\nIt must address all known or suspected factors and causes of the Failure. Amoco\nshould consider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another\nfailure to develop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Affected\nSegment.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the Failure.\n\n\n\n7\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and\npressure test failures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written\nreport containing all the available information such as the locations, dates,\nand causes of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis,\nand other corrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-\nexisting operational and assessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-\nexisting operational data includes, but is not limited to, construction,\noperations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and\nany third-party consultation information. Pre-existing assessment data\nincludes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing,\ndirect assessments, close interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Failure are likely\nto exist elsewhere on the Affected Segment. Conduct additional field tests,\ninspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to determine whether, and to\nwhat extent, the conditions associated with the Failure and other failures\nfrom the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or any other integrity threats are\npresent elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At a minimum, this process\nmust consider all failure causes and specify the use of one or more of the\nfollowing:\n1) Inline inspection (ILI) tools that are technically appropriate for\nassessing the pipeline system based on the cause of the Failure and\nthat can reliably detect and identify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Corrosion control methods including cathodic protection and\ncoating evaluations, close-interval surveys, evaluation of stray\ncurrent, and stress corrosion cracking and selective seam corrosion\nsurveys, if applicable,\n4) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate\nfor the Failure causes.\nNote: Amoco may use the results of previous tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations if approved by the Director, provided the\nresults of the tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations are\nanalyzed with regard to the factors known or suspected to have caused\nthe Failure.\nv. Describe the inspection and repair criteria Amoco will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\nintegrity threats, including those related to processes applied per (e)(iv)\nabove. Include a description of how any defects will be graded and a\nschedule for repairs or replacement.\nvi. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment,\ndescribe the methods Amoco will use to repair, replace, or take other\ncorrective measures to remediate the conditions associated with the Failure\n\n\n\n8\nand to address other known integrity threats along the Affected Segment.\nThe repair, replacement, or other corrective measures must meet the criteria\nspecified in (e)(v) above.\nvii. Incorporate findings and lessons learned in response to the Failure in all\nrelated programs and procedures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the\nAffected Segment considering the results of the analyses, inspections, and\nevaluations resulting from actions taken in response to this Order.\nf. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\ng. Amoco must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and to incorporate modifications\nrequired by the Director. Amoco must submit any plan revisions to the Director for\nprior approval. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally. Any and\nall revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by reference\ninto this Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO Documentation\nReport (CDR).\nh. Amoco must implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any\nrevisions to the plan.\n11. CAO Documentation Report (CDR). Amoco must create and revise, as necessary, a CAO\nDocumentation Report (CDR). When Amoco has concluded all the items in this Order it\nwill submit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to\ncomplete a thorough review of all actions taken by Amoco with regards to this Order prior\nto approving the closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities\nand documentation associated with this Order in one document.\na. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire\nCDR.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nc. The CDR must include but not be limited to:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. Summary of the pipeline Failure, and the response activities;\niii. Summary of pipe data and properties and all prior assessments of the\nAffected Segment;\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis\nrequired by the Order;\nv. Summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by the\nOrder;\nvi. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nvii. Documentation of all actions taken by Amoco to implement the RWP, the\nresults of those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\n\n\n\n9\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and\nwhenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the\nfailure investigation and remedial activities;\nix. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\nx. A path forward describing specific actions Amoco will take on its entire\npipeline system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order;\nand\nxi. Appendices (if required).\n12. Reporting. Amoco must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all\navailable data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2)\ndescribe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first\nquarterly report is due on November 1, 2026, covering the period through the date the first\nquarterly report is submitted. The Director may change the interval for the submission of\nthese reports.\n13. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of\nthe costs associated with implementation of this CAO. Include in each quarterly report\nsubmitted the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of procedures,\nstudies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including repairs,\nreplacements, and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.\nAdministrative Actions\n14. Approvals. With respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of\nthe Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve\nthe submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies;\n(d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the\nsubmission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n15. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\nBe advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\n\n\n\n10\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 3-2026-023-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 CFR Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued\nto Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of federal\nor state law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR\n§ 190.5.\n__________________________ _______________________\nKeith Coyle Date Issued\nChief Counsel\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration","truncated":false,"body_characters":29523}