# WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 420105010
- **title:** WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2010-03-11
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(c)(13), 195.402(c)(3), 195.402(e)(3), 195.402(e)(9), 195.505(c), 195.52(a), 195.54(a).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420105010
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(c)(13),  195.402(c)(3),  195.402(e)(3),  195.402(e)(9),  195.505(c),  195.52(a),  195.54(a). The case was opened on 2010-03-11 and is reported as closed as of 2013-06-10. Proposed civil penalty: $415,000. Assessed civil penalty: $405,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420105010_Closure_06102013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105010/420105010_Closure_06102013.pdf

420105010_Closure_06102013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105010/420105010_Closure_06102013_text.pdf

420105010_Decision on Reconsideration_12312012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105010/420105010_Decision%20on%20Reconsideration_12312012.pdf

420105010_Decision on Reconsideration_12312012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105010/420105010_Decision%20on%20Reconsideration_12312012_text.pdf

420105010_Final Order_08012012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105010/420105010_Final%20Order_08012012.pdf

420105010_Final Order_08012012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105010/420105010_Final%20Order_08012012_text.pdf

420105010_NOPV PCP PCO_03112010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105010/420105010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03112010.pdf

420105010_NOPV PCP PCO_03112010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105010/420105010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03112010_text.pdf

420105010_Response to NOPV PCP PCO_04112010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105010/420105010_Response%20to%20NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_04112010.pdf

420105010_Decision on Reconsideration_12312012_text.pdf

DECEMBER 31, 2012
Mr. Michael J. Hennigan
President and Chief Executive Officer
Sunoco Logistics Partners L.P.
1818 Market Street, Suite 1500
Philadelphia, PA 19103-3615
Re: CPF No. 4-2010-5010
Dear Mr. Hennigan:
Enclosed please find the Decision on Reconsideration issued in the above-referenced case. It
grants your Petition, in part, to the extent you requested reconsideration of the civil penalty
amount assessed in the August 1, 2012 Final Order and reduces the total civil penalty by
$10,000, but denies your Petition in all other respects. Service of the Decision by certified mail
is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Rod Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA
Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, PHMSA
Ms. Lisa A. Runyon, Senior Counsel, Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P.
CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
______________________________
In the Matter of )
Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P., ) )
)
)
Petitioner. )
______________________________)
CPF No. 4-2010-5010
DECISION ON RECONSIDERATION
In an August 1, 2012 Final Order, I found that Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P. (Sunoco Logistics
or Petitioner) had committed seven violations of the hazardous liquid pipeline safety regulations
in 49 C.F.R. Part 195 in connection with an investigation by the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) of an accident that occurred on the West Texas Gulf
Pipeline System at the Colorado Station in Colorado City Texas on June 17, 2009.1 Specifically,
I found that Sunoco Logistics had violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.52(a)(2), 195.50(a), 195.402(c)(3),
195.402(c)(13), 195.402(e), 195.402(e)(9), and 195.505(c) (Items 1-7 respectively). I assessed
Petitioner a civil penalty of $415,000 for committing these violations and ordered the company
to take certain actions to comply with the cited regulations.
On August 27, 2012, Sunoco Logistics submitted a petition for reconsideration (Petition) of the
Final Order. In its Petition, Sunoco Logistics requested reconsideration of the findings of
violation for Items 1, 2, and 4 of the Final Order, and requested that the civil penalties assessed
for these three items be rescinded.
2
Having reviewed the record including all factual and legal arguments, I find that Petitioner’s
arguments warrant a partial reduction in the civil penalties assessed for Items 1 and 2 in the
August 1, 2012 Final Order as set forth below. Accordingly, the Petition is granted in part, to the
extent that it sought reconsideration of the civil penalties assessed for Items 1 and 2. I also find
that the findings of violation in the Final Order for all three of these items were supported by the
evidence, and that Petitioner has presented no information or arguments that would warrant the
withdrawal of any of these three findings of violation. I further find that Petitioner has presented
1 In the Matter of Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P, Final Order, CPF No. 4-2010-5010 (Aug. 1, 2012).
2 Petition at 1-2.



