{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420075003","title":"BP PIPELINE (NORTH AMERICA) INC. — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2007-02-13","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.410(a)(1), 195.420(c), 195.432(a), 195.436, 195.573(a), 195.579(a), 195.581(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420075003.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420075003.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420075003","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420075003","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving BP PIPELINE (NORTH AMERICA) INC.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.410(a)(1),  195.420(c),  195.432(a),  195.436,  195.573(a),  195.579(a),  195.581(a). The case was opened on 2007-02-13 and is reported as closed as of 2012-04-17. Proposed civil penalty: $168,000. Assessed civil penalty: $142,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420075003_Amended Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_02172011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/420075003_Amended%20Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_02172011.pdf\n\n420075003_Amended Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_02172011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/420075003_Amended%20Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_02172011_text.pdf\n\n420075003_Closure_04172012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/420075003_Closure_04172012.pdf\n\n420075003_Closure_04172012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/420075003_Closure_04172012_text.pdf\n\n420075003_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_02042011 .pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/420075003_Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_02042011%20.pdf\n\n420075003_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_02042011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/420075003_Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_02042011_text.pdf\n\n420075003_FinalOrder_07192010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/420075003_FinalOrder_07192010.pdf\n\n420075003_FinalOrder_07192010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/420075003_FinalOrder_07192010_text.pdf\n\n420075003_Petition for Reconsideration_08122010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/420075003_Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_08122010.pdf\n\nCPF 4-2007-5003 BP Pipeline North America - Response Letter.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/CPF%204-2007-5003%20BP%20Pipeline%20North%20America%20-%20Response%20Letter.pdf\n\nCPF 4-2007-5003 BP Pipeline North America NOPV.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420075003/CPF%204-2007-5003%20BP%20Pipeline%20North%20America%20NOPV.pdf\n\nCPF 4-2007-5003 BP Pipeline North America NOPV.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration\n8701 South Gessner, Suite 11 10\nHouston, TX 77074\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPI-IANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 13, 2007\nMr. Jim La Manna\nV. P. Operations\nBP Pipeline North America, Inc.\nMail Code 7018\n281 00 Torch Parkway\nWarrenville, IL 60555\n- CPF 4-2007-5003\nDear Mr. La Manna:\n4\nDuring the months of August, 2004, July, August, September, October, November and\nDecember, 2005 a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted\npipeline safety inspections of BP Pipeline North America, Inc. (BP) facilities and records\npertaining to the Seaway Products System, in Texas and Oklahoma; West System, New\nMexicoTTexas; and Texas/Oklahoma; East System, Oklahoma; and the Cushing Tank\nFarm.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of\nthe Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items\ninspected and the probable violations are:\n1. 9195.410 Line markers\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall\nplace and maintain line markers over each buried pipeline in accordance with\nthe following:\n(1) Markers must be located at each public road crossing, at each railroad\n\n\n\ncrossing, and in sufficient number along the remainder of each buried line so\nthat its location is accurately known.\n(c) Each operator shall provide line marking at locations where the line is\nabove ground in areas that are accessible to the public.\nBP does not have sufficient markers to accurately show where their pipelines are\nlocated. When crossing cultivated agricultural fields, often the markers on the far side of\nthe field could not be seen. From valve sites, looking in both directions, the next marker\nfor the pipeline could not be seen. The lack of pipeline marking is a common problem\nwith several of the BP pipelines that were inspected. The pipelines were marked at road\ncrossings.\n2. 9195.436 Security of facilities.