# ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 420131010
- **title:** ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2013-06-17
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 191.15(a), 191.17(a), 191.5(a), 192.463(a), 192.491(c), 192.605(a), 192.605(b)(8), 192.805(a).
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- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131010.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131010
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420131010
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 191.15(a),  191.17(a),  191.5(a),  192.463(a),  192.491(c),  192.605(a),  192.605(b)(8),  192.805(a). The case was opened on 2013-06-17 and is reported as closed as of 2015-12-29. Proposed civil penalty: $137,200. Assessed civil penalty: $131,600. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420131010_Closure Letter_12292015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Closure%20Letter_12292015.pdf

420131010_Closure Letter_12292015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Closure%20Letter_12292015_text.pdf

420131010_Final Order_09022014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Final%20Order_09022014.pdf

420131010_Final Order_09022014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Final%20Order_09022014_text.pdf

420131010_NOPV PCP PCO_06172013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_06172013.pdf

420131010_NOPV PCP PCO_06172013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_06172013_text.pdf

420131010_Operator Response to Notice and Request for Time Extension_07172013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Request%20for%20Time%20Extension_07172013.pdf

420131010_Operator Response to Notice_09182013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131010/420131010_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_09182013.pdf

420131010_Closure Letter_12292015_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
December 29, 2015
Mr. Paul Brewer
Senior VP Operations and EH&S
Enable Gas Transmission, LLC
Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC
One Leadership Square
211 N Robinson Ave., Suite 150
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
CPF 4-2013-1010
Dear Mr. Brewer:
From January 30 through October 19, 2012, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code inspected the Enable
Gas Transmission, LLC/Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC (Enable) procedures/records for
Operations and Maintenance, Integrity Management, Emergency Response, Operator Qualification, and
Construction Specifications in Shreveport, LA. As a result of the inspection, Enable was issued a Notice
of Probable Violation, Probable Civil Penalty, and Probable Compliance Order on June 17, 2013.
On May 29, 2015 Enable submitted a response to the Final Order. Enable provided the requested
documentation and completed the Compliance Order Items on December 7, 2015. The penalty payment
was made on September 26, 2014. My staff reviewed the submitted documentation, and it appears that the
inadequacies outlined in the Notice of Probable Violation have been corrected.
This letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you for your
cooperation.
Sincerely,
R. M. Seeley
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

420131010_Final Order_09022014_text.pdf

SEPTEMBER 2, 2014
Mr. Scott Prochazka
President
Centerpoint Energy, Inc.
1111 Louisiana Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Re: CPF No. 4-2013-1010
Dear Mr. Prochazka:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $131,600, issues warnings, and specifies actions
that need to be taken by Enable Gas Transmission, LLC, and Enable Mississippi River
Transmission, LLC, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms
are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the
compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement
action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the
date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Chris Bullock, Enable Midstream Partners, Midstream Pipeline Safety,
525 Milam St., Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________________
In the Matter of )
Enable Gas Transmission, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2013-1010
and )
Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC, )
)
)
)
)
)
Respondents. )
____________________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
Between January 30 and October 19, 2012, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of CenterPoint
Energy Gas Transmission Company, LLC (now Enable Gas Transmission, LLC), and
Mississippi River Transmission Company (now Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC) in
Shreveport, Louisiana.
1 Both companies (EGT/MRT or Respondents) are indirect, wholly-
owned interstate pipeline subsidiaries of Enable Midstream Partners, LP, and together operate
more than 8,000 miles of interstate pipe located in Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas, as well as six storage facilities.2 Enable
Midstream Partners, LP, is a subsidiary of Centerpoint Energy, Inc.
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondents, by letter dated June 17, 2013, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the
Notice proposed finding that EGT/MRT had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Parts 191
and 192 and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $137,200 for the alleged violations. The
Notice also proposed ordering Respondents to take certain measures to correct the alleged
1 Subsequent to the issuance of the Notice and effective July 30, 2013, CenterPoint Energy – Mississippi River
Transmission, LLC, changed its name to Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC. On the same date,
CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Company, LLC, changed its name to Enable Gas Transmission, LLC. A
response to the Notice was filed in this proceeding by Enable Midstream Partners, LP, on behalf of both companies.
See Response, at 1. Enable Midstream Partners, LP, is a subsidiary of Centerpoint Energy, Inc.
http://www.centerpointenergy.com/services/pipelines/egt/ (last accessed on April 18, 2014).
2 http://www.centerpointenergy.com/services/pipelines/egt/ (last accessed on April 18, 2014).



