{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420125010","title":"MAGELLAN PIPELINE COMPANY, LP — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-03-23","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.406(a), 195.406(b), 195.410, 195.430, 195.432, 195.567(b), 195.571, 195.573(c), 195.573(d), 195.575(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420125010.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420125010.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420125010","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420125010","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving MAGELLAN PIPELINE COMPANY, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.406(a),  195.406(b),  195.410,  195.430,  195.432,  195.567(b),  195.571,  195.573(c),  195.573(d),  195.575(a). The case was opened on 2012-03-23 and is reported as closed as of 2016-03-04. Proposed civil penalty: $149,800. Assessed civil penalty: $149,800. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420125010_Closure Letter_03042016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420125010/420125010_Closure%20Letter_03042016.pdf\n\n420125010_Closure Letter_03042016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420125010/420125010_Closure%20Letter_03042016_text.pdf\n\n420125010_Final Order_09022014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420125010/420125010_Final%20Order_09022014.pdf\n\n420125010_Final Order_09022014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420125010/420125010_Final%20Order_09022014_text.pdf\n\n420125010_NOPV PCP PCO_03232012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420125010/420125010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03232012.pdf\n\n420125010_NOPV PCP PCO_03232012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420125010/420125010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03232012_text.pdf\n\n420125010_Operator_Response_and_Request_for_Hearing_04272012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420125010/420125010_Operator_Response_and_Request_for_Hearing_04272012.pdf\n\n420125010_NOPV PCP PCO_03232012_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMarch 23, 2012\nMr. Larry Davied\nVice President, Technical Services\nMagellan Pipeline Company\nOne Williams Center\nTulsa, OK 74172\nCPF 4-2012-5010\nDear Mr. Davied:\nBetween March 22, 2010 and April 22, 2011, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code\nwere on site and inspected your operations and maintenance procedures and ten pipeline\ninspection units in Oklahoma and Texas.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the\nprobable violation(s) are:\n1. 195.575 Which facilities must I electrically isolate and what inspections, tests, and\nsafeguards are required?\n(a) You must electrically isolate each buried or submerged pipeline from other\nmetallic structures, unless you electrically interconnect and cathodically protect the\npipeline and the other structures as a single unit. (b) You must install one or more\ninsulating devices where electrical isolation of a portion of a pipeline is necessary to\nfacilitate the application of corrosion control. (c) You must inspect and electrically\n\n\n\ntest each electrical isolation to assure the isolation is adequate. (d) If you install an\ninsulating device in an area where a combustible atmosphere is reasonable to\nforesee, you must take precautions to prevent arcing. (e) If a pipeline is in close\nproximity to electrical transmission tower footings, ground cables, or counterpoise,\nor in other areas where it is reasonable to foresee fault currents or an unusual risk\nof lightning, you must protect the pipeline against damage from fault currents or\nlightning and take protective measures at insulating devices.\nMagellan (the Operator) failed to isolate each buried pipeline from other metallic structures as\nrequired by §195.575 and confirmed in the written procedures required under §195.402. As\ndiscussed below, the Operator has both metallically and electrolytically shorted casings in the\nunits inspected (including Longhorn, Duncan to Ft. Smith, Cimarron Pipeline, Orion West,\nOklahoma City, and Tulsa) and has not consistently taken measures to achieve electrical\nisolation between the casings and carrier pipes.\nMetallically shorted casings are addressed by Magellan Corrosion Control Program procedures,\n7.04-ADM-001, Section 2.9.4, which states that metallically shorted casings require actions\nwhen the casing potential is within 100 millivolts of the carrier pipe. Magellan’s annual surveys\nof pipe-to-soil and casing-to-soil readings show some casing-to-soil readings taken at the same\ntest station or a nearby test station to be within 100 mV of the pipe-to-soil readings. According\nto Magellan records, testing performed by the Operator has confirmed that some of these casings\nare metallically shorted but actions have not been taken to achieve the electrical isolation\nrequired to comply with the requirements of 195.575. In addition, the Operator has not followed\nits procedures to clear the short or fill the casing annulus with dielectric material for each\nmetallically shorted casing.