{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420121011H","title":"NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CO OF AMERICA (KMI) — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-06-12","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420121011h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420121011h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420121011h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420121011H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CO OF AMERICA (KMI). The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2012-06-12 and is reported as closed as of 2013-03-26. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420121011H_Closure Letter_03262013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420121011H/420121011H_Closure%20Letter_03262013.pdf\n\n420121011H_Corrective Action Order 06122012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420121011H/420121011H_Corrective%20Action%20Order%2006122012_text.pdf\n\n420121011H_Corrective Action Order_06122012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420121011H/420121011H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_06122012.pdf\n\n420121011H_Closure Letter_03262013.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nHouston, TX 77074\n8701 South Gessner, Suite 1110\nPipeline and\nAdministration\nHazardous Materials Safety\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMarch 26, 2013\nMr. Dwayne Burton\nVice President, Gas Pipeline Operations\nNatural Gas Pipeline Company of America (KMI)\n500 Dallas Street, Suite 1000\nRoom 318011\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF No. 4-2012-1011H\nDear Mr. Burton:\nOn June 6, 2012, Natural Gas Pipeline of America (KMI) experienced a failure of its Oklahoma\nExtension (OE #1) 26-inch diameter pipeline near Laketon, Texas. As a result of the incident,\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a Corrective\nAction Order (CAO), 4-2012-1011H, dated June 12, 2012, requiring KMI to take corrective\nactions with respect to its pipeline system.\nThe cause of the failure was determined to be hydrogen induced stress cracking within a hard\nspot on the pipeline and KMI presented a plan of identification and corrective measures designed\nto prevent additional in-service failures. PHMSA monitored the actions taken within the\nintegrity verification process, and has determined that KMI has substantially completed the\nrequirements of the CAO.\nConsequently, PHMSA has closed the CAO, CPF 4-2012-1011H.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n420121011H_Corrective Action Order_06122012.pdf\n\nof Transportation\nU.S. Department\nWashington, D.C. 20590\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nMaterials Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous\nJUN 1 2 2012\nAdministration\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL (Mr. Dwayne Burton| AND FAX TO: (713)-495-7432\nMr. Dwayne Burton\nVice President, Gas Pipeline Operations\nNatural Gas Pipeline Company of America (KMI)\n500 Dallas Street, Suite 1000\nRoom 3180H\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2012-1011H\nDear Mr. Burton:\nEnclosed please find the Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It finds\nthat operation of Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America's 26-inch Oklahoma Extension\nnatural gas pipeline is hazardous to life, property, and the environment without corrective action.\nThe Corrective Action Order requires you to take immediate action to protect the public,\nproperty, and the environment in connection with the failure of the pipeline that occurred on or\nabout June 6, 2012, near Laketon, Texas.\nService of the Corrective Action Order is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your\nreceipt of this Corrective Action Order constitutes service of that document under\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of the Order are effective upon receipt.\nWe look forward to a successful resolution of the concerns arising out of this failure to ensure\nthe safe operation of the pipeline. Please direct any questions on this matter to Rod Seeley,\nDirector, Southwest Region, OPS, at (713) 272-2852.\nSincerely,\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosures: Corrective Action Order and Copy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233\nCC:\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Rod Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\nIn the Matter of\nNatural Gas Pipeline\nCPF No. 4-2012-1011H\nCompany of America (KMI),\nRespondent.\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued under 49 U.S.C. § 60112 to Natural Gas\nPipeline Company of America (KMI) (NGPA or Respondent), the operator of the 26-inch\ndiameter Oklahoma Extension natural gas pipeline. This Order finds that operation of the\npipeline without corrective action is hazardous to life, property, or the environment and requires\nRespondent to take immediate action to ensure the safe operation of the pipeline.\nOn or about June 6, 2012, Respondent experienced a failure on the Oklahoma Extension (OE #1)\npipeline near the town of Laketon, Texas, resulting in a release of gas that ignited and burned.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The cause\nof the failure has not yet been determined. The preliminary findings of the investigation are as\nfollows:\nPreliminary Findings\nAt approximately 2:00 a.m. CDT on June 6, 2012, Respondent experienced a sudden\npressure drop on the OE #1 pipeline, requiring shut down of the line. Pampa local law\nenforcement contacted Respondent's Gas Control 800 number and reported a fire in the\nvicinity of a compressor station in a rural farming area.