{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420091005","title":"COLUMBIA GULF TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2009-02-12","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.605(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420091005.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420091005.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420091005","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420091005","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving COLUMBIA GULF TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 192.605(a). The case was opened on 2009-02-12 and is reported as closed as of 2011-04-01. Proposed civil penalty: $1,555,000. Assessed civil penalty: $806,500. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420091005_FinalOrder_03212011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_FinalOrder_03212011.pdf\n\n420091005_FinalOrder_03212011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_FinalOrder_03212011_text.pdf\n\n420091005_NOPVPCP_02122009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_NOPVPCP_02122009.pdf\n\n420091005_NOPVPCP_02122009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_NOPVPCP_02122009_text.pdf\n\n420091005_Operator Response_03242009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_Operator%20Response_03242009.pdf\n\n420091005_FinalOrder_03212011_text.pdf\n\nMAR 21 2011\nMr. Victor Gaglio\nSenior Vice President, Operations and Engineering\nColumbia Gulf Transmission Company\n1700 MacCorkle Avenue, SE\nCharleston, West Virginia 25314\nRe: CPF No. 4-2009-1005\nDear Mr. Gaglio:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and assesses a reduced civil penalty of $806,500. The penalty payment terms are set\nforth in the Final Order. This enforcement action closes automatically upon payment. Service of\nthe Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise\nprovided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Rod M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED[7005 1160 0001 0041 3627]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nColumbia Gulf Transmission Company, ) CPF No. 4-2009-1005\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\nFINAL ORDER\nBetween December 14, 2007 and April 2008, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted a post-incident investigation of a failure on a 30-inch interstate natural gas\ntransmission pipeline (Line 100) that occurred on December 14, 2007, near Delhi, Louisiana\n(2007 Failure).\nColumbia Gulf Transmission Company (Columbia Gulf or Respondent), the owner and operator\nof the pipeline that failed, operates three parallel pipelines at this location (Lines 100, 200, 300).\nColumbia Gulf is owned by NiSource, Inc., an energy company engaged in natural gas\ntransmission, storage and distribution, as well as electric generation, transmission and\ndistribution. Respondent operates approximately 3,400 miles of pipeline and 11 compressor\nstations located primarily in Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Kentucky.1\nThe 2007 Failure resulted in an explosion and fire, causing one fatality and one non-fatal injury,\nproperty damage and the temporary closure of Interstate 20. The two individuals that were\ninjured were members of the public who were traveling east on I-20 at the time of the 2007\nFailure.\n2\nOn December 19, 2007, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO No. 4-2007-1017H) to\nColumbia Gulf, requiring the company to take immediate corrective actions to protect public\nsafety.3 A third-party metallurgical firm determined the probable cause of the 2007 Failure was\nexternal pitting corrosion of the carrier pipe inside the casing at the crossing with I-20.4\nThe\n1 See\nhttp://www.ngts.com/about-ngts/columbia-gulf-transmission (last accessed December 30, 2010).\n2 See Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty, pg. 2 (February 12, 2009) (on file with PHMSA).\n3 This Corrective Action Order (CAO) was closed on January 31, 2011.\n4 See Metallurgical & Materials Technologies, Inc. (MMT) report attached as Exhibit 1 to Response. The report\nstated that “moisture in the atmosphere and standing water in the bottom of the casing, in conjunction with a high\n\n\n\n2\nmetallurgical firm discovered that the external corrosion was caused by moisture in the\natmosphere and standing water in the casing.5\nAs a result of the post-incident investigation, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director),\nissued to Respondent, by letter dated February 12, 2009, a Notice of Probable Violation and\nProposed Civil Penalty (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed\nfinding that Respondent had violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605, 192.617, and 192.613 and assessing\na civil penalty of $1,550,000 for the alleged violations.