\nA sample of the Magellan annual cathodic protection survey records, included as evidence, show\nthe inspection date, the name of the pipeline segment, the milepost, a description of the location,\nthe pipe-to-soil and casing-to-soil readings in volts and the casing status. Some examples in the\nMagellan records with casing-to-soil reading within 100 mV of the pipe-to-soil reading,\nindicating the potential for the casing to be metallically shorted, include the following:\nSegment Name MP/Station Year(s) Comments\nPonca City to Barnsdall 22+24 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 (2009) P/S -2.175V, C/S -2.181V\nEnid to Oklahoma City 74+06 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 (2009) P/S -1.612V, C/S -1.602V\nAllen to Drumright 16+27 20072, 20082, 20091 (2009) P/S -0.926V, C/S -0.844V\nTulsa Jct. to Kansas St. Line 119.223 20053,20064,20074,20084,20094 (2009) P/S -1.620V, C/S -1.617V\nBarnsdall to Kansas City #3-8 1+06 20052, 20072, 20084, 20092 (2008) P/S -1.205V, C/S -1.109V\nWest Tulsa to Glenpool 4.38 20054,20064,20074,20084,20091 (2009) P/S -0.901V, C/S -0.900V\nWest Tulsa to Glenpool 4.58 20054,20064,20074,20084,20091 (2009) P/S -0.943V, C/S -0.930V\nClyde to DeLeon 156.302 2010 P/S -1.127V, C/S -1.124V\n1 Casing-to-soil within 100 mV of pipe-to-soil but shown in Magellan records to be clear.\n2 >100 mV difference and shown in Magellan records as electrolytically shorted.\n3 Casing-to-soil within 100 mV of pipe-to-soil and shown in Magellan records to be metallically shorted.\n4 Casing-to-soil within 100 mV of pipe-to-soil and shown in Magellan records to be electrolytically shorted.\nThe Magellan records show casing status test designations using “C” for clear (not shorted), “E”\nfor electrolytically shorted, “S” for metallically shorted, and “I” for inhibited (the annulus of the\ncasing has been filled with a dielectric material). These designations have sometimes changed2\n\n\n\nfrom year to year between metallically shorted, electrolytically shorted, and clear. For example,\nthe shorted casing at station 22+24 on the Ponca City to Barnsdall segment was designated to be\nmetallically shorted (S) as early as 2005, was changed to electrolytically shorted (E) in 2006,\nthen back to metallically shorted (S) in 2007, 2008, and 2009. The operator does not explain\nthese inconsistencies.\nResearch on corrosion of cased pipes supports the need to achieve electrical isolation between\nthe carrier pipe and casing and a discussion is provided in the associated Violation Report.\nMagellan does not have a procedure specifically addressing the issue of electrolytically shorted\ncasings, but the records indicate that the Operator has recognized the issue given the many\ncasings in their records designated to be electrolytically shorted. The records, however, do not\nindicate the operator has taken consistent actions to address these electrolytic shorts and achieve\nelectrical isolation as required by 195.575. Out of the many shorted casings (electrolytically) on\nthe Magellan system where the casing-to-soil readings are not within 100 mV of the pipe-to-soil\nreadings some specific examples are as follows:\nSegment Name MP/Station Year(s) Comments\nPonca City to Barnsdall 0+04,44+22,52+08 20051,20061,2007,2008,2009 (00+04,2009) P/S -1.395V,C/S -1.102V\nEnid to Oklahoma City 69+14,80+26 20062,20072,2008,2009 (69+14,2009) P/S -1.271V,C/S -1.062V\nAllen to Drumright 68+25,69+16,75+15 2007,2008,2009 (68+25,2009) P/S-1.692V, C/S -1.466V\nTulsa Jct. to Kansas St. Line 110.878,151.557 20053,2006,2007,2008,20091 (110.87,2009) P/S-1.519V,C/S -0.992V\nBarnsdall to Kansas City (#3-8) 29+44 2006,2007,2008,2009 (2009) P/S -1.791V, C/S -0.953V\nCushing to Drumright 8+15 2006,2007,2008,2009,2010 (2010) P/S -1.457V, C/S -1.177V\nDrumright to Tulsa 0+24, 28+40, 32+29 20055,20061,20074,20084,2009 (2009,0+24) P/S -1.349V, C/S -0.896V\nConcord to East Houston 170.6 2006,2007,2008,2009,2010 (2010) P/S -1.171V, C/S -1171V\nClyde to DeLeon 187.200 2010 P/S -1.201V, C/S -0.972V\n1 Casing(s) designated as clear even though casing-to-soil reading is significantly more electronegative than native steel in soil.\n2 Casing at 80+26 designated as clear.\n3 Casing at 110.878 designated as metallically shorted.\n4 Casing at 32+29 designated as clear.