# ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 420071004
- **title:** ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2007-03-29
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.917(a), 192.917(c), 192.917(e)(1), 192.917(e)(4), 192.925(b), 192.925(b)(1), 192.927(c)(1)(i), 192.927(c)(5)(ii), 192.929(b)(1), 192.935(c).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420071004
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.917(a),  192.917(c),  192.917(e)(1),  192.917(e)(4),  192.925(b),  192.925(b)(1),  192.927(c)(1)(i),  192.927(c)(5)(ii),  192.929(b)(1),  192.935(c). The case was opened on 2007-03-29 and is reported as closed as of 2012-01-23. Proposed civil penalty: $95,000. Assessed civil penalty: $51,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420071004_Closure Letter_01232012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_Closure%20Letter_01232012.pdf

420071004_Closure Letter_01232012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_Closure%20Letter_01232012_text.pdf

420071004_FinalOrder_02112011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_FinalOrder_02112011.pdf

420071004_FinalOrder_02112011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_FinalOrder_02112011_text.pdf

420071004_Notice Letter_03292007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_Notice%20Letter_03292007.pdf

420071004_operator response to notice_09282007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420071004/420071004_operator%20response%20to%20notice_09282007.pdf

420071004_Closure Letter_01232012_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
January 23, 2012
Mr. Walter Ferguson
Division Sr. VP MidStream Field Operations, Engineering & Construction
CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission, LLC
P.O. Box 21734
Shreveport, Louisiana 71151
CPF 4-2007-1004
Dear Mr. Ferguson:
On February 11, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration issued a Final Order
to CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company (CenterPoint) in the referenced case. Based
on review of the documentation you provided and confirmation that the administrative civil
penalty has been paid, it has been determined that CenterPoint has complied with the terms and
conditions of the Final Order.
Accordingly, PHMSA now considers this case closed and no further action is contemplated with
respect to the maters involved in this case.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
R. M. Seeley
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration

420071004_FinalOrder_02112011_text.pdf

FEB 11 2011
Mr. Pete Kirsch
Division Senior Vice President
Pipeline, Operations and Engineering
CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77210-1700
Re: CPF No. 4-2007-1004
Dear Mr. Kirsch:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, withdraws certain allegations of violation, and assesses a reduced civil penalty of
$51,000. The Final Order also specifies certain actions that need to be taken by CenterPoint to
comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final
Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed,
as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Your
receipt of the Final Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. R.M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA
Mr. Kenneth B. Driver, Esq.
Counsel for CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission
Jones Day
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0041 3221]



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
_____________________________________________
In the Matter of )
CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company, )
Respondent. )
)
)
)
)
) CPF No. 4-2007-1004
_____________________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
On September 12-16, and November 14-18, 2005, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a
representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office
of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the Integrity
Management Program records of CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company (CenterPoint
or Respondent), in Shreveport, Louisiana.
approximately 8,200 miles of interstate natural gas pipelines, of which 186 miles were covered
by its Integrity Management Program (IMP).
1 At the time of the inspection, Respondent operated
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated March 29, 2007, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the
Notice proposed finding that CenterPoint had violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.917(a), 192.917(c),
192.917(e)(1), 192.917(e)(4), 192.925(b)(1), 192.927(c)(1)(i), 192.927(c)(5)(ii), 192.929(b)(1),
and 192.935(c) and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $95,000 for the alleged violations. The
Notice also proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged
violations.
CenterPoint responded to the Notice by letter dated April 30, 2007. Respondent contested the
allegations and requested a hearing. In advance of the hearing, by letter dated September 28,
2007, CenterPoint submitted an additional response detailing its arguments and providing
supporting documents (Response). A hearing was subsequently held on October 11, 2007, in
Houston, TX, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding.
Respondent was represented by counsel in this proceeding. After the hearing, CenterPoint
provided a Post-Hearing Submission by letter dated November 13, 2007 (Closing).
1 CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of CenterPoint Energy,
Inc.