\nColumbia Gulf responded to the Notice by letter dated March 24, 2009 (Response). The\ncompany contested the items in the Notice and requested that the proposed civil penalty be\nreduced or rescinded. Columbia Gulf did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right\nto one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nBackground\nPrior to the 2007 Failure, Columbia Gulf experienced three similar incidents in the same area\ninvolving either Line 100 or 200. In September of 2000, Columbia Gulf experienced a failure on\nLine 200. The pipeline ruptured and caught fire approximately two miles from the Delhi Station.\nA metallurgical evaluation performed after the failure determined that the rupture was caused by\nexternal corrosion. Approximately a year later, in August of 2001, the operator experienced an\nincident on Line 100 which the operator described as a leak. This failure was caused by external\ncorrosion under a casing spacer ring. A second leak occurred in September of 2006 on this same\nline (Line 100) and again was caused by external corrosion. Approximately, fifteen months\nlater, on December 14, 2007, Line 100 ruptured. This failure was again caused by external\ncorrosion.\nAllegations\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605, which states:\n§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each\npipeline, a manual for written procedures for conducting operations and\nmaintenance activities and for emergency response. For transmission\nlines, the manual must include procedures for handling abnormal\nconcentration of chlorides in the environment, and damage to and localized failure of the coating are responsible for\nthe corrosion noted and the failure of the pipe.” MMT report, at 30.\n5 Id. at 30; See also, Response, 6.\n\n\n\n3\noperations. This manual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.\nThis manual must be prepared before operations of a pipeline system\ncommence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations\nwhere operations and maintenance activities are conducted….\n(e) Surveillance, emergency response, and accident investigation.\nThe procedures required by §§ 192.613(a), 192.615, and 192.617 must be\nincluded in the manual required by paragraph (a) of this section….\n§ 192.617 Investigation of Failures.\nEach operator shall establish procedures for analyzing accidents and\nfailures, including the selection of samples of the failed facility or\nequipment for laboratory examination, where appropriate, for the purpose\nof determining the causes of the failure and minimizing the possibility of a\nrecurrence.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) and (e) and § 192.617 by\nfailing to follow its procedures for analyzing accidents and failures. According to OPS,\nRespondent failed to follow its O&M procedures, specifically its twelve-point “Incident\nEvaluation and Investigation” procedure, for a thorough incident investigation.6 Item 12 of this\nprocedure required Respondent’s personnel to “make recommendations to reduce the likelihood\nof a reoccurrence of an incident [and] assign someone to act upon the recommendation(s) and\nby either failing to make recommendations after each failure or making recommendations that\nrepeat failure.\ntrack progress.”7 did not address the cause of the prior incidents and therefore could not reduce the likelihood of a\nIn the Notice, OPS argued that Columbia Gulf failed to follow its procedures\nAccording to Columbia Gulf’s records supplied to OPS after the 2007 Failure, the probable\ncause of the 2000 failure was external corrosion, specifically microbiological induced corrosion\n(MIC).8 However, in response to this failure, Columbia Gulf recommended running a smart pig\non the Delhi to Inverness segment and installing a rectifier at the rupture site.\nthese recommendations could not have reduced the likelihood of a repeat failure caused by\nmicrobiological induced corrosion. On this basis, OPS alleged that Columbia Gulf failed to\nfollow its Incident Evaluation and Investigation procedures.\n9 OPS asserted that\n6 Response, Exhibit 9, Columbia Gulf Incident Evaluation and Investigation Procedure, at 24.\n7 Id.\n8 Response, at 12. The metallurgist stated that “the exact cause of the corrosion was not determined. However,\nisolated pitting and otherwise un-corroded pipe, the morphology of the pitted surfaces, and the detection of sulfur on\nthe pitted surface suggests that the pitting was due to microbiologically influenced corrosion.” See Response,\nExhibit 10.\n9 Violation Report, Exhibit 4, Form #2377-EG4 completed in response to 2000 incident.\n\n\n\n4\nThe cause of the 2001 leak was external corrosion under a spacing ring.\nGulf made recommendations to replace the affected pipe within the casing but did not make any\nrecommendations for other casings on this particular line or nearby lines.