\n5 Casings at 0+24 designated as clear even though casing-to-soil reading is significantly more electronegative than native steel in soil.\nNone of the casings were intentionally bonded to the carrier pipe or connected to the cathodic\nprotection system to cathodically protect the casings. Therefore, it was not the intent of the\nOperator to protect the pipe and casing as a unit. In addition, no records were presented\ndocumenting the installation of galvanic anodes to cathodically protect the casings which could\nresult in elevated casing-to-soil readings.\n2. 195.410 Line Markers.\n(1) Markers must be located at each public road crossing, at each railroad crossing,\nand in sufficient number along the remainder of each buried line so that its location\nis accurately known. (c) Each operator shall provide line marking at locations\nwhere the line is above ground in areas that are accessible to the public.\nThe Operator did not meet the requirements of §195.410 by placing a sufficient number of\nmarkers along the buried pipeline so that its location is accurately known. Magellan also did not\nfollow its “Pipeline Marking Procedure, 7.05-ADM-002, pages 1-5 of 5” dated January 1, 2010\n3\n\n\n\nregarding its criteria to “Effectively delineate the pipeline corridor.” This procedure also states\nthat “Markers must be placed and maintained over each buried pipeline at the following\nlocations: 3.3.4 in sufficient numbers along the remainder of each buried line so that its location\nis accurately known.”\nDuring the field inspection there were locations on the Magellan pipeline system where there\nwere an inadequate number of pipeline markers in order to accurately know the location of the\npipeline, even when turning 360 degrees. At each of the sites listed below and by walking in\nvarious directions from each of the specific known pipeline locations identified by the operator,\nit was impossible to ascertain with any certainty the ongoing pipeline path through the further\nobservation of pipeline markers that would accurately show the location of the pipeline.\nLocations where there were inadequate pipeline markers include segments in the Barnsdall,\nTulsa, Oklahoma City, Odessa to El Paso, and Cimarron inspection units. Some examples are\nincluded in the following table:\nDate Unit Pipeline Segment Approximate Location Comments\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line Oologah, OK near Road E0390 Pipeline near house, apt. bldg.\n09/24/2010 Oklahoma City Allen to Drumright County Road 3261 near 81+05 Pipeline near corral, residence\n09/28/2010 Oklahoma City Wynnewood to OKC County road crossing near MP 11 Pipeline near residence\n09/21/2010 Oklahoma City Tulsa to Drumright 56th Street near 26+48\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 138 Near Oologah Lake block valve\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 148\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 144 Near old Alluwe Station site\n05/11/2010 Duncan-Ft. Smith Duncan to Ft. Smith ROW near 94+07 Near east end of Sander Road\n05/11/2010 Duncan-Ft. Smith Duncan to Ft. Smith ROW near 128+96 Near county road crossing\n05/11/2010 Duncan-Ft. Smith Duncan to Ft. Smith ROW near 142+31 Near Massey Point gate valve\n05/11/2010 Duncan-Ft. Smith Duncan to Ft. Smith ROW near 199+32 Near Havener gate valve\n05/11/2010 Duncan-Ft. Smith Duncan to Ft. Smith ROW near MP 201 Near Spiro rectifier\n05/14/2010 Duncan-Ft. Smith Duncan to Ft. Smith ROW near 213+21 Near RR x-ing\n06/09/2010 Orion West Frost to Odessa ROW near MP 310 Near Frost Station\n06/09/2010 Orion West Frost to Odessa ROW near MP 202 Near Highway 8 crossing\n06/09/2010 Orion West Frost to Odessa ROW near MP 174\n06/09/2010 Orion West Frost to Odessa ROW near MP 163 Near county road 483\n06/09/2010 Orion West Frost to Odessa ROW near MP 162 Near state highway 283\n06/09/2010 Orion West Frost to Odessa ROW near MP 73 Near Colorado River crossing\n06/10/2010 Orion West Frost to Odessa ROW near MP 72 Near Colorado River crossing\n07/27/2010 Odessa-El Paso Odessa to El Paso ROW near MP 44\n07/27/2010 Odessa-El Paso Odessa to El Paso ROW near MP 46 Damaged marker\n07/27/2010 Odessa-El Paso Odessa to El Paso ROW near MP 61 Damaged marker\n07/27/2010 Odessa-El Paso Odessa to El Paso ROW near rectifier E-8 Near 355+00\n07/29/2010 Odessa-El Paso Odessa to El Paso ROW near rectifier E-40 Near 11208+95\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 168 Near Highway 10 crossing\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 158 Near county road crossing\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 147\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 139\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 130\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 118 Pipeline near