2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(a), which states:
§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline
integrity and use the threat identification in its integrity program?
(a) Threat identification. An operator must identify and evaluate all
potential threats to each covered pipeline segment. Potential threats that
an operator must consider include, but are not limited to, the threats listed
in ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7), section
2, which are grouped under the following four categories:.….
(1) Time dependent threats such as internal corrosion, external
corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking;
(2) Static or resident threats such as third party damage and outside
force damage; and
(3) Time independent threats such as third party damage and outside
force damage; and
(4) Human error.
The Notice also recited the relevant portion of ASME B31.8S, section 2, which states:
ASME B31.8S, Section 2.2, Integrity Threat Classification
The interactive nature of threats (i.e., more than one threat occurring
on a section of pipeline at the same time) shall also be considered. An
example of such an interaction is corrosion at a location that also has third
party damage.2
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(a) by failing to identify or
evaluate in its IMP the potential for interactive threats to each covered pipeline segment.
Specifically, it alleged that CenterPoint’s procedures contained no process to ensure that multiple
threats on the same pipeline were evaluated for interrelated effects.3
CenterPoint contested this allegation, arguing that it used a risk assessment model to add
together the individual failure-likelihood values for each threat category, to reach an overall risk
score.
provided a measure of the interactive nature of threats. CenterPoint also indicated that it was not
aware of any published standards beyond ASME B31.8S (ASME Standard) explaining how the
company was supposed to evaluate “interactive” threats. Respondent maintained that its
procedure appropriately considered the interactive nature of threats.
4 Respondent contended that by adding together different threats, the resulting score
2 AM. SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, “MANAGING SYSTEM INTEGRITY OF GAS PIPELINES”, ASME
STANDARD B31.8S-2004 § 2.2 (JANUARY 14, 2005).
3 Notice at 1-2, citing CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Procedure PS-03-01-216, “Threat Identification and
Risk Assessment,” Section 2.2.
4 Response at 4-7.



3
At the hearing, OPS argued that CenterPoint’s process of simply adding the scores of various
threats did not constitute an adequate analysis of interactive threats. OPS explained that the
combined threat posed by numerous threats could be greater than the sum of those threats
individually. On that basis, OPS argued that Respondent’s process of simply adding threat
scores did not reflect the complex relationship between multiple threats. For example, OPS
indicated that the combined threats presented by internal corrosion and pipeline seam issues, at
the same location, would be much greater than the sum of those threats if assessed individually.
At the hearing and in its Closing, CenterPoint maintained its objection to this allegation.
Respondent argued further that neither the regulation nor the referenced ASME Standard
expressly requires that a “plus” factor be used when any two risk factors are present on the same
covered segment.5
CenterPoint is correct that nothing in the regulation or the ASME Standard expressly requires a
“plus” factor. Section 192.917(a) simply requires that the interactive nature of threats be
considered. However, the lack of specificity in the regulation does not mean that it is acceptable
to conduct a risk analysis which does not provide an accurate indication of the synergy of
multiple threats. Respondent did not dispute the agency’s contention that a combination of
threats might well produce a greater threat than the various threats assessed individually; rather,
it argued that in the absence of more specific guidance, it was permissible to simply add the
threat scores.
The Integrity Management regulations are designed to be flexible and permit CenterPoint to
come up with a process for threat evaluation that is best suited to its particular pipeline system
and operations. However, such flexibility does not mean that Respondent may simply add threat
scores and disregard the undisputedly more complex relationship among threats. The intent of a
threat evaluation process is to provide an operator with a sophisticated and accurate measure of
the individual and combined threats facing its pipeline system, so that it may address these
threats and reduce pipeline integrity risks. Respondent need not use any specific “plus” factor or
any other particular logarithm or process. Rather, the regulations give CenterPoint the flexibility
to develop a procedure that realistically assesses the interactive nature of threats. Only through
such a realistic assessment, however, will Respondent have an accurate indication of the
potential threats to the integrity of its system.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
§ 192.917(a) by failing to identify or evaluate in its IMP the potential for interactive threats on
each covered pipeline segment.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(c), which states:
§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline
integrity and use the threat identification in its integrity program?
(a) ….
(c) Risk assessment. An operator must conduct a risk assessment that
follows ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and considers the identified
threats for each covered segment….
5 Closing at 4.