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violations.
On July 17, 2013, EGT/MRT requested a 60-day extension to submit their response to PHMSA
and it was granted. Respondents then responded to the Notice by letter dated
September 18, 2013 (Response). The companies contested Items 3, 4, 5 and 7, offered additional
information in response to the Notice, and requested that the proposed civil penalty be reduced.
Respondents did not request a hearing and therefore have waived their right to one.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. Parts 191 and 192, as follows:
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 191.17(a), which states:
§ 191.17 Transmission systems; gathering systems; and liquefied
natural gas facilities: Annual report.
(a) Transmission or Gathering. Each operator of a transmission or a
gathering pipeline system must submit an annual report for that system on
DOT Form PHMSA 7100.2.1. This report must be submitted each year, not
later than March 15, for the preceding calendar year, except that for the
2010 reporting year the report must be submitted by June 15, 2011.
The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 191.17(a) by failing to submit annual
reports for calendar years 2007-2010 that included the companies’ entire transmission or
gathering pipeline systems. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the 2011 Annual Report showed
that EGT/MRT operated approximately 22.3 mile of unprotected steel pipe, but the 2008, 2009,
and 2010 Annual Reports omitted all quantities of bare unprotected steel pipe. The Notice
further alleged that the 2007 Annual Report listed a quantity of only three miles of bare
unprotected steel pipe, an amount different than the quantity reported for the other years.
In their Response, EGT/MRT claimed to operate three segments of bare unprotected pipe: 1)
16.63 miles of Line 9, 2) 0.3 miles of line FT-3, and 3) 5.35 miles of line KM-26. Respondents
contended that they did not omit the 22.3 miles of pipe at issue but, rather, had “inadvertently
categorized” these 22.3 miles of pipe at issue as either bare protected pipe or coated protected
pipe instead of bare unprotected pipe.3 Upon discovering that the 22.3 miles had not been listed
under the correct category, EGT/MRT corrected the error in their 2011 Annual Report.
Therefore, Respondents argued that this Item should be withdrawn or the penalty substantially
reduced.
Upon review of the attachment that Respondents submitted, the total mileage incorrectly
reported in the 2007-2010 Annual Reports for Lines 9, FT-3, and KM-26 is 18.5 miles.
According to the 2011 Annual Report, there are actually 22.3 miles of bare unprotected steel
pipe. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondents violated
49 C.F.R. § 191.17(a) by failing to submit annual reports for the calendar years 2007-2010 that
3 Response at 3.