\nEach operator shall provide protection for each pumping station and breakout\ntank area and other exposed facility (such as scraper traps) from vandalism\nand unauthorized entry.\nBP has a number of pump station, junction and scraper trap facilities that do not have\nadequate protection against unauthorized entry or vandalism. Barbed wire fences are\nnot adequate. The Monroe pump station and break out tanks had cyclone fencing with\nbarbed wire around the top around the pump station, and 3 strands of barbed wire\naround the break out tank area. Vandals got into the tank area, climbed up a tank and\nwalked around the wind girders on one of the tanks spraying graffiti. The vandals then\nclimbed down onto the floating roof, painted graffiti, and smoked on the floating roof.\nThe Artesia pump station has a 4 foot high hog and barbed wire fence facing the county\nroad, and barbed wire around the remainder of the facility. The Fullerton pump station1\nbreak out tank area have no fencing at all. The gravel county road actually cuts through\nthe pump station. Remote location is also not adequate to meet the requirements of this\nregulation.\n9195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(a) Protected pipelines. You must do the following to determine whether\ncathodic protection required by this subpart complies with Sec. 195.571:\n1. Conduct tests on the protected pipeline at least once each calendar year,\nbut with intervals not exceeding 15 months. However, if tests at those intervals\nare impractical for separately protected short sections of bare or ineffectively\ncoated pipelines, testing may be done at least once every 3 calendar years, but\nwith intervals not exceeding 39 months.\n(d) Breakout tanks. You must inspect each cathodic protection system used to\ncontrol corrosion on the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank to ensure\nthat operation and maintenance of the system are in accordance with API\nRecommended Practice 651. However, this inspection is not required if you\nnote in the corrosion control procedures established under Sec. 195.402(~)(3)\nwhy compliance with all or certain operation and maintenance provisions of\nAPI Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for the safety of the tank.\nBP is just beginning to implement surveys that consider IR drop. This requirement has\nbeen in place since regulations were changed in 2001. A number of locations had\ninstant off potentials, measured during the PHMSA inspections that were less negative\n\n\n\nthan the -850 mV criteria. Operator records indicate that the tank bottoms are also not\nbeing surveyed to account for IR drop during annual CP surveys.\n4. 9195.579 What must I do to mitigate internal corrosion?\n(a) General. If you transport any hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide that would\ncorrode the pipeline, you must investigate the corrosive effect of the\nhazardous liquid or carbon dioxide on the pipeline and take adequate steps to\nmitigate internal corrosion.\nBP has not done adequate investigations to determine whether there is internal\ncorrosion or the potential for internal corrosion. BP has performed little monitoring, and\nhas not done inspections to investigate whether there could be internal corrosion in\nfacilities and non-piggable piping. The investigation of internal corrosion appears to be\nbased upon a few internal coupons, which are improperly located on pipelines, and no\nother evidence could be produced.\n5. 91 95.420 Valve maintenance\n(c) Each operator shall provide protection for each valve from unauthorized\noperation and from vandalism.\nA number of the BP Pipeline valves do not have protection from vandalism at the\nsites. The valves were chained and locked to prevent unauthorized use, but\nthese locations did not provide any deterrence against vandalism. Local\npersonnel did provide additional information regarding this issue.\nDuring the inspections it was noted that BP' preferred method of complying with\n195.420~ is to install locked chain link fencing around the valves. This was\nevident in the six BP units that were inspected, where most of above ground\nvalves were located in locked fences.\nSome of the remaining valves in those units were located above ground with no\nfences. Some of the valves were inside a pipe post and beam enclosure, which\nmay be sufficient to keep cattle from rubbing on the valves, but do not address\nprevention of vandalism. The number of above ground valves that were\nobserved without fences by the inspector on the six Texas and New Mexico units\nexceeded seven, and the lack of fencing was pointed out to BP personnel at the\ntime of the inspections.\nIt should be pointed out that all of the unfenced valves were chain locked and\nsome had steel barricade posts installed. A review of your procedures by our\ninspectors did not reveal any alternative method of security for valve sites\nacceptable to you. BP should review their program, procedures, and facilities to\nensure they are compliant with this regulation.