4
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(c) by failing to conduct a risk
assessment in accordance with Section 5 of ASME B31.8S. Specifically, it alleged that
CenterPoint did not provide documentation in its IMP to support the conclusion that the
company could eliminate certain threats from its risk assessment for High Consequence Areas
(HCAs) along its pipeline.
for risk assessments in a prescriptive integrity management program.
6 Section 5 of the ASME Standard requires minimum data and criteria
CenterPoint argued that its risk assessment did include a proper consideration of the required
minimum data and criteria for risk assessment to support the elimination of certain threats.
Respondent cited its procedures and numerous sections of the ASME Standard in support of
its contention that its risk assessment process used the latest available data to determine if
CenterPoint’s procedures that were in question but, rather, that Respondent had no
threats could be eliminated.7 At the hearing, OPS explained that it was not the adequacy of
documentation of having applied these procedures to its pipeline system.
CenterPoint responded that it had used the latest data each time it ran the risk assessment model,
to determine the threats on its system and whether any threats could be eliminated. However,
Respondent provided no documentation of its application of the risk assessment model to the
actual pipeline system data. In the absence of such evidence, PHMSA is unable to verify
whether the elimination of a particular threat was appropriate or not. Improper elimination could
result in HCAs not being properly assessed for the actual threats presented. If a threat is
improperly eliminated, it could cause or contribute to a pipeline failure and cause harm to the
public, property or the environment. For any given HCA segment where CenterPoint has
eliminated a threat, Respondent must provide some evidence in support of its decision.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated § 192.917(c) by failing to conduct a risk assessment
that followed Section 5 of ASME B31.8S, by providing documentation for its decision to
eliminate certain threats from its HCAs.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(1), which states:
§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline
integrity and use the threat identification in its integrity program?
(a) ….
(e) Actions to address particular threats. If an operator identifies any
of the following threats, the operator must take the following actions to
address the threat.
(1) Third party damage. An operator must utilize the data integration
required in paragraph (b) of this section and ASME/ANSI B31.8S,
Appendix A7 to determine the susceptibility of each covered segment to
the threat of third party damage. If an operator identifies the threat of
third party damage, the operator must implement comprehensive
6 A “High Consequence Area” is an area defined as either a Class 3 location or Class 4 location under § 192.5; any
area in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact radius is greater than 660 feet (200 meters) and the
area within a potential impact circle contains 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy; or as further
defined in 49 C.F.R. § 192.903.
7 Response at 8-13.



5
additional preventive measures in accordance with § 192.935 and monitor
the effectiveness of the preventive measures. If, in conducting a baseline
assessment under § 192.921, or a reassessment under § 192.937, an
operator uses an internal inspection tool or external corrosion direct
assessment, the operator must integrate data from these assessments with
data related to any encroachment or foreign line crossing on the covered
segment, to define where potential indications of third party damage may
exist in the covered segment.
An operator must also have procedures in its integrity management
program addressing actions it will take to respond to findings from this
data integration.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(1) by failing to have a
procedure or process to integrate data from internal inspection tools and External Corrosion
Direct Assessment (ECDA) with data related to encroachments or foreign line crossings on
certain covered segments, in order to define where potential indications of third-party damage
might exist. Specifically, it alleged that CenterPoint’s procedures did not include processes for
the integration of such data.8
Respondent admitted that its procedures “did not specifically state that the data from ECDA and
foreign line crossings would be integrated.”9 However, CenterPoint argued that such data was
integrated as part of its ECDA process; the company provided numerous supporting documents
in support of its position.
integrated some data, they do not demonstrate that Respondent had a written procedure in place,
as required by the regulation. In the absence of such a procedure for data integration, there is no
mechanism by which Respondent could consistently and accurately integrate assessment data
with data on third-party damage. Accordingly, upon review of all of the evidence, I find that
Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(1) by failing to have a procedure or process for
integrating data from internal inspection tools and ECDA with data related to encroachments or
foreign line crossings on each covered pipeline segment.
10 While these documents may indeed indicate that CenterPoint
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(1), as quoted
above, by failing to integrate data from internal inspection tools and ECDA with data related to
encroachments and foreign line crossings on specific covered segments, in order to define where
potential indications of third-party damage might exist. Specifically, it alleged that CenterPoint
failed to integrate such data when it performed ECDA assessments for the ALE, BT-1, and A-
206 pipelines. At the hearing, CenterPoint provided documents showing that the company had,
in fact, performed data integration on these pipelines.11
Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I order that Item 4 be withdrawn.
8 Notice at 3, citing CenterPoint Procedures PS-03-01-110, GATHER, REVIEW AND INTEGRATE DATA; and PS-03-
01-216, THREAT IDENTIFICATION and RISK ASSESSMENT.
9 Response at 16.
10 Id.
11 Response at 19, Attachments 3.1-4.6.