residence\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near 49th Street North\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to State Line ROW near MP 105 Near Million Dollar Casino\n08/10/2010 Tulsa Glenpool to W. Tulsa ROW near MP 10\n08/11/2010 Tulsa Glenpool to W. Tulsa ROW near MP 2 Old Koch tie-in\n09/21/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to Drumright 56th Street area\n09/21/2010 Tulsa Tulsa to Drumright MP 19 area\n09/23/2010 Oklahoma City OKC to Wynnewood MP 34 area\n09/23/2010 Oklahoma City OKC to Wynnewood Wynnewood tank farm area\n09/23/2010 Oklahoma City Allen to Drumright ROW near 1+42\n09/24/2010 Oklahoma City Allen to Drumright MP 74 area\n4\n\n\n\n09/24/2010 Oklahoma City Allen to Drumright MP 40 area County road 108\n09/24/2010 Oklahoma City Allen to Drumright MP 29 area\n10/05/2010 Cimarron Crude Glenpool to Tulsa MP 3 area\n10/05/2010 Cimarron Crude Glenpool to Tulsa South I-44 and railroad tracks\n3. 195.567 Which pipelines must have test leads and what must I do to install and\nmaintain the leads?\n(b) Installation. You must install test leads as follows: (1) Locate the leads at\nintervals frequent enough to obtain electrical measurements indicating the\nadequacy of cathodic protection.\n(c) Maintenance. You must maintain the test lead wires in a condition that enables\nyou to obtain electrical measurements to determine whether cathodic protection\ncomplies with §195.571.\nMagellan failed to maintain its test lead wires in a condition that enabled Magellan to obtain\nelectrical measurements to determine whether cathodic protection complies with §195.571.\nDuring the field inspection, Magellan was observed to have cathodic protection test stations\nlisted in their records as annual test points that were damaged but had not yet been repaired so\nthat electrical measurements to determine the adequacy of cathodic protection could be made.\nFor example:\n• The test station on the Wynnewood to Allen segment of the Duncan to Ft. Smith\n12-inch and 10-inch pipeline located on Racetrack Road north of County Road\n357 was destroyed and had not been repaired at the time of the inspection.\n• The test station at 7705+00 on the Black river to Hueco segment of the Odessa to\nEl Paso pipeline had been destroyed and not repaired at the time of the inspection.\n• The test station on the Cimarron pipeline near County Road 4804 read -707mV at\nthe time of the inspection and the analysis performed by the corrosion technician\nindicated that the test leads may not have been solidly connected to the pipe.\nThese actions also show that the Operator failed to follow its procedure for installing and\nmaintaining test leads as required in their procedure titled “Corrosion Control Program, 7.04-\nADM-001, pages 1-21 of 21, dated January 1, 2010, section 2.10 Test Leads 195.567, 192.460,\nand 192.471.”\n4. 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.\n(a) Except for surge pressures and other variations from normal operations, no\noperator may operate a pipeline at a pressure that exceeds any of the following: (1)\nThe internal design pressure of the pipe determined in accordance with §195.106.\nHowever, for steel pipe in pipelines being converted under §195.5, if one or more\nfactors of the design formula (§195.106) are unknown, one of the following pressures\n5\n\n\n\nis to be used as design pressure: (i) Eighty percent of the first test pressure that\nproduces yield under section N5.0 of Appendix N of ASME B31.8, reduced by the\nappropriate factors in §§195.106(a) and (e); or (ii) If the pipe is 323.8 mm (12¾ in)\nor less outside diameter and is not tested to yield under this paragraph, 1379 kPa\n(200 psig). (2) The design pressure of any other component of the pipeline. (3)\nEighty percent of the test pressure for any part of the pipeline which has been\npressure tested under Subpart E of this part. (4) Eighty percent of the factory test\npressure or of the prototype test pressure for any individually installed component\nwhich is excepted from testing under §195.305. (5) For pipelines under\n§§195.302(b)(1) and (b)(2)(i), that have not been pressure tested under Subpart E of\nthis part, 80 percent of the test pressure or highest operating pressure to which the\npipeline was subjected for 4 or more continuous hours that can be demonstrated by\nrecording charts or logs made at the time the test or operations were conducted.\n(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges or other\nvariations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the operating pressure\nlimit established under paragraph (a) of this section. Each operator must provide\nadequate controls and protective equipment to control the pressure within this limit.