\n10 In response, Columbia\nFinally, in response to the third incident, which was caused by corrosion of a carrier pipe inside a\ncased crossing, Columbia Gulf replaced the carrier pipe where the leak occurred and filled the\ncasing but did not make any recommendations to investigate other casings on the system. OPS\nasserted that the recommendations Columbia Gulf did make were not specific to the cause of the\nfailures and therefore could not reduce the likelihood of a reoccurrence. OPS alleged that the\nrecommendations summarized above were not tailored to the cause of the prior failures and\ntherefore could not reduce the likelihood of a repeat failure.\nResponse\nIn its Response, Columbia Gulf contended that it had established the necessary procedures for\nanalyzing accidents and failures, its personnel followed these procedures after each incident, and\nits procedures did not require the company to investigate other locations on the pipeline system\nfor similar deficiencies.\nColumbia Gulf disagreed with OPS’ reliance on the Incident Evaluation and Investigation\nprocedures for all four events. Columbia Gulf asserted that its procedures entitled “Manual of\nApproved Procedures” dated April 12, 1993 were in effect at the time of the 2000 and 2001\nincidents and not the twelve-point Incident and Evaluation and Investigation Procedure.\n11\nColumbia Gulf also disagreed with the application of the Incident Evaluation and Investigation\nprocedures to the 2006 leak. Although these procedures were issued in 2004 and therefore were\nin use at the time of the 2006 incident, Respondent stated that the 2006 incident was a Grade 2\nleak and did not meet the criteria to take action under these. In support, Columbia Gulf cited\npage 24 of these procedures which state that “the impact and severity of the incident shall be\nargued that the requirement to make recommendations after the 2006 incident did not apply.\nSince the Manual of Approved Procedures (1993) was the controlling document during the 2000\nconsidered to determine whether an investigation is necessary.12 Therefore, Columbia Gulf\nand 2001 incidents and did not require specific recommendations and the 2006 leak was not\nsevere enough to initiate the Incident and Evaluation Investigation Procedure (2004), Columbia\nGulf argued that Item #1 should be withdrawn.\nIn its Response, Columbia Gulf also confirmed the steps that it took in response to each incident\nincluding conducting internal line inspections (ILIs), coating repairs, and replacement of pipe.\nRespondent stated that it completed a high resolution internal inspection for the Delhi, LA to\nInverness, MS segment on Line 200 after the 2000 Failure.\n13\nResults from this ILI confirmed\n10 Response, at 2.\n11 Response, Exhibit 4.\n12 Response, Exhibit 9, page 24.\n13 Response, 13.\n\n\n\n5\nexternal corrosion in several locations. Thereafter, Columbia Gulf performed approximately 472\nfeet of pipe replacement and coating repairs.14 In 2008, Columbia Gulf completed a second ILI\nat this location requiring no immediate repairs.15 Columbia Gulf maintained that an ILI is the\nmost effective approach for conducting inspections for wall loss due to external corrosion. After\nthe 2001 leak, Columbia Gulf replaced the entire segment of Line 100 involved in this specific\nincident with newly coated steel pipe.16 Columbia Gulf replaced 312 feet of new pipe through\nthe casing and increased cathodic protection measures by installing a new rectifier and a deep\nwell anode bed.17 Columbia Gulf also stated that it installed 200 feet of newly coated steel pipe\nand filled the casing with non-conductive casing filler material.18 When a year later, this line\nruptured (2007 Failure), Columbia Gulf stated it immediately engaged Metallurgical &\nMaterials Technologies, Inc. to perform a failure analysis and expedited ILIs of Lines 100, 200,\nand 300. Columbia Gulf confirmed that all ILIs on Line 100 had been completed with the\nexception of three segments.\n19 These areas were scheduled to be completed in 2009. Columbia\nGulf also modified its leak surveillance program with respect to casings to provide for\ninstrumented leak surveys on a semi-annual basis.\nsteps were appropriate measures to minimize the likelihood of future incidents caused by\nexternal corrosion and therefore Item #1 should be withdrawn.\n20 Columbia Gulf maintained that all these\nAnalysis\nThere was some dispute as to which procedures were in effect at the time of each incident. In its\nResponse, Columbia Gulf argued that the procedures referenced in the Notice were not in effect\nuntil 2003 and therefore were inapplicable in the 2000 and 2001 incidents.21\nI have reviewed both sets of procedures and evaluated the parties’ arguments. I find that the\n1993 procedures were Respondent’s failure investigation procedures at the time of the 2000 and\n2001 incidents. These procedures required Respondent to complete Form 2377-EG4 which\nincluded making recommendations for future action. The 1993 procedure specifically states that\n“the Section Superintendent shall prepare a written report of all failures and malfunctions, as\n14 Response, 7.