{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420071004","title":"ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2007-03-29","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.917(a), 192.917(c), 192.917(e)(1), 192.917(e)(4), 192.925(b), 192.925(b)(1), 192.927(c)(1)(i), 192.927(c)(5)(ii), 192.929(b)(1), 192.935(c).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420071004.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420071004.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420071004","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420071004","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.917(a),  192.917(c),  192.917(e)(1),  192.917(e)(4),  192.925(b),  192.925(b)(1),  192.927(c)(1)(i),  192.927(c)(5)(ii),  192.929(b)(1),  192.935(c). The case was opened on 2007-03-29 and is reported as closed as of 2012-01-23. Proposed civil penalty: $95,000. Assessed civil penalty: $51,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420071004_Closure Letter_01232012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_Closure%20Letter_01232012.pdf\n\n420071004_Closure Letter_01232012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_Closure%20Letter_01232012_text.pdf\n\n420071004_FinalOrder_02112011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_FinalOrder_02112011.pdf\n\n420071004_FinalOrder_02112011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_FinalOrder_02112011_text.pdf\n\n420071004_Notice Letter_03292007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_Notice%20Letter_03292007.pdf\n\n420071004_operator response to notice_09282007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_operator%20response%20to%20notice_09282007.pdf\n\n420071004_Closure Letter_01232012_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nJanuary 23, 2012\nMr. Walter Ferguson\nDivision Sr. VP MidStream Field Operations, Engineering & Construction\nCenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission, LLC\nP.O. Box 21734\nShreveport, Louisiana 71151\nCPF 4-2007-1004\nDear Mr. Ferguson:\nOn February 11, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration issued a Final Order\nto CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company (CenterPoint) in the referenced case. Based\non review of the documentation you provided and confirmation that the administrative civil\npenalty has been paid, it has been determined that CenterPoint has complied with the terms and\nconditions of the Final Order.\nAccordingly, PHMSA now considers this case closed and no further action is contemplated with\nrespect to the maters involved in this case.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\n\n420071004_FinalOrder_02112011_text.pdf\n\nFEB 11 2011\nMr. Pete Kirsch\nDivision Senior Vice President\nPipeline, Operations and Engineering\nCenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company\nP.O. Box 1700\nHouston, Texas 77210-1700\nRe: CPF No. 4-2007-1004\nDear Mr. Kirsch:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, withdraws certain allegations of violation, and assesses a reduced civil penalty of\n$51,000. The Final Order also specifies certain actions that need to be taken by CenterPoint to\ncomply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final\nOrder. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed,\nas determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Your\nreceipt of the Final Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. R.M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA\nMr. Kenneth B. Driver, Esq.\nCounsel for CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission\nJones Day\n51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.\nWashington, D.C. 20001\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0041 3221]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n_____________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nCenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company, )\nRespondent. )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n) CPF No. 4-2007-1004\n_____________________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn September 12-16, and November 14-18, 2005, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a\nrepresentative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office\nof Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the Integrity\nManagement Program records of CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company (CenterPoint\nor Respondent), in Shreveport, Louisiana.\napproximately 8,200 miles of interstate natural gas pipelines, of which 186 miles were covered\nby its Integrity Management Program (IMP).\n1 At the time of the inspection, Respondent operated\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated March 29, 2007, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that CenterPoint had violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.917(a), 192.917(c),\n192.917(e)(1), 192.917(e)(4), 192.925(b)(1), 192.927(c)(1)(i), 192.927(c)(5)(ii), 192.929(b)(1),\nand 192.935(c) and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $95,000 for the alleged violations. The\nNotice also proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged\nviolations.