\nMagellan has allowed pipeline pressures to exceed the maximum operating pressure in violation\nof the requirements in §195.406. Specifically, according to records submitted by the Operator in\nresponse to the PHMSA March 3, 2011, Request for Specific Information, Magellan has allowed\ntheir pipeline system to exceed the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) for ten (10) minutes, or\nlonger, seventeen (17) times since 2007. Magellan states that it is standard practice per their\nSystem Integrity Plan procedure 13.01-ADM-008, Abnormal Operating Conditions List, to alarm\nas an abnormal operating condition when exceeding MOP on a ten minute basis. However,\nallowing the pressure to remain over the MOP for ten minutes is not consistent with a reasonable\ndefinition of surge pressure.\nAnother issue involving an overpressure situation occurred when the Magellan control center\nreceived an alarm indicating that the MOP +110% had been exceeded at the Ponca City facility.\nThe Operator determined that a pressure relief valve had been incorrectly set at 1,440 psig for a\npipeline with a MOP of 480 psig. A Magellan technician also found during an inspection at the\nSooner Road facility that the numbered tags identifying the pressure relief devices did not match\nthe numbers on the Pipeline and Instrumentation Drawing (P&ID). In addition to showing the\nconfiguration of the piping, valves, and relief devices, the P&ID ties the MOP of the pipeline\nsegment to the relief valve so that the correct settings can be established. Incorrect tagging may\nresult in incorrect setpoints for the pressure relief devices.\nMagellan records also show that at the Drumright facility the overpressure devices were set to\nactivate at pressures higher than the designated pressure on the inspection form (07-FORM-\n0741). For example, the inspection form indicates that device MLMF-0033 on the East Pig\nBypass should be set to activate at a pressure of 1,050 psig. However, on September 24, 2009,\nthe pressure was set at 1,448 psig. Another example is device UNT2-0012 was set to activate at\n6\n\n\n\n809 psig but the maximum pressure indicated on the form is 800 psig. The inspection form for\nthe Oklahoma City Reno facility shows that device PSV-1221 was found to be set to relieve at\n500 psig but the maximum pressure is 305 psig. Improperly setting the relief device pressures\nmay allow an overpressure condition and could result in a failure of the pipeline facilities.\n5. 195.402(a) Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be\nreviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,\nand appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.\nThis manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and maintenance\nactivities are conducted.\nMagellan failed to follow its Inspection of Right-of-way Procedure, 7.05-ADM-006, which\nrequires the Operator to identify activity along the right-of-way that could, if not corrected, pose\na hazard or compromise the safety, integrity or operation of pipelines and right-of-way.\nSpecifically, several encroachments were observed during the field inspection with large\nquantities of junk on the right-of-way (abandoned trucks and cars, and oil storage tanks) in West\nTulsa and near Drumright, OK. While barn construction predates the Magellan acquisition of the\npipeline, there are other indications of encroachment and overgrowth indicating Magellan is not\nfollowing its Inspection of Right-of-way Procedure for identifying conditions on the pipeline\nright-of-way that could pose a hazard or compromise safety.\nSpecific locations where problems were found related to encroachment activities found on or adjacent to the pipeline\nROW include:\n1. Sandler Road, tank on the ROW\n2. Race Track Road, encroachment of equipment on the ROW\n3. County Road 145, barn on the ROW\n4. Commercial business wareyard on the ROW\n5. Cushing 8”, truck and storage facilities encroaching on the ROW\n6. Cushing 8”, oil field debris on the ROW\n7. Wynnewood 12”, metal debris on the ROW\n8. Cushing to Glenpool, abandoned vehicles on the ROW\n9. West Tulsa Area, miscellaneous materials in yard over ROW\n10. Tulsa to Drumright 8”, facility encroachment on the ROW\nMajor overgrowth which obscured the ROW was found at the following locations identified as follows:\n1. 39th street\n2. Caney River\n3. 49th street\n4. Glenpool to PSO\n5. Glenpool to West Tulsa\n7\n\n\n\n6. South Ok City\n7. Allen to Drumright 8”, MP68\n6. 195.402(a) Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be\nreviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,\nand appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.\nThis manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and maintenance\nactivities are conducted.