{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420101007H","title":"TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2010-12-03","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420101007h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420101007h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420101007h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420101007H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2010-12-03 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420101007H_CAO_12032010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420101007H/420101007H_CAO_12032010.pdf\n\n420101007H_CAO_12032010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420101007H/420101007H_CAO_12032010_text.pdf\n\n420101007H_Post-Hearing Decision Continuing CAO_04072011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420101007H/420101007H_Post-Hearing%20Decision%20Continuing%20CAO_04072011.pdf\n\n420101007H_Post-Hearing Decision Continuing CAO_04072011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420101007H/420101007H_Post-Hearing%20Decision%20Continuing%20CAO_04072011_text.pdf\n\n420101007H_Post-Hearing Decision Continuing CAO_04072011_text.pdf\n\nAPR 7 2011\nMr. Bill Cope\nVice President, Operations (TGP & SNG)\nTennessee Gas Pipeline Company\n569 Brookwood Village, Suite 501\nBirmingham, AL 35209\nRe: CPF No. 4-2010-1007H\nDear Mr. Cope:\nPlease find enclosed the Post-Hearing Decision Confirming the Corrective Action Order issued\nin the above-referenced case. The Decision confirms the findings and the need for the corrective\nmeasures required by the Corrective Action Order (CAO) issued to Tennessee Gas Pipeline\nCompany on December 3, 2010, but makes certain modifications in the CAO. An amended\nCAO is being issued simultaneously herewith and is attached. This Decision is being served by\nfacsimile and certified mail under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5, and its terms and conditions are effective\nupon receipt.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. R.M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA\nMr. Jesus Soto, Vice President, Operations Services, El Paso Corporation/Tennessee Gas\nMs. Elizabeth Herdes, Senior Counsel, El Paso Corporation/Tennessee Gas\nMr. Patrick Carey, Director, DOT Compliance Services, El Paso/Tennessee Gas\nEl Paso Building\n1001 Louisiana\nHouston, TX 77002\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FACSIMILE TO:205 325-7528 [7005 1160 0001 0073 9826]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n___________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nTennessee Gas Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 4-2010-1007H\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\nPOST-HEARING DECISION CONTINUING\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nOn December 3, 2010, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), issued a Corrective\nAction Order (CAO) under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, finding that continued operation by\nPipeline System from Texas to West Virginia would be hazardous to life, property, and the\nenvironment. The CAO made preliminary findings that these potential hazards arose from a\nNovember 30, 2010 failure of TGP’s pipeline system and would continue unless certain\nTennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP or Respondent )1 of certain segments of its TGP 100\ncorrective measures were taken. The CAO further found that failure to issue the CAO\nexpeditiously would likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the environment.\nBackground\nThe November 30, 2010 failure on TGP’s 100-2 Line (Failure) resulted in the release of natural\nThere were no fires, injuries, or explosions as a result of the Failure. Approximately 150 homes\nwere evacuated as a precautionary measure. The release occurred on one of nine segments of the\ngas from a crack located on a wrinkle bend2 near MP 40-2+1.39 near Natchitoches, Louisiana.\nTGP 100 Pipeline System with wrinkle bends.\nFollowing issuance of the CAO, by letter dated December 13, 2010, Respondent contested the\nCAO and requested a hearing, as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.233(c). On February 1, 2011,\nTGP submitted a “Statement of the Issues” (Response), objecting to the finding in the CAO that\napproximately 1,400 miles of its system, running from Texas to West Virginia, were deemed\n“hazardous” and included as part of the “Affected System” under the CAO.\n1 The CAO was issued to Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, a subsidiary of El Paso Corporation, which operates\napproximately 42,000 miles of natural gas pipelines running from the Mexican border to Canada. See\nhttp://www.elpaso.com/pipelines (last accessed March 30, 2011).\n2 A “wrinkle bend” is a construction technology or process of conforming pipe to topography by bending. The\nprocess was used predominately in construction into the early 1950’s.\n\n\n\n2\nA hearing was subsequently held on February 10, 2011, in Houston, Texas, with an attorney\nfrom the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. At the hearing, Respondent and the\nSouthwest Region, OPS, were represented by counsel and presented evidence in support of their\nrespective positions regarding the validity of the issuance of the CAO.\nAt the hearing, TGP introduced a PowerPoint presentation and reiterated the arguments\npresented in its Response. After the hearing, Respondent provided additional written material\nfor the record, by letter dated February18, 2011 (Closing).