{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420131014H","title":"FLORIDA GAS TRANSMISSION CO — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-06-24","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131014h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131014h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131014h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420131014H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving FLORIDA GAS TRANSMISSION CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2013-06-24 and is reported as closed as of 2016-07-27. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420131014H_Closure Letter_07272016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131014H/420131014H_Closure%20Letter_07272016.pdf\n\n420131014H_Closure Letter_07272016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131014H/420131014H_Closure%20Letter_07272016_text.pdf\n\n420131014H_Corrective Action Order_06242013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131014H/420131014H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_06242013.pdf\n\n420131014H_Corrective Action Order_06242013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131014H/420131014H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_06242013_text.pdf\n\n420131014H_Closure Letter_07272016_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nJuly 27, 2016\nMr. Ryan Coffey\nExecutive Vice President, Operations\nFlorida Gas Transmission Company, LLC\n800 Sonterra Blvd., #400\nSan Antonio, TX 78258\nCPF No. 4-2013-1014H\nDear Mr. Coffey:\nOn June 18, 2013, a failure occurred on Florida Gas Transmission’s (FGT) Line 200 pipeline\nnear the town of Enon in Washington Parish, Louisiana. The accident was reported to the\nNational Response Center (NRC Report # 1050774) on April June 18, 2013, at approximately\n07:30, local time.\nPHMSA issued the Corrective Action Order (CAO) CPF 4-2013-1014H, to FGT on June 24,\n2013, requiring a pressure restriction on the affected segment, development of a remedial work\nplan and mitigative actions necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline.\nOn July 26, 2016, FGT submitted an amended Remedial Work Plan and requested that upon its\napproval, the CAO be closed. The amended RWP, Final Version, Rev. 1 is hereby approved.\nPHMSA monitored the actions taken within the integrity verification process and reviewed\nrecords submitted by FGT. FGT has completed all of the requirements of the CAO.\nConsequently, no further action is necessary under this CAO and this case is now closed.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Eric Amundsen, VP Technical Services, Energy Transfer\n\n420131014H_Corrective Action Order_06242013_text.pdf\n\nJUNE 24, 2013\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (210) 403-7578\nRyan Coffey, Executive Vice President, Operations\nFlorida Gas Transmission Company, LLC\n800 E. Sonterra Blvd., #400\nSan Antonio, TX 78258\nRe: CPF No. 4-2013-1014H\nDear Mr. Coffey:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration in the above-referenced case. It requires Florida Gas Transmission Company,\nLLC, to take certain corrective actions with respect to its Line 200 natural gas pipeline that failed\non June 18, 2013, near the town of Enon in Washington Parish, Louisiana. Service is being\nmade by certified mail and facsimile. Service of this Corrective Action Order by facsimile or\nother electronic means is complete upon transmission or acknowledgement of receipt, as\nprovided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nimmediately upon service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\ncc: Enclosure\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Rod Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\nMr. Jeff Whippo, Vice President Operations Services, Florida Gas Transmission Company,\nLLC\nMr. Eric Amundsen, Vice President Technical Services, Florida Gas Transmission Company,\nLLC\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n__________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nFlorida Gas Transmission Company, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2013-1014H\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n__________________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112\nand 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, to require Florida Gas Transmission Company, LLC (FGT or\nRespondent), to take the necessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from potential hazards associated with a recent failure involving FGT’s Line 200\nnatural gas pipeline in Louisiana.\nOn June 18, 2013, a failure occurred on a 30-inch diameter section of Respondent’s Line 200\npipeline near the town of Enon in Washington Parish, Louisiana, resulting in the release of an\nunknown quantity of natural gas. The cause of the failure has not yet been determined.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the incident. The\npreliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are set forth below.\nPreliminary Findings\n• FGT, an affiliate of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, LP, operates approximately\n5,400 miles of interstate pipelines that transport natural gas from south Texas to south\nFlorida.1 Approximately 674 miles of the pipelines in FGT’s system are in the State of\nLouisiana. FGT’s natural gas pipelines in Louisiana include an original 24-inch diameter\n1 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, LP, is a subsidiary of Southern Union Company, which is owned by\nEnergy Transfer Partners, LP, through ETP Holdco Corporation. See\nhttp://www.panhandleenergy.com/comp fld.asp; http://www.energytransfer.com/overview sug.aspx (last accessed\nJune 21, 2013).\n\n\n\nmainline, designated as “Line 100,” that was constructed in the 1950s and later “looped”\nwith parallel of 26-inch diameter, 30-inch diameter, and 36-inch diameter pipelines.2\n• The “Line 200” pipeline is a loop line that includes a 26-inch diameter section that starts\nat the Buller Compressor Station at Mile Post (MP) 440.6 in western Louisiana and runs\nto the Zachary Compressor Station in Zachary, Louisiana at MP 559.3; and a 30-inch\ndiameter section that starts west of the Zachary Compressor Station at MP 520.1 and runs\napproximately 548 miles to Brooker, Florida. Portions of the 30-inch diameter section of\nLine 200 run through populated areas, environmentally sensitive areas, and cross state\nand local highways.