6
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(4), which states:
§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline
integrity and use the threat identification in its integrity
program?
(a) . . . .
(e) Actions to address particular threats. If an operator identifies any
of the following threats, the operator must take the following actions to
address the threat.
(1) ….
(4) ERW pipe. If a covered pipeline segment contains low frequency
electric resistance welded pipe (ERW), lap welded pipe or other pipe that
satisfies the conditions specified in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, Appendices
A4.3 and A4.4, and any covered or noncovered segment in the pipeline
system with such pipe has experienced seam failure, or operating pressure
on the covered segment has increased over the maximum operating
pressure experienced during the preceding five years, an operator must
select an assessment technology or technologies with a proven application
capable of assessing seam integrity and seam corrosion anomalies. The
operator must prioritize the covered segment as a high risk segment for the
baseline assessment or a subsequent reassessment.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(4) by failing to specify an
assessment method for each covered segment to identify anomalies associated with the specific
threat identified for that segment. Specifically, the Notice alleged that CenterPoint’s Baseline
Assessment Plan (BAP) did not identify an assessment technology with a proven application
capable of assessing seam integrity and seam corrosion anomalies for covered pipe segments that
contained ERW pipe and had experienced either seam failure or the operating pressure had
exceeded maximum operating pressure within the last five years. Section A4 of ASME B31.8S
states that “pressure testing must be performed to address the seam issue.
allowed for either a hydrotest or the use of a Transverse Flux Inspection (TFI) tool; however,
Section A4.4 of the ASME Standard only permits a hydrotest when assessing seam threats. A
TFI tool is not an acceptable method of integrity assessment in this case.
”12 CenterPoint’s BAP
Respondent admitted that its assessment tool selection guide mistakenly permitted the use of a
TFI tool in response to a pressure increase on a pipeline segment containing ERW pipe or pipe
with other specified seam issues.13 CenterPoint explained that it had intended to include the TFI
tool option only for manufacturing defects, not seam threats.14 Respondent further explained
that in spite of such mistake in its procedures, it never actually used a TFI tool in response to a
pressure increase15 and that after the OPS inspection, it revised its procedures to address this
issue. A TFI tool would not properly address the threat and could subsequently lead to a pipeline
12 ASME STANDARD B31.8S-2004, supra, § A4, “MANUFACTURING THREAT (PIPE SEAM AND PIPE).”
13 Response at 21; Closing at 8.
14 Id.
15 Id.



7
failure affecting public safety. Although CenterPoint notes that it revised its procedures, this
modification occurred after the OPS inspection and therefore does not cure the violation.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(4) by failing to select a proper assessment technology with a proven
application capable of assessing seam integrity and seam corrosion anomalies.
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1), which states:
§ 192.925 What are the requirements for using External Corrosion
Direct Assessment (ECDA)?
(a) Definition. ECDA is a four-step process that combines
preassessment, indirect inspection, direct examination, and post
assessment to evaluate the threat of external corrosion to the integrity of a
pipeline.
(b) General requirements. An operator that uses direct assessment to
assess the threat of external corrosion must follow the requirements in this
section, in ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see §192.7),
section 6.4, and in NACE RP 0502–2002 (incorporated by reference, see
§192.7). An operator must develop and implement a direct assessment
plan that has procedures addressing preassessment, indirect examination,
direct examination, and post-assessment. If the ECDA detects pipeline
coating damage, the operator must also integrate the data from the ECDA
with other information from the data integration (§192.917(b)) to evaluate
the covered segment for the threat of third party damage, and to address
the threat as required by § 192.917(e)(1).
(1) Preassessment. In addition to the requirements in ASME/ANSI
B31.8S section 6.4 and NACE RP 0502–2002, section 3, the plan's
procedures for preassessment must include—
(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting
ECDA for the first time on a covered segment; and
(ii) The basis on which an operator selects at least two different, but
complementary indirect assessment tools to assess each ECDA Region. If
an operator utilizes an indirect inspection method that is not discussed in
Appendix A of NACE RP0502–2002, the operator must demonstrate the
applicability, validation basis, equipment used, application procedure, and
utilization of data for the inspection method.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1) by failing to comply with
its own procedures and the requirements of NACE RP 0502-2003 (NACE Standard), Section 3,
in conducting ECDA preassessments. Specifically, it alleged four separate violations of
§ 192.925(b)(1). First, it alleged that CenterPoint violated the NACE Standard and its own
procedures by failing to define minimum data collection requirements for conducting
16
preassessments.
Second, it alleged that the company violated the NACE Standard and its own
16 NACE Standard Section 3.2.1.1 provides: “The pipeline operator shall define minimum data requirements based
on the history and condition of the pipeline segment. In addition, the pipeline operator shall identify data elements
that are critical to the success of the ECDA process.”