\nI. Determination of Necessity for a Corrective Action Order\nThe purpose of a hearing following the issuance of a CAO without prior notice is for the\nAssociate Administrator, OPS, to “determine whether a compliance order should remain in effect\nor be rescinded or suspended….\nstandard of review, asserting that PHMSA’s position should not be given deference under\nChevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). That\nargument, however, is not pertinent during an administrative proceeding. I have reviewed the\nCAO to determine the necessity for a CAO, in compliance with Section 60112 of Title 49,\nUnited States Code and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233.\n”3 In its Response and during the hearing, TGP argued a\nThe bases for determining whether a pipeline facility requires corrective action are specified in\n49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233. Under those provisions, the Associate\nAdministrator may issue a CAO if, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, he\nfinds that a particular pipeline facility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the\nenvironment. The terms of that Order may include the suspended or restricted use of that\npipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or any other action as\nappropriate.\nII. Scope of CAO\nIn its Response and during the hearing, TGP argued that the CAO was overly broad because it\nfound that the entire TGP 100 Pipeline System, referred to as the “Affected System,” was\n“hazardous.” To support its argument, Respondent relied on its review of CAOs issued in recent\nyears, and proffered that they did not find any CAOs that covered an entire natural gas pipeline\nsystem. The company further asserted that the CAOs it had reviewed were generally limited in\ngeographical area. To the extent that Respondent is arguing that PHMSA’s previous CAOs\ncreate a limit that is not in the statute or regulations, this argument is rejected. 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.233(e) makes clear that I may consider four explicit factors, as well as other factors that I\ndeem appropriate. The characteristics of the affected geographic area are but one consideration\nin finding a particular pipeline facility hazardous.\n3 49 C.F.R. § 190.233(b).\n\n\n\n3\nIII. PHMSA’s Hazard Finding\nRespondent contended that based on the factors outlined above, the CAO should be modified to\ndefine the “Affected System” as being that portion of “TGP’s Line 100-2 between mainline\nvalve (MLV) 40 to MLV 47,” instead of the “TGP 100 Pipeline System from Texas to West\nVirginia.”4\nIn issuing the CAO, OPS found that the “continued operation of the Affected Pipeline Facility\nwithout corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property and the environment.” More\nspecifically, OPS “considered the age of the pipelines in the Affected System, the common\nmethod of construction, the circumstances surrounding the failure, the proximity of the Affected\nSystem to populated areas and public roadways, the hazardous nature of the product being\ntransported, the pressure required for transporting the material, and the ongoing investigation to\npressure required for transporting the material, the uncertainties as to the cause of the Failure,\ndetermine the cause of the failure.”5 At the hearing, agency staff testified that PHMSA had\nconsidered multiple factors in issuing the order, including the age of the pipelines in the Affected\nSystem, their method of construction, the hazardous nature of the product transported, the\nand the proximity of the pipe to populated areas.\nWhen the CAO was issued, the entire TPG System was believed to be sufficiently similar to Line\n100-2 at the Failure site to warrant the determination of the scope of the hazard finding. The\nother pipelines of the Affected System were thought to be constructed during roughly the same\nperiod. Also, based on the evidence available at the time that the CAO was issued, it was\nbelieved that the other pipelines were likely to also contain wrinkle bends with integrity issues,\nas these types of bends were typically used during pipeline construction until about 1955.\nSince the time the CAO was issued, , however, additional evidence has been presented regarding\nthe characteristics of the TGP 100 Pipeline System and the Failure investigation. Respondent\npresented evidence of the approximate length of the entire pipeline system, the age of certain\nsegments, and characteristics related to each segment. The Failure occurred in a pipeline that\nwas 30 inches in diameter and originally installed in 1948. TGP’s metallurgical analysis\ndetermined that the Failure occurred when tensile overload caused a 50-inch fracture in a wrinkle\nbend. The metallurgical analysis did not find any corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, or\nchemical or mechanical properties typical of wrinkle bend failures.\n4 Respondent contends that the facts in this case suggest that the failure of this particular wrinkle bend was unique.\nTGP hired P.E. LaMoreaux & Associates, Inc. (PELA), a third-party contractor, to conduct a study of the local\nhydrogeologic conditions near the leak site. In conducting its study, PELA relied on the fact that several factors are\npresent in a majority of all wrinkle bend failures: (1) the long seam of the pipe ran through the wrinkle bend and the\nwrinkle was in a sag bend; (2) corrosion at the wrinkle; (3) movement of the wrinkle bend due to soil disturbance; or\n(4) the presence of Hydrogen Induced Cracking on the inner diameter of the wrinkles. TGP presented evidence that\nPELA had not determined that any of these factors led to the failure of the wrinkle bend in this case. TGP further\nasserted that, even though the company did not know the root cause of the Failure, this incident was not sufficiently\nsimilar to other wrinkle bend incidents to justify a finding that its pipeline system was hazardous. Closing, p. 4.