2
no information or arguments that would warrant the reduction or elimination of the civil penalty
assessed for Item 4. Accordingly, the Petition is denied in all other respects.
Standard of Review
A Petitioner is afforded the right to petition the Associate Administrator for reconsideration of a
Final Order. However, that right does not constitute an appeal or an opportunity to seek a de
novo review of the record. Instead, it is a venue for presenting the Associate Administrator with
information that was not previously available or requesting that any errors in the Final Order be
corrected. Requests for consideration of additional facts or arguments must be supported by a
statement of reasons as to why those facts or arguments were not presented prior to the issuance
of the Final Order. Repetitious information or arguments will not be considered.3
Background
On March 11, 2010, PHMSA issued to Petitioner a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice) as a result of an investigation by PHMSA of
an accident that occurred on the West Texas Gulf Pipeline System at the Colorado Station in
Colorado City Texas on June 17, 2009. On that date, a fire occurred during a pipeline repair
project involving the replacement of a section of pipe and a spill of approximately 3,416 barrels
of crude oil occurred later that day at the same location. In accordance with 49 C.F.R.
§ 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that Sunoco Logistics had committed various violations
of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and proposed assessing a total civil penalty of $415,000 for the alleged
violations. The Notice also proposed ordering Petitioner to take certain measures to correct the
alleged violations.
Sunoco Logistics responded to the Notice by letter dated April 11, 2010 (Response). Petitioner
contested most of the allegations and requested a hearing. A hearing was held on
September 23, 2010, in Houston, Texas, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel,
PHMSA, presiding. At the hearing, Petitioner was represented by counsel. After the hearing,
Petitioner provided additional written material for the record, by letter dated November 23, 2010
(Closing Response).
On August 1, 2012, I issued a Final Order finding that Sunoco Logistics had violated 49 C.F.R.
§§ 195.52(a)(2), 195.50(a), 195.402(c)(3), 195.402(c)(13), 195.402(e), 195.402(e)(9), and
195.505(c); assessing Petitioner a civil penalty of $415,000 for committing these violations; and
ordering the company to take certain actions to comply with the cited regulations.
3 49 C.F.R. § 190.215(a)-(e).



3
Analysis
I. Final Order Items 1 and 2 regarding Accident Reporting
Item 1 of the Final Order found that Petitioner violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.52(a)(2) by failing to
give telephonic notice to the National Response Center at the earliest practicable moment after
an unintentional fire occurred at the Colorado City Station on June 17, 2009 during a project
involving the removal and replacement of a section of 24-inch diameter pipe that functioned as
the suction and fill line for a crude oil breakout tank designated as Tank No. 10 (Line 10
Project). Item 2 of the Final Order found that Petitioner violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.50(a) by failing
to submit a written accident report to PHMSA following the accident.
Sunoco Logistics undertook the Line 10 Project to replace a 5-foot section of the pipe due to
corrosion in the pipe wall. Once the pipe was “cold cut” open and the corroded 5-foot section of
pipe removed, petroleum was allowed to drip out of both sides of the open pipe into catch pans
and mud was packed into both sides of the pipe opening to isolate the petroleum from the repair
work involving torches. During the torch-beveling process, which is part of preparing the new
pipe for welding, at least one mud pack failed, allowing some form of petroleum to escape past
the mud and flammable petroleum vapors were ignited by the torch.
At this point, all personnel involved in the beveling process left the area immediately to escape
the fire. The project leader then returned with a fire extinguisher and the fire was extinguished
within about 15 minutes.4 Sunoco Logistics ceased the repair work and contacted the West
Texas District Manager in Abilene, Texas, who dispatched a Safety and Health Specialist to the
Colorado City Station to investigate the fire.
In its Responses, at the hearing, and in its Petition, Sunoco Logistics argued with respect to both
Items 1 and 2 that “the release was not a release from the pipeline and even if it was it did not
constitute a release of hazardous liquids as required under the regulations to trigger a release
notification.”5
In evaluating Petitioner’s argument that this fire was not required to be reported, I noted in the
Final Order that the pipeline safety regulations in Part 195 are not limited to pipeline safety risks
arising solely from products in a liquid state. In § 195.2, the definition of “hazardous liquid”
means “petroleum, petroleum products, or anhydrous ammonia.” It does not state that petroleum
or petroleum products must be in a liquid state. For many years, PHMSA’s regulations have
specifically required hazardous liquid pipeline operators to address the safety threats posed by
hazardous and/or flammable vapors incident to the transportation of hazardous liquids by
pipeline. For example, § 195.438 prohibits “smoking and open flames in each pump station area
and each breakout tank area where there is a possibility of the leakage of a flammable hazardous
liquid or of the presence of flammable vapors.”6 In this case, Petitioner’s own internal
4 Statement of Felix M. Ramos, June 24, 2009 at 2. PHMSA Violation Report Exhibit G.
5 Petition at 1.