\n.\nThe failure occurred at Compressor Station 154 located at Mile Post (MP) 52 in Gray\nCounty, Texas, approximately four miles east of the town of Laketon.\n\n\n\n2\n• The escaping gas ignited, leaving a crater approximately 30 feet in diameter and burning\napproximately two acres of an agricultural area including two 500-gallon plastic tanks\nused to store liquid fertilizer. The fire also burned two telephone poles and associated\ntransformers and required State Highway 152 to be shut down for several hours.\nFollowing the failure, automated valves closed upstream and downstream of the failure\nsite and the main fire self-extinguished after about two hours, although a smaller fire\nresulting from valve leakage continued to burn for about seven hours. The pipeline\nremains out of service.\n• NGPA reported the incident to the National Response Center at 4:07 EST a.m. (NRC\nReport 1013669)\n• On June 9, 2012, Respondent excavated the failure site and removed the section of pipe\ncontaining the failed pipe. The preliminary visual inspection by NGPA at the scene\nindicated the presence of a 50-foot-long longitudinal rupture in the body of the pipe at the\n1 o'clock position that propagated through one girth weld and arrested at the next\nupstream girth weld. The failed pipe section has been transported to a metallurgist in\nHouston, Texas, for failure analysis.\n• The cause of the failure is unknown and the investigation is ongoing.\n• The OE #1 pipeline transports gas from its origin station near the town of Fritch in\nHutchinson County, Texas, across portions of Southern Oklahoma to its end station near\nthe town of Bridgeport in Wise County, Texas. Its total length is approximately 256\nmiles and portions of the pipeline are routed near populated areas and cross numerous\nstate and local highways.\n• The 26-inch diameter OE #1 pipeline was constructed in 1957 of 0.250-inch wall\nthickness, grade X52 pipe with an electric flash welded (EFW) seam. It was\nmanufactured by A. O. Smith and has an asphalt enamel coating and an impressed-\ncurrent cathodic protection system.\n• The maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline is 720 psig. At the\ntime of the failure, the actual operating pressure of the pipeline was reported to be 688\npsig.\n• NGPA operates an interstate pipeline system consisting of approximately 9,800 miles of\npipeline and is the largest transporter of natural gas into the Chicago market.'\n1 Kinder Morgan, to, owns and perses 20% inse i CAL is isi one 1, 20c, owns 80%.\n\n\n\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety (Associate Administrator) may issue a corrective action order after providing reasonable\nnotice and the opportunity for a hearing if he finds that a particular pipeline facility is or would\nbe hazardous to life, property, or the environment. The terms of such an order may include the\nsuspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement,\nor any other action as appropriate. The Associate Administrator may also issue a corrective\naction order without providing any notice or the opportunity for a hearing if he finds that a\nfailure to do so expeditiously will result in likely serious harm to life, property or the\nenvironment. The opportunity for a hearing is provided as soon as practicable after the issuance\nof the CAO in such cases.\nAfter evaluating the preliminary findings, I find that the continued operation of the OE #1\npipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.\nAdditionally, having considered the age of the pipe, the manufacture of the pipe, the\ncircumstances surrounding the failure, the proximity of the pipeline to populated areas and public\nroadways, the hazardous nature of the product being transported, the pressure required for\ntransporting the material, and the ongoing investigation to determine the cause of the failure, I\nfind that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would\nresult in likely serious harm to life, property, and the environment. Accordingly, this Corrective\nAction Order is being issued without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing and the terms and\nconditions are effective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held\ntelephonically or in-person in Houston, Texas.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nadditional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nconsistent with safety, NGPA will receive notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the\nimposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Action\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, NGPA is ordered to immediately take the following corrective\nactions to ensure the safe operation of the 26-inch OE #1 pipeline:\n1. Develop and submit a written re-start plan for prior approval of the Director. Obtain\nwritten approval from the Director prior to resuming operation of the pipeline. The\nrestart plan must address all damage to the pipeline facilities caused by the June 6, 2012\nfailure. Additionally, the restart plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the pipeline\n\n\n\n4\nsegment during the restart process, must specify a daylight restart, and must specify\nadvance communications with local emergency response officials.