{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420111012","title":"SOUTHERN NATURAL GAS CO — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-10-20","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.163(d), 192.199(e), 192.465(d), 192.475, 192.605(a), 192.705(a), 192.911(d), 192.911(e).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420111012.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420111012.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420111012","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420111012","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving SOUTHERN NATURAL GAS CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.163(d),  192.199(e),  192.465(d),  192.475,  192.605(a),  192.705(a),  192.911(d),  192.911(e). The case was opened on 2011-10-20 and is reported as closed as of 2012-06-15. Proposed civil penalty: $72,900. Assessed civil penalty: $72,900. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420111012_Final Order_06152012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420111012/420111012_Final%20Order_06152012.pdf\n\n420111012_Final Order_06152012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420111012/420111012_Final%20Order_06152012_text.pdf\n\n420111012_NOPV PCP_10202011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420111012/420111012_NOPV%20PCP_10202011.pdf\n\n420111012_NOPV PCP_10202011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420111012/420111012_NOPV%20PCP_10202011_text.pdf\n\n420111012_Operator Response to NOPV PCP_11282011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420111012/420111012_Operator%20Response%20to%20NOPV%20PCP_11282011.pdf\n\n420111012_Final Order_06152012_text.pdf\n\nJUNE 15, 2012\nMr. William Cope\nVice President, Eastern Operations\nSouthern Natural Gas Company, LLC\n569 Brookwood Village, Suite 501\nBirmingham, Alabama 35209\nRe: CPF No. 4-2011-1012\nDear Mr. Cope:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and assesses a civil penalty of $72,900. This is to acknowledge receipt of payment of\nthe full penalty amount, by wire transfer, dated November 23, 2011. Therefore, this\nenforcement action is now closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed\neffective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Rod M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nSouthern Natural Gas Company, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2011-1012\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nBetween January 1 and December 31, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Southern\nNatural Gas Company, LLC1 (SNG or Respondent) in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,\nGeorgia, South Carolina, and the Gulf of Mexico. SNG is a wholly-owned subsidiary of El Paso\nPipeline Partners Operating Company, LLC.\n2 SNG operates approximately 7,600 miles of\nnatural gas transmission pipelines throughout the southeastern United States.3\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated October 20, 2011, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil\nPenalty (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that\nSNG had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and assessing a civil penalty of\n$72,900 for the alleged violations.\nSNG responded to the Notice by letter dated November 28, 2011 (Response). The company did\nnot contest the allegations of violation and paid the proposed civil penalty of $72,900 as\nprovided in 49 C.F.R. § 190.227. Payment of the penalty serves to close the case with prejudice\nto Respondent. SNG did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\n1 Effective August 1, 2011, Southern Natural Gas converted from a general partnership to a limited liability\ncompany and changed its name to Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C. See Annual Report at\nhttp://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/92232/000119312512079780/d268733d10k.htm.\n2 Id.\n3 See http://www.eppipelinepartners.com/Assets/sng.shtm (last accessed April 30, 2012).\n\n\n\n2\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§192.911, 192.925, and 192.947\nwhich state:\n§ 192.911 What are the elements of an integrity management\nprogram?\nAn operator’s initial integrity management program begins with a\nframework (see § 192.907) and evolves into a more detailed and\ncomprehensive integrity management program, as information is gained\nand incorporated into the program. An operator must make continual\nimprovements to its program. The initial program framework and\nsubsequent program must, at minimum, contain the following elements.\n(When indicated, refer to ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by\nreference, see § 192.7) for more detailed information on the listed\nelement.)….\n(d) A direct assessment plan, if applicable, meeting the requirements\nof § 192.923, and depending on the threat assessed, of §§ 192.925,\n192.927, or 192.929.\n§ 192.925 What are the requirements for using External Corrosion\nDirect Assessment (ECDA)?\n(b) General requirements. An operator that uses direct assessment to\nassess the threat of external corrosion must follow the requirements in this\nsection, in ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7),\nsection 6.4, and in NACE SP0502–2008 (incorporated by reference, see\n§ 192.7). An operator must develop and implement a direct assessment\nplan that has procedures addressing preassessment, indirect examination,\ndirect examination, and post-assessment. If the ECDA detects pipeline\ncoating damage, the operator must also integrate the data from the ECDA\nwith other information from the data integration (§ 192.917(b)) to\nevaluate the covered segment for the threat of third party damage, and to\naddress the threat as required by § 192.917(e)(1).\n(1) Preassessment. In addition to the requirements in ASME/ANSI\nB31.8S section 6.4 and NACE SP0502–2008, section 3, the plan’s\nprocedures for preassessment must include—\n(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting\nECDA for the first time on a covered segment; and\n(ii) The basis on which an operator selects at least two different, but\ncomplementary indirect assessment tools to assess each ECDA Region. If\nan operator utilizes an indirect inspection method that is not discussed in\nAppendix A of NACE SP0502–2008, the operator must demonstrate the\napplicability, validation basis, equipment used, application procedure, and\nutilization of data for the inspection method.\n§ 192.947 What records must an operator keep?