\nCenterPoint responded to the Notice by letter dated April 30, 2007. Respondent contested the\nallegations and requested a hearing. In advance of the hearing, by letter dated September 28,\n2007, CenterPoint submitted an additional response detailing its arguments and providing\nsupporting documents (Response). A hearing was subsequently held on October 11, 2007, in\nHouston, TX, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding.\nRespondent was represented by counsel in this proceeding. After the hearing, CenterPoint\nprovided a Post-Hearing Submission by letter dated November 13, 2007 (Closing).\n1 CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of CenterPoint Energy,\nInc.\n\n\n\n2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(a), which states:\n§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline\nintegrity and use the threat identification in its integrity program?\n(a) Threat identification. An operator must identify and evaluate all\npotential threats to each covered pipeline segment. Potential threats that\nan operator must consider include, but are not limited to, the threats listed\nin ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7), section\n2, which are grouped under the following four categories:.….\n(1) Time dependent threats such as internal corrosion, external\ncorrosion, and stress corrosion cracking;\n(2) Static or resident threats such as third party damage and outside\nforce damage; and\n(3) Time independent threats such as third party damage and outside\nforce damage; and\n(4) Human error.\nThe Notice also recited the relevant portion of ASME B31.8S, section 2, which states:\nASME B31.8S, Section 2.2, Integrity Threat Classification\nThe interactive nature of threats (i.e., more than one threat occurring\non a section of pipeline at the same time) shall also be considered. An\nexample of such an interaction is corrosion at a location that also has third\nparty damage.2\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(a) by failing to identify or\nevaluate in its IMP the potential for interactive threats to each covered pipeline segment.\nSpecifically, it alleged that CenterPoint’s procedures contained no process to ensure that multiple\nthreats on the same pipeline were evaluated for interrelated effects.3\nCenterPoint contested this allegation, arguing that it used a risk assessment model to add\ntogether the individual failure-likelihood values for each threat category, to reach an overall risk\nscore.\nprovided a measure of the interactive nature of threats. CenterPoint also indicated that it was not\naware of any published standards beyond ASME B31.8S (ASME Standard) explaining how the\ncompany was supposed to evaluate “interactive” threats. Respondent maintained that its\nprocedure appropriately considered the interactive nature of threats.\n4 Respondent contended that by adding together different threats, the resulting score\n2 AM. SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, “MANAGING SYSTEM INTEGRITY OF GAS PIPELINES”, ASME\nSTANDARD B31.8S-2004 § 2.2 (JANUARY 14, 2005).\n3 Notice at 1-2, citing CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Procedure PS-03-01-216, “Threat Identification and\nRisk Assessment,” Section 2.2.\n4 Response at 4-7.\n\n\n\n3\nAt the hearing, OPS argued that CenterPoint’s process of simply adding the scores of various\nthreats did not constitute an adequate analysis of interactive threats. OPS explained that the\ncombined threat posed by numerous threats could be greater than the sum of those threats\nindividually. On that basis, OPS argued that Respondent’s process of simply adding threat\nscores did not reflect the complex relationship between multiple threats. For example, OPS\nindicated that the combined threats presented by internal corrosion and pipeline seam issues, at\nthe same location, would be much greater than the sum of those threats if assessed individually.\nAt the hearing and in its Closing, CenterPoint maintained its objection to this allegation.\nRespondent argued further that neither the regulation nor the referenced ASME Standard\nexpressly requires that a “plus” factor be used when any two risk factors are present on the same\ncovered segment.5\nCenterPoint is correct that nothing in the regulation or the ASME Standard expressly requires a\n“plus” factor. Section 192.917(a) simply requires that the interactive nature of threats be\nconsidered. However, the lack of specificity in the regulation does not mean that it is acceptable\nto conduct a risk analysis which does not provide an accurate indication of the synergy of\nmultiple threats. Respondent did not dispute the agency’s contention that a combination of\nthreats might well produce a greater threat than the various threats assessed individually; rather,\nit argued that in the absence of more specific guidance, it was permissible to simply add the\nthreat scores.