3
included their entire pipeline systems by omitting to report bare unprotected steel pipe. As for
Respondents’ argument that the inaccurate reporting for years prior to 2011 should be treated as
a warning or a Notice of Amendment, I see no reason why this Item should not be treated as a
violation, since the Annual Reports in question did not involve inadequate procedures and
contained significant errors over several years.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a), which states:
§ 192.463 External corrosion control: Cathodic protection.
(a) Each cathodic protection system required by this subpart must
provide a level of cathodic protection that complies with one or more of
the applicable criteria contained in appendix D of this part. If none of
these criteria is applicable, the cathodic protection system must provide a
level of cathodic protection at least equal to that provided by compliance
with one or more of these criteria.
The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a) by failing to provide a
cathodic protection system for their pipeline that complied with one or more of the applicable
criteria contained in Appendix D of Part 192. Section II of Appendix D requires an operator to
fully consider voltage (IR) drop for a valid interpretation of the voltage measurement when
utilizing the criteria of a negative voltage of at least 0.85 volts (-850 mV).4 Specifically, the
Notice alleged that Respondents’ practice was to add an additional -50mV to the -850 mV
criteria and look for a minimum of -900 mV. This approach of assuming an IR drop of 0.50 V
everywhere along the system failed to account for areas where the IR drop exceeded 50 mV.
According to the Notice, EGT/MRT could not demonstrate that the IR drop was limited to 0.5 V
along their entire pipeline systems. In addition, the Notice alleged that Respondents’ Corrosion
Control Program procedure, PS-03-02-400 Cathodic Protection: Centerpoint Energy Midstream
Operations Use of -0.85 Volt Criteria and IR Drop, was not referenced by the company’s other
key procedure for executing cathodic protection electrical checks, PS-03-02-210, Cathodic
Protection Criteria.
Respondents contested this allegation of violation on a number of grounds. First, they argued
that in response to a previous Notice of Amendment issued by PHMSA in 2006,5 the company
had submitted a procedure change that included a voltage drop to 0.900 V.6 According to
4 “IR drop” is the difference between the voltage at the top of the pipe and the voltage at the surface of the earth
caused by the electrical resistance of the soil in which the pipeline is buried.
5 In the Matter of Centerpoint Energy [4-2006-1015M] (issued October 27, 2006).
6 The Response contended that Procedure PS-03-02-210, Section 2.2-0.850 Volts Pipe-to-Soil (P/S) Criteria, had
been amended to read:
Voltage (IR) drops shall be considered per section 2.6 below.
Where P/S potentials below -0.900 volts (current applied) are measured, further evaluation is required as
follows:
• Perform test to confirm proper operation of cathodic protection systems
• Consider use of current interruption test methods
• Consider adjustments for cathodic protection systems.



4
Respondents, this procedure was reviewed by PHSMA staff and on May 3, 2007, the agency
“confirmed that this procedure was adequate….”7
Second, they argued that because Section II of Appendix D does not specify the method or
procedure that must be used for considering IR drop, the regulations require only that the
pipeline operator develop and document a process for how IR drop will be considered and
nothing more. Under the companies’ procedure, PS-03-02-210, they take IR drops into
consideration because the -0.900 mV trigger accounts for an IR drop of -0.50 mV, as compared
to the -0.850 benchmark used in Section I.A.(1) of Appendix D.
Third, Respondents argued that the regulation does not specify a standard for determining IR
drop; instead, it appears that the standard applied during PHMSA’s inspection was NACE
Standard SP0169, which has not been incorporated into the regulations. Therefore, Respondents
argued that PHMSA was attempting to impose a requirement beyond the scope of the
regulations.
Fourth, the companies argued that PS-03-02-210, Sections 2.2 and 2.6, and PS-03-02-400
together established “sound engineering practices in determining the significance of voltage (IR)
drops.”8 Finally, they argued that the Notice alleged that company “personnel acknowledged
that IR Drop was not considered if the read is more negative than -900mV.” Respondents
contended that any such acknowledgment was not correct and should not be the basis for a
finding of violation.
I reject the arguments presented by Respondents. The crux of the matter here is that sound
engineering practice does not support the approach actually used by the companies to ensure
cathodic protection. Although EGT/MRT cited procedure PS-03-02-210 Cathodic Protection
Criteria, they actually used another procedure, PS-03-02-400 Cathodic Protection: Centerpoint
Energy Midstream Operation’s Use of -0.85 Volt Criteria and IR Drop, to address the IR drops.
Their practice was to add a factor of -0.050 volts to the -0.850 volts and use the resulting -0.900
volts as a determining factor for the consideration of an IR drop. This approach mistakenly
assumed that the IR drop everywhere along their pipelines would be equal to or more positive
than a -0.050 volts.
However, Respondents could not demonstrate that the IR drop was, in fact, limited to -0.050
volts along their entire system. In fact, their own records establish that there were instances
where the IR drop exceeded the -0.050 volts they had set. The Respondents’ procedures that
Response at 7.
7 Id.
8 Under these procedures, personnel must:
(i) Measure or calculate voltage drop(s);
(ii) Review the historical performance of the cathodic protection system;
(iii) Evaluate the physical and electrical characteristics of the pipe and its environment; and
(iv) Determine whether or not there is physical evidence of corrosion.
Response at 10.