\n6. 9195.432 Breakout tanks.\n(a) Except for breakout tanks inspected under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this\nsection, each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least\nonce each calendar year, inspect each in-service breakout tank.\n\n\n\n(b) Each operator shall inspect the physical integrity of in-service atmospheric\nand low-pressure steel aboveground breakout tanks according to section 4 of\nAPI Standard 653. However, if structural conditions prevent access to the tank\nbottom, the bottom integrity may be assessed according to a plan included in\nthe operations and maintenance manual under §195.402(~)(3).\n(c) Each operator shall inspect the physical integrity of in-service steel\naboveground breakout tanks built to API Standard 2510 according to section 6\nof API 510.\n(d) The intervals of inspection specified by documents referenced in\nparagraphs (b) and (c) of this section begin on May 3, 1999, or on the\noperator's last recorded date of the inspection, whichever is earlier.\nDuring the PHMSA inspections of BP breakout tanks at pump stations and the Cushing\ntank farm, a number of breakout tanks were noted for items not in compliance with the\nrequirements of API 653.\nThe records indicate that the tanks have been inspected, and the items not in\ncompliance with API 653 should have been noted and corrected after the inspections.\nThe records for the internal inspections and in some cases external inspections make it\nimpossible to determine whether issues documented during the inspections have been\naddressed. Record keeping must include the records for the items identified during the\ninspections, and their resolution, or reasons for not being resolved.\n7. S195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric corrosion and\nwhat coating material may I use?\n(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is\nexposed to the atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this\nsection.\nSeveral of the breakout tank roofs, above ground valves, piping in opened vaults and\nexposed pipeline areas had coating that was failing or had failed, and was leaving the\npipe or tank top susceptible to external corrosion. If left as is, corrosion could continue\nto the extent that the integrity of the pipeline or tanks would be compromised. Coating\nshould be replaced before serious corrosion occurs.\nUnder 49 United States Code, 5 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$1 00,000 for each violation for each day the violations persists up to a maximum of\n$1,000,000 for any related series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed\nthe circumstances and supporting documentation involved in the above probable\nviolation(s) and has recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of\n$168,000 as follows:\nItem number\n1\n2\n3\nPENALTY\n$26,000\n\n\n\nWith respect to items 5, and 7, we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting\ndocuments involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement\naction or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly\ncorrect these item(s). Be advised that failure to do so may result in BP being subject to\nadditional enforcement action.\nWith respect to items 1 through 4, and 6, pursuant to 49 United States Code § 601 18,\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a\nCompliance Order to BP Products Operating, L.P. Please refer to the Proposed\nCompliance Order which is enclosed and made a part of this Notice.\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline\nOperators in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the\nresponse options. If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this\nconstitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and authorizes\nthe Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice\nwithout further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 4-2007-5003 and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code $ 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to BP Pipeline North America, Inc. a\nCompliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the\ncompliance of BP with the pipeline safety regulations:\n1. In regard to ltem #1 of the Notice, BP must perform an inspection of pipeline ROW'S\nthroughout BP's pipeline system. The inspection is to evaluate the line markers\ncurrently posted along the rights-of-way, as well as identify those areas where\nadditional markers are needed. If there are areas, such as cultivated fields, where it\nis impractical to place markers, or because the markers are removed or plowed\nunder by the farmer, an alternative method of ensuring the safety of the public and\nthe pipeline should be developed. In areas where there are insufficient markers,\ndevelop a plan and time table to place markers to ensure BP is in compliance with\n$1 95.41 O(a)(l).