8
procedures by failing to document the basis for the conservative assumptions used on the ALE,
BT-1 and A-206 pipelines.
17 Third, the Notice alleged that CenterPoint violated the NACE
Standard and its own procedures by failing to document whether an ECDA feasibility assessment
had been conducted.
18 Finally, it alleged that Respondent violated the NACE Standard and its
own procedures by failing to document either the specific indirect inspection tools that were
ultimately chosen or the basis for choosing them.
19
Regarding the first allegation, CenterPoint argued that it had collected adequate data to make an
ECDA feasibility determination.20 However, Respondent admitted that its procedures “did not
include a list of minimum data requirements defining when ECDA was a feasible
violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1) by failing to define minimum data requirements concerning
data collection for ECDA preassessments.
alternative…”21 Accordingly, upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent
Regarding the second allegation, CenterPoint argued that there is no requirement in
§ 192.925(b)(1) to document conservative assumptions.22 I disagree. Respondent’s own
procedures allowed the use of conservative assumptions and required that they be documented.23
Nonetheless, CenterPoint explained that no conservative assumptions were documented because
none were used on the ALE, BT-1, and A-206 pipelines.24 Accordingly, based on a review of
the record, I hereby order that this portion of Item 6 be withdrawn.
Regarding the third allegation, Respondent argued that it had performed an ECDA feasibility
assessment on the ALE, BT-1 and A-206 pipelines.25 The company explained that it had
recorded data on preassessment forms but admitted that its ECDA feasibility determination was
not recorded.26
CenterPoint further argued that its documentation of ECDA regions and tool
17 Respondent’s ECDA Procedure PS-03-01-232 states that conservative defaults may be substituted when data is
missing. Its Quality Assurance Procedure PS-03-01-268 requires the company to “verify that conservative
assumptions were documented.”
18 NACE Standard Section 3.3.1 provides: “The pipeline operator shall integrate and analyze the data collected [as
required in Section 3.2] to determine whether conditions for which indirect inspection tools cannot be used or that
would preclude ECDA application exist.”
19 The Notice also alleged that Respondent failed to document whether the assessment tools were complementary to
each other. Proper documentation of the basis for tool selection would invariably include information on whether
the tools were complementary. Therefore I do not treat the language in the Notice on complementary tools as a
separate allegation.
20 Response at 27-28.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 28.
23 See supra note 13.
24 Response at 28.
25 Id. at 29-30.
26 Id. at 30.



9
By failing to document the process it used to undertake a feasibility determination, Respondent
skipped a key step in the ECDA process. Without such documentation, neither Respondent nor
OPS can accurately determine whether the ECDA process was properly performed.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1) by failing to properly document a feasibility assessment for the ALE,
BT-1 and A-206 pipelines.
selections proved that it had in fact performed a feasibility determination.27 Again, I disagree.
Regarding the fourth allegation, CenterPoint contended that it did document the specific indirect
inspection tools selected for the BT-1, ALE, and A-206 pipelines.
28 The regulation requires an
operator, as part of its preassessment procedure, to include “the basis on which an operator
selects at least two different, but complementary indirect assessment tools to assess each ECDA
region.” In addition, the publicly available 2004 OPS IMP Inspection Protocols indicated that
on when certain tools should be used, none of these documents explains the basis on which
Respondent nor OPS can verify that the proper tools were selected. Accordingly, based upon a
review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1) by
OPS would verify an operator’s documentation of its ECDA tool selections.29 While
CenterPoint has provided documents showing which tools it selected, as well as general guidance
specific tools were selected for particular ECDA regions. Absent such documentation, neither
failing to document the basis for its selection of indirect inspection tools.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1)(i), as quoted
above, and § 192.925(b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i), which state:
§ 192.925 What are the requirements for using External Corrosion
Direct Assessment (ECDA)?
(a-b) ….
(2) Indirect examination. In addition to the requirements in
ASME/ANSI B31.8S section 6.4 and NACE RP 0502–2002, section 4, the
plan's procedures for indirect examination of the ECDA regions must
include—
(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting
ECDA for the first time on a covered segment;…
(3) Direct examination. In addition to the requirements in
ASME/ANSI B31.8S section 6.4 and NACE RP 0502–2002, section 5, the
plan's procedures for direct examination of indications from the indirect
examination must include—
(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting
ECDA for the first time on a covered segment;…
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i)
by failing to document how it applied more restrictive criteria when conducting ECDA for the
27 Id.
28 Response at 31, Attachments 6.1–6.3 ECDA Preassessment Forms.
29 PHMSA-OPS Gas Integrity Management Protocol Results Form, Protocol D.02.c, (Oct. 2004) (available at
http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/gasimp/documents.htm).