5
were reviewed by PHMSA in response to the NOA may have been sufficient before the
companies’ own records established instances where the IR drop exceeded -0.050 volts. If an
assumed value for IR drop is to be used, it must be greater than any measured results to assure a
valid interpretation of the voltage measurement when utilizing the criteria of a negative voltage
of at least 0.85 volts (-850 mV). Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find
that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a) by failing to provide a cathodic protection
system for their pipelines that complied with one or more of the applicable criteria contained in
Appendix D of part 192.
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(8), which states:
§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline,
a manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance
activities and for emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual
must also include procedures for handling abnormal operations. This
manual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at intervals not
exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. . . .
(b) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following, if
applicable, to provide safety during maintenance and operations.
(1) . . .
(8) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to
determine the effectiveness, and adequacy of the procedures used in normal
operation and maintenance and modifying the procedures when
deficiencies are found.
The Notice alleged that EGT/MRT violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(8) by failing to prepare a
manual of written procedures for periodically reviewing the effectiveness and adequacy of the
procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and modifying them when deficiencies
were found. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the procedure in place was insufficient insofar
as it did not require a periodic and actual review of the company’s procedures but merely
encouraged personnel to comment on the adequacy of those procedures on an ad hoc basis.9
In its Response, EGT/MRT argued that the proposed finding of violation should be withdrawn
because its Procedure 102 (General), Procedure 200 (Abnormal Operations) and Procedure 600
(Emergency Plan) already required the review of procedures for effectiveness and adequacy.
EGT/MRT further contended that the Notice addressed the adequacy of the company’s
9 The language found in Respondent’s Procedure 102 General, Section A – Scope, Item 6, reads:
Operator personnel are encouraged to comment on the adequacy of the procedures found
in the manuals as they are used in normal operations. When a procedure is thought to be
deficient, operator personnel will inform the Region Director. The Region Director will
notify Compliance & Support Services of the deficiency and Compliance and Support
Services will modify the procedure as required by the Company’s Management of Change
process.



6
procedures, rather than a violation of the pipeline safety regulations, and therefore, a Notice of
Amendment would be the more appropriate vehicle for addressing any deficiency in procedures.
I disagree. While EGT/MRT’s existing procedures for the periodic review of abnormal
operations and emergencies may well be adequate, those procedures are not at issue here. The
only issue raised in the Notice was the allegation that the company failed to prepare a procedure
for the periodic and systematic review of its normal operation and maintenance procedures. I
find that Procedure 102 (General) does not require a periodic review of work performed by
personnel during normal operations to determine the effectiveness and adequacy of the
procedures used during the work. Merely encouraging personnel to comment on such
procedures on an ad hoc basis does not meet the regulatory requirement that an operator
periodically analyze the work performed during normal operations to determine the effectiveness
of its procedures, and document these periodic reviews by showing what modifications were
made. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondents violated
49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(8) by failing to prepare procedures for periodically reviewing the
effectiveness and adequacy of the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and
modifying those procedures when deficiencies were found.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a), as quoted above,
by failing to follow for each pipeline a manual of written procedures for conducting operations
and maintenance activities and for emergency response. Specifically, the Notice alleged that
EGT/MRT failed to follow their own established procedure, PS-03-01-272, IMP Personnel
Qualifications Requirements, Section 2.6, which required Integrity Management supervisory
personnel to complete, at a minimum, five training modules designed to ensure they had a
thorough knowledge of the company’s Integrity Management Program (IMP) and the elements
of that program for which each supervisor was responsible, as required under 49 C.F.R.
§ 192.915. Respondents identified thirty-five (35) employees within their IMP who were
required to complete these courses. All 35 of these individuals were responsible for supervision,
oversight, analysis and interpretation of external corrosion direct assessments, internal corrosion
direct assessments, in-line inspection (ILI), stress corrosion cracking direct assessments, and
other technologies used as assessment methods.
Respondents argued that the investigators’ misunderstanding of the chart that EGT used to track
course completion resulted in a miscalculation of the number of employees who had not
completed one or more of the five training modules.10 Sixteen employees, rather than the 25
cited in the Notice, had not completed the training. This discrepancy was due to the fact that one
of the training modules, identified by its course number 8000IMP, was tracked under two course
numbers. Since the numbers were listed separately, it looked like many employees had failed to
complete either the 8000IMP course or the 8000IMP-E course.
In their Response, EGT/MRT did not dispute that the violation had occurred but did not agree
with the Notice as to the number of employees affected. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) by failing to follow for
each pipeline a manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance
activities and for emergency response.
10 Response at 17.