\n2. ltem #2 of the Notice indicates a lack of security at some BP facilities. BP shall\nperform a survey of their pipeline facilities, identifying any facilities that do not meet\nthe requirements of $195.436. For BP facilities that do not meet the regulatory\nrequirements of being protected from unauthorized entry, and vandalism, BP shall\ndevelop a plan and time table to secure the facilities, and ensure that they are in\ncompliance with $1 95.436.\n3. In regard to ltem #3 of the Notice pertaining to BP's pipeline systems, review BP's\nCP data collection and evaluation to ensure that data meets the regulatory\nrequirements, and that the pipelines are protected. In areas where the pipelines are\nnot adequately protected, develop a plan and time table to improve the CP systems\nto bring BP into compliance.\n4. In regard to ltem #4 of the Notice pertaining to BP's pipeline systems, perform an\nassessment of pipelines and all facilities to determine if there are areas that would be\nsusceptible to internal corrosion. Perform inspections, install monitoring, and if\nactive corrosion is determined, implement mitigation methods.\n5. Regarding ltem #6 of the Notice, BP must perform a review to ensure that all of BP's\nbreakout tanks are in compliance with $195.432. Items found not in compliance with\ns195.432 and API-653 requirements shall be corrected, and a program to follow\nthrough on future inspection issues implemented.\nThe data and results generated during API-653 internal and external inspections\nshall be presented, along with a report showing resolution of any issues discovered\nduring the inspection, and explanation of any issues that were not resolved.\n6. BP shall maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with\nfulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to R. M. Seeley, Director,\nSouthwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Costs\n\n\n\nshall be reported in two categories: I) total cost associated with preparationlrevision\nof plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with\nreplacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\n7. Submit to the Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration, 8701 South Gessner, Suite 11 10, Houston, Texas 77074.\n1. Results of surveys and plans, with time tables, must be submitted within 30 days\nfollowing the receipt of the Final Order.\n2. All items shall be completed within 365 days following the receipt of the Final\nOrder.\n\n420075003_FinalOrder_07192010_text.pdf\n\nJUL 19 2010\nMr. Steve Pankhurst\nPresident\nBP Pipelines (North America), Inc.\n28100 Torch Parkway\nWarrenville, IL 60555\nRe: CPF No. 4-2007-5003\nDear Mr. Pankhurst:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $142,000, and specifies certain actions that need to\nbe taken by BP Pipelines (North America), Inc., to comply with the pipeline safety regulations.\nThe penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid\nand the terms of the Compliance Order completed, as determined by the Director, Southwest\nRegion, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is\ndeemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Rod M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA\nMr. Rob Knanishu, BP Pipelines (North America), Inc.\nMr. Bill Von Drehle, Director of Safety and Compliance, Centurion Pipeline\n5 Greenway Plaza, Suite 110, Houston, TX 77046\nMr. Todd Tullio, Manager, Regulatory Compliance, ConocoPhillips Pipeline Company\n600 North Dairy Ashford, Houston, Texas 77079\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED[7009 1410 0000 2472 2575]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nBP Pipelines (North America), Inc., ) CPF No. 4-2007-5003\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nDuring August 2004 and on various dates between July and December 2005, pursuant to 49\nU.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of\nthe facilities and records of BP Pipelines (North America), Inc. (BP Pipelines or Respondent), at\nthe company’s New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma locations. The inspection included the\nfollowing systems: Seaway Products Texas System, a 400-mile system transporting\nhydrocarbons across Texas; the Seaway Oklahoma Unit, a 155-mile system transporting\nhydrocarbons; the East System Oklahoma Unit, a 246-mile system transporting crude oil; the\nWest System, a 520-mile system transporting crude oil across Texas and New Mexico; the\nNorthwest System, a 672-mile system transporting crude oil across Texas and Oklahoma; and the\nCushing Tank Farm, an 80-tank facility in Oklahoma.1 BP Pipelines transports over 450 million\nbarrel miles of oil, refined products, natural gas liquids, carbon dioxide and chemicals daily\nthroughout the United States.