{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420105016S","title":"ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC — Safety Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2010-11-10","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED safety order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420105016s.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420105016s.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420105016s","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420105016S","body":"Safety Order involving ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2010-11-10 and is reported as closed as of 2015-02-26. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420105016S_Closure_02262015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105016S/420105016S_Closure_02262015.pdf\n\n420105016S_Closure_02262015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105016S/420105016S_Closure_02262015_text.pdf\n\n420105016S_NOPSO_11102010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105016S/420105016S_NOPSO_11102010.pdf\n\n420105016S_NOPSO_11102010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105016S/420105016S_NOPSO_11102010_text.pdf\n\n420105016S_Operator Response to NOPSO_11242010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105016S/420105016S_Operator%20Response%20to%20NOPSO_11242010.pdf\n\n420105016S_Safety Order_04042011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105016S/420105016S_Safety%20Order_04042011.pdf\n\n420105016S_Safety Order_04042011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420105016S/420105016S_Safety%20Order_04042011_text.pdf\n\n420105016S_Safety Order_04042011_text.pdf\n\nAPR 04 2011\nMr. Wesley J. Christensen\nSenior Vice President, Natural Gas Liquids Operations\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P.\n100 West Fifth Street\nTulsa, OK 74103\nRe: CPF No. 4-2010-5016-S\nDear Mr. Christensen:\nEnclosed please find the Safety Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes a finding\nthat ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P.’s Sterling 1 NGL pipeline system has a condition or conditions\nthat pose a pipeline integrity risk and specifies actions that must be taken by ONEOK to ensure\nthat the public, property, and the environment are protected from the risk. When the terms of the\norder have been completed, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement\naction will be closed. Service of the Safety Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the\ndate of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. R. M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [ 7005 1160 0001 0041 3641 ]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P., ) CPF No. 4-2010-5016-S\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nSAFETY ORDER\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an investigation of the safety of ONEOK\nNGL Pipeline, L.P.’s (ONEOK or Respondent) Sterling 1 NGL pipeline system in Texas and\nOklahoma, including an accident that occurred on November 1, 2010. ONEOK, a subsidiary of\nONEOK Partners, L.P., operates approximately 8,000 miles of pipeline primarily in Texas,\nOklahoma, and Kansas, which transport highly volatile natural gas liquids (ethane/propane).\n1\nAs a result of the investigation, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated November 10, 2010, a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice). In\naccordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, the Notice proposed finding that conditions exist on the\npipeline system that pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property or the environment,\nand proposed that Respondent take certain measures to ensure that the public, property, and the\nenvironment are protected from the potential risk.\nONEOK responded to the Notice by letter dated November 24, 2010. In its letter, Respondent\nexpressed its intent to comply with the terms of the Notice as proposed, and requested an\n“informal consultation” pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.239(b)(2). Respondent also provided\ninformation concerning the corrective actions it has taken. By letter dated December 1, 2010,\nONEOK withdrew its request for an informal consultation, authorizing the entry of this Safety\nOrder. Respondent did not request a hearing, and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS\nRespondent did not contest the proposed findings in the Notice that its Sterling 1 NGL pipeline\nsystem has a condition or conditions that pose a pipeline integrity risk. Accordingly, pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60117(l) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, I find as follows:\n1 This information is reported by Respondent pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 195.49.\n\n\n\n2\n• The Sterling 1 NGL pipeline system is a 596-mile, 8- and 10-inch pipeline that\noriginates in Medford, Oklahoma and traverses Oklahoma and Texas to its endpoint in\nMont Belvieu, Texas. The Medford-to-Nevada Segment originates at the Medford\nPump Station in Grant County, Oklahoma and terminates at the Nevada Booster Station\nnear Royse City, Texas in Rockwall County. The Medford-to-Nevada Segment is an 8-\ninch diameter pipeline with Polyken tape coating.