4
investigation of the Line 10 Project accident concluded that the petroleum fire occurred “due to
crude oil or crude oil vapors” passing around the mud plug.7
The last “catch-all” item in the list of criteria for reporting in § 195.52(a)(5) is an accident that
“In the judgment of the operator was significant even though it did not meet the criteria of any
other paragraph of this section.” A fire occurring on a pipeline that transports flammable
petroleum is a particularly hazardous type of pipeline accident and the fact that Petitioner ceased
the repair work and launched an investigation by its Safety and Health Specialist demonstrates
that Petitioner’s project leader considered the accident to be significant at the time it occurred.
In the Final Order, I also noted that the purpose of accident reporting goes well beyond the need
to keep statistics on spill volumes. Accident reporting provides a means for prompt response and
investigation of significant accidents of this nature that put pipeline personnel at risk during pipe
repairs and replacements. Both federal and state regulators depend on data from these accident
reports to evaluate operator performance and manage their inspection programs, and to identify
trends that may require changes or additions to the regulations to ensure safety. I found that
Petitioner’s argument that an unintentional petroleum fire need not be reported runs counter to
the Part 195 regulations and would not be consistent with pipeline safety.
Based on a review of the record and the information provided in the Petition, I find, pursuant to
49 C.F.R. § 190.215(c), that the arguments in Sunoco Logistics’ Petition regarding the findings
of violation for Items 1 and 2 are repetitious. Notwithstanding such finding, I have considered
all the information and arguments submitted by Petitioner and find no basis to alter the findings
of violation in the Final Order. Therefore, I affirm the findings of violation set forth in the Final
Order for Items 1 and 2.
Reconsideration of the Civil Penalties Assessed for Items 1 and 2
In assessing the civil penalties for Items 1 and 2 in the Final Order, I considered the nature,
circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the
degree of Petitioner’s culpability; the history of Petitioner’s prior offenses; Petitioner’s ability to
pay the penalty and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business;
and the good faith of Petitioner in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. I
noted that accident reporting is a longstanding regulatory requirement and is a key part of
pipeline safety. The absence of reporting is serious because it can adversely impact the oversight
process. Making a telephonic report is not a costly or burdensome requirement and I found that
Petitioner was fully culpable for its failure to provide telephonic notice since there was no
impediment to doing so.
6 Many petroleum-based hazardous liquids are volatile and form vapor when exposed to the atmosphere depending
on the temperature and the properties of the particular substance.
7 Investigation Report for Colorado City Station Oil Spill, July 6, 2009, at 4. Response, Attachment 3.