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Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a), as quoted above,
by failing to follow for each pipeline a manual of written procedures for conducting operations
and maintenance activities and for emergency response. Specifically, the Notice alleged that
EGT/MRT failed to follow their own established procedure requiring company personnel to
provide the ILI vendor with feature information (feedback) based on the excavation and
evaluation of immediate and non-immediate (scheduled or monitored) conditions.11 The Notice
alleged that for the following ILI runs and the associated monitored or scheduled condition digs,
EGT/MRT were unable to provide verification that they had provided feedback to the vendor for
possible tool calibration purposes:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 11-3 East of Pumpkin Center HCA;
ML-2 Fountain Hill to Perryville;
ML-3 Carlisle to West Point;
BT-1-AS Jessieville to Perla Station; and
F-185 Willow Springs to Coal Barn Trap.
Respondents did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) by failing to follow for
each pipeline a manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance
activities and for emergency response.
Item 10: The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a), which states:
§ 192.805 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification
program. The program shall include provisions to:
(a) Identify covered tasks: . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program that included provisions to identify covered tasks.
Specifically, it alleged that EGT/MRT had failed to include as covered tasks in its Operator
Qualification Plan the loading, launching, receiving and unloading of ILI tools used to perform
integrity assessments under § 192.937(c)(1) and to perform cleaning, batching, etc. According to
the Notice, EGT/MRT had identified covered tasks for CT-10: Internal Corrosion Monitoring-
Sampling; CT-14: Valve Maintenance; CT-19: Visual External and Internal Pipe Inspection; CT-
26: Blow Down, Purge and Return a Pipeline to Service; and CT-47: Responding &
Investigating Abnormal Operating Conditions, but these covered tasks did not encompass the
training and qualification requirements specific to loading, launching, receiving, and unloading
ILI tools from both in-service and out-of-service pipelines.
11 CEGT IMP Procedure PS-03-01-248 ILI Vendor Performance Specification, Section 2.4.3 Reported Anomalous
Conditions, states:
Non-Immediate Conditions: The Company shall provide the ILI vendor any
feature information, based on the excavation and evaluation, for possible tool calibration.