\n2. After receiving approval from the Director to restart the pipeline, maintain a twenty\npercent (20%) pressure reduction in the operating pressure of the 26-inch Oklahoma\nExtension pipeline running from Compressor Station 111 (MP 1) to Compressor Station\n801 (MP 256). The operating pressure is not to exceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual\noperating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure. Submit the actual operating\npressures for each pump station on the pipeline at the time of failure and the reduced\ndischarge pressure limits for approval by the Director in the restart plan referenced in\nItem 1. This pressure reduction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits,\nto be adjusted accordingly. If the results of any action undertaken pursuant to this Order\nsoftware programming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices\nnecessitate a reduction in the operating pressure permitted by the Order, NGPA must\nfurther reduce the operating pressure accordingly and notify the Director. This pressure\nrestriction will remain in effect until written approval to increase the pressure or return\nthe pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the Director pursuant to\nItem 8.\n3. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete third-party mechanical and\nmetallurgical testing of the failed pipe, including analysis of soil samples and any foreign\nmaterials, and a root cause analysis of all factors that caused or contributed to the failure.\nComplete the testing and analysis as follows:\nA. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site;\nB. Use the testing protocol provided by PHMSA and submit the selection of the\ntesting laboratory to the Director for prior approval;\nC. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a PHMSA\nrepresentative to witness the testing; and\nD. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety\n(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same time as they\nare made available to Respondent.\n4. Within 90 days following completion of the testing and failure analysis required by Item\n3, submit an integrity verification and remedial work plan to the Director for approval.\nThe plan must provide for the verification of the integrity of the pipeline and must\naddress all factors known or suspected in the failure. The plan must include:\nA. Integration of the results of the testing and failure analysis performed pursuant to\nItem 3, with all relevant system data, including all historical repair information,\n\n\n\n5\nconstruction, operating, maintenance, testing, metallurgical analysis or other\nthird-party consultation information, and assessment data for the line segment.\nData-gathering activities must include a review of the failure history (including\nboth in-service and pressure test failures) of the pipeline and development of a\nwritten report containing all available information regarding locations, dates, and\ncauses of leaks and failures;\nB. The performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether and to what extent the conditions associated with the failure,\nor any other integrity-threatening conditions, are present elsewhere on the\npipeline. The additional testing and inspections must include consideration of a\nhydrostatic test of the section of OE #1 originating at Compressor Station 154 and\nending at the District 112 Station, additional in-line inspections, or other testing\nand inspections as appropriate to the cause of the failure. Include a detailed\ndescription of the criteria to be used for the evaluation and prioritization of any\nintegrity threats and anomalies that are identified;\nC. A detailed description of the inspection and repair criteria to be used in the\nevaluation and prioritization of identified integrity threats. This is to include a\ndescription of how any defects are to be graded and a schedule for repairs or\nreplacement;\nD. Provisions for continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\nmeasures, considering the results of the analyses, inspections, and corrective\nmeasures undertaken pursuant to this Order, to ensure the ongoing safe operation\nof the pipeline; and\nE. A proposed schedule for completion of the actions required by paragraphs A-D of\nthis Item.\n5. Upon approval by the Director, the integrity verification and remedial work plan becomes\nincorporated into this Order and must be revised as necessary to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever necessary to incorporate new\ninformation obtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities. Submit any\nsuch plan revisions to the Director for prior approval. The Director may approve plan\nelements incrementally.\n6. Implement the work plan as approved by the Director, including any revisions to the plan.\n7. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and results of\nthe testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress of the\nrepairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report for the\nperiod from June 6, 2012, through September 30, 2012, shall be due by October 31, 2012.\n\n\n\n6\n8. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction set forth\nin Item 2 upon receipt of a written request from Respondent demonstrating that the\nhazard has abated and that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure or\nestablished MAOP is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the\npressure increase is safe, considering all known defects, anomalies and operating\nparameters of the pipeline.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of this Order\nupon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an extension.