5
While Petitioner’s argument that Items 1 and 2 be withdrawn entirely was not persuasive, I
acknowledge that this appears to be the first enforcement case to specifically articulate the need
to report this particular type of fire. As a result, Petitioner may have had a credible, if erroneous
belief that reporting was not required.8 While PHMSA believes that any operator in Petitioner’s
circumstances should have reasonably concluded that reporting was required, if there is
legitimate uncertainty about the applicability of a particular regulation, it is not always
appropriate for the first operator found to have violated that regulation to be subjected to the full
amount of the penalty that would otherwise be assessed after all other operators can avail
themselves of the precedent established by that first instance. In this case, I acknowledge that
Petitioner may have had a credible, if erroneous belief, that reporting was not required.
For the reasons discussed above, having reviewed the record and reconsidered the assessment
criteria, I find that a 50 percent reduction in the civil penalty amounts assessed in the Final Order
for Items 1 and 2 is warranted. Accordingly, I assess Petitioner a reduced civil penalty of $5,000
for its violation of § 195.52(a)(2) (Item 1) and $5,000 for its violation of § 195.50(a) (Item 2).
II. Final Order Item 4 regarding Lockout/Tagout Audits
Item 4 of the Final Order found that Petitioner violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to
follow its own procedures for determining the effectiveness of company procedures used in
normal operation and maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies were found.
Specifically, it alleged that Sunoco Logistics failed to conduct annual field audits of
Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) work done by operator personnel at the Colorado City Station for 2008
and 2009, as set forth in its own Procedure HS-P-005.
In its Responses, at the hearing, and in its Petition, Sunoco Logistics argued that its failure to
conduct annual field audits for 2008 and 2009 at the Colorado City Station was due to its use of a
“random sampling” approach and not all stations in each geographic district where LOTO work
had been done were audited every year.9
The LOTO procedure in effect during the relevant period states the following at page 18 in
relevant part:
The LOTO's required by this program will be reviewed at least annually
by HES [Health, Environment, and Safety Dept.] to assure that the
procedures and the requirements of this program are being followed. This
review will be supplemented by:
• Work site inspections conducted by HES, and any reports of
program deficiencies made by Sunoco Logistics’ supervisors; and,
8 Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.11(a), however, an operator can obtain information and advice about compliance by
telephone and internet at any time during business hours.
9 Petition at 2.



6
• A review of LOTO records, including site-specific ECPs [Energy
Control Procedures] used or developed during the course of the
year, and
• A review of LOTOs being used at the facility.
The periodic review will be designed to correct any deviations or
inadequacies observed.10
In the Final Order, I noted that this procedure requires Petitioner to conduct annual field audits of
all LOTO done by its personnel and does not exclude any facilities from being audited. Notably,
Petitioner followed this procedure for all facilities for three consecutive years in 2005, 2006, and
2007 but did not follow it in 2008 and 2009 for the Colorado City Station, the period leading up
to the June 17, 2009 accident.11 Petitioner did not provide any documentation of a decision by
the company to change to a sampling approach in the 2008 period.
Based on a review of the record and the information provided in the Petition, I find, pursuant to
49 C.F.R. § 190.215(c), that the arguments in Sunoco Logistics’ Petition regarding the findings
of violation for Item 4 are repetitious. Notwithstanding such finding, I have considered all the
information and arguments submitted by Petitioner and find no basis to alter the finding of
violation in the Final Order. Therefore, I affirm the finding of violation set forth in the Final
Order for Item 4.
Reconsideration of the Civil Penalty Assessed for Item 4
In assessing the civil penalty for Item 4 in the Final Order, I considered the nature,
circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the
degree of Petitioner’s culpability; the history of Petitioner’s prior offenses; Petitioner’s ability to
pay the penalty and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business;
and the good faith of Petitioner in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. I
noted that the 3,416 barrel oil spill was a direct consequence of the failure to fully accomplish
LOTO. If Petitioner had performed the annual field audits of LOTO work in 2008 and 2009—
the time period leading up to the accident—the deficiencies that manifested themselves on June
17, 2009, may have potentially been identified and corrected. Petitioner presented no
justification for its failure to conduct these field audits.
Petitioner has presented no information or arguments that warrant a reduction in the penalty
amount assessed in the Final Order for this Item. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and
considered the assessment criteria, I affirm the assessment in the Final Order of a civil penalty of
$22,500 for Petitioner’s violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13).
10 PHMSA Violation Report, Exhibit C.
11 Respondent provided a Lockout/Tagout audit record to PHMSA dated 7/2009 but this record was for a specific
project (project number 935004-isolate idle line 1-2-3-18/Booster pump) and was not an annual field audit for
Lockout/Tagout work at the station.