\nRespondent’s argument is not persuasive. Using Respondent’s logic, PHMSA would not be able to make a hazard\nfinding in any situation where a failure had occurred but no root cause had yet been determined.\n5 Respondent asserts that PHMSA made a determination that “any pipe segment that is constructed with a wrinkle\nbend must be ‘hazardous’.” Upon review of the CAO and the evidence presented, that argument is without merit.\n\n\n\n4\nRespondent explained that the TGP 100 System contained many variations, as it was built\nbetween 1944 and 1966, and that the various loops in the 100 System did not always run in the\nsame right-of-way space, were built using different pipe materials and sizes, were manufactured\nby different vendors, and had been installed by various contractors using various work practices.\nAt the hearing, OPS indicated that based on its own investigation and information that is now\navailable, the hazard appears to be limited to Line 100-2. Upon consideration of the evidence\npresented, I find that the first bullet of the Preliminary Findings and the definition of the term\n“Affected System” in the CAO should be modified as follows: 6\nThe TGP 100 Pipeline System is approximately 4,600 miles in length running\nfrom Texas to West Virginia, and consists of a looped system. Line 100-2 is the\nAffected System.\nIV. Pressure Restriction in Item 2\nThe CAO placed a pressure restriction on MLV 32 to MLV47, in Item 2. Respondent states that,\nto the extent that a pressure reduction is necessary, it should be limited to that portion of the line\nrunning from MLV 40 to MLV 41. The company argued that the pressure restriction in Item 2\nof the CAO was too broad and went far beyond what was necessary to protect the public.\nRespondent contended that the abnormal pressure restriction could have adverse effects on\nTGP’s ability to meet commercial and human needs during the winter heating, and summer\ncooling seasons.\nOPS has considered this argument and believes that while it has merit, the limitation requested\nby Respondent does not. OPS has proposed that the pressure restrictions should apply to TGP’s\nLine 100-2 from MLV 40 to MLV 47, focusing on this portion of the line as the primary portion\nof the system that suffered the Failure. This proposal is based on TGP’s argument to focus the\nentire compliance order on this portion of the pipeline. It is also logically defined as the portion\nof the pipeline from the compressor station that is upstream of the incident to the compressor\nstation that is downstream of the incident.\nAccordingly, with respect to Item 2 of the CAO, I order that the pressure restriction set forth in\nthe CAO is hereby modified to apply only to that same portion of TGP’s Line 100-2 running\nfrom MLV 40 to MLV 47.\nV. Integrity Analysis in Item 4\nThe CAO required an integrity analysis on TGP’s Line 100-1, 100-2, 100-3 and 100-4.\nRespondent indicated that it is committed to working on and developing a solid relative risk\nmatrix to determine what factors would give rise to a reason to appropriate mitigation measures.\nThe company proffers that it can use the data from Line 100-2 MLV 40 to MLV 47, instead of\ngathering data from the previously defined affected system, TGP’s Line 100-1, 100-2, 100-3, and\n6 The CAO made a preliminary finding that “[t]he TGP 100 Pipeline System is approximately 1400 miles in length,\nrunning from Texas to West Virginia, and consists of a looped system that includes Lines 100-1, 100-2, 100-3, and\n100-4 (Affected System).” CAO, p. 1. Respondent has indicated that the TGP 100 Pipeline System is actually 4600\nmiles.\n\n\n\n5\n100-4. The company argues that “[a] focus on this data will drive faster validation and\nimprovement of a relative risk matrix while minimizing disturbing other vintage pipe which\ncould cause integrity concerns in stable wrinkle bends.”\nI agree that focusing TGP’s investigation, as specifically required in Required Corrective Action\nItem 4(B), to Line 100-2 MLV 40 to MLV 47 would provide sufficient data to apply findings to\nthe Affected System, consistent with the CAO, and to the entire TGP 100 Pipeline System, as\nrequired under the integrity management regulations. Accordingly, Item 4(B) of the CAO is\namended as follows:\nThe performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether and to what extent the conditions associated with the failure,\nor other integrity threatening conditions are present on Line 100-2 MLV 40 to\nMLV 47. Data-gathering activities shall include, to the extent warranted by the\nfailure analysis, identification of the location and integrity of wrinkle bends along\nLine 100-2 MLV 40 to MLV 47. Include a detailed description of the criteria to\nbe used for the evaluation and prioritization of any integrity threats/anomalies that\nare identified. Make the results of the inspections, field excavations, and\nevaluations available to PHMSA or its representative;\nConclusion\nThe CAO will remain in effect but is modified as provided above. All other provisions of CAO\nshall remain in full force and effect until the Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA, determines\nthat all of the corrective actions required under the CAO have been satisfactorily completed and\nthat the hazardous conditions giving rise to the CAO no longer exist.\n_______________________________ ______________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese, Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":16705}