{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420131010","title":"ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-06-17","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 191.15(a), 191.17(a), 191.5(a), 192.463(a), 192.491(c), 192.605(a), 192.605(b)(8), 192.805(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131010.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131010.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131010","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420131010","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 191.15(a),  191.17(a),  191.5(a),  192.463(a),  192.491(c),  192.605(a),  192.605(b)(8),  192.805(a). The case was opened on 2013-06-17 and is reported as closed as of 2015-12-29. Proposed civil penalty: $137,200. Assessed civil penalty: $131,600. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420131010_Closure Letter_12292015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Closure%20Letter_12292015.pdf\n\n420131010_Closure Letter_12292015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Closure%20Letter_12292015_text.pdf\n\n420131010_Final Order_09022014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Final%20Order_09022014.pdf\n\n420131010_Final Order_09022014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Final%20Order_09022014_text.pdf\n\n420131010_NOPV PCP PCO_06172013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_06172013.pdf\n\n420131010_NOPV PCP PCO_06172013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_06172013_text.pdf\n\n420131010_Operator Response to Notice and Request for Time Extension_07172013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Request%20for%20Time%20Extension_07172013.pdf\n\n420131010_Operator Response to Notice_09182013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_09182013.pdf\n\n420131010_Closure Letter_12292015_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nDecember 29, 2015\nMr. Paul Brewer\nSenior VP Operations and EH&S\nEnable Gas Transmission, LLC\nEnable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC\nOne Leadership Square\n211 N Robinson Ave., Suite 150\nOklahoma City, OK 73102\nCPF 4-2013-1010\nDear Mr. Brewer:\nFrom January 30 through October 19, 2012, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code inspected the Enable\nGas Transmission, LLC/Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC (Enable) procedures/records for\nOperations and Maintenance, Integrity Management, Emergency Response, Operator Qualification, and\nConstruction Specifications in Shreveport, LA. As a result of the inspection, Enable was issued a Notice\nof Probable Violation, Probable Civil Penalty, and Probable Compliance Order on June 17, 2013.\nOn May 29, 2015 Enable submitted a response to the Final Order. Enable provided the requested\ndocumentation and completed the Compliance Order Items on December 7, 2015. The penalty payment\nwas made on September 26, 2014. My staff reviewed the submitted documentation, and it appears that the\ninadequacies outlined in the Notice of Probable Violation have been corrected.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you for your\ncooperation.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n420131010_Final Order_09022014_text.pdf\n\nSEPTEMBER 2, 2014\nMr. Scott Prochazka\nPresident\nCenterpoint Energy, Inc.\n1111 Louisiana Street\nHouston, Texas 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2013-1010\nDear Mr. Prochazka:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $131,600, issues warnings, and specifies actions\nthat need to be taken by Enable Gas Transmission, LLC, and Enable Mississippi River\nTransmission, LLC, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms\nare set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the\ncompliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement\naction will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the\ndate of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Chris Bullock, Enable Midstream Partners, Midstream Pipeline Safety,\n525 Milam St., Shreveport, Louisiana 71101\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nEnable Gas Transmission, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2013-1010\nand )\nEnable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC, )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nRespondents. )\n____________________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nBetween January 30 and October 19, 2012, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of CenterPoint\nEnergy Gas Transmission Company, LLC (now Enable Gas Transmission, LLC), and\nMississippi River Transmission Company (now Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC) in\nShreveport, Louisiana.\n1 Both companies (EGT/MRT or Respondents) are indirect, wholly-\nowned interstate pipeline subsidiaries of Enable Midstream Partners, LP, and together operate\nmore than 8,000 miles of interstate pipe located in Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,\nMississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas, as well as six storage facilities.2 Enable\nMidstream Partners, LP, is a subsidiary of Centerpoint Energy, Inc.