7
RELIEF GRANTED
Based on a review of the record and for the reasons stated above, the civil penalty of $10,000
assessed for Item 1 in the Final Order is reduced to $5,000; and the civil penalty of $10,000
assessed for Item 2 in the Final Order is reduced to $5,000.
RELIEF DENIED
Based on a review of the record and for the reasons stated above, the Petition is denied in all
other respects.
Payment of the $405,000 civil penalty assessed in the Final Order, as reduced by this Decision, is
now due. To date, Petitioner has already paid $372,500 of this penalty. I hereby order that the
remaining penalty amount of $32,500 be paid within 20 days following receipt of this Decision
in accordance with the payment instructions set forth in detail in the Final Order. Federal
regulations (49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require that all payments be made by wire transfer, through
the Federal Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury.
Detailed instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should
be directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-341), Federal Aviation Administration,
Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, OK 73125; (405) 954-
8893.
Failure to pay the remaining $32,500 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current
annual rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23.
Failure to pay the civil penalty may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for
appropriate action in a district court of the United States.
This Decision is the final administrative action in this proceeding.
_____________________________ __________________________
Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

420105010_NOPV PCP PCO_03112010_text.pdf

NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
March 11, 2010
Mr. David Justin
Vice President – Operations
Sunoco Pipeline L.P.
Eastern Area headquarters
525 Fritztown Road
Sinking Springs, PA 19608
CPF 4-2010-5010
Dear Mr. Justin:
From June 18, 2009 through July 17, 2009, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of Title 49 United States
Code investigated an accident that occurred at West Texas Gulf Pipeline Company’s Colorado
City Station near Colorado City, Texas on June 17, 2009. West Texas Gulf Pipeline Company is
a subsidiary of Sunoco Pipeline L.P. (Sunoco), and the West Texas Gulf Pipeline System is
operated by Sunoco.
As a result of the accident investigation, it appears that you have committed probable violations
of the Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected
and the probable violation(s) are:



1. §195.52 Telephonic notice of certain accidents
(a) At the earliest practicable moment following discovery of a release of the
hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide transported resulting in an event described in
§195.50, the operator of the system shall give notice, in accordance with paragraph
(b) of this section, of any failure that:
(2) Resulted in either a fire or explosion not intentionally set by the
operator;
Sunoco failed to provide telephonic notice to the National Response Center (NRC) of a
fire that occurred at Colorado City Station during the preparation for welding a new piece
of pipe into a 24-inch pipeline from which a 5-foot section of this pipeline has been
removed. The fire occurred between 1:00 pm and 1:30 pm on June 17, 2009. Mud plugs
on both sides of the 24-inch pipeline failed allowing hydrocarbon vapor to escape from
the pipe.
The project manager notified the West Texas district manager in Abilene, TX, shortly
after the fire accident. The Safety and Health Specialist was assigned to go to Colorado
City station to investigate the fire accident. While en route to the fire accident site, he
was notified that 3416 bbls. of crude oil spill occurred at the same location where a fire
occurred. Sunoco reported the crude oil spill accident to the NRC (NRC # 908908);
however, there was no telephonic report for the fire that occurred approximately three (3)
hours before the crude oil spill on June 17, 2009.
2. §195.50 Reporting accidents.
An accident report is required for each failure in a pipeline system subject to this
part in which there is a release of the hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide
transported resulting in any of the following:
(a) Explosion or fire not intentionally set by the operator.
§195.54 Accident reports.
(a) Each operator that experiences an accident that is required to be reported under
§195.50 shall as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days after discovery of the
accident, prepare and file an accident report on DOT Form 7000-1, or a facsimile.
Sunoco failed to submit an accident report on DOT Form 7000-1, or a facsimile to
PHMSA within 30 days for a fire that occurred at Colorado City Station during the
preparation for welding a new piece of pipe into a 24-inch pipeline from which a 5-foot
section of this pipeline has been removed. The fire occurred between 1:00 pm and 1:30
pm on June 17, 2009.
2