10
first time on a covered segment. The cited regulations impose restrictive criteria requirements at
the preassessment, indirect examination, and direct examination steps of the ECDA process.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that the ECDA assessments for the ALE, BT-1, and A-206
pipelines did not contain any documentation of the more restrictive criteria that CenterPoint used
for this initial ECDA.
Respondent contested this allegation and provided documents to demonstrate that it had, in fact,
this documentation and agrees that it demonstrates more restrictive criteria were in fact used and
properly documented. Accordingly, based on the foregoing and a review of the record, I order
that Item 7 be withdrawn.
documented its use of more restrictive criteria at the time of the inspection.30 OPS has reviewed
Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.927(c)(1)(i), which states:
§ 192.927 What are the requirements for using Internal Corrosion
Direct Assessment (ICDA)?
(a) ….
(c) The ICDA plan. An operator must develop and follow an ICDA
plan that provides for preassessment, identification of ICDA regions and
excavation locations, detailed examination of pipe at excavation locations,
and post-assessment evaluation and monitoring.
(1) Preassessment. In the preassessment stage, an operator must gather
and integrate data and information needed to evaluate the feasibility of
ICDA for the covered segment, and to support use of a model to identify
the locations along the pipe segment where electrolyte may accumulate, to
identify ICDA regions, and to identify areas within the covered segment
where liquids may potentially be entrained. This data and information
includes, but is not limited to—
(i) All data elements listed in appendix A2 of ASME/ANSI B31.8S;…
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.927(c)(1)(i) by failing to evaluate
the feasibility of ICDA for certain pipeline segments. Specifically, it alleged that CenterPoint
failed to perform or document feasibility evaluations for ICDA preassessments performed on its
FT-11 and ADT-8 pipelines. It also alleged that Respondent did not document the basis for
selecting the feasibility criteria for pigging, water upsets, and introduction of sludge. The Notice
further alleged that Respondent’s ICDA preassessment data for these pipelines was of “poor
quality” and that this “could lead” to improper determinations of ICDA regions.
CenterPoint argued that it had, in fact, performed and documented feasibility evaluations and
feasibility flow charts for the FT-11 and ADT-8 pipelines, and that it had records of the source
data used to fill out the charts.
31 The company also pointed to those portions of its IMP
procedures that described the basis for selecting feasibility criteria.32
In response, OPS argued
30 Response at 32-35, Attachments 7.2-7.16
31 Response at 37, Attachments 8.1-8.2 and 8.5-8.12.
32 Id., Attachment 8.4, Procedure 03-01-238.