\n• On November 1, 2010, an accident occurred on the Medford-to-Nevada Segment near\nMP 251 at station number 13266+06 in a topographically low lying portion of the\npipeline. PHMSA became aware of the accident on the same day when NRC Report\n#958656 was received. PHMSA initiated an investigation of the accident.\n• Investigations at the accident site, evaluation of soil and corrosion product samples, and\nevaluation of the failed section of pipe have suggested the probable cause of the failure\nto be through-wall pitting corrosion caused by microbiologically induced corrosion\n(MIC). ONEOK has indicated that the failure occurred in a section of pipe that\ncontained disbonded Polyken tape coating, which appeared to have allowed electrolyte\nto come into contact with the pipe surface resulting in MIC. MIC can be an accelerated\npitting form of corrosion, which poses a threat to pipeline integrity. Comparisons of in-\nline inspection (ILI) tool runs can provide advanced identification of areas where\naccelerated corrosion is taking place.\n• ONEOK has also indicated that AC stray current induced corrosion has previously been\nidentified on the Sterling 1 NGL pipeline system as a threat to integrity, and the\ncompany had implemented AC mitigation measures. Based on data reviewed by\nONEOK from testing stations near the accident site, the company indicated that AC or\nDC stray current induced corrosion was not a probable cause of the accident.\n• The Medford-to-Nevada Segment was constructed in 1981 from 8.625-inch diameter,\nelectric resistance welded (ERW) pipe, manufactured by Republic. The wall thickness\nand grade varies along the segment. There are 67.3 miles of 0.188-inch X46 pipe, 6.2\nmiles of 0.375-inch X42 pipe, and 193 feet of 0.625-inch X42 pipe.\n• The Sterling 1 pipeline system transports batched highly volatile natural gas liquids\n(HVLs) that are typically an ethane and propane mix. The system usually operates in a\nsteady state operation between 1200 to 1300 psig depending upon the batched product\ntransported.\n• The Sterling 1 pipeline system traverses rolling hills and stratigraphic geography as it\nmoves from Medford, Oklahoma to the coastal plains at its endpoint in Mont Belvieu,\nTexas.\n• From the accident site, the nearest Unusually Sensitive Area (USA), as defined in\n§195.2, is 9,130 feet downstream. The nearest High Consequence Area (HCA), as\ndefined in §195.450, is an “other populated area” located 12,211 feet upstream of the\naccident site.\n\n\n\n3\n• If left unaddressed, accelerated corrosion anomalies may result in pipeline failures and\nthe release of hazardous HVLs. The failures may be in the form of leaks (if the\ncorrosion pits are spaced far apart) or ruptures (if the pits are closely packed together).\nHVL releases can form vapor clouds that have serious consequences to persons,\nproperty, and the environment, especially if an ignition source is present.\n• It is probable that accelerated corrosion is present on the Sterling 1 NGL pipeline\nsystem in other areas, particularly where tape coating has disbonded. If left\nunidentified and not addressed, accelerated corrosion anomalies would likely continue\nto grow and deepen into through wall failures.\nIssuance of Safety Order\nSection 60117(l) of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a safety order, after\nreasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective measures, which may\ninclude physical inspection, testing, repair, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making\nthe determination that a pipeline facility has a condition or conditions that pose a pipeline\nintegrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment is set forth both in the above-\nreferenced statute and 49 C.F.R. §190.239.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing findings and considering the age of the pipe involved, the\nmanufacturer, the hazardous nature of the product transported and the pressure required for\ntransporting such product, the characteristics of the geographical areas where the pipeline facility\nis located, and the likelihood that the conditions could worsen or develop on other areas of the\npipeline and potentially impact its serviceability, PHMSA finds that Respondent’s Sterling 1\nNGL pipeline system has a condition or conditions that pose a pipeline integrity risk to public\nsafety, property, or the environment. Accordingly, PHMSA issues this Safety Order, which\nrequires that Respondent take measures specified below to address the risk.\nCorrective Measures\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117(l) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P. must\ntake the following remedial requirements with respect to the Sterling 1 NGL pipeline system:\n1. ONEOK must perform appropriate tests, analyses, and evaluations to establish the\nprobable cause of the accident.\n2. ONEOK must compare and re-evaluate the previous ILI runs performed on the\nMedford-to-Nevada Segment, identify specific areas where accelerated corrosion may\nbe occurring on this segment, and remediate those areas. Criteria for identifying\naccelerated corrosion and for remediation must be in accordance with the work plan\napproved by the Director pursuant to Item 5.\n\n\n\n4\n3. ONEOK must perform an integrity assessment on the Medford-to-Nevada Segment to\nidentify areas of accelerated corrosion and remediate those areas. Criteria for\nidentifying accelerated corrosion and remediation must be in accordance with the work\nplan approved by the Director pursuant to Item 5.