\nThe Integrity Management regulations are designed to be flexible and permit CenterPoint to\ncome up with a process for threat evaluation that is best suited to its particular pipeline system\nand operations. However, such flexibility does not mean that Respondent may simply add threat\nscores and disregard the undisputedly more complex relationship among threats. The intent of a\nthreat evaluation process is to provide an operator with a sophisticated and accurate measure of\nthe individual and combined threats facing its pipeline system, so that it may address these\nthreats and reduce pipeline integrity risks. Respondent need not use any specific “plus” factor or\nany other particular logarithm or process. Rather, the regulations give CenterPoint the flexibility\nto develop a procedure that realistically assesses the interactive nature of threats. Only through\nsuch a realistic assessment, however, will Respondent have an accurate indication of the\npotential threats to the integrity of its system.\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n§ 192.917(a) by failing to identify or evaluate in its IMP the potential for interactive threats on\neach covered pipeline segment.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(c), which states:\n§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline\nintegrity and use the threat identification in its integrity program?\n(a) ….\n(c) Risk assessment. An operator must conduct a risk assessment that\nfollows ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and considers the identified\nthreats for each covered segment….\n5 Closing at 4.\n\n\n\n4\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(c) by failing to conduct a risk\nassessment in accordance with Section 5 of ASME B31.8S. Specifically, it alleged that\nCenterPoint did not provide documentation in its IMP to support the conclusion that the\ncompany could eliminate certain threats from its risk assessment for High Consequence Areas\n(HCAs) along its pipeline.\nfor risk assessments in a prescriptive integrity management program.\n6 Section 5 of the ASME Standard requires minimum data and criteria\nCenterPoint argued that its risk assessment did include a proper consideration of the required\nminimum data and criteria for risk assessment to support the elimination of certain threats.\nRespondent cited its procedures and numerous sections of the ASME Standard in support of\nits contention that its risk assessment process used the latest available data to determine if\nCenterPoint’s procedures that were in question but, rather, that Respondent had no\nthreats could be eliminated.7 At the hearing, OPS explained that it was not the adequacy of\ndocumentation of having applied these procedures to its pipeline system.\nCenterPoint responded that it had used the latest data each time it ran the risk assessment model,\nto determine the threats on its system and whether any threats could be eliminated. However,\nRespondent provided no documentation of its application of the risk assessment model to the\nactual pipeline system data. In the absence of such evidence, PHMSA is unable to verify\nwhether the elimination of a particular threat was appropriate or not. Improper elimination could\nresult in HCAs not being properly assessed for the actual threats presented. If a threat is\nimproperly eliminated, it could cause or contribute to a pipeline failure and cause harm to the\npublic, property or the environment. For any given HCA segment where CenterPoint has\neliminated a threat, Respondent must provide some evidence in support of its decision.\nAccordingly, I find that Respondent violated § 192.917(c) by failing to conduct a risk assessment\nthat followed Section 5 of ASME B31.8S, by providing documentation for its decision to\neliminate certain threats from its HCAs.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(1), which states:\n§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline\nintegrity and use the threat identification in its integrity program?\n(a) ….\n(e) Actions to address particular threats. If an operator identifies any\nof the following threats, the operator must take the following actions to\naddress the threat.\n(1) Third party damage. An operator must utilize the data integration\nrequired in paragraph (b) of this section and ASME/ANSI B31.8S,\nAppendix A7 to determine the susceptibility of each covered segment to\nthe threat of third party damage. If an operator identifies the threat of\nthird party damage, the operator must implement comprehensive\n6 A “High Consequence Area” is an area defined as either a Class 3 location or Class 4 location under § 192.5; any\narea in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact radius is greater than 660 feet (200 meters) and the\narea within a potential impact circle contains 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy; or as further\ndefined in 49 C.F.R. § 192.903.