\nWith respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the submission on\nspecified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d) disapprove, in\nwhole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the submission; or (e) any\ncombination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon conditions, or modification\nby the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all actions required by the submission as\napproved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any portion of the\nsubmission, Respondent shall correct all deficiencies within the time specified by the Director,\nand resubmit it for approval. If a resubmitted item is disapproved in whole or in part, the\nDirector may again require Respondent to correct the deficiencies in accordance with the\nforegoing procedure, and the Director may otherwise proceed to enforce the terms of this Order.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), you must provide, along with the complete original\ndocument, a second copy of the document with those portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted, along with an explanation of why you believe the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to \"CPF No. 4-2012-1011H\" and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The\nactions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent's pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any other order\nissued to NGPA under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of\nFederal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator, whose\ndecision will be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\n\n\n\n7\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nJUN 1 2 2012\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nDate Issued\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n420121011H_Corrective Action Order 06122012_text.pdf\n\nJUNE 12, 2012\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL [Mr. Dwayne Burton] AND FAX TO: (713)-495-7432\nMr. Dwayne Burton\nVice President, Gas Pipeline Operations\nNatural Gas Pipeline Company of America (KMI)\n500 Dallas Street, Suite 1000\nRoom 3180H\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2012-1011H\nDear Mr. Burton:\nEnclosed please find the Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It finds\nthat operation of Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America’s 26-inch Oklahoma Extension\nnatural gas pipeline is hazardous to life, property, and the environment without corrective action.\nThe Corrective Action Order requires you to take immediate action to protect the public,\nproperty, and the environment in connection with the failure of the pipeline that occurred on or\nabout June 6, 2012, near Laketon, Texas.\nService of the Corrective Action Order is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your\nreceipt of this Corrective Action Order constitutes service of that document under\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of the Order are effective upon receipt.\nWe look forward to a successful resolution of the concerns arising out of this failure to ensure\nthe safe operation of the pipeline. Please direct any questions on this matter to Rod Seeley,\nDirector, Southwest Region, OPS, at (713) 272-2852.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosures: Corrective Action Order and Copy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233\ncc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Rod Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nNatural Gas Pipeline ) CPF No. 4-2012-1011H\nCompany of America (KMI), )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued under 49 U.S.C. § 60112 to Natural Gas\nPipeline Company of America (KMI) (NGPA or Respondent), the operator of the 26-inch\ndiameter Oklahoma Extension natural gas pipeline. This Order finds that operation of the\npipeline without corrective action is hazardous to life, property, or the environment and requires\nRespondent to take immediate action to ensure the safe operation of the pipeline.\nOn or about June 6, 2012, Respondent experienced a failure on the Oklahoma Extension (OE #1)\npipeline near the town of Laketon, Texas, resulting in a release of gas that ignited and burned.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The cause\nof the failure has not yet been determined. The preliminary findings of the investigation are as\nfollows:\nPreliminary Findings\n• At approximately 2:00 a.m. CDT on June 6, 2012, Respondent experienced a sudden\npressure drop on the OE #1 pipeline, requiring shut down of the line. Pampa local law\nenforcement contacted Respondent’s Gas Control 800 number and reported a fire in the\nvicinity of a compressor station in a rural farming area.\n• The failure occurred at Compressor Station 154 located at Mile Post (MP) 52 in Gray\nCounty, Texas, approximately four miles east of the town of Laketon.\n\n\n\n2\n• The escaping gas ignited, leaving a crater approximately 30 feet in diameter and burning\napproximately two acres of an agricultural area including two 500-gallon plastic tanks\nused to store liquid fertilizer. The fire also burned two telephone poles and associated\ntransformers and required State Highway 152 to be shut down for several hours.\n• Following the failure, automated valves closed upstream and downstream of the failure\nsite and the main fire self-extinguished after about two hours, although a smaller fire\nresulting from valve leakage continued to burn for about seven hours. The pipeline\nremains out of service.\n• NGPA reported the incident to the National Response Center at 4:07 EST a.m. (NRC\nReport 1013669)\n• On June 9, 2012, Respondent excavated the failure site and removed the section of pipe\ncontaining the failed pipe. The preliminary visual inspection by NGPA at the scene\nindicated the presence of a 50-foot-long longitudinal rupture in the body of the pipe at the\n1 o’clock position that propagated through one girth weld and arrested at the next\nupstream girth weld. The failed pipe section has been transported to a metallurgist in\nHouston, Texas, for failure analysis.