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondents, by letter dated June 17, 2013, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that EGT/MRT had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Parts 191\nand 192 and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $137,200 for the alleged violations. The\nNotice also proposed ordering Respondents to take certain measures to correct the alleged\n1 Subsequent to the issuance of the Notice and effective July 30, 2013, CenterPoint Energy – Mississippi River\nTransmission, LLC, changed its name to Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC. On the same date,\nCenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company, LLC, changed its name to Enable Gas Transmission, LLC. A\nresponse to the Notice was filed in this proceeding by Enable Midstream Partners, LP, on behalf of both companies.\nSee Response, at 1. Enable Midstream Partners, LP, is a subsidiary of Centerpoint Energy, Inc.\nhttp://www.centerpointenergy.com/services/pipelines/egt/ (last accessed on April 18, 2014).\n2 http://www.centerpointenergy.com/services/pipelines/egt/ (last accessed on April 18, 2014).\n\n\n\n2\nviolations.\nOn July 17, 2013, EGT/MRT requested a 60-day extension to submit their response to PHMSA\nand it was granted. Respondents then responded to the Notice by letter dated\nSeptember 18, 2013 (Response). The companies contested Items 3, 4, 5 and 7, offered additional\ninformation in response to the Notice, and requested that the proposed civil penalty be reduced.\nRespondents did not request a hearing and therefore have waived their right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. Parts 191 and 192, as follows:\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 191.17(a), which states:\n§ 191.17 Transmission systems; gathering systems; and liquefied\nnatural gas facilities: Annual report.\n(a) Transmission or Gathering. Each operator of a transmission or a\ngathering pipeline system must submit an annual report for that system on\nDOT Form PHMSA 7100.2.1. This report must be submitted each year, not\nlater than March 15, for the preceding calendar year, except that for the\n2010 reporting year the report must be submitted by June 15, 2011.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 191.17(a) by failing to submit annual\nreports for calendar years 2007-2010 that included the companies’ entire transmission or\ngathering pipeline systems. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the 2011 Annual Report showed\nthat EGT/MRT operated approximately 22.3 mile of unprotected steel pipe, but the 2008, 2009,\nand 2010 Annual Reports omitted all quantities of bare unprotected steel pipe. The Notice\nfurther alleged that the 2007 Annual Report listed a quantity of only three miles of bare\nunprotected steel pipe, an amount different than the quantity reported for the other years.\nIn their Response, EGT/MRT claimed to operate three segments of bare unprotected pipe: 1)\n16.63 miles of Line 9, 2) 0.3 miles of line FT-3, and 3) 5.35 miles of line KM-26. Respondents\ncontended that they did not omit the 22.3 miles of pipe at issue but, rather, had “inadvertently\ncategorized” these 22.3 miles of pipe at issue as either bare protected pipe or coated protected\npipe instead of bare unprotected pipe.3 Upon discovering that the 22.3 miles had not been listed\nunder the correct category, EGT/MRT corrected the error in their 2011 Annual Report.\nTherefore, Respondents argued that this Item should be withdrawn or the penalty substantially\nreduced.\nUpon review of the attachment that Respondents submitted, the total mileage incorrectly\nreported in the 2007-2010 Annual Reports for Lines 9, FT-3, and KM-26 is 18.5 miles.\nAccording to the 2011 Annual Report, there are actually 22.3 miles of bare unprotected steel\npipe. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondents violated\n49 C.F.R. § 191.17(a) by failing to submit annual reports for the calendar years 2007-2010 that\n3 Response at 3.\n\n\n\n3\nincluded their entire pipeline systems by omitting to report bare unprotected steel pipe. As for\nRespondents’ argument that the inaccurate reporting for years prior to 2011 should be treated as\na warning or a Notice of Amendment, I see no reason why this Item should not be treated as a\nviolation, since the Annual Reports in question did not involve inadequate procedures and\ncontained significant errors over several years.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a), which states:\n§ 192.463 External corrosion control: Cathodic protection.\n(a) Each cathodic protection system required by this subpart must\nprovide a level of cathodic protection that complies with one or more of\nthe applicable criteria contained in appendix D of this part. If none of\nthese criteria is applicable, the cathodic protection system must provide a\nlevel of cathodic protection at least equal to that provided by compliance\nwith one or more of these criteria.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a) by failing to provide a\ncathodic protection system for their pipeline that complied with one or more of the applicable\ncriteria contained in Appendix D of Part 192. Section II of Appendix D requires an operator to\nfully consider voltage (IR) drop for a valid interpretation of the voltage measurement when\nutilizing the criteria of a negative voltage of at least 0.85 volts (-850 mV).4 Specifically, the\nNotice alleged that Respondents’ practice was to add an additional -50mV to the -850 mV\ncriteria and look for a minimum of -900 mV. This approach of assuming an IR drop of 0.50 V\neverywhere along the system failed to account for areas where the IR drop exceeded 50 mV.