\n7 Response at 8-13.\n\n\n\n5\nadditional preventive measures in accordance with § 192.935 and monitor\nthe effectiveness of the preventive measures. If, in conducting a baseline\nassessment under § 192.921, or a reassessment under § 192.937, an\noperator uses an internal inspection tool or external corrosion direct\nassessment, the operator must integrate data from these assessments with\ndata related to any encroachment or foreign line crossing on the covered\nsegment, to define where potential indications of third party damage may\nexist in the covered segment.\nAn operator must also have procedures in its integrity management\nprogram addressing actions it will take to respond to findings from this\ndata integration.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(1) by failing to have a\nprocedure or process to integrate data from internal inspection tools and External Corrosion\nDirect Assessment (ECDA) with data related to encroachments or foreign line crossings on\ncertain covered segments, in order to define where potential indications of third-party damage\nmight exist. Specifically, it alleged that CenterPoint’s procedures did not include processes for\nthe integration of such data.8\nRespondent admitted that its procedures “did not specifically state that the data from ECDA and\nforeign line crossings would be integrated.”9 However, CenterPoint argued that such data was\nintegrated as part of its ECDA process; the company provided numerous supporting documents\nin support of its position.\nintegrated some data, they do not demonstrate that Respondent had a written procedure in place,\nas required by the regulation. In the absence of such a procedure for data integration, there is no\nmechanism by which Respondent could consistently and accurately integrate assessment data\nwith data on third-party damage. Accordingly, upon review of all of the evidence, I find that\nRespondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(1) by failing to have a procedure or process for\nintegrating data from internal inspection tools and ECDA with data related to encroachments or\nforeign line crossings on each covered pipeline segment.\n10 While these documents may indeed indicate that CenterPoint\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(1), as quoted\nabove, by failing to integrate data from internal inspection tools and ECDA with data related to\nencroachments and foreign line crossings on specific covered segments, in order to define where\npotential indications of third-party damage might exist. Specifically, it alleged that CenterPoint\nfailed to integrate such data when it performed ECDA assessments for the ALE, BT-1, and A-\n206 pipelines. At the hearing, CenterPoint provided documents showing that the company had,\nin fact, performed data integration on these pipelines.11\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I order that Item 4 be withdrawn.\n8 Notice at 3, citing CenterPoint Procedures PS-03-01-110, GATHER, REVIEW AND INTEGRATE DATA; and PS-03-\n01-216, THREAT IDENTIFICATION and RISK ASSESSMENT.\n9 Response at 16.\n10 Id.\n11 Response at 19, Attachments 3.1-4.6.\n\n\n\n6\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(4), which states:\n§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline\nintegrity and use the threat identification in its integrity\nprogram?\n(a) . . . .\n(e) Actions to address particular threats. If an operator identifies any\nof the following threats, the operator must take the following actions to\naddress the threat.\n(1) ….\n(4) ERW pipe. If a covered pipeline segment contains low frequency\nelectric resistance welded pipe (ERW), lap welded pipe or other pipe that\nsatisfies the conditions specified in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, Appendices\nA4.3 and A4.4, and any covered or noncovered segment in the pipeline\nsystem with such pipe has experienced seam failure, or operating pressure\non the covered segment has increased over the maximum operating\npressure experienced during the preceding five years, an operator must\nselect an assessment technology or technologies with a proven application\ncapable of assessing seam integrity and seam corrosion anomalies. The\noperator must prioritize the covered segment as a high risk segment for the\nbaseline assessment or a subsequent reassessment.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(4) by failing to specify an\nassessment method for each covered segment to identify anomalies associated with the specific\nthreat identified for that segment. Specifically, the Notice alleged that CenterPoint’s Baseline\nAssessment Plan (BAP) did not identify an assessment technology with a proven application\ncapable of assessing seam integrity and seam corrosion anomalies for covered pipe segments that\ncontained ERW pipe and had experienced either seam failure or the operating pressure had\nexceeded maximum operating pressure within the last five years. Section A4 of ASME B31.8S\nstates that “pressure testing must be performed to address the seam issue.