3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of
this section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during
maintenance and normal operations:
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
Sunoco has written procedures for conducting work in a facility. During the Line 10
Project at the Colorado City Station, Sunoco employees and contractors did not follow
certain procedures as described below. Based on the investigation conducted by
PHMSA, it appears that if Sunoco employees and contractors had followed these
procedures during the Line 10 Project at the Colorado City Station, the accident on June
17, 2009, that resulted in the release of 3416 bbls. of crude oil could have been prevented.
Sunoco did not follow Line Time Request/Work Plan procedure for scheduling
maintenance work which requires down time. Below is a listing of deficiencies identified
during the accident investigation regarding the Line 10 project.
• List of Equipment/Valves/Energy Sourced to be Locked Out was not filled out
• No notification of the job status was provided to the appropriate personnel
• No detailed work plan for the Line 10 project was generated
• Two projects were combined into one (1) Line Time Request/Work Plan- there must
be two (2) separate work plans generated (one for Snyder project – manifold
modification, and one for the replacement of a corroded pipe associated with tank
10).
• Clear communication between controller at Sugarland and Colorado City Station was
not established. The controller in Sugarland didn’t know the Line 10 project was
extended beyond June 16, 2009 as stated on the original Timeline Request.
• No fire watchers were assigned
• No pre-job safety meeting was conducted
Sunoco did not follow the Overview of Work Permits procedure, HS-G-012. The work
permit # 253852 for the Line 10 project was issued by the on-site project leader. Below
is a listing of requirements that Sunoco did not follow.
• There was not a hot work permit checklist or energy control procedure (lock-out/tag-
out) attached to the hot permit
• The on-site project leader did not conduct a hazard assessment prior to starting the
project
Sunoco also did not follow the Lockout/Tagout Program, HS-P-005, Appendix HS-P-
006-1 “General LOTO Checklist” and HS-P-006-2 “General LOTO Procedures” for the
Line 10 project which involved the removal of a five-foot segment of the 24-inch line on
June 17, 2009, at Colorado City Station, TX. The investigation evidence showed that the
maintenance crew cut an in-service line.
3



4. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of
this section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during
maintenance and normal operations:
(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator to determine the
effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance
and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
Sunoco did not conduct annual field audits of Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) for 2008 and
2009 as required in LOTO procedure (HS-P-005). The last annual audit was conducted
on 10/03/2007.
5. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(e) Emergencies The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section must include
procedures for the following to provide safety when an emergency condition occurs;
(2)Prompt and effective response to a notice of each type emergency,
including fire or explosion occurring near or directly involving a pipeline
facility, accidental release of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide from a
pipeline facility, operational failure causing a hazardous condition, and
natural disaster affecting pipeline facilities.
(3) Having personnel, equipment, instruments, tools, and material available
as needed at the scene of an emergency.
Sunoco did not have personnel, equipment, instruments, tools, and material available as
needed at the scene of an emergency. Sunoco and contractor employees who were
involved in the Line 10 project were sent to the spill area without proper personal
protective equipment (PPE) in response to the release of 3416 bbls of sour crude oil.
Figure 2.10-2, “Hydrogen Sulfide initial response action checklist” of the Sunoco West
Texas Response Zone Oil Spill Response Plan calls for response personnel to “wear a
full faced self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or goggles and a half faced SCBA.”
None of the individuals sent to the spill area for emergency response to this sour crude oil
spill were provided with the required respirators even though the presence of hydrogen
sulfide gas was detected by respondent’s smell and hazardous gas monitoring equipment.
6. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(e) Emergencies (see above)
(9) Providing for a post accident review of employee activities to determine
whether the procedures were effective in each emergency and taking
corrective action where deficiencies are found.
Sunoco did not conduct a post-accident review of emergency response activities to
determine if the emergency response procedure was effective and was implemented
properly. Sunoco did not follow the procedural requirements of Section 8.3 of the West
Texas Response Zone/Oil Spill Response Plan Section 8 that requires that the operator
4



debrief employees within two weeks of the termination of response operations on the
findings of the post accident review, and the required “Standard Incident Debriefing
Form” in Figure 8.3.1 was not completed as part of the review. PHMSA requested
documentation of the required post accident review, and no documentation was provided.
A Sunoco Compliance Specialist stated that Sunoco investigated the cause of the incident
and made the decision terminating three employees who were found to have violated
Sunoco’s safety procedures, and no further review of employee activities regarding
emergency response was conducted.
7. §195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The program
shall include provisions to:
(c) Allow individuals that are not qualified pursuant to this subpart to perform
a covered task if directed and observed by an individual that is qualified;
Sunoco failed to ensure that non-qualified employees performing a covered task (# 402
remove/replace pipe component – welded or mechanical) were under the direct
observation and direction of a qualified individual. Sunoco did not follow the procedural
requirements of Section 8 (Non-Qualified Individuals) of their OQ Plan because the
qualified individual was not directing and observing the covered task being performed in
the manifold pit where the accident occurred (cutting out and replacing 5-foot segment),
and he was directing and observing multiple covered tasks at the same time. The Sunoco
Senior Pipeliner (Line 10 on-site project leader), was responsible for overseeing the Line
10 work done by non-qualified personnel in the manifold pit area, and he was required to
be at the job site for direct observation and direction of non-qualified personnel
performing the covered task. However, the Sunoco Senior Pipeliner was not always
present at the manifold pit work area, and he was at different places during the
performance of the work where direct observation and direction of the non-qualified
individuals was not possible. During performance of the manifold pit work, he was
checking on work being performed by BJB contractor by the maintenance shop, checking
on drain valve work associated with breakout tank #10, and checking on vacuum truck
removing crude oil. While he was at these other places, he lost visual contact with the
manifold pit area work, and he was not able to direct and observe the covered task being
performed by non-qualified individuals.
5