\n2\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated February 13, 2007, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that BP Pipelines had committed certain violations of 49 C.F.R. Part\n195 and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $168,000 for the alleged violations. The Notice\n1 After the inspection, on February 17, 2006, BP Pipelines submitted a letter to PHMSA indicating that\nConocoPhillips had acquired BP Pipelines’ interest in the Seaway Products Pipeline JV, effective December 1,\n2005. The Seaway Products Pipeline carries refined petroleum products from Pasadena, Texas, to Cushing,\nOklahoma. On June 19, 2007, BP Pipelines submitted a second letter to OPS, confirming that it had transferred the\nWest Texas/New Mexico/Cushing Pipeline system to Centurion Pipeline, L.P., a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum\nCorp. BP Pipelines retained ownership of the Cushing Terminal and Shinn Pence tank farm in Oklahoma. Mr. Bill\nVon Drehle represented Centurion Pipeline at the July 23, 2007 hearing. Since the OPS inspection occurred prior to\nthese ownership changes, the findings of violation set forth below are directed to BP Pipelines, the operator of all the\nfacilities at the time of the inspection.\n2 http://www.bppipelines.com/aboutus.html (last accessed December 2, 2009).\n\n\n\n2\nalso proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations and\nwarned Respondent to address other probable violations or be subject to future enforcement\naction.\nBP Pipelines responded to the Notice by letter dated March 23, 2007 (Response). Respondent\ncontested the allegations, penalties, and proposed compliance order, and requested a hearing. A\nhearing was subsequently held on July 23, 2007, in Houston, Texas, with an attorney from the\nOffice of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. BP Pipelines was represented by counsel at the\nhearing. Respondent subsequently provided a post-hearing submission dated August 20, 2007\n(Brief).\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.436, which states:\n§ 195.436 Security of facilities.\nEach operator shall provide protection for each pumping station\nand breakout tank area and other exposed facility (such as scraper traps)\nfrom vandalism and unauthorized entry.\nOPS alleged in the Notice that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.436 by failing to provide\nprotection for a number of pump stations, junctions, and scraper trap facilities from vandalism\nand unauthorized entry. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to protect the\nMonroe, Artesia, and Fullerton facilities, as follows:\nMonroe - The Monroe pump station and breakout tank area allegedly were secured only\nby cyclone fencing and with barbed wire around the top of the pump station. BP Pipelines used\nthree strands of barbed wire around the breakout tank area. As a result, vandals entered the tank\narea, sprayed the tank and floating roof with graffiti, and smoked on top of the structure, leaving\ncigarette butts on the roof. OPS attached pictures of the damage with the Violation Report.3\nArtesia – BP Pipelines allegedly used only a four-foot-high hog fence and barbed wire to\nsecure the facility. The pump station faces a county road and was therefore readily accessible to\nthe public.\nFullerton–The Fullerton pump station and breakout tank area allegedly did not have any\nfencing. A county road cuts through the facility, providing easy public access to the pump\nstation.\nIn its Response, BP Pipelines contended that its procedures and practices were consistent with\nPart 195. However, at the hearing and in its submissions, the company agreed to survey its\nfacilities and provide additional security to prevent vandalism and unauthorized entry. OPS\n3 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), (February 15, 2007) (on file with PHMSA).\n\n\n\n3\nconfirms that BP Pipelines has now completed the survey and secured the stations identified in\nthe Notice. Such corrective action, however, does not negate the fact that Respondent failed to\nsecure these facilities from unauthorized entry as of the date of the inspection. Accordingly,\nhaving reviewed the evidence in the record, I find that Respondent violated § 195.436 by failing\nto provide protection for each pumping station and breakout tank from vandalism and\nunauthorized entry.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573, which states:\n§ 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(a) Protected pipelines. You must do the following to determine\nwhether cathodic protection required by this subpart complies with\n§ 195.571:\n(1) Conduct tests on the protected pipeline at least once each\ncalendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months. However, if\ntests at those intervals are impractical for separately protected short\nsections of bare or ineffectively coated pipelines, testing may be done at\nleast once every 3 calendar years, but with intervals not exceeding 39\nmonths….