\n15 Id.\n16 Response, at 8.\n17 Response, at 13.\n18 Response, 14.\n19 Response, 9.\n20 Id.\n21 Only the 2004 procedures were provided to OPS in response to the January 29, 2008 Request for Specific\nInformation . The Request for Specific Information required Columbia Gulf to provide all procedures and\ninvestigation reports for the 2000-2007 Incidents.\n\n\n\n6\ndefined in Section II.B, using Form 2377-EG4, “Incident/Failure Report”.22 Both the 2000 and\n2001 failures met Columbia Gulf’s definition of a failure in its 1993 procedures (“a failure is\nfurther defined in Section II.B of this procedure as a “…failure or malfunction of any pipeline\nfacility, equipment, or component, whether or not a release of gas is involved.”)23\nAlthough Columbia Gulf argued that it had followed its procedure for the 2000 and 2001 failures\nby completing the form, the company left the recommendation section for the 2001 incident\nblank.\n24 The instructions for this form required personnel to “provide a full description of what\nhappened and respective actions as called for.”25 complete Form 2377-EG4, which included making recommended future actions, is a violation of\nthe operator’s 1993 procedures and accordingly I make a finding of violation.\nTherefore, for the 2001 incident, the failure to\nWith respect to the 2000 incident, Columbia Gulf did follow its procedures by completing the\nForm 2377-EG4 to include recommended future actions of “smart pig line from Delhi to\nInverness, Miss; also install rectifier in area of rupture”.26 In the Notice, OPS asserted that\nbecause Columbia Gulf had failed to make recommendations to address microbiological induced\ncorrosion (MIC), a violation had occurred. However, the metallurgist stated that “the exact\ncause of the corrosion was not determined.”27 Since the metallurgist could not determine if the\ncause of the external corrosion was specifically microbiological induced corrosion, Respondent’s\nprocedures did not require it to make recommended future actions tailored toward this type of\ncorrosion. Although a prudent operator may have recommended future actions to address any\npotential threat by microbiological induced corrosion, Columbia Gulf was not required to do so\nat the time of the 2000 incident. In addition, the 1993 procedures were silent as to the types of\nrecommended action that should be made and only required the completion of the form. No\nfurther detail was provided in these procedures as to the extent or substantive nature of the\nrecommended future actions. In fact, whether a formal investigation would occur was a\ntaken more expansive future action, they were not required to do so under the procedures in\n2000 incident is withdrawn. A finding, however, is made with respect to the 2001 incident.\ndiscretionary decision of the Vice President-Engineering.28 Although the company could have\neffect at the time of the 2000 incident. Therefore, the probable violation associated with the\nColumbia Gulf’s 2004 Incident Management Plan, including the Incident Evaluation and\nInvestigation procedures, was in effect at the time of the 2006 incident and 2007 Failure. These\nprocedures defined an incident as “a non-routine event that requires immediate company\n22 Response, Exhibit 4, page 6.\n23 Id. at page 2.\n24 Response, Exhibits 5 and 6.\n25 Response, Exhibit 4, page 17.\n26 Response, Exhibit 5.\n27 Response, Exhibit 10.\n28 Exhibit 4, page 9.\n\n\n\n7\nresponse and either has or could threaten the safety or security of the public, company employees\nor facilities; cause significant property damage; interrupt service; and/or bring notable attention\nto the company”.29 Further, the Incident Evaluation and Investigation procedures, a subset of the\nIncident Management Plan, required Respondent’s personnel to “make recommendations to\nreduce the likelihood of a reoccurrence of an incident [and] assign someone to act upon the\nrecommendation(s) and track progress.”30 In response to the 2006 leak, the company did not\nmake any recommendations to reduce the likelihood of a reoccurrence. In its Response,\nColumbia Gulf stated that the 2006 leak was a Grade 2 leak and did not meet the criteria of the\nIncident Management Plan. In support of its argument that the 2006 leak was not an “incident”\nper its Incident Management Plan, Columbia Gulf attached a Work Order Report which confirms\nthat the company categorized it as a leak.\nwhich cited $150,000 of property damage and demonstrated that it was a reportable incident. It\nis therefore reasonable that this incident was non-routine, required immediate company response,\ninvolved enough property damage to require incident reporting and could have threatened the\nsafety or security of the public. Particularly since it was a reportable incident, Respondent\nshould have initiated its Incident Management Plan and made recommendations to reduce the\nlikelihood of a reoccurrence of an incident. On this basis, I find that Respondent did not follow\nits procedures with regard to the 2006 incident.