8
Respondents did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondents violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program that included provisions to identify covered tasks.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
action taken against Respondents.
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondents are subject to an administrative civil penalty not to
exceed $200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for
any related series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.
§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,
circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the
degree of Respondents’ culpability; the history of Respondents’ prior offenses; and any effect
that the penalty may have on their ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of
Respondents in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may
consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of
subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total
civil penalty of $137,200 for the violations cited above.
Item 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $8,100 for Respondents’ violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 191.17, for failing to submit annual reports for the calendar years 2007-2010 that included their
entire pipeline systems by failing to report all bare unprotected steel pipe. The operators noted
that upon discovering that 22.3 miles of pipe had not been listed under the correct category,
EGT/MRT corrected the error on their next Annual Report. EGT/MRT argued that operators
should not be fined for proactively taking steps to ensure the accuracy of their records, and then
reporting on the basis of such corrected information.12 Although Respondents are to be
commended for correcting their errors, it does not change the fact that they had incorrectly
reported bare unprotected steel pipe in previous years. Accordingly, having reviewed the record
and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondents a civil penalty of $8,100 for
violation of 49 C.F.R. § 191.17.
Item 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $60,900 for Respondents’ violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 192.605(a), for failing to follow for each pipeline a manual of written procedures for
conducting operations and maintenance activities and for emergency response. Respondents
argued that because almost twice as many employees were trained on all five training modules as
PHMSA believed at the time the Notice was issued, PHMSA should reduce the penalty by 50
percent. Due to the discrepancy in the records with the number of affected employees, I have
lowered the proposed penalty but not by 50 percent as requested, since the application of
PHMSA’s penalty assessment criteria is not based on an equal penalty amount for each instance
of violation. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I
assess Respondents a reduced civil penalty of $55,300 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a).
12 Response at 4.



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Item 8: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $27,000 for Respondents’ violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 192.605(a), for failing to follow for each pipeline a manual of written procedures for
conducting operations and maintenance activities and for emergency response. Respondents did
not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed
the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondents a civil penalty of $27,000
for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a).
Item 10: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $41,200 for Respondents’ violation of
49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a), for failing to develop and include a covered task or tasks in its Operator
Qualification Plan for loading, launching, receiving and unloading in-line tools used to perform
integrity assessment, to meet the requirements of § 192.937(c)(1), and other in-line tools used for
cleaning, batching, etc. Respondents did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed
penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I
assess Respondents a civil penalty of $41,200 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.805(a).
In summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the
Items cited above, I assess Respondents a total civil penalty of $131,600.
Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations
(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal
Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed
instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be
directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125. The
telephone number is (405) 954-8845.
Failure to pay the $131,600 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual
rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to
those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if
payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty
may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district
court of the United States.
COMPLIANCE ORDER
The Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 4, 6, 7, and 10 in the Notice for
violations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.463(a), 192.605(b), 192.605(a) and 192.805(a), respectively.
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns
or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards
established under chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R.
§ 190.217, Respondents are ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the
pipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations:
1. With respect to the violation of § 192.463(a) (Item 4), Respondents must amend
their procedures to properly consider IR drop. Where the -0.85 V criteria is utilized,
EGT/MRT must record the Instant Off Reading to show the IR drop associated with



10
this test point. The companies must provide a summary report to PHMSA Southwest
Region detailing areas where IR drop was in excess of 50 mV and any remedial
action required by further investigation at these locations, as required by
§ 192.463(a).
2. With respect to the violation of § 192.615(b)(3) (Item 6), Respondents must
develop procedures to require an effectiveness review and analysis of procedures
used during normal operations and maintenance activities. This review/analysis must
show that some analysis has been performed to determine the adequacy of a
procedure and, if found to be inadequate, and that appropriate modifications are
made. The effectiveness review and analysis of procedures should be directed toward
procedure refinement, not employee evaluation.
3. With respect to the violation of § 192.605(a) (Item 7), Respondents must ensure
that all Integrity Management Program employees required to complete these training
modules successfully complete this task. EGT/MRT must provide PHMSA with
records that verify successful completion of the 5 modules by the IM supervisory
personnel.
4. With respect to the violation of § 192.805(a) (Item 10), Respondents must develop
covered tasks for loading, launching, receiving and unloading ILI smart tools for both
in-service and out-of-service pipelines and incorporate them into their Operator
Qualification program.
5. Provide PHMSA with documentation that verifies completion of numbers 1-4
above within 45 days following the receipt of the Final Order.
6. It is requested that EGT/MRT maintain documentation of the safety improvement
costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to R.M.
Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total
cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses;
and 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline
infrastructure.
The Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a
written request timely submitted by the Respondents and demonstrating good cause for an
extension.
WARNING ITEMS
With respect to Items 1, 2, 5 and 9, the Notice alleged probable violations of Part 192 but did not
propose a civil penalty or compliance order for these items. Therefore, these are considered to
be warning items. The warnings were for:
49 C.F.R. § 191.5(a) (Item 1) Respondents’ alleged failure to give notice at the
earliest practicable moment following discovery of Incident No. 20070063-5058