\n(d) Breakout tanks. You must inspect each cathodic protection\nsystem used to control corrosion on the bottom of an aboveground\nbreakout tank to ensure that operation and maintenance of the system are\nin accordance with API Recommended Practice 651. However, this\ninspection is not required if you note in the corrosion control procedures\nestablished under § 195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or certain\noperation and maintenance provisions of API Recommended Practice 651\nis not necessary for the safety of the tank....\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573 by failing to conduct surveys\nto determine whether BP Pipelines’ cathodic protection (CP) system complied with § 195.571.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to account for voltage or “IR drop” in its\nannual cathodic protection surveys and therefore the company could not determine if its cathodic\nprotection system complied with § 195.571.\n4 Under § 195.571, operators are required to utilize\nCP that meets “one or more of the applicable criteria and other considerations for cathodic\nprotection contained in paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 of NACE Standard RP 0169…”. Operators may\nuse the -850 mV criterion for determining whether adequate levels of CP have been achieved.5\nHowever, when using this factor, voltage drops other than across the structure-to-electrolyte\nboundary must be considered.6\n4 “IR drop” is the difference between the voltage at the top of the pipe and the voltage at the surface of the earth. An\noperator must consider this drop for a valid interpretation of the standards set forth by NACE RPO169, paragraph\n6.2.\n5 NACE International, RP0169, Paragraph 6.2 (2002).\n6 Id. at 6.2.2.1.1.\n\n\n\n4\nAfter reviewing and considering BP Pipelines’ annual CP surveys for calendar years 2003, 2004,\nand 2005, and discussing them with company personnel, OPS alleged in the Notice that several\nlocations had “instant-off” potentials that did not meet the -850 mV criterion. The requirement\nto conduct tests to determine whether the cathodic protection on the pipeline complies with\n§ 195.571 was promulgated by final rule on December 27, 2001, effective January 28, 2002.7\nHowever, according to OPS, BP Pipelines had still not incorporated IR drop into its surveys at\nthe time of the 2004 OPS inspection. As documented in the Violation Report, BP Pipelines’\ncorrosion engineer initially argued that the -850 mV criterion already factored in the IR drop.8\nIn addition to the surveys, OPS also alleged that BP Pipelines failed to demonstrate that the\nbreakout tanks at pumps stations and at the Cushing Tank Farm met the protection criteria of API\nRP 651.9\nIn its submissions and at the hearing, Respondent argued that its prior external corrosion control\nprocedures and practices were in compliance with § 195.571 since the company used a\nmethodology of -850 mV in conjunction with sound engineering practices.\n10 BP Pipelines\nexplained that the sound engineering practices it relied on included the historical performance of\nthe CP system. The company stated that there had been no DOT-reportable spills caused by\nexternal corrosion on this line. Respondent also stated that interrupted surveys were not the only\nacceptable method of considering IR drop. The company contended that it had modified its\nprocedures in 2004 to include consideration of IR drop in response to a Notice of Amendment\n(NOA) issued by OPS.\nargued that the allegation of violation should be withdrawn. Finally, Respondent stated that\npursuant to its revised procedures, the company ran a Close Interval Survey (CIS) within a year\nof every in-line inspection. Since segments from this inspection were assessed by in-line\ninspection in 2006, a CIS would be conducted during the 2007 calendar year. On the basis of\nthese procedures and actions, BP Pipelines argued that the probable violation, proposed civil\npenalty, and compliance order all should be withdrawn.\n11 Since these procedures had been approved by OPS, the company\n7 Controlling Corrosion on Hazardous Liquid and Carbon Dioxide Pipelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 66999 (Dec. 27, 2001).\n8 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), (February 15, 2007) (on file with PHMSA).\n9 Notice, at 2-3. Violation Report, at 8.\n10 Operators using the -850 mV criterion must consider voltage drop. “Consideration” is further defined as “the\napplication of sound engineering practice…such as measuring or calculating the voltage drop; reviewing the\nhistorical performance of the cathodic protection system; evaluating the physical and electrical characteristics of the\npipe and its environment; and determining whether or not there is physical evidence of corrosion. NACE Standard\nRP0169, Paragraph 6.2.2.1.1.1 (2002).