\nallowed for either a hydrotest or the use of a Transverse Flux Inspection (TFI) tool; however,\nSection A4.4 of the ASME Standard only permits a hydrotest when assessing seam threats. A\nTFI tool is not an acceptable method of integrity assessment in this case.\n”12 CenterPoint’s BAP\nRespondent admitted that its assessment tool selection guide mistakenly permitted the use of a\nTFI tool in response to a pressure increase on a pipeline segment containing ERW pipe or pipe\nwith other specified seam issues.13 CenterPoint explained that it had intended to include the TFI\ntool option only for manufacturing defects, not seam threats.14 Respondent further explained\nthat in spite of such mistake in its procedures, it never actually used a TFI tool in response to a\npressure increase15 and that after the OPS inspection, it revised its procedures to address this\nissue. A TFI tool would not properly address the threat and could subsequently lead to a pipeline\n12 ASME STANDARD B31.8S-2004, supra, § A4, “MANUFACTURING THREAT (PIPE SEAM AND PIPE).”\n13 Response at 21; Closing at 8.\n14 Id.\n15 Id.\n\n\n\n7\nfailure affecting public safety. Although CenterPoint notes that it revised its procedures, this\nmodification occurred after the OPS inspection and therefore does not cure the violation.\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49\nC.F.R. § 192.917(e)(4) by failing to select a proper assessment technology with a proven\napplication capable of assessing seam integrity and seam corrosion anomalies.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1), which states:\n§ 192.925 What are the requirements for using External Corrosion\nDirect Assessment (ECDA)?\n(a) Definition. ECDA is a four-step process that combines\npreassessment, indirect inspection, direct examination, and post\nassessment to evaluate the threat of external corrosion to the integrity of a\npipeline.\n(b) General requirements. An operator that uses direct assessment to\nassess the threat of external corrosion must follow the requirements in this\nsection, in ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see §192.7),\nsection 6.4, and in NACE RP 0502–2002 (incorporated by reference, see\n§192.7). An operator must develop and implement a direct assessment\nplan that has procedures addressing preassessment, indirect examination,\ndirect examination, and post-assessment. If the ECDA detects pipeline\ncoating damage, the operator must also integrate the data from the ECDA\nwith other information from the data integration (§192.917(b)) to evaluate\nthe covered segment for the threat of third party damage, and to address\nthe threat as required by § 192.917(e)(1).\n(1) Preassessment. In addition to the requirements in ASME/ANSI\nB31.8S section 6.4 and NACE RP 0502–2002, section 3, the plan's\nprocedures for preassessment must include—\n(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting\nECDA for the first time on a covered segment; and\n(ii) The basis on which an operator selects at least two different, but\ncomplementary indirect assessment tools to assess each ECDA Region. If\nan operator utilizes an indirect inspection method that is not discussed in\nAppendix A of NACE RP0502–2002, the operator must demonstrate the\napplicability, validation basis, equipment used, application procedure, and\nutilization of data for the inspection method.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1) by failing to comply with\nits own procedures and the requirements of NACE RP 0502-2003 (NACE Standard), Section 3,\nin conducting ECDA preassessments. Specifically, it alleged four separate violations of\n§ 192.925(b)(1). First, it alleged that CenterPoint violated the NACE Standard and its own\nprocedures by failing to define minimum data collection requirements for conducting\n16\npreassessments.\nSecond, it alleged that the company violated the NACE Standard and its own\n16 NACE Standard Section 3.2.1.1 provides: “The pipeline operator shall define minimum data requirements based\non the history and condition of the pipeline segment. In addition, the pipeline operator shall identify data elements\nthat are critical to the success of the ECDA process.”\n\n\n\n8\nprocedures by failing to document the basis for the conservative assumptions used on the ALE,\nBT-1 and A-206 pipelines.\n17 Third, the Notice alleged that CenterPoint violated the NACE\nStandard and its own procedures by failing to document whether an ECDA feasibility assessment\nhad been conducted.\n18 Finally, it alleged that Respondent violated the NACE Standard and its\nown procedures by failing to document either the specific indirect inspection tools that were\nultimately chosen or the basis for choosing them.