\n• The cause of the failure is unknown and the investigation is ongoing.\n• The OE #1 pipeline transports gas from its origin station near the town of Fritch in\nHutchinson County, Texas, across portions of Southern Oklahoma to its end station near\nthe town of Bridgeport in Wise County, Texas. Its total length is approximately 256\nmiles and portions of the pipeline are routed near populated areas and cross numerous\nstate and local highways.\n• The 26-inch diameter OE #1 pipeline was constructed in 1957 of 0.250-inch wall\nthickness, grade X52 pipe with an electric flash welded (EFW) seam. It was\nmanufactured by A. O. Smith and has an asphalt enamel coating and an impressed-\ncurrent cathodic protection system.\n• The maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline is 720 psig. At the\ntime of the failure, the actual operating pressure of the pipeline was reported to be 688\npsig.\n• NGPA operates an interstate pipeline system consisting of approximately 9,800 miles of\npipeline and is the largest transporter of natural gas into the Chicago market.\n1\n1 Kinder Morgan, Inc., owns and operates a 20% interest in NGPA, while Myria Holdings, Inc., owns 80%.\nhttp://www.kindermorgan.com/business/gas_pipelines/central/NGPL/ (last visited June 11, 2012).\n\n\n\n3\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety (Associate Administrator) may issue a corrective action order after providing reasonable\nnotice and the opportunity for a hearing if he finds that a particular pipeline facility is or would\nbe hazardous to life, property, or the environment. The terms of such an order may include the\nsuspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement,\nor any other action as appropriate. The Associate Administrator may also issue a corrective\naction order without providing any notice or the opportunity for a hearing if he finds that a\nfailure to do so expeditiously will result in likely serious harm to life, property or the\nenvironment. The opportunity for a hearing is provided as soon as practicable after the issuance\nof the CAO in such cases.\nAfter evaluating the preliminary findings, I find that the continued operation of the OE #1\npipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.\nAdditionally, having considered the age of the pipe, the manufacture of the pipe, the\ncircumstances surrounding the failure, the proximity of the pipeline to populated areas and public\nroadways, the hazardous nature of the product being transported, the pressure required for\ntransporting the material, and the ongoing investigation to determine the cause of the failure, I\nfind that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would\nresult in likely serious harm to life, property, and the environment. Accordingly, this Corrective\nAction Order is being issued without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing and the terms and\nconditions are effective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held\ntelephonically or in-person in Houston, Texas.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, NGPA will receive notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the\nimposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Action\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, NGPA is ordered to immediately take the following corrective\nactions to ensure the safe operation of the 26-inch OE #1 pipeline:\n1. Develop and submit a written re-start plan for prior approval of the Director. Obtain\nwritten approval from the Director prior to resuming operation of the pipeline. The\nrestart plan must address all damage to the pipeline facilities caused by the June 6, 2012\nfailure. Additionally, the restart plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the pipeline\n\n\n\n4\nsegment during the restart process, must specify a daylight restart, and must specify\nadvance communications with local emergency response officials.\n2. After receiving approval from the Director to restart the pipeline, maintain a twenty\npercent (20%) pressure reduction in the operating pressure of the 26-inch Oklahoma\nExtension pipeline running from Compressor Station 111 (MP 1) to Compressor Station\n801 (MP 256). The operating pressure is not to exceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual\noperating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure. Submit the actual operating\npressures for each pump station on the pipeline at the time of failure and the reduced\ndischarge pressure limits for approval by the Director in the restart plan referenced in\nItem 1. This pressure reduction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits,\nsoftware programming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices\nto be adjusted accordingly. If the results of any action undertaken pursuant to this Order\nnecessitate a reduction in the operating pressure permitted by the Order, NGPA must\nfurther reduce the operating pressure accordingly and notify the Director. This pressure\nrestriction will remain in effect until written approval to increase the pressure or return\nthe pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the Director pursuant to\nItem 8.\n3. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete third-party mechanical and\nmetallurgical testing of the failed pipe, including analysis of soil samples and any foreign\nmaterials, and a root cause analysis of all factors that caused or contributed to the failure.\nComplete the testing and analysis as follows:\nA. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site;\nB. Use the testing protocol provided by PHMSA and submit the selection of the\ntesting laboratory to the Director for prior approval;\nC. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a PHMSA\nrepresentative to witness the testing; and\nD. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety\n(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same time as they\nare made available to Respondent.\n4. Within 90 days following completion of the testing and failure analysis required by Item\n3, submit an integrity verification and remedial work plan to the Director for approval.\nThe plan must provide for the verification of the integrity of the pipeline and must\naddress all factors known or suspected in the failure. The plan must include:\nA. Integration of the results of the testing and failure analysis performed pursuant to\nItem 3, with all relevant system data, including all historical repair information,\n\n\n\n5\nconstruction, operating, maintenance, testing, metallurgical analysis or other\nthird-party consultation information, and assessment data for the line segment.\nData-gathering activities must include a review of the failure history (including\nboth in-service and pressure test failures) of the pipeline and development of a\nwritten report containing all available information regarding locations, dates, and\ncauses of leaks and failures;\nB. The performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether and to what extent the conditions associated with the failure,\nor any other integrity-threatening conditions, are present elsewhere on the\npipeline. The additional testing and inspections must include consideration of a\nhydrostatic test of the section of OE #1 originating at Compressor Station 154 and\nending at the District 112 Station, additional in-line inspections, or other testing\nand inspections as appropriate to the cause of the failure. Include a detailed\ndescription of the criteria to be used for the evaluation and prioritization of any\nintegrity threats and anomalies that are identified;\nC. A detailed description of the inspection and repair criteria to be used in the\nevaluation and prioritization of identified integrity threats. This is to include a\ndescription of how any defects are to be graded and a schedule for repairs or\nreplacement;\nD. Provisions for continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\nmeasures, considering the results of the analyses, inspections, and corrective\nmeasures undertaken pursuant to this Order, to ensure the ongoing safe operation\nof the pipeline; and\nE. A proposed schedule for completion of the actions required by paragraphs A-D of\nthis Item.\n5. Upon approval by the Director, the integrity verification and remedial work plan becomes\nincorporated into this Order and must be revised as necessary to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever necessary to incorporate new\ninformation obtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities. Submit any\nsuch plan revisions to the Director for prior approval. The Director may approve plan\nelements incrementally.\n6. Implement the work plan as approved by the Director, including any revisions to the plan.\n7. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and results of\nthe testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress of the\nrepairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report for the\nperiod from June 6, 2012, through September 30, 2012, shall be due by October 31, 2012.\n\n\n\n6\n8. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction set forth\nin Item 2 upon receipt of a written request from Respondent demonstrating that the\nhazard has abated and that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure or\nestablished MAOP is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the\npressure increase is safe, considering all known defects, anomalies and operating\nparameters of the pipeline.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of this Order\nupon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an extension.\nWith respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the submission on\nspecified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d) disapprove, in\nwhole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the submission; or (e) any\ncombination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon conditions, or modification\nby the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all actions required by the submission as\napproved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any portion of the\nsubmission, Respondent shall correct all deficiencies within the time specified by the Director,\nand resubmit it for approval. If a resubmitted item is disapproved in whole or in part, the\nDirector may again require Respondent to correct the deficiencies in accordance with the\nforegoing procedure, and the Director may otherwise proceed to enforce the terms of this Order.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), you must provide, along with the complete original\ndocument, a second copy of the document with those portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted, along with an explanation of why you believe the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 4-2012-1011H” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The\nactions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any other order\nissued to NGPA under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of\nFederal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator, whose\ndecision will be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\n\n\n\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n__________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n7","truncated":false,"body_characters":37840}