\nAn operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records\nthat demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At\n\n\n\n3\nminimum, an operator must maintain the following records for review\nduring an inspection.\n(a) A written integrity management program in accordance with\n§ 192.907;\n(b) Documents supporting the threat identification and risk\nassessment in accordance with § 192.917;\n(c) A written baseline assessment plan in accordance with § 192.919;\n(d) Documents to support any decision, analysis and process\ndeveloped and used to implement and evaluate each element of the\nbaseline assessment plan and integrity management program. Documents\ninclude those developed and used in support of any identification,\ncalculation, amendment, modification, justification, deviation and\ndetermination made, and any action taken to implement and evaluate any\nof the program elements;\n(e) Documents that demonstrate personnel have the required training,\nincluding a description of the training program, in accordance with\n§ 192.915;\n(f) Schedule required by § 192.933 that prioritizes the conditions\nfound during an assessment for evaluation and remediation, including\ntechnical justifications for the schedule.\n(g) Documents to carry out the requirements in §§ 192.923 through\n192.929 for a direct assessment plan;…\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§192.911, 192.925, and 192.947 by\nfailing to maintain complete documentation supporting the decisions it made in performing the\npre-assessment step for the External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) of the Graniteville\nMills Expansion Line. During the inspection, OPS inspectors discovered two casings listed in\nthe pre-assessment data. However, SNG personnel clarified that the two casings did not exist but\nrather were horizontal directional drills. This information was not documented in SNG’s ECDA\nreport.\nIn its Response, SNG did not contest this allegation of violation. SNG acknowledged that errors\noccurred in the ECDA project file. SNG confirmed that it has corrected the report stating that\nthe two casings did not exist. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that SNG\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 192.947 by failing to maintain the required documentation.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605(a) and 192.475,\nwhich state:\n§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each\npipeline, a manual of written procedures for conducting operations and\nmaintenance activities and for emergency response. For transmission\nlines, the manual must also include procedures for handling abnormal\noperations. This manual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.\n\n\n\n4\nThis manual must be prepared before operations of a pipeline system\ncommence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations\nwhere operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\n(b) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following, if\napplicable, to provide safety during maintenance and operations….\n(2) Controlling corrosion in accordance with the operations and\nmaintenance requirements of subpart I of this part.\n§ 192.475 Internal corrosion control: General.\n(a) Corrosive gas may not be transported by pipeline, unless the\ncorrosive effect of the gas on the pipeline has been investigated and steps\nhave been taken to minimize internal corrosion.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605(a) and 192.475(a) by failing\nto follow its procedures for controlling corrosion. Specifically, the Notice alleged that SNG\nfailed to follow procedures for monitoring gas quality at the Olga station. During the OPS\ninspection, SNG confirmed that it uses El Paso’s Gas Quality Guidelines (Seventh Edition).\nThese procedures require company personnel to perform a review to determine whether the gas\nflow is conforming or non-conforming in relation to the particular company tariff. The El Paso\nguidelines require that the review should not exceed 72 hours. The tariff mandates that SNG\nshould not transport gas with a water vapor of 7 lbs/MMscf or more.\nSNG’s records demonstrated that on September 15, 2010, the moisture analyzer at the Olga\nstation indicated that the water vapor was registering at 7.5 lbs/MMscf, above the threshold set\nby the tariff. In fact, SNG had received a “high” alarm from an on-line moisture analyzer on\nSeptember 9, 2010. The OPS inspection confirmed that SNG was aware of the problem with the\nmoisture analyzer since September 6, 2010, however, did not send out a technician to examine\nthe problem until September 23, 2010. SNG admitted during the OPS inspection that they\ntransported gas for 14 days during which the online moisture analyzer registered over 7.0\nlbs/MMscf. This amount of time exceeds the 72 hour limitation for a review listed in its\nprocedure.\nIn its Response, SNG did not contest this item. Although it acknowledged that it did not\ndocument its action on a Gas Quality Summary Report as required by its procedures, it noted that\nit did follow its procedures in handling this situation. SNG stated that it received the “high”\nalarm on September 9, 2010 and undertook efforts to trace where the high water vapor had\nentered the system. SNG also sampled gas received into the system from eight different\nproducers. All showed water content at 6 lbs/MMcf or lower. Without direct evidence that the\ngas had water vapor outside the parameters of its tariff, SNG decided not take further action.\nSNG then had a technician evaluate the moisture analyzer on September 22-23, 2010. SNG\npresented a summary of these actions in its Response to demonstrate that it had appropriately\naddressed the high water volume alarm. However, having reviewed all of the evidence, SNG did\nnot complete the Gas Quality Summary Report, which was a requirement of its procedures.\nAccordingly, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) by failing to follow its\nprocedures for controlling corrosion.\n\n\n\n5\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.475, which states:\n§ 192.475 Internal corrosion control: General.\n(b) Whenever any pipe is removed from a pipeline for any reason,\nthe internal surface must be inspected for evidence for corrosion. If\ninternal corrosion is found—\n(1) The adjacent pipe must be investigated to determine the extent\nof internal corrosion;\n(2) Replacement must be made to the extent required by applicable\nparagraphs of §§ 192.485, 192.487, or 192.489; and;\n(3) Steps must be taken to minimize the internal corrosion.