\n19\nRegarding the first allegation, CenterPoint argued that it had collected adequate data to make an\nECDA feasibility determination.20 However, Respondent admitted that its procedures “did not\ninclude a list of minimum data requirements defining when ECDA was a feasible\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1) by failing to define minimum data requirements concerning\ndata collection for ECDA preassessments.\nalternative…”21 Accordingly, upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent\nRegarding the second allegation, CenterPoint argued that there is no requirement in\n§ 192.925(b)(1) to document conservative assumptions.22 I disagree. Respondent’s own\nprocedures allowed the use of conservative assumptions and required that they be documented.23\nNonetheless, CenterPoint explained that no conservative assumptions were documented because\nnone were used on the ALE, BT-1, and A-206 pipelines.24 Accordingly, based on a review of\nthe record, I hereby order that this portion of Item 6 be withdrawn.\nRegarding the third allegation, Respondent argued that it had performed an ECDA feasibility\nassessment on the ALE, BT-1 and A-206 pipelines.25 The company explained that it had\nrecorded data on preassessment forms but admitted that its ECDA feasibility determination was\nnot recorded.26\nCenterPoint further argued that its documentation of ECDA regions and tool\n17 Respondent’s ECDA Procedure PS-03-01-232 states that conservative defaults may be substituted when data is\nmissing. Its Quality Assurance Procedure PS-03-01-268 requires the company to “verify that conservative\nassumptions were documented.”\n18 NACE Standard Section 3.3.1 provides: “The pipeline operator shall integrate and analyze the data collected [as\nrequired in Section 3.2] to determine whether conditions for which indirect inspection tools cannot be used or that\nwould preclude ECDA application exist.”\n19 The Notice also alleged that Respondent failed to document whether the assessment tools were complementary to\neach other. Proper documentation of the basis for tool selection would invariably include information on whether\nthe tools were complementary. Therefore I do not treat the language in the Notice on complementary tools as a\nseparate allegation.\n20 Response at 27-28.\n21 Id.\n22 Id. at 28.\n23 See supra note 13.\n24 Response at 28.\n25 Id. at 29-30.\n26 Id. at 30.\n\n\n\n9\nBy failing to document the process it used to undertake a feasibility determination, Respondent\nskipped a key step in the ECDA process. Without such documentation, neither Respondent nor\nOPS can accurately determine whether the ECDA process was properly performed.\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49\nC.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1) by failing to properly document a feasibility assessment for the ALE,\nBT-1 and A-206 pipelines.\nselections proved that it had in fact performed a feasibility determination.27 Again, I disagree.\nRegarding the fourth allegation, CenterPoint contended that it did document the specific indirect\ninspection tools selected for the BT-1, ALE, and A-206 pipelines.\n28 The regulation requires an\noperator, as part of its preassessment procedure, to include “the basis on which an operator\nselects at least two different, but complementary indirect assessment tools to assess each ECDA\nregion.” In addition, the publicly available 2004 OPS IMP Inspection Protocols indicated that\non when certain tools should be used, none of these documents explains the basis on which\nRespondent nor OPS can verify that the proper tools were selected. Accordingly, based upon a\nreview of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1) by\nOPS would verify an operator’s documentation of its ECDA tool selections.29 While\nCenterPoint has provided documents showing which tools it selected, as well as general guidance\nspecific tools were selected for particular ECDA regions. Absent such documentation, neither\nfailing to document the basis for its selection of indirect inspection tools.\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1)(i), as quoted\nabove, and § 192.925(b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i), which state:\n§ 192.925 What are the requirements for using External Corrosion\nDirect Assessment (ECDA)?\n(a-b) ….\n(2) Indirect examination. In addition to the requirements in\nASME/ANSI B31.8S section 6.4 and NACE RP 0502–2002, section 4, the\nplan's procedures for indirect examination of the ECDA regions must\ninclude—\n(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting\nECDA for the first time on a covered segment;…\n(3) Direct examination. In addition to the requirements in\nASME/ANSI B31.8S section 6.4 and NACE RP 0502–2002, section 5, the\nplan's procedures for direct examination of indications from the indirect\nexamination must include—\n(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting\nECDA for the first time on a covered segment;…\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i)\nby failing to document how it applied more restrictive criteria when conducting ECDA for the\n27 Id.