\n11 In the Matter of BP Pipeline Company, Final Order, CPF No. 3-2004-5021M)(available at\nwww.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/enforcement). In response to this Notice of Amendment, BP Pipelines submitted\nrevised procedures on December 16, 2004, June 10, 2005, January 31, 2006, and March 10, 2006. The NOA alleged\nthat Respondent’s procedures included several “inadequacies”, including §§ 195.571 and 195.573. Upon review of\nthe company’s revised procedures, the Director stated that the inadequacies had been resolved and closed the case.\n\n\n\n5\nAt the hearing, OPS clarified that the NOA issued to BP Pipelines on August 12, 2004, served as\na notification that OPS considered the company’s procedures inadequate. In fact, OPS stated in\nthe NOA that “BP Pipelines’ procedures fail[ed] to address identifying circumstances in which a\nclose-interval survey would apply” and that “BP Pipelines’ procedures fail[ed] to consider IR\ndrop when utilizing the -850 mVcriteria, as required by NACE RP 0169-96.”12 According to\nOPS, BP Pipelines corrected its procedures after receipt of the NOA but did not put the new\nprocedures into practice. The OPS inspector stated in the Violation Report that it was evident at\nthe time of the inspection that BP Pipelines was just beginning to conduct interrupted surveys\nno indication that Respondent considered voltage drop during its annual CP surveys prior to the\ninspection, thereby prompting issuance of the Notice.\nand close-interval surveys in conjunction with its Integrity Management Program.13 OPS found\nI have reviewed the evidence and the arguments set forth by OPS and BP Pipelines. I find OPS’\nargument persuasive in that the 2004 NOA pertained to the operator’s procedures, whereas the\nNotice involved the operator’s practices. In 2004, BP Pipelines updated its procedures in\nresponse to the NOA but failed to demonstrate that it had actually incorporated voltage drop in\nits CP surveys as of the date of the inspection. Further, I do not find merit in Respondent’s\nargument that leak history and a proposed CIS constitute compliance with § 195.571. I note that\nthe NACE Standard RP 0619, Paragraph 6.1.5, specifically states that corrosion leak history is\nnot sufficient by itself to determine whether adequate CP levels have been achieved.14 In\naddition, BP Pipelines was in violation of this regulation prior to the submission of its revised\nprocedures in 2004 since consideration of IR drop became a requirement of the code as of\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(a)(1) and (d) by failing to conduct CP surveys to ensure its\nJanuary 2002. 15 Therefore, based upon all of the evidence in the record, I find that Respondent\ncathodic protection system complied with 49 C.F.R. § 195.571.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.579(a), which states:\n§ 195.579 What must I do to mitigate internal corrosion?\n(a) General. If you transport any hazardous liquid or carbon\ndioxide that would corrode the pipeline, you must investigate the corrosive\neffect of the hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide on the pipeline and take\nadequate steps to mitigate internal corrosion….\nOPS alleged in the Notice that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.579 by failing to investigate\nthe corrosive effect of its products being transported. Specifically, the Notice and Violation\nReport alleged that Respondent failed to perform inspections on dead legs, low points, facility\nand non-piggable pipe, and in areas downstream of supplier taps. OPS alleged that these areas\nhad the potential to collect water that would corrode the pipeline but that Respondent failed to\nmonitor them for internal corrosion. OPS further alleged that Respondent had been unable to\n12 Id. at 3.\n13 Violation Report, at 9.\n14 NACE International, RP0169, paragraph 6.1.5 (2002).\n15 66 Fed. Reg. at 66999.\n\n\n\n6\npresent evidence that it was meeting the requirements of the regulation, other than pointing to a\nfew internal coupons that had been inappropriately located on the pipeline.\nIn its Response and at the hearing, BP Pipelines contended that it had examined the facilities\nincluded in the OPS inspection for internal corrosion. As evidence of its investigation\ntechniques, the company stated that its In-Line Inspection (ILI) results demonstrated the non-\ncorrosive nature of its crude oil and that the company had not experienced internal corrosion on\nthese lines. In addition, the company indicated that it had instituted a Facility Integrity\nManagement Program (FIMP) in 2005 that focused on internal corrosion. Prior to commencing\nthe program, BP Pipelines had replaced sections of pipe, eliminating dead legs and low-flow\npiping. Finally, after the OPS inspection, Respondent performed a sample analysis of the crude\noil transported in its systems, which confirmed its non-corrosive nature.