\nAccording to the Notice, EGT/MRT could not demonstrate that the IR drop was limited to 0.5 V\nalong their entire pipeline systems. In addition, the Notice alleged that Respondents’ Corrosion\nControl Program procedure, PS-03-02-400 Cathodic Protection: Centerpoint Energy Midstream\nOperations Use of -0.85 Volt Criteria and IR Drop, was not referenced by the company’s other\nkey procedure for executing cathodic protection electrical checks, PS-03-02-210, Cathodic\nProtection Criteria.\nRespondents contested this allegation of violation on a number of grounds. First, they argued\nthat in response to a previous Notice of Amendment issued by PHMSA in 2006,5 the company\nhad submitted a procedure change that included a voltage drop to 0.900 V.6 According to\n4 “IR drop” is the difference between the voltage at the top of the pipe and the voltage at the surface of the earth\ncaused by the electrical resistance of the soil in which the pipeline is buried.\n5 In the Matter of Centerpoint Energy [4-2006-1015M] (issued October 27, 2006).\n6 The Response contended that Procedure PS-03-02-210, Section 2.2-0.850 Volts Pipe-to-Soil (P/S) Criteria, had\nbeen amended to read:\nVoltage (IR) drops shall be considered per section 2.6 below.\nWhere P/S potentials below -0.900 volts (current applied) are measured, further evaluation is required as\nfollows:\n• Perform test to confirm proper operation of cathodic protection systems\n• Consider use of current interruption test methods\n• Consider adjustments for cathodic protection systems.\n\n\n\n4\nRespondents, this procedure was reviewed by PHSMA staff and on May 3, 2007, the agency\n“confirmed that this procedure was adequate….”7\nSecond, they argued that because Section II of Appendix D does not specify the method or\nprocedure that must be used for considering IR drop, the regulations require only that the\npipeline operator develop and document a process for how IR drop will be considered and\nnothing more. Under the companies’ procedure, PS-03-02-210, they take IR drops into\nconsideration because the -0.900 mV trigger accounts for an IR drop of -0.50 mV, as compared\nto the -0.850 benchmark used in Section I.A.(1) of Appendix D.\nThird, Respondents argued that the regulation does not specify a standard for determining IR\ndrop; instead, it appears that the standard applied during PHMSA’s inspection was NACE\nStandard SP0169, which has not been incorporated into the regulations. Therefore, Respondents\nargued that PHMSA was attempting to impose a requirement beyond the scope of the\nregulations.\nFourth, the companies argued that PS-03-02-210, Sections 2.2 and 2.6, and PS-03-02-400\ntogether established “sound engineering practices in determining the significance of voltage (IR)\ndrops.”8 Finally, they argued that the Notice alleged that company “personnel acknowledged\nthat IR Drop was not considered if the read is more negative than -900mV.” Respondents\ncontended that any such acknowledgment was not correct and should not be the basis for a\nfinding of violation.\nI reject the arguments presented by Respondents. The crux of the matter here is that sound\nengineering practice does not support the approach actually used by the companies to ensure\ncathodic protection. Although EGT/MRT cited procedure PS-03-02-210 Cathodic Protection\nCriteria, they actually used another procedure, PS-03-02-400 Cathodic Protection: Centerpoint\nEnergy Midstream Operation’s Use of -0.85 Volt Criteria and IR Drop, to address the IR drops.\nTheir practice was to add a factor of -0.050 volts to the -0.850 volts and use the resulting -0.900\nvolts as a determining factor for the consideration of an IR drop. This approach mistakenly\nassumed that the IR drop everywhere along their pipelines would be equal to or more positive\nthan a -0.050 volts.\nHowever, Respondents could not demonstrate that the IR drop was, in fact, limited to -0.050\nvolts along their entire system. In fact, their own records establish that there were instances\nwhere the IR drop exceeded the -0.050 volts they had set. The Respondents’ procedures that\nResponse at 7.\n7 Id.\n8 Under these procedures, personnel must:\n(i) Measure or calculate voltage drop(s);\n(ii) Review the historical performance of the cathodic protection system;\n(iii) Evaluate the physical and electrical characteristics of the pipe and its environment; and\n(iv) Determine whether or not there is physical evidence of corrosion.\nResponse at 10.\n\n\n\n5\nwere reviewed by PHMSA in response to the NOA may have been sufficient before the\ncompanies’ own records established instances where the IR drop exceeded -0.050 volts. If an\nassumed value for IR drop is to be used, it must be greater than any measured results to assure a\nvalid interpretation of the voltage measurement when utilizing the criteria of a negative voltage\nof at least 0.85 volts (-850 mV). Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find\nthat Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a) by failing to provide a cathodic protection\nsystem for their pipelines that complied with one or more of the applicable criteria contained in\nAppendix D of part 192.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(8), which states:\n§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline,\na manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance\nactivities and for emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual\nmust also include procedures for handling abnormal operations. This\nmanual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at intervals not\nexceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. . . .\n(b) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following, if\napplicable, to provide safety during maintenance and operations.\n(1) . . .\n(8) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to\ndetermine the effectiveness, and adequacy of the procedures used in normal\noperation and maintenance and modifying the procedures when\ndeficiencies are found.\nThe Notice alleged that EGT/MRT violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(8) by failing to prepare a\nmanual of written procedures for periodically reviewing the effectiveness and adequacy of the\nprocedures used in normal operation and maintenance and modifying them when deficiencies\nwere found. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the procedure in place was insufficient insofar\nas it did not require a periodic and actual review of the company’s procedures but merely\nencouraged personnel to comment on the adequacy of those procedures on an ad hoc basis.9\nIn its Response, EGT/MRT argued that the proposed finding of violation should be withdrawn\nbecause its Procedure 102 (General), Procedure 200 (Abnormal Operations) and Procedure 600\n(Emergency Plan) already required the review of procedures for effectiveness and adequacy.\nEGT/MRT further contended that the Notice addressed the adequacy of the company’s\n9 The language found in Respondent’s Procedure 102 General, Section A – Scope, Item 6, reads:\nOperator personnel are encouraged to comment on the adequacy of the procedures found\nin the manuals as they are used in normal operations. When a procedure is thought to be\ndeficient, operator personnel will inform the Region Director. The Region Director will\nnotify Compliance & Support Services of the deficiency and Compliance and Support\nServices will modify the procedure as required by the Company’s Management of Change\nprocess.\n\n\n\n6\nprocedures, rather than a violation of the pipeline safety regulations, and therefore, a Notice of\nAmendment would be the more appropriate vehicle for addressing any deficiency in procedures.\nI disagree. While EGT/MRT’s existing procedures for the periodic review of abnormal\noperations and emergencies may well be adequate, those procedures are not at issue here. The\nonly issue raised in the Notice was the allegation that the company failed to prepare a procedure\nfor the periodic and systematic review of its normal operation and maintenance procedures. I\nfind that Procedure 102 (General) does not require a periodic review of work performed by\npersonnel during normal operations to determine the effectiveness and adequacy of the\nprocedures used during the work. Merely encouraging personnel to comment on such\nprocedures on an ad hoc basis does not meet the regulatory requirement that an operator\nperiodically analyze the work performed during normal operations to determine the effectiveness\nof its procedures, and document these periodic reviews by showing what modifications were\nmade. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondents violated\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(8) by failing to prepare procedures for periodically reviewing the\neffectiveness and adequacy of the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and\nmodifying those procedures when deficiencies were found.\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a), as quoted above,\nby failing to follow for each pipeline a manual of written procedures for conducting operations\nand maintenance activities and for emergency response. Specifically, the Notice alleged that\nEGT/MRT failed to follow their own established procedure, PS-03-01-272, IMP Personnel\nQualifications Requirements, Section 2.6, which required Integrity Management supervisory\npersonnel to complete, at a minimum, five training modules designed to ensure they had a\nthorough knowledge of the company’s Integrity Management Program (IMP) and the elements\nof that program for which each supervisor was responsible, as required under 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.915. Respondents identified thirty-five (35) employees within their IMP who were\nrequired to complete these courses. All 35 of these individuals were responsible for supervision,\noversight, analysis and interpretation of external corrosion direct assessments, internal corrosion\ndirect assessments, in-line inspection (ILI), stress corrosion cracking direct assessments, and\nother technologies used as assessment methods.