\n4. Until the time that ONEOK receives approval from the Director to operate at higher\npressures up to the established maximum of 1335 psig, ONEOK may not operate the\nMedford-to-Nevada Segment at a pressure more than 1064 psig (discharge pressure at\nthe Durant, Oklahoma Station), which equates to 80% of the operating pressure\nexperienced on the segment immediately prior to the pipeline failure.\n5. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, ONEOK must develop and submit to the\nDirector for approval, a written remedial work plan that includes corrective measures.\nThe work plan must include:\n(A) Details for the performance of each of the above requirements, including the\ncriteria that will be used for identifying accelerated corrosion for remediation.\n(B) The performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether and to what extent the conditions described in this Order are\npresent elsewhere on the Sterling 1 NGL pipeline system. A provision to make\nthe results of the inspections, field excavations, and evaluations available to\nPHMSA or its representative;\n(C) The performance of repairs or other corrective measures that fully remediate the\nidentified risk condition(s), including provisions for continuing long-term\nperiodic testing and integrity verification measures to ensure the ongoing safe\noperation of the pipeline considering the results of the analyses, inspections, and\ncorrective measures undertaken pursuant to this Safety Order; and\n(D) A proposed schedule for completion of the actions required by this Order.\n6. Revise the remedial work plan as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the evaluations and associated remedial activities. Submit any such plan\nrevisions to the Director for prior approval. The Director may approve plan elements\nincrementally. The remedial work plan shall become incorporated into this Safety\nOrder.\n7. Implement the work plan as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to\nthe plan.\n8. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include available data and results of\nthe testing and evaluations required by this Safety Order; and (2) describe the progress\nof the repairs and other remedial actions being undertaken. The first report is due 60\ndays from receipt of this Order.\n\n\n\n5\n9. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction set forth\nin Item 4 upon a written request from ONEOK demonstrating that restoring the\npipeline, or portion thereof, to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based on a\nreliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all\nknown defects, anomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 4-2010-5016-S and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nThe Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of the Safety\nOrder upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an extension.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nThe actions taken pursuant to this Safety Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199,\nunder any other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under\nany other provision of Federal or state law.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this proceeding and\nimplementation of the work plan, PHMSA may identify other safety measures that need to be\ntaken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any proposed additional measures and, if\nnecessary, amendments to the work plan or Safety Order.\nThe terms and conditions of this Safety Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n420105016S_Closure_02262015_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 26, 2015\nMr. Wesley J. Christensen\nSr. Vice President of Operations\nONEOK NGL Pipeline L.L.C.\n100 West Fifth Street\nTulsa, OK 74103\nCPF 4-2010-5016S\nDear Mr. Christensen:\nOn November 1, 2010, ONEOK NGL Pipeline L.L.C. (ONEOK) experienced a line rupture related accident\non its Sterling 1 NGL Pipeline, 8-inch Medford-to-Nevada Segment, at approximate Mile Post 251. As a\nresult of this accident, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code conducted an\naccident investigation and performed an inspection of your Integrity Management Plan.\nAs a result of the investigation, a Notice of Proposed Safety Order was issued under case file CPF 4-2010-\n5016S to ONEOK in a letter dated November 10, 2010. The final Safety Order was issued on April 4, 2011.\nIn a letter dated November 24, 2014, ONEOK requested closure of the case, with a summary of actions taken\nby ONEOK.\nONEOK represents in their request to close this case that they will continue with the shortened inspection\ninterval and other actions taken during this order. In the event that ONEOK changes their Integrity\nManagement Continual Assessment Plan (IMP CAP) to increase the time interval between assessments (or\nmodify the other items related to this order) for the Medford to Nevada segment, a notification must be made\nto this office in advance of the change. ONEOK has completed all of the requirements of the Safety Order.\nAt this time, no further action is necessary and this case is now closed\nThank you for your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","truncated":false,"body_characters":17127}