11
that the flow charts did not constitute the evaluation required by the regulation but the agency did
not explain why. While the feasibility flow charts are indeed sparse, they do show that
Respondent performed some type of feasibility analysis. In the absence of more specific
allegations or some explanation as to why Respondent’s documentation was inadequate, I find
that the record does not support a finding of violation for this portion of the allegation.
Finally, Respondent argued that it had the necessary data to perform ICDA preassessments and
that it was not of “poor quality”
.
33 Respondent provided numerous examples of such data.34
Again, the Notice did not explain why CenterPoint’s data was of poor quality or what data was
missing. With such lack of specificity in the Notice and upon review of the documents provided
by Respondent and which OPS has not addressed, I find that the record does not support a
finding of violation on this portion of the allegation.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing and a review of the record, I order that Item 8 be
withdrawn.
Item 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.927(c)(5)(ii), which states:
§ 192.927 What are the requirements for using Internal Corrosion
Direct Assessment (ICDA)?
(a) ….
(c) The ICDA plan. An operator must develop and follow an ICDA
plan that provides for preassessment, identification of ICDA regions and
excavation locations, detailed examination of pipe at excavation locations,
and post-assessment evaluation and monitoring.
(1) ….
(5) Other requirements. The ICDA plan must also include–
(i) ….
(ii) Provisions for apply more restrictive criteria when conducting
ICDA for the first time on a covered segment and that become less
stringent as the operator gains experience;…
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.927(c)(5)(ii) by failing to
document the more restrictive criteria the company used when conducting ICDA for the first
time on a covered segment. Specifically, it alleged that CenterPoint failed to document these
criteria, both in its ICDA plan and in the initial ICDAs performed on the FT-11 and ADT-8
pipelines. Respondent contested this allegation and provided numerous documents to
demonstrate that it had in fact documented more restrictive criteria at the time of the
inspection.35
OPS has reviewed these materials and agrees that CenterPoint was in compliance with this
regulation at the time of the inspection. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing and a review of
the record, I order that Item 9 be withdrawn.
33 Response at 38-39.
34 Response, Attachments 8.13-8.26.
35 Response at 41-43, Attachments 9.1-9.8.



12
Item 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.929(b)(1), which states:
§ 192.929 What are the requirements for using Direct Assessment for
Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCCDA)?
(a) ….
(b) General requirements. An operator using direct assessment as an
integrity assessment method to address stress corrosion cracking in a
covered pipeline segment must have a plan that provides, at minimum,
for—
(1) Data gathering and integration. An operator's plan must provide
for a systematic process to collect and evaluate data for all covered
segments to identify whether the conditions for SCC are present and to
prioritize the covered segments for assessment. This process must include
gathering and evaluating data related to SCC at all sites an operator
excavates during the conduct of its pipeline operations where the criteria
in ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see §192.7), appendix
A3.3 indicate the potential for SCC. This data includes at minimum, the
data specified in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, appendix A3.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.929(b)(1) by failing to provide in
its IMP a systematic data collection and evaluation process for all covered pipeline segments.
Specifically, the Notice alleged four separate violations regarding the SCCDA portion of
CenterPoint’s IMP.
First, it alleged that Respondent failed to include in its SCCDA plan a requirement for the
gathering and integration of data related to SCC at all sites. Specifically, it alleged that
CenterPoint excavated both covered and non-covered pipe segments, during its normal course of
business, in a manner that met the criteria listed in the ASME Standard indicating potential SCC.
The company’s procedures, however, allegedly failed to require the collection of data on non-
covered pipelines, as required by the regulation. Second, it alleged that Respondent failed to
follow its own procedures by not gathering and reviewing certain data elements used for SCCDA
under the ASME Standard. Third, it alleged that Respondent failed to follow the ASME
Standard by including a provision in its IMP for notifying PHMSA at least 180 days prior to
using a “near-neutral” SCCDA plan. Fourth, it alleged that Respondent failed to follow the
ASME Standard by neglecting to include a provision in its IMP requiring the performance of a
hydrostatic “spike test” following an in-service leak or rupture attributable to SCC.
Regarding the first allegation, Respondent argued that it had performed and documented
inspections of its pipelines during excavation and that its procedures for doing so were contained
in its Operations and Maintenance (O&M) manual, rather than in its IMP documentation.36
However, Respondent admitted that “its procedures at the time of the audit did not specifically
call for evaluation of data at sites where criteria indicate the potential for SCC.”37
Accordingly,
based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 192.929(b)(1) by failing to include in its SCCDA plan a requirement for the gathering and
integration of data related to SCC at all excavation sites where the criteria listed in the ASME
36 Response at 46.
37 Id. at 47.



13
Standard indicated the potential for SCC.
Regarding the second allegation, Respondent argued that it had, in fact, evaluated the SCCDA-
related data as required by its procedures; the company submitted Data Element Forms to
support its position.
that Respondent performed the requisite evaluations as of the date of the inspection.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing and a review of the record, I order that this portion of Item
10 be withdrawn.
38 Upon review of these records, I find that these materials do demonstrate
Regarding the third allegation, Respondent argued that its IMP procedure need not contain a
provision for notifying PHMSA be
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