\n28 Response at 31, Attachments 6.1–6.3 ECDA Preassessment Forms.\n29 PHMSA-OPS Gas Integrity Management Protocol Results Form, Protocol D.02.c, (Oct. 2004) (available at\nhttp://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/gasimp/documents.htm).\n\n\n\n10\nfirst time on a covered segment. The cited regulations impose restrictive criteria requirements at\nthe preassessment, indirect examination, and direct examination steps of the ECDA process.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that the ECDA assessments for the ALE, BT-1, and A-206\npipelines did not contain any documentation of the more restrictive criteria that CenterPoint used\nfor this initial ECDA.\nRespondent contested this allegation and provided documents to demonstrate that it had, in fact,\nthis documentation and agrees that it demonstrates more restrictive criteria were in fact used and\nproperly documented. Accordingly, based on the foregoing and a review of the record, I order\nthat Item 7 be withdrawn.\ndocumented its use of more restrictive criteria at the time of the inspection.30 OPS has reviewed\nItem 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.927(c)(1)(i), which states:\n§ 192.927 What are the requirements for using Internal Corrosion\nDirect Assessment (ICDA)?\n(a) ….\n(c) The ICDA plan. An operator must develop and follow an ICDA\nplan that provides for preassessment, identification of ICDA regions and\nexcavation locations, detailed examination of pipe at excavation locations,\nand post-assessment evaluation and monitoring.\n(1) Preassessment. In the preassessment stage, an operator must gather\nand integrate data and information needed to evaluate the feasibility of\nICDA for the covered segment, and to support use of a model to identify\nthe locations along the pipe segment where electrolyte may accumulate, to\nidentify ICDA regions, and to identify areas within the covered segment\nwhere liquids may potentially be entrained. This data and information\nincludes, but is not limited to—\n(i) All data elements listed in appendix A2 of ASME/ANSI B31.8S;…\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.927(c)(1)(i) by failing to evaluate\nthe feasibility of ICDA for certain pipeline segments. Specifically, it alleged that CenterPoint\nfailed to perform or document feasibility evaluations for ICDA preassessments performed on its\nFT-11 and ADT-8 pipelines. It also alleged that Respondent did not document the basis for\nselecting the feasibility criteria for pigging, water upsets, and introduction of sludge. The Notice\nfurther alleged that Respondent’s ICDA preassessment data for these pipelines was of “poor\nquality” and that this “could lead” to improper determinations of ICDA regions.\nCenterPoint argued that it had, in fact, performed and documented feasibility evaluations and\nfeasibility flow charts for the FT-11 and ADT-8 pipelines, and that it had records of the source\ndata used to fill out the charts.\n31 The company also pointed to those portions of its IMP\nprocedures that described the basis for selecting feasibility criteria.32\nIn response, OPS argued\n30 Response at 32-35, Attachments 7.2-7.16\n31 Response at 37, Attachments 8.1-8.2 and 8.5-8.12.\n32 Id., Attachment 8.4, Procedure 03-01-238.\n\n\n\n11\nthat the flow charts did not constitute the evaluation required by the regulation but the agency did\nnot explain why. While the feasibility flow charts are indeed sparse, they do show that\nRespondent performed some type of feasibility analysis. In the absence of more specific\nallegations or some explanation as to why Respondent’s documentation was inadequate, I find\nthat the record does not support a finding of violation for this portion of the allegation.\nFinally, Respondent argued that it had the necessary data to perform ICDA preassessments and\nthat it was not of “poor quality”\n.\n33 Respondent provided numerous examples of such data.34\nAgain, the Notice did not explain why CenterPoint’s data was of poor quality or what data was\nmissing. With such lack of specificity in the Notice and upon review of the documents provided\nby Respondent and which OPS has not addressed, I find that the record does not support a\nfinding of violation on this portion of the allegation.\nAccordingly, based on the foregoing and a review of the record, I order that Item 8 be\nwithdrawn.\nItem 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.927(c)(5)(ii), which states:\n§ 192.927 What are the requirements for using Internal Corrosion\nDirect Assessment (ICDA)?\n(a) ….\n(c) The ICDA plan. An operator must develop and follow an ICDA\nplan that provides for preassessment, identification of ICDA regions and\nexcavation locations, detailed examination of pipe at excavation locations,\nand post-assessment evaluation and monitoring.\n(1) ….\n(5) Other requirements. The ICDA plan must also include–\n(i) ….