\n31 However, the company filed a RSPA 7100.2 report\nIn the Notice, OPS alleged that Respondent failed to follow its incident investigation procedures\nafter the 2000, 2001, and 2006 incidents. Having reviewed the evidence, I find that Columbia\nGulf failed to follow its procedures after the 2001 and 2006 incidents but complied with its\nprocedures for the 2000 incident. Accordingly, having reviewed the evidence in the record, I\nfind that Respondent violated §§ 192.605(a) and 192.617 with respect to the 2001 and 2006\nincidents.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605 and 192.613, which\nstate:\n§ 195.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each\npipeline, a manual for written procedures for conducting operations and\nmaintenance activities and for emergency response. For transmission\nlines, the manual must include procedures for handling abnormal\noperations. This manual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.\nThis manual must be prepared before operations of a pipeline system\ncommence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations\nwhere operations and maintenance activities are conducted….\n(e) Surveillance, emergency response, and accident investigation.\nThe procedures required by §§ 192.613(a), 192.615, and 192.617 must be\nincluded in the manual required by paragraph (a) of this section….\n29 Response, Exhibit 9.\n30 Id.\n31 Response, Exhibit 3.\n\n\n\n8\n§ 192.613 Continuing Surveillance\n(a) Each operator shall have a procedure for continuing surveillance\nof its facilities to determine and take appropriate action concerning\nchanges in class location, failures, leakage history, corrosion, substantial\nchanges in cathodic protection requirements, and other unusual operating\nand maintenance conditions.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) and (e) and § 192.613 by\nfailing to define and implement a specific continuous surveillance program to detect potential\nrepeat failures at cased crossings along Lines 100, 200, and 300. Specifically, the Notice alleged\nthat Columbia Gulf failed to have surveillance procedures which would take into account the\nsimilar failures that occurred in 2000, 2001, 2006, and 2007 and implement a specific program\ntailored to the cause of the repeated failures or leaks in this area. According to OPS, Columbia\nGulf should have recognized the pattern of failure in cased pipelines and initiated a surveillance\nmonitoring program to prevent related incidents elsewhere on the three parallel lines. In\nresponse to OPS’s Request for Specific Information, Columbia Gulf provided no evidence of\ncontinuous surveillance procedures or that such surveillance was performed on these parallel\nlines to determine if other cased crossings may have had the same type of damage, corrosion, and\nrisk of failure.32\nResponse\nIn response to the Notice, Columbia Gulf stated that “its ongoing high resolution inspections of\nthe Mainlines, coupled with its instrumented leak detection surveillance program for all cased\npipe, which was in place prior to 2000, were appropriate to prevent recurrences.”33 In addition,\nColumbia Gulf stated that it uses facility patrols in Class 1 and 2 areas once per calendar year, at\nintervals not to exceed 15 months.34 Columbia Gulf stated that it conducted investigations after\neach incident and in the company’s judgment, considered its standard and high resolution\ninternal pipeline inspection and instrumented leak detection for cased piping to be appropriate\ncontinuous surveillance tools.35\nAnalysis\nPursuant to § 192.613 and § 192.605, Columbia Gulf was required to have and follow a\nprocedure for continuing surveillance to determine and take appropriate action concerning\nchanges in operation and maintenance conditions including failures, leakage history, and\ncorrosion.\n”36\nIn the Notice, OPS alleged that the operator failed to “define and implement” a\ncontinuous surveillance program specifically designed to detect ongoing corrosion in cased\n32 See Request for Specific Information dated January 29, 2008.\n33 Response, 17.\n34 Notice, 4.\n35 Response, 3.\n36 49 C.F.R. § 192.613\n\n\n\n9\npipelines. I have reviewed the evidence in the case file which includes the Violation Report\nexhibits, the documents supplied by Columbia Gulf in response to the Request for Specific\nInformation, and the documents attached to the Response. I did not find any documentation of\ncontinuous surveillance procedures implemented under § 192.613, other than the procedures\neffective December 15, 2007, one day after the 2007 Failure. Since these procedures are dated\nafter the four incidents, they certainly do not reflect actions that Respondent took in response to\nthe earlier incidents.