\nRespondents argued that the investigators’ misunderstanding of the chart that EGT used to track\ncourse completion resulted in a miscalculation of the number of employees who had not\ncompleted one or more of the five training modules.10 Sixteen employees, rather than the 25\ncited in the Notice, had not completed the training. This discrepancy was due to the fact that one\nof the training modules, identified by its course number 8000IMP, was tracked under two course\nnumbers. Since the numbers were listed separately, it looked like many employees had failed to\ncomplete either the 8000IMP course or the 8000IMP-E course.\nIn their Response, EGT/MRT did not dispute that the violation had occurred but did not agree\nwith the Notice as to the number of employees affected. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) by failing to follow for\neach pipeline a manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance\nactivities and for emergency response.\n10 Response at 17.\n\n\n\n7\nItem 8: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a), as quoted above,\nby failing to follow for each pipeline a manual of written procedures for conducting operations\nand maintenance activities and for emergency response. Specifically, the Notice alleged that\nEGT/MRT failed to follow their own established procedure requiring company personnel to\nprovide the ILI vendor with feature information (feedback) based on the excavation and\nevaluation of immediate and non-immediate (scheduled or monitored) conditions.11 The Notice\nalleged that for the following ILI runs and the associated monitored or scheduled condition digs,\nEGT/MRT were unable to provide verification that they had provided feedback to the vendor for\npossible tool calibration purposes:\n1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 11-3 East of Pumpkin Center HCA;\nML-2 Fountain Hill to Perryville;\nML-3 Carlisle to West Point;\nBT-1-AS Jessieville to Perla Station; and\nF-185 Willow Springs to Coal Barn Trap.\nRespondents did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) by failing to follow for\neach pipeline a manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance\nactivities and for emergency response.\nItem 10: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a), which states:\n§ 192.805 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification\nprogram. The program shall include provisions to:\n(a) Identify covered tasks: . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a) by failing to have and\nfollow a written qualification program that included provisions to identify covered tasks.\nSpecifically, it alleged that EGT/MRT had failed to include as covered tasks in its Operator\nQualification Plan the loading, launching, receiving and unloading of ILI tools used to perform\nintegrity assessments under § 192.937(c)(1) and to perform cleaning, batching, etc. According to\nthe Notice, EGT/MRT had identified covered tasks for CT-10: Internal Corrosion Monitoring-\nSampling; CT-14: Valve Maintenance; CT-19: Visual External and Internal Pipe Inspection; CT-\n26: Blow Down, Purge and Return a Pipeline to Service; and CT-47: Responding &\nInvestigating Abnormal Operating Conditions, but these covered tasks did not encompass the\ntraining and qualification requirements specific to loading, launching, receiving, and unloading\nILI tools from both in-service and out-of-service pipelines.\n11 CEGT IMP Procedure PS-03-01-248 ILI Vendor Performance Specification, Section 2.4.3 Reported Anomalous\nConditions, states:\nNon-Immediate Conditions: The Company shall provide the ILI vendor any\nfeature information, based on the excavation and evaluation, for possible tool calibration.\n\n\n\n8\nRespondents did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a) by failing to have and\nfollow a written qualification program that included provisions to identify covered tasks.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondents.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondents are subject to an administrative civil penalty not to\nexceed $200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for\nany related series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondents’ culpability; the history of Respondents’ prior offenses; and any effect\nthat the penalty may have on their ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of\nRespondents in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may\nconsider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of\nsubsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total\ncivil penalty of $137,200 for the violations cited above.\nItem 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $8,100 for Respondents’ violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 191.17, for failing to submit annual reports for the calendar years 2007-2010 that included their\nentire pipeline systems by failing to report all bare unprotected steel pipe. The operators noted\nthat upon discovering that 22.3 miles of pipe had not been listed under the correct category,\nEGT/MRT corrected the error on their next Annual Report. EGT/MRT argued that operators\nshould not be fined for proactively taking steps to ensure the accuracy of their records, and then\nreporting on the basis of such corrected information.12 Although Respondents are to be\ncommended for correcting their errors, it does not change the fact that they had incorrectly\nreported bare unprotected steel pipe in previous years. Accordingly, having reviewed the record\nand considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondents a civil penalty of $8,100 for\nviolation of 49 C.F.R. § 191.17.