Proposed Civil Penalty
Under 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000
for each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any
supporting documentation involved in the above probable violation(s) and has recommended that
related series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and
you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $415,000 as follows:
Item number
PENALTY
$ 10,000
2
$ 10,000
3
$ 200,000
$ 22,500
5
6
$ 37,500
$ 35,000
$ 100,000
Proposed Compliance Order
With respect to items 2, 3, 4, and 6 pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to Sunoco
Pipeline L.P. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a part
of this Notice.
Response to this Notice
Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators
in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be
advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you
must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information
qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30 days
of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this
Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in
this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.
6



In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 4-2010-5010 and for each document
you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
R. M. Seeley
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
Enclosure: Proposed Compliance Order
Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
7



PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
Pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Sunoco Pipeline L.P. a Compliance Order
incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Sunoco Pipeline
L.P. with the pipeline safety regulations:
1. In regard to Item Number 2 of the Notice pertaining to Sunoco’s failure to submit
an accident report on DOT Form 7000-1, or a facsimile to PHMSA within 30
days for a fire that occurred at Colorado City Station between 1:00 pm and 1:30
pm on June 17, 2009, Sunoco must submit this report within 90 days following
receipt of the Final order.
2. In regards to Item 3, Sunoco must incorporate the lessons learned from its June
17, 2009 accident investigation into its training program and provide this training
to its employees within 90 days following receipt of the Final Order.
3. In regards to Item 4, Sunoco must incorporate deficiencies during the review of
personnel performance in response to this accident into its’ emergency response
training program and provide this training to its employees within 90 days
following receipt of the Final Order.
4. In regard to Item Number 6 of the Notice pertaining to Sunoco’s failure to
conduct a post-accident review of emergency response activities that occurred in
response to the accident that occurred around 4:00 pm on June 17, 2009 and
resulted in the release of 3416 bbls. of sour crude oil, Sunoco must submit this
report within 90 days following receipt of the Final Order.
5. Submit the results of the Proposed Compliance Order item above to Mr. R. M.
Seeley, Region Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 8701 South Gessner, Suite 1110,
Houston, TX 77074.
6. Sunoco Pipeline L.P. shall maintain documentation of the safety improvement
costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to Mr.
R. M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration. Costs shall be reported in two categories: 1) total cost
associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses,
and 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to
pipeline infrastructure.
8

420105010_Closure_06102013_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
June 10, 2013
Mr. Michael J. Hennigan
President and Chief Executive Officer
Sunoco Logistics Partners L.P.
1818 Market Street, Suite 1500
Philadelphia, PA 19103-3615
CPF 4-2010-5010
Dear Mr. Hennigan:
On August 1, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued to
Sunoco Pipeline Company a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This Order included a
Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our review of the documentation you
provided and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has been determined that you have
complied with the terms of this Order.
Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the matters
involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
R. M. Seeley
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration

420105010_Final Order_08012012_text.pdf

AUGUST 1, 2012
Mr. Michael J. Hennigan
President and Chief Executive Officer
Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP
1818 Market Street, Suite 1500
Philadelphia, PA 19103-3615
Re: CPF No. 4-2010-5010
Dear Mr. Hennigan:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, assesses a civil penalty of $415,000, and specifies actions that need to be taken by
Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty
payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the
terms of the Compliance Order completed, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this
enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed
effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffre
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