\nColumbia Gulf argued in its Response that it had conducted continuous surveillance through a\nseries of maintenance activities such as standard and high resolution internal inspections, leak\ndetections, and facility patrols, however, none of these activities were incorporated into specific\nsurveillance procedures under § 192.613. In addition, all three of these safety measures are\nalready required under the pipeline safety regulations. Columbia Gulf did not accelerate the\ntimeframe for conducting any of the three activities which further calls into question whether the\ncompany had a continuous surveillance program. Leakage surveys were conducted once per\ncalendar year at intervals not exceeding 15 months which is the required timeframe under 49\nC.F.R. § 192.706. Further, Columbia Gulf cited to right-of-way patrols conducted as a method\nof surveillance. However, since the prior incidents occurred in casings it is questionable whether\nRespondent could have used routine right-of-way patrols as a method of continuous surveillance.\nFinally, Columbia Gulf maintains that it used ILIs as the most accurate and reliable form of\nsurveillance. However, Respondent performed an ILI on the segment between Delhi and the\nMississippi River in 1996 and not again until after the 2007 Failure. Allowing eleven years to\npass between ILIs, which is supposedly the cornerstone of Respondent’s surveillance program,\ncalls into question whether Respondent had a defined surveillance program. Moreover, the ILI\ncompleted in January of 2008 was a requirement of the Corrective Action Order issued on\nDecember 19, 2007. If the CAO had not been issued and the ILI was performed as previously\nscheduled by the company for the year 2010, fourteen years would have transpired between ILIs\nfor this line. In fact, the 2008 ILI required by the CAO revealed an immediate repair condition\ncrossing on the same segment that had failed. Certainly, performing an ILI every eleven to\ninvolving 80% wall loss.37 This anomaly was discovered on the carrier pipe at another cased\nfourteen years is not an effective form of surveillance.\nPrior to December 2007, Columbia Gulf did not have procedures developed to establish a\nconcerted plan to identify areas experiencing unusual operating and maintenance conditions.38\nRespondent has provided little or no evidence of its continuous surveillance program other than\nstating that it relied on ILIs and instrumented leak surveys which do not appear to be part of a\nspecific plan to identify any pipeline facilities experiencing abnormal or unusual operating\nconditions. Accordingly, having reviewed the evidence in the record, I find that Respondent\nviolated §§ 192.605(a) and 192.613.\n37 Violation Report, at 3.\n38 The 2007 continuous surveillance procedures which were effective after the 2007 Failure discuss quarterly\ninstrumented leakage surveillance which is the type of evidence that supports an ongoing continuous surveillance\nprogram.\n\n\n\n10\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605(a), which states:\n§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each\npipeline, a manual for written procedures for conducting operations and\nmaintenance activities and for emergency response. For transmission\nlines, the manual must include procedures for handling abnormal\noperations. This manual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.\nThis manual must be prepared before operations of a pipeline system\ncommence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations\nwhere operations and maintenance activities are conducted….\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) by failing to follow its\nprocedures for the investigation of shorted casings. Specifically, Respondent’s procedure\n70.01.01 in its O&M manual entitled “External Corrosion Control”, dated March 5, 2007, stated\nthat “as a general rule, if the potential difference between the casing and the pipeline is over 100\nmV, the casing should be considered not shorted….if the potential difference between the casing\nand the pipeline is less than 100 mV, the casing will be considered shorted until further testing is\ncompleted to determine its status (clear or shorted)….if the status of the casing is unknown, it\nshall be treated as a shorted casing”.39\nThe last annual potential survey of Line 100 at the Interstate 20 crossing occurred on\nJune 27, 2007. The readings revealed pipe-to-soil potential of -979 mV and the casing to soil\npotential of -879 mV amounting to exactly a 100 mV difference. Respondent’s procedure\nnotably only covers the potential difference of over 100mV or under 100 mV but is silent as to a\npotential difference that is exactly 100 mV. OPS argued that since the status of the casing was\nneither shorted nor unshorted under these procedures, the status of this particular casing therefore\nmust be