\nItem 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $60,900 for Respondents’ violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.605(a), for failing to follow for each pipeline a manual of written procedures for\nconducting operations and maintenance activities and for emergency response. Respondents\nargued that because almost twice as many employees were trained on all five training modules as\nPHMSA believed at the time the Notice was issued, PHMSA should reduce the penalty by 50\npercent. Due to the discrepancy in the records with the number of affected employees, I have\nlowered the proposed penalty but not by 50 percent as requested, since the application of\nPHMSA’s penalty assessment criteria is not based on an equal penalty amount for each instance\nof violation. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I\nassess Respondents a reduced civil penalty of $55,300 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a).\n12 Response at 4.\n\n\n\n9\nItem 8: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $27,000 for Respondents’ violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.605(a), for failing to follow for each pipeline a manual of written procedures for\nconducting operations and maintenance activities and for emergency response. Respondents did\nnot contest this allegation of violation or the proposed penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed\nthe record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondents a civil penalty of $27,000\nfor violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a).\nItem 10: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $41,200 for Respondents’ violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a), for failing to develop and include a covered task or tasks in its Operator\nQualification Plan for loading, launching, receiving and unloading in-line tools used to perform\nintegrity assessment, to meet the requirements of § 192.937(c)(1), and other in-line tools used for\ncleaning, batching, etc. Respondents did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed\npenalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I\nassess Respondents a civil penalty of $41,200 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a).\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the\nItems cited above, I assess Respondents a total civil penalty of $131,600.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125. The\ntelephone number is (405) 954-8845.\nFailure to pay the $131,600 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual\nrate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 4, 6, 7, and 10 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.463(a), 192.605(b), 192.605(a) and 192.805(a), respectively.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns\nor operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards\nestablished under chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.217, Respondents are ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the\npipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 192.463(a) (Item 4), Respondents must amend\ntheir procedures to properly consider IR drop. Where the -0.85 V criteria is utilized,\nEGT/MRT must record the Instant Off Reading to show the IR drop associated with\n\n\n\n10\nthis test point. The companies must provide a summary report to PHMSA Southwest\nRegion detailing areas where IR drop was in excess of 50 mV and any remedial\naction required by further investigation at these locations, as required by\n§ 192.463(a).\n2. With respect to the violation of § 192.615(b)(3) (Item 6), Respondents must\ndevelop procedures to require an effectiveness review and analysis of procedures\nused during normal operations and maintenance activities. This review/analysis must\nshow that some analysis has been performed to determine the adequacy of a\nprocedure and, if found to be inadequate, and that appropriate modifications are\nmade. The effectiveness review and analysis of procedures should be directed toward\nprocedure refinement, not employee evaluation.\n3. With respect to the violation of § 192.605(a) (Item 7), Respondents must ensure\nthat all Integrity Management Program employees required to complete these training\nmodules successfully complete this task. EGT/MRT must provide PHMSA with\nrecords that verify successful completion of the 5 modules by the IM supervisory\npersonnel.\n4. With respect to the violation of § 192.805(a) (Item 10), Respondents must develop\ncovered tasks for loading, launching, receiving and unloading ILI smart tools for both\nin-service and out-of-service pipelines and incorporate them into their Operator\nQualification program.\n5. Provide PHMSA with documentation that verifies completion of numbers 1-4\nabove within 45 days following the receipt of the Final Order.\n6. It is requested that EGT/MRT maintain documentation of the safety improvement\ncosts associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to R.M.\nSeeley, Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total\ncost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses;\nand 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline\ninfrastructure.