\nI have reviewed the record and find that BP Pipelines violated § 195.579. Crude oil can be\ncorrosive if it contains water or other electrolytes. BP Pipelines was using internal coupons on\nthis line, demonstrating that the company itself recognized the potential corrosivity of the\nproducts being transported. Under the regulation, BP Pipelines had an obligation to investigate\nthe corrosive effect of the product being transported and to take “adequate steps” to mitigate\ninternal corrosion. At the time of the inspection, Respondent failed to meet these affirmative\nobligations.\nThe fact that this line had not had a history of internal corrosion spills is not persuasive.\nAlthough BP Pipelines had not experienced a spill caused by internal corrosion, this fact alone\ndid not eliminate the possibility of a future incident, nor did it eliminate BP Pipelines’\nresponsibility to investigate the corrosive nature of its products. Although ILI results are\nexcellent corrosion indicators for piggable lines, additional preventive and mitigating measures\nwere necessary. Respondent should have identified the factors that could influence the formation\nof internal corrosion, focusing on alignment changes such as dead legs and low points where\nwater could settle and lead to internal corrosion. Respondent also should have engaged in more\nsampling activities. A periodic sampling of product only tests for corrosivity at specific times\nand does not reflect a continuous sample of the product.\nFinally, in its Response, BP Pipelines pointed to its FIMP program. However, this program was\ninstituted in 2005, after the OPS inspection had raised the alleged violation. Although the FIMP\nprogram should benefit Respondent’s facilities by removing internal corrosion that has occurred,\nRespondent was required to take other steps to effectively investigate and monitor the corrosive\nnature of its product. Accordingly, having reviewed the evidence in the record, I find that BP\nPipelines violated § 195.579 by failing to investigate the corrosive effect of its product on the\npipeline and take adequate steps to mitigate internal corrosion.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.432(b) and (d), which\nstates:\n\n\n\n7\n§ 195.432 Inspection of in-service breakout tanks.\n(a) Except for breakout tanks inspected under paragraphs (b) and\n(c) of this section, each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, inspect each in-service\nbreakout tank.\n(b) Each operator shall inspect the physical integrity of in-service\natmospheric and low-pressure steel aboveground breakout tanks according\nto section 4 of API Standard 653. However, if structural conditions\nprevent access to the tank bottom, the bottom integrity may be assessed\naccording to a plan included in the operations and maintenance manual\nunder § 195.402(c)(3).\n(c) Each operator shall inspect the physical integrity of in-service\nsteel aboveground breakout tanks built to API Standard 2510 according to\nsection 6 of API 510.\n(d) The intervals of inspection specified by documents referenced\nin paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section begin on May 3, 1999, or on the\noperator’s last recorded date of the inspection, whichever is earlier.\nThe Notice alleged that BP Pipelines violated § 195.432(b) and (d) by failing to inspect its in-\nservice breakout tanks at pump stations and at the Cushing Tank Farm in compliance with\nSection 4 of API 653, as incorporated by reference in the pipeline safety regulations. Pursuant to\nAPI 653, operators must perform routine visual inspections of in-service breakout tanks, at\nintervals not exceeding one month, and document certain areas of non-compliance for follow-up\naction.16 Both OPS and the Respondent agree that BP Pipelines conducted the required\ninspections. However, OPS alleged in the Notice and Violation Report that the company failed\nto document and correct certain areas of non-compliance, as prescribed by API 653.\nSpecifically, the inspector noted broken and spalling concrete ring walls, cavities under tanks\nmade by animals and washouts, settlement around tank perimeters, exterior paint failure and\ncorrosion, lack of sealant between tank bottom and concrete ringwall, rivet/seam leakage, flange\nthat it was impossible to determine from Respondent’s records whether these issues were\nleaks and leaks around flange bolts, and signs of leakage at mixers.17 In the Notice, OPS alleged\ndocumented and resolved. OPS maintained that these items should have been documented\nduring monthly inspections and corrected before the next inspection.\nIn response, BP Pipelines asserted that it had inspected its breakout tanks as required by API\n653. As part of its Response, BP Pipelines submitted follow-","truncated":true,"body_characters":85578}