unknown. Since the operator’s procedures require personnel to treat unknown casings\nas shorted necessitating additional testing, OPS asserted that Columbia Gulf should have\nperformed additional testing with regard to this casing. For shorted casings, the Respondent’s\nprocedures require “at a minimum, all shorted casings must be monitored with leakage detection\nequipment according to Plan 220.03.01, Facility Patrol and Leakage Inspection.”40\nResponse\nIn its Response, Columbia Gulf asserted that it had proper O&M procedures and its personnel\nhandled the casing under these procedures. Columbia Gulf admitted that although the\nprocedures in place at the time of the 2007 Failure were not a model of clarity, the procedures\ndid not require an investigation to determine if the casing was metallically shorted. However,\nColumbia Gulf stated that it added the casing to a list of shorted casings “that were to be\nincluded in the instrumented continuing surveillance program for shorted casings”.\n41\nColumbia\n39 Response, Exhibit 20, page 7-8.\n40 Response, Exhibit 20, page 6.\n41 Response, at 6.\n\n\n\n11\nGulf also stated that neither the internal investigations of the 2001 and 2006 leaks nor the third-\nparty analysis of the 2007 pipeline failure revealed that shorted casings caused or contributed to\nthe 2007 Failure. Since shorted casings were not a contributing factor to the 2007 Failure,\nColumbia Gulf alleged that it did not violate its O&M procedures.\nAnalysis\nUpon consideration of all of the evidence and the arguments of the parties, I find that a violation\nof § 192.605(a) occurred. I find that the status of the casing was unknown at the time of the\nassessment since Columbia Gulf could not determine if it was shorted or unshorted and\nColumbia Gulf therefore should have conducted additional testing on this particular casing.\nI also find that Columbia Gulf did not conduct the required additional testing and therefore\nviolated its procedures. The operator’s procedures state that “at a minimum, all shorted casings\nmust be monitored with leakage detection equipment.”42 I did not find any compelling evidence\nin the case file that this additional testing did in fact occur. Columbia Gulf stated in its Response\nthat the casing had not been tested for leaks; however, it attached a copy of a Leak Detection\nTest dated “June 2007” for the “Delhi line”.43 I find that this record does not sufficiently\ndemonstrate that this testing occurred since it lacks a specific date other than “June 2007” and\nfails to state with any specificity which casing was examined. It is also noteworthy that in order\nfor Columbia Gulf to conduct leak detection testing on this casing in “June 2007”, it would have\nhad to complete the testing on the two days directly following the assessment since the annual\npotential survey of the Interstate 20 crossing occurred on Wednesday, June 27, 2007 and only\nthree days (two of which were business days) remained in the month of June.\nFinally, Columbia Gulf was aware that there was a gap in the procedures and a prudent operator\nwould have treated an assessment of exactly 100 mV as a shorted casing until further testing\ncould occur. Based upon the foregoing, I find that there is sufficient evidence to support this\nallegation of violation. Accordingly, having reviewed the evidence in the record, I find that\nRespondent violated §§ 192.605(a).\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 per\nviolation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any related series of\nviolations.\n49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 require that, in determining the amount of the civil\npenalty, I consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,\nincluding adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history\n42 Response, Exhibit 20, page 6.\n43 Columbia Gulf stated in its Response that “…even if the casing had been tested for gas leaks, no leak would have\nbeen detected since there was no evidence that the pitting had penetrated the wall of the pipe”. Response, at 19\n(emphasis added); See Response, Exhibit 19 for a copy of the Leak Detection Test.\n\n\n\n12\nof Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s ability to pay the penalty and any effect that\nthe penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent\nin attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the\neconomic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent\ndamages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil\npenalty of $1,550,000 for the alleged violations. The Notice proposed a penalty of $760,000\n(Item 1) for failing to follow procedures for analyzing the cause of an accident and minimizing\nrecurrences; a $35,000 civil penalty (Item 2) for failing to establish procedures for a continuous\nsurveillance program; and a $760,000 civil penalty (Item 3) for failing to investigate a shorted\ncasing.