\n(ii) Provisions for apply more restrictive criteria when conducting\nICDA for the first time on a covered segment and that become less\nstringent as the operator gains experience;…\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.927(c)(5)(ii) by failing to\ndocument the more restrictive criteria the company used when conducting ICDA for the first\ntime on a covered segment. Specifically, it alleged that CenterPoint failed to document these\ncriteria, both in its ICDA plan and in the initial ICDAs performed on the FT-11 and ADT-8\npipelines. Respondent contested this allegation and provided numerous documents to\ndemonstrate that it had in fact documented more restrictive criteria at the time of the\ninspection.35\nOPS has reviewed these materials and agrees that CenterPoint was in compliance with this\nregulation at the time of the inspection. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing and a review of\nthe record, I order that Item 9 be withdrawn.\n33 Response at 38-39.\n34 Response, Attachments 8.13-8.26.\n35 Response at 41-43, Attachments 9.1-9.8.\n\n\n\n12\nItem 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.929(b)(1), which states:\n§ 192.929 What are the requirements for using Direct Assessment for\nStress Corrosion Cracking (SCCDA)?\n(a) ….\n(b) General requirements. An operator using direct assessment as an\nintegrity assessment method to address stress corrosion cracking in a\ncovered pipeline segment must have a plan that provides, at minimum,\nfor—\n(1) Data gathering and integration. An operator's plan must provide\nfor a systematic process to collect and evaluate data for all covered\nsegments to identify whether the conditions for SCC are present and to\nprioritize the covered segments for assessment. This process must include\ngathering and evaluating data related to SCC at all sites an operator\nexcavates during the conduct of its pipeline operations where the criteria\nin ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see §192.7), appendix\nA3.3 indicate the potential for SCC. This data includes at minimum, the\ndata specified in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, appendix A3.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.929(b)(1) by failing to provide in\nits IMP a systematic data collection and evaluation process for all covered pipeline segments.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged four separate violations regarding the SCCDA portion of\nCenterPoint’s IMP.\nFirst, it alleged that Respondent failed to include in its SCCDA plan a requirement for the\ngathering and integration of data related to SCC at all sites. Specifically, it alleged that\nCenterPoint excavated both covered and non-covered pipe segments, during its normal course of\nbusiness, in a manner that met the criteria listed in the ASME Standard indicating potential SCC.\nThe company’s procedures, however, allegedly failed to require the collection of data on non-\ncovered pipelines, as required by the regulation. Second, it alleged that Respondent failed to\nfollow its own procedures by not gathering and reviewing certain data elements used for SCCDA\nunder the ASME Standard. Third, it alleged that Respondent failed to follow the ASME\nStandard by including a provision in its IMP for notifying PHMSA at least 180 days prior to\nusing a “near-neutral” SCCDA plan. Fourth, it alleged that Respondent failed to follow the\nASME Standard by neglecting to include a provision in its IMP requiring the performance of a\nhydrostatic “spike test” following an in-service leak or rupture attributable to SCC.\nRegarding the first allegation, Respondent argued that it had performed and documented\ninspections of its pipelines during excavation and that its procedures for doing so were contained\nin its Operations and Maintenance (O&M) manual, rather than in its IMP documentation.36\nHowever, Respondent admitted that “its procedures at the time of the audit did not specifically\ncall for evaluation of data at sites where criteria indicate the potential for SCC.”37\nAccordingly,\nbased upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.929(b)(1) by failing to include in its SCCDA plan a requirement for the gathering and\nintegration of data related to SCC at all excavation sites where the criteria listed in the ASME\n36 Response at 46.\n37 Id. at 47.\n\n\n\n13\nStandard indicated the potential for SCC.\nRegarding the second allegation, Respondent argued that it had, in fact, evaluated the SCCDA-\nrelated data as required by its procedures; the company submitted Data Element Forms to\nsupport its position.\nthat Respondent performed the requisite evaluations as of the date of the inspection.\nAccordingly, based on the foregoing and a review of the record, I order that this portion of Item\n10 be withdrawn.\n38 Upon review of these records, I find that these materials do demonstrate\nRegarding the third allegation, Respondent argued that its IMP procedure need not contain a\nprovision for notifying PHMSA be","truncated":true,"body_characters":91648}