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.475 by failing to inspect the\ninternal surface for evidence of corrosion, when the pipe was removed. SNG performed a hot\ntap on the 24” pipe to install a stopple for the Mississippi hub tie-in. On June 14, 2010, when the\npipe was exposed, the operator observed crack-like indications on the pipe. An external\nexamination was performed and the pipe was removed from the system. However, SNG did not\ninspect the internal surface for internal corrosion.\nSNG removed another segment on November 24, 2009. An anomaly dig was conducted on\nNovember 16, 2009. SNG ultimately cut out the pipe on November 24, 2009. However, SNG’s\nrecords revealed that no internal inspection for internal corrosion was performed. The pipeline\nsafety regulations require that operators inspect the internal surface whenever pipe is removed.\nIn its Response, SNG stated that the internal surfaces of the pipe were inspected. However, SNG\ncould not provide documentation to support that these inspections occurred. After considering\nall of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.475 by failing to inspect the\ninternal surface for evidence of corrosion.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under\n49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s\nability to pay the penalty and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing\nbusiness; and the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety\nregulations. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without\nany reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require.\nThe Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $72,900 for the violations cited above.\n\n\n\n6\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $29,100 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.911, for failing to maintain proper documentation supporting the decisions made\nin performing the pre-assessment step for the ECDA of the Graniteville Mills Expansion Line.\nSNG did not contest either the allegation of violation or the proposed penalty amount.\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the penalty assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a civil penalty of $29,100 which has already been remitted.\nItem 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $21,600 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a), for failing to follow its procedure for controlling corrosion. SNG did not\ncontest either the allegation of violation or the proposed penalty amount. Accordingly, having\nreviewed the record and considered the penalty assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil\npenalty of $21,600, which has already been remitted.\nItem 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $22,200 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.475, for failing to inspect the internal surface of a pipe for evidence of internal\ncorrosion when the pipe was removed. SNG did not contest either the allegation of violation or\nthe proposed penalty amount. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the\npenalty assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $22,200, which has already\nbeen remitted.\nIn summary, upon review of all the evidence and consideration of the assessment criteria for\neach of the Items cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $72,900, which has\nalready been remitted.\nWARNING ITEMS\nWith respect to Items 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10, the Notice alleged a probable violation of Part 192\nspecifically considered to be warning items. The warning were for:\n49 C.F.R. § 192.911, as supplemented by § 192.925(b) (Item 2) ─ Respondent’s\nalleged failure to implement its ECDA plan for conducting indirect examinations. SNG\ndid not complete indirect examinations over the entire HCA segment of the 8”\nGraniteville Mills Expansion Line with the tools selected during the 2007 External\nCorrosion Direct Assessment.\n49 C.F.R. § 192.911, as supplemented by § 192.933 (Item 3)---Respondent’s alleged\nfailure to take prompt action following the discovery of the immediate condition or to\nreduce the pressure within the timeframe required by the regulations.\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) (Item 4)---Respondent’s alleged failure to follow its Site\nSpecific Internal Corrosion Action Plan for the North Main Loop line. Specifically, in\n2007, SNG did not run a cleaning pig in its North Main Loop line from the Tarrant\nCompressor station to Moody Gate according to its Corrosion Action Plan.\n\n\n\n7\n49 C.F.R. § 192. 465 (Item 6)—Respondent’s alleged failure to take prompt remedial\naction to repair a damaged test station on the Gadsden Branch Loop line at Steele\nRaceway, Mile Post 22.204. SNG deactivated the test point in April 2009 upon\ndiscovering that the test point was destroyed; however, SNG did not take further action\nto determine if the cathodic protection on the line was effective.\n49 C.F.R. § 192.705 (Item 8)—Respondent’s alleged failure to have a patrol program to\nobserve surface conditions on and adjacent to its transmission lines right-of-way. SNG\nconducted patrols by flight. On September 15, 2010, SNG discovered that a motor\nhome was placed over a SNG right-of-way near Adolphus Road. During the OPS\ninspection, SNG personnel confirmed that the motor home has been in the right-of-way\nsince 2009. The mobile home was removed on December 10, 2010.\n49 C.F.R. § 192.199 (Item 9)—Respondent’s alleged failure to have discharge stacks,\nvents, or outlet ports designed to prevent accumulation of water, ice, or snow where gas\ncan be discharged into the atmosphere without undue hazard. The discharge stack for\nthe relief valve at SNG’s Dubin #1 Regulator station was not positioned to vent to a safe\narea.\n49 C.F.R. § 192.163 (Item 10)---Respondent’s alleged failure to have gates at its Pell\nCity Compressor Station that provided a convenient opportunity for exit to safety. The\nregulations require that gates at compressor stations must open outward and must be\nable to be opened without a key. SNG’s gate at the Pell City Compressor Station was\nlocked and not equipped with a bump bar to provide a convenient opportunity for exit to\nsafety. SNG has since confirmed that it has installed a bump bar at this location.\nIf OPS finds a violation of these provisions in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be\nsubject to future enforcement action.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon receipt of service.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":20859}