\nRelated in a Series Argument\nIn its Response, Columbia Gulf argued that the proposed civil penalties are for related in a series\nof violations and therefore pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, the total civil penalty cannot exceed\n$1,000,000. Respondent contends that the violations are related because more than one violation\nhas been cited in connection with the same incident.\nContrary to Columbia Gulf’s assertion, an operator can be cited for more than one violation in\nconnection with a single accident or incident. The pipeline safety laws do not require PHMSA to\nselect only one regulation in an enforcement matter. In exercising its rulemaking authority, a\nregulatory agency often establishes numerous different regulatory requirements in the same\nsubject matter area.44 I am not aware of any court decision or other authority that would force an\nagency to enforce only one requirement because citing more than one would make separate\nrequirements “related” simply because they involve the same subject matter. Rather, the statute\nand implementing regulations cap the penalty amount at $1,000,000 for related violations. To be\nrelated, the violations must be based upon the same facts and evidence. The civil penalty cap of\n$1,000,000 is used narrowly in two limited cases where either 1) a single violation occurs over\nthe course of multiple days or 2) violations arise from a continuous, related course of conduct\nand require the proof of identical facts and evidence. In the latter situation, both factors must be\nmet for the $1,000,000 cap to apply.45\nIn this case, the Notice alleged in Item 1 that Respondent violated the pipeline safety violations\nby failing to follow its procedures for investigating incidents. In support of the allegation, OPS\nrelied on the company’s response to the Request for Specific Information; the procedures entitled\n“Incident Evaluation and Investigation”; the procedures entitled “Manual of Approved\nProcedures” dated April 12, 1993; Columbia Gulf’s Incident/Failure Reports for 2000 and 2001;\nand the company’s failure to make recommendations to avoid a similar incident occurring on its\nlines. In Item 2, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to define and implement a continuous\nsurveillance program in response to past accidents in the same area that were all caused by\nexternal corrosion. In support of this violation, OPS cited to Columbia Gulf’s Continuing\n44 The Code of Federal Regulations is organized into Parts, Subparts, and other subdivisions which often involve a\nsingle subject area.\n45 In the Matter of Colorado Interstate Gas Company, CPF No. 5-2008-1005 (November 23, 2008) (available at\nwww.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/enforcement).\n\n\n\n13\nSurveillance procedures and its Mainline High Resolution Internal Inspection report (Exhibit 2 to\nResponse). Finally, in Item 3, the Notice alleged that Columbia Gulf failed to follow its\nprocedures for examining shorted casings. In support of this allegation, OPS cited to\nRespondent’s External Corrosion Control procedures.\nIn all three items, OPS cited to different procedures to support each alleged violation. The\nalleged violations do not arise from a continuous, related course of conduct but rather they are\nbased on distinct conduct: 1) failure to follow incident evaluation and investigation procedures;\n2) failure to define and implement a continuous surveillance program; and 3) failure to\ninvestigate a shorted casing. Therefore, these three items cannot be considered ‘related in a\nseries’ since they do not arise from a continuous, related course of conduct or require proof of\nidentical facts and evidence. It is of no consequence that these three violations arise out of a\nsingle pipeline failure. Therefore, the $1,000,000 cap does not apply to this enforcement matter.\nCivil Penalty Assessments\nWith respect to Item 1, the Notice proposed a penalty of $760,000 for Respondent’s violation of\n§§192.605(a) and (e) and 192.617 for failing to follow procedures for analyzing the cause of\naccidents for the purpose of minimizing a recurrence. As stated above, it was determined that\nColumbia Gulf did not violate § 192.617 with respect to the 2000 incident. Therefore, the civil\npenalty is reduced on this basis.\nColumbia Gulf experienced four incidents on these lines related to corrosion since the year 2000\nand failed to make recommendations to avoid repeat failures. Moreover, this violation occurred\nover a series of years, involving multiple incidents. Corrosion is one of the major causes of\npipeline failure and can lead to leaks, ruptures, and explosions, presenting a major safety threat\nto the public and environment. The 2007 Failure involved property damage, injuries, and a\nfatality. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I\nassess Respondent a reduced civil penalt","truncated":true,"body_characters":44037}