\nMagellan did not install pipeline markers where the pipe is to remain exposed as specified by its\nprocedures, Corrosion Control Program, 7.04-ADM-001, 2.11.4. The Magellan procedures state\nthat if the pipe is to remain exposed, proper pipeline markers shall be installed. During the field\ninspection exposures were observed without pipeline markers and without stated plans for\nreburial. The Operator was found to have unmarked exposures on the Glenpool to West Tulsa,\nTulsa to Drumright, Drumright to Cushing, Cushing to Glenpool, Barnsdall to El Dorado, and\nOdessa to El Paso pipelines.\n7. 195.571 What criteria must I use to determine the adequacy of cathodic protection?\nCathodic protection required by this subpart must comply with one or more of the\napplicable criteria and other considerations for cathodic protection contained in\nparagraphs 6.2 and 6.3 of NACE Standard RP 0169 (incorporated by reference, see\n§195.3).\nMagellan did not meet one of the applicable cathodic protection criteria required by §195.571 for\nportions of its pipeline system. With regard to §195.571, the Operator was unable to adequately\nshow how IR drop is considered in the pipe-to-soil readings as required by the referenced\nstandard (NACE RP 0169). Magellan also did not follow its Corrosion Control Program\nprocedure, 7.04-ADM-001, Sections 2.3 and 2.4. During the field portion of the inspection,\nsome pipe-to-soil readings were not meeting the criterion chosen by the Operator for determining\nthe adequacy of the cathodic protection. Examples of inadequate readings were found on the\nCimarron 8-inch pipeline at MP 53 (-683mV), MP 54 (-768mV), MP 61 (-696mV), MP 71 (-\n707mv), the Odessa to El Paso pipeline at 9899+72 (-700mV), 9700+19 (-771mV), 9747+19 (-\n500mV), 10123+95 (-500mV), 10264+00 (-654mV), the Cushing to Oklahoma City pipeline at\nMP 30.5 (-781mV), MP 0.7 (-817mV), the Glenpool to PSO pipeline at MP 16.7 (-822mV), the\nTulsa to State Line pipeline at MP 110.5 (-500mV), MP 128.4 (-746mV).\n8. 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n8\n\n\n\n(d) Breakout tanks. You must inspect each cathodic protection system used to\ncontrol corrosion on the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank to ensure that\noperation and maintenance of the system are in accordance with API Recommended\nPractice 651. However, this inspection is not required if you note in the corrosion\ncontrol procedures established under §195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or\ncertain operation and maintenance provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is\nnot necessary for the safety of the tank.\nMagellan did not meet one of the applicable cathodic protection criteria required by §195.573 for\nsome breakout tanks. For the breakout tanks not meeting the cathodic protection requirements,\nthe operator has not demonstrated why compliance with API 651 is unnecessary as required by\n§195.573. Magellan also did not follow its Corrosion Control Program procedure, 7.04-ADM-\n001, Sections 2.3 and 2.4. During the field portion of the inspection, some tank-to-soil readings\nwere not meeting the criterion chosen by the Operator for determining the adequacy of the\ncathodic protection. With regard to §195.573, structure-to-soil readings for breakout tanks 533,\n535, and 868 in Oklahoma City were found to not meet the criterion chosen by the operator.\n9. 195.573 What must I do to monitor atmospheric corrosion control?\n(c) If you find atmospheric corrosion during an inspection, you must provide\nprotection against the corrosion as required by Sec. 195.581.\nMagellan failed to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion as required by §195.581.\nThe operator also did not follow its Corrosion Control Program procedure, 7.04-ADM-001,\nSection 3.0. There were areas of oxidation observed on the chime area of some breakout tanks,\nabove ground valves and piping, flange bolts, pipe/soil interfaces, and spans at various locations\non the Magellan Pipeline System. Evidence includes photographs taken during the field inspection.\nThese photographs indicate ongoing atmospheric corrosion at the following locations:\n1. Allen Station Breakout Tank (BOT) 880\n2. Barnsdale BOT 1214\n3. Barnsdale BOT 416\n4. Barnsdale BOT 729\n5. Barnsdale BOT 730\n6. Enid BOT 1231\n7. Enid BOT 1232\n8. Enid BOT 1238\n9. Odessa BOT 574\n10. Odessa piping\n11. Odessa BOT 586\n12. Odessa BOT 225\n13. Odessa BOT 228\n14. Odessa BOT 229\n15. Line #1, 8” MP 21\n16. P/S Interface on Old Tulsa line\n9\n\n\n\n17. Orion West Unit\n18. Orion West MP 312\n19. Pipeline span near Black River Station\n20. Glenpool to West Tulsa\n21. MLV @ MP 21\n22. Pipeline Span @ MP 46\n10. 195.430 Firefighting equipment.