11
at approximately 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2007. During the disassembly of an
unloader involving compressor #3 on unit 2, an employee was struck in the
abdomen when the pressurized equipment blew out and resulted in the
employee’s in-patient hospitalization.
49 C.F.R. § 191.15(a) (Item 2) ─ Respondents’ alleged failure to submit DOT
Form RSPA 7100.2 as soon as practicable but not more than 30 days after an
incident that occurred on August 31, 2010, in Fouke, Arkansas. Specifically, the
Notice alleged that on August 31, 2010, an incident involving a lightning strike
resulted in a fire at the Fouke Town Border station, but EGT/MRT did not submit
Form 7100.2 for this incident until October 5, 2010, five days past the filing
deadline.
49 C.F.R. § 192.491(c) (Item 5) ─ Respondents’ alleged failure to maintain
records of each test, survey, or inspection required by Subpart I in sufficient detail
to demonstrate the adequacy of corrosion control measures or that a corrosive
condition does not exist for the Carlisle Team Area for the January 2009 to June
2012 period. Respondents contend that the records that were kept were accurate
and complete but PHMSA misinterpreted the information pertaining to
completion of the inspections; and
49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) (Item 9) ─ Respondents’ alleged failure to follow their own
written procedures for analysis of ILI data by failing to identify a foreign metal object in
close proximity to the pipe.
EGT/MRT presented information in their Response showing they had taken certain actions to
address the cited items. If OPS finds a violation of any of these items in a subsequent inspection,
Respondents may be subject to future enforcement action.
Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondents have a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of
this Final Order. The petition must be sent to: Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline
Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC
20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. PHMSA
will accept petitions received no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this Final Order by
the Respondents, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and meet all other
requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. The filing of a petition automatically stays the payment of
any civil penalty assessed. Unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay, all
other terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with
49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
___________________________________ __________________________
Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

420131010_NOPV PCP PCO_06172013_text.pdf

NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
June 17, 2013
Mr. Pete Kirsch
Sr. VP - Pipeline Operations and Engineering
Centerpoint Energy Gas Transmission Co
Mississippi River Transmission Co
1111 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002
CPF 4-2013-1010
Dear Pete Kirsch:
On multiple occasions between January 30 and October 19, 2012, representatives of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to
Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code conducted an onsite inspection of Centerpoint Energy Gas
Transmission Co. and Mississippi River Transmission Co. (together, CEGT) procedures and records
for Operations and Maintenance, Integrity Management, Emergency Response, Operator
Qualification, and Construction Specifications in Shreveport, LA.
As a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the Pipeline
Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the probable
violations are:



1. 2. 3. §191.5 Immediate notice of certain incidents.
(a) At the earliest practicable moment following discovery, each operator shall give
notice in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section of each incident as defined
in §191.3.
CEGT failed to give notice at the earliest practicable moment following discovery of Incident
No. 20070063-5058: At approximately 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2007, during disassembly of
an unloader involving compressor #3 on unit 2 (Unionville CS), an employee was struck in
the abdomen when the pressurized equipment caused an actuator to blow out and this
required immediate hospitalization for several days. CEGT did not report the incident to the
National Response Center (NRC) until May 30, 2007 despite the absence of any
circumstances that would have prevented it from making the telephonic report at or about the
time the employee was hospitalized.
§191.15 Transmission systems, gathering systems, and liquefied natural gas facilities.
Incident report.
(a) Transmission or Gathering. Each operator of a transmission or a gathering pipeline
system must submit DOT Form PHMSA F 7100.2 as soon as practicable but not
more than 30 days aft
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