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondents and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nWARNING ITEMS\nWith respect to Items 1, 2, 5 and 9, the Notice alleged probable violations of Part 192 but did not\npropose a civil penalty or compliance order for these items. Therefore, these are considered to\nbe warning items. The warnings were for:\n49 C.F.R. § 191.5(a) (Item 1) Respondents’ alleged failure to give notice at the\nearliest practicable moment following discovery of Incident No. 20070063-5058\n\n\n\n11\nat approximately 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2007. During the disassembly of an\nunloader involving compressor #3 on unit 2, an employee was struck in the\nabdomen when the pressurized equipment blew out and resulted in the\nemployee’s in-patient hospitalization.\n49 C.F.R. § 191.15(a) (Item 2) ─ Respondents’ alleged failure to submit DOT\nForm RSPA 7100.2 as soon as practicable but not more than 30 days after an\nincident that occurred on August 31, 2010, in Fouke, Arkansas. Specifically, the\nNotice alleged that on August 31, 2010, an incident involving a lightning strike\nresulted in a fire at the Fouke Town Border station, but EGT/MRT did not submit\nForm 7100.2 for this incident until October 5, 2010, five days past the filing\ndeadline.\n49 C.F.R. § 192.491(c) (Item 5) ─ Respondents’ alleged failure to maintain\nrecords of each test, survey, or inspection required by Subpart I in sufficient detail\nto demonstrate the adequacy of corrosion control measures or that a corrosive\ncondition does not exist for the Carlisle Team Area for the January 2009 to June\n2012 period. Respondents contend that the records that were kept were accurate\nand complete but PHMSA misinterpreted the information pertaining to\ncompletion of the inspections; and\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) (Item 9) ─ Respondents’ alleged failure to follow their own\nwritten procedures for analysis of ILI data by failing to identify a foreign metal object in\nclose proximity to the pipe.\nEGT/MRT presented information in their Response showing they had taken certain actions to\naddress the cited items. If OPS finds a violation of any of these items in a subsequent inspection,\nRespondents may be subject to future enforcement action.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondents have a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be sent to: Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC\n20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. PHMSA\nwill accept petitions received no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this Final Order by\nthe Respondents, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and meet all other\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. The filing of a petition automatically stays the payment of\nany civil penalty assessed. Unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay, all\nother terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n420131010_NOPV PCP PCO_06172013_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nJune 17, 2013\nMr. Pete Kirsch\nSr. VP - Pipeline Operations and Engineering\nCenterpoint Energy Gas Transmission Co\nMississippi River Transmission Co\n1111 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 4-2013-1010\nDear Pete Kirsch:\nOn multiple occasions between January 30 and October 19, 2012, representatives of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to\nChapter 601 of 49 United States Code conducted an onsite inspection of Centerpoint Energy Gas\nTransmission Co. and Mississippi River Transmission Co. (together, CEGT) procedures and records\nfor Operations and Maintenance, Integrity Management, Emergency Response, Operator\nQualification, and Construction Specifications in Shreveport, LA.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the Pipeline\nSafety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the probable\nviolations are:\n\n\n\n1. 2. 3. §191.5 Immediate notice of certain incidents.\n(a) At the earliest practicable moment following discovery, each operator shall give\nnotice in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section of each incident as defined\nin §191.3.\nCEGT failed to give notice at the earliest practicable moment following discovery of Incident\nNo. 20070063-5058: At approximately 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2007, during disassembly of\nan unloader involving compressor #3 on unit 2 (Unionville CS), an employee was struck in\nthe abdomen when the pressurized equipment caused an actuator to blow out and this\nrequired immediate hospitalization for several days. CEGT did not report the incident to the\nNational Response Center (NRC) until May 30, 2007 despite the absence of any\ncircumstances that would have prevented it from making the telephonic report at or about the\ntime the employee was hospitalized.\n§191.15 Transmission systems, gathering systems, and liquefied natural gas facilities.\nIncident report.\n(a) Transmission or Gathering. Each operator of a transmission or a gathering pipeline\nsystem must submit DOT Form PHMSA F 7100.2 as soon as practicable but not\nmore than 30 days aft","truncated":true,"body_characters":66563}