\nEach operator shall maintain adequate firefighting equipment at each pump station\nand breakout tank area. The equipment must be-\n(a) In proper operating condition at all times;\n(b) Plainly marked so that its identity as firefighting equipment is clear; and,\n(c) Located so that it is easily accessible during a fire.\nMagellan does not maintain adequate firefighting equipment at each pump station and breakout\ntank area. The Operator has only fire extinguishers at most pump stations and breakout tank\nareas as required under its Portable Fire Extinguishers Administrative Procedure, 5.05-ADM-\n076, which states that “equipment shall be adequate to extinguish fires that are in the early stages\nof development and in no case shall be expected to fight a fully engulfed fire.” The Operator\nrelies on public firefighting agencies or firefighting cooperatives to respond to fires at their\nbreakout facilities. However, liaison documentation is not adequate to show that Magellan has\nconfirmed that these agencies have adequate training, equipment, and supplies to respond to fires\nat their pump stations and breakout tank areas.\n11. 195.432 Inspection of in-service breakout tanks.\n(a) Except for breakout tanks inspected under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,\neach operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each\ncalendar year, inspect each in-service breakout tank.\n(b) Each operator must inspect the physical integrity of in-service atmospheric and\nlow-pressure steel aboveground breakout tanks according to API Standard 653\n(incorporated by reference, see §195.3). However, if structural conditions prevent\naccess to the tank bottom, the bottom integrity may be assessed according to a plan\nincluded in the operations and maintenance manual under §195.402(c)(3).\nThe Magellan breakout tank inspection program and methodology to establish in-service and\nout-of-service inspections does not meet the requirements for a risk-based inspection process\ndefined by API 653, incorporated into Part 195 by reference. Specifically, the Magellan Tank\nIntegrity Risk Based Inspection Procedure, 7.10-ADM-013, does not adequately incorporate\nsome of the factors in the referenced version of API 653, including the materials of construction,\nthe as-built standard, the accuracy and completeness of determining bottom plate thickness, the\nmethods used to determine the product side and soil side corrosion rates and accuracy of the\n10\n\n\n\nmethods, the availability, accuracy and need for leak detection, the effectiveness of corrosion\nmitigation measures, and the quality of maintenance including previous repairs. Magellan\npersonnel administering the risk-based program do not have formal training in risk-based\ninspection methodology and no records showing initial and subsequent assessments of the\nprogram by an authorized inspector and tank engineer were presented. Also, the Magellan\nroutine breakout tank inspections failed to identify issues that should be addressed by the\nOperator’s breakout tank maintenance program such as plugged telltale holes, corrosion near the\nfloor to shell weld, corrosion of the extension, soil or gravel covering the extension, corrosion\naround the perimeter of the reinforcing plates, cracked foundations supporting equipment and\npiping connected to the tanks, incomplete records of construction and repairs, and documentation\nthat API 653 inspection recommended repairs were evaluated and completed or determined by\nthe operator to not be needed.\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000\nfor each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and\nsupporting documentation involved in the above probable violation(s) and has recommended that\nyou be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $149,800 as follows:\nItem number PENALTY\n2 $ 61,500\n4 $ 55,400\n5 $ 32,900\nWarning Items\nWith respect to item(s) 3, and 6 through 11 we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting\ndocuments involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action\nor penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly correct these item(s).\nBe advised that failure to do so may result in Magellan Pipeline Company being subject to\nadditional enforcement action.\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to item(s) 1, 2, 4, and 5, pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to\nMagellan Pipeline Company. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed\nand made a part of this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators\nin Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you11\n\n\n\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30 days\nof receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in\nthis Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 4-2012-5010 and for each document\nyou submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n12\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Magellan Pipeline Company a Compliance Order\nincorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Magellan\nPipeline Company with the pipeline safety regulations:\n1. In regard to Item Number 1 of the Notice pertaining to electrical isolation where Magellan failed\nto address metallically and electrolytically shorted casings, the Operator must perform tests to\ndetermine if each casing is metallically or electrolytically shorted. If a casing is determined to be\nmetallically or electrolytically shorted, the Operator must evaluate any existing ILI data to\ndetermine if there are metal loss indications and make any required repairs to the carrier pipe. If\nno ILI data is available from studies made within the past five years, Magellan must perform\nstudies using ILI or an alternative technology to determine for each casing if there is metal loss\nrequiring repairs. The Operator must also clear the shorts, purge the casings of electrolyte, and\nreplace the end seals as described in NACE SP0200. The Operator must also develop a\nprocedure that specifically addresses the issue of electrolytically shorted casings.\n2. In regard to Item Number 2 of the Notice pertaining to line markers where Magellan failed to\nadequately mark its pipeline, the Operator must install additional line markers in the Barnsdall,\nTulsa, Oklahoma City, Odessa to El Paso, and Cimarron inspection units so that the location of\nthe pipeline is accurately known as required by 195.410.\n3. In regard to Item Number 4 of the Notice pertaining to maximum operating pressure where\nMagellan allowed the pipeline pressure to exceed the MOP for durations longer than indicated by\na surge event, the Operator must review the design of its overpressure protection and make\nchanges necessary to prevent recurrence. Magellan must also perform a review of the MOP’s for\neach pipeline segment, check the setpoints of each overpressure device, ensure each overpressure\ndevice is correctly tagged, and check each inspection form to ensure the tag numbers, maximum\npressures, and setpoints are all correct.\n4. In regard to Item Number 5 of the Notice pertaining to patrolling the rights-of-way where\nMagellan failed to identify activity along the right-of-way that could, if not corrected, pose a\nhazard or compromise the safety, integrity or operation of pipelines and right-of-way specified\nby its inspection of right-of-way procedure. The Operator also failed to remedy overgrowth that\nprevents the inspection of the surface condition on or adjacent to the pipeline right-of-way, also\nas specified by its right-of-way procedure. Magellan must make modifications to its patrolling\npractices to ensure that its procedures are followed. The Operator must also remedy existing\nencroachments that impair observation of the right-of-way and safety of the pipeline system.\nThe operator must also perform maintenance on areas of the right-of-way that are obscured by\nvegetation.\n5. Magellan must complete all items within 180 days following receipt of the Final Order.\n13\n\n\n\n6. It is requested (not mandated) that Magellan Pipeline Company maintain documentation of the\nsafety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to\nR. M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total cost\nassociated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost\nassociated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\n14\n\n420125010_Final Order_09022014_text.pdf\n\nSEPTEMBER 2, 2014\nMr. Michael N. Mears\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nMagellan Midstream Partners, LP\nMagellan Pipeline Company, LP\nOne Williams Center\nTulsa, OK 74172\nRe: CPF No. 4-2012-5010\nDear Mr. Mears:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a civil penalty of $149,800, and specifies corrective action that must be\ncompleted. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty\nhas been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director,\nSouthwest Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order is made\npursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. R.M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\nMs. Bizunesh Scott, Steptoe & Johnson LLP\n1330 Connecticut Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n___________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nMagellan Pipeline Company, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2012-5010\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\nFINAL ORDER\nBetween March 22, 2010, and April 22, 2011, pursuant ","truncated":true,"body_characters":99596}