\n• The 30-inch diameter section of Line 200 includes two adjacent sections on the upstream\nand downstream sides of the Franklinton Compressor Station (located at MP 64.8) that\nare designated as LAMEB-8 and LAMEB-9, respectively.\n• The pipeline failed on June 18, 2013, at approximately 6:49 a.m. CST on the 30-inch\ndiameter LAMEB-9 segment near MP 65.3, approximately 0.5 miles east of the\nFranklinton Compressor Station.\n• The force of the rupture ejected a 75-foot-long section of pipe from the ground and the\nescaping natural gas ignited, causing a fire that burned a nearby forest area and damaged\na residential dwelling and power transmission lines in the area. Various federal, state and\nlocal agencies, including PHMSA, responded to the scene of the failure. One person was\nhospitalized and emergency responders evacuated the area and extinguished the fire.\n• FGT shut down the pipeline compressors and closed the nearest upstream and\ndownstream main line valves to minimize further release of product. FGT reported the\nfailure to the National Response Center at 7:30 a.m. on June 18, 2013 (NRC Report No.\n1050774).\n• The 30-inch diameter section of Line 200 was originally constructed in 1966. It consists\nof Grade X60 pipe manufactured by Kaiser, has a wall thickness of 0.344,” has a double\nsubmerged arc welded (DSAW) seam, and has Bucote coating.\n• The maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the Line 200 segment on which\nthe failure occurred is 974 psig. At the time of the failure, the actual operating pressure\nof the pipeline at the failure site was approximately 952 psig.\n• Respondent has removed a 125-foot portion of the pipeline, including the failure origin,\nand is transporting it to a metallurgical lab for failure analysis. The LAMEB-9 portion of\nLine 200 remains out of service between Main Line Valve (MLV) 9-0 at the Franklinton\nCompressor Station and MLV 9-1.\n• The cause of the failure is still undetermined and the investigation is ongoing. A\npreliminary visual examination of the failed pipe at the scene indicated the possible\npresence of external corrosion.\n2 The system also includes various laterals.\n\n\n\n• This is the second failure on Line 200 in the past 16 months. On February 13, 2012, a\nfailure at pressures corresponding to similar pipe stress levels occurred on LAMEB-8\nbetween the Zachary Compressor Station and MP 8.1. This failure was determined to\nhave been caused by external corrosion.3\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in\nthe above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the\nenvironment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable\nafter the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\npipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.\nAdditionally, having considered the unknown cause of the failure; the location of the failure; the\nproximity of the pipeline to populated areas, highways, and environmentally sensitive areas; and\nthe nature of the product being transported; and the prior failure on the pipeline, I find that a\nfailure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in\nthe likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the environment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held\ntelephonically or in-person in Houston, Texas or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be\nnotified of any additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\n3 The LAMEB-8 pipe that failed in 2012 was also constructed in 1966, consisted of 30-inch diameter, Grade X60\npipe manufactured by Kaiser, had a wall thickness of 0.344,” and had a double submerged arc welded (DSAW)\nseam. On February 24, 2012, PHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed Safety Order [CPF No. 4-2012-1001S] in\nconnection with this failure and resulted in a pressure reduction and other required remedial actions.\n\n\n\nRequired Corrective Actions\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Florida Gas Transmission Company, LLC, to\nimmediately take the following corrective actions with respect to the 30-inch section of Line\n200:\n1. Metallurgical Testing. Complete metallurgical testing and analysis of the failed pipe as\nfollows:\nA. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site;\nB. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, submit to the Director a proposed\nselection of the testing laboratory and proposed metallurgical testing protocol if\ndifferent from PHMSA’s testing protocol for prior approval.\nC. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a\nPHMSA representative to witness the testing; and\nD. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety\n(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same time as\nthey are made available to Respondent.\n2. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Amend the Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA) of the\n2012 in-service failure of the LAMEB-8 line to incorporate the June 18, 2013 LAMEB-9\nfailure, and expand its scope to include the contributing factors as identified in the\nmetallurgical analysis for both failures. The RCFA must ensure that the management\npractices applied to the oversight of FGT’s corrosion and integrity programs are included\nin the scope of the failure analysis and proposed remedial actions. The RCFA must\ndocument all contributory factors and the basis for recommended actions. Submit a final\nreport of the RCFA results to the Director, including any lessons learned and whether the\nfindings are applicable to other locations on Line 200.\n3. Restart Plan. Develop and submit a written re-start plan for prior approval of the\nDirector, Southwest Region. The restart plan must provide for the completion of all\nnecessary repairs at the failure site, provide for adequate patrolling of the pipeline during\nthe restart process, and specify a daylight restart and provide for advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials. Obtain written approval from\nthe Director prior to resuming operation.\n4. Pressure Restricted Segment. After receiving approval from the Director to restart the\npipeline, the pressure in the LAMEB-9 segment running from the Franklinton\nCompressor Station at MP 64.8 to the Wiggins Compressor Station at MP 128.8\n(Pressure Restricted Segment) is not to exceed 80% of the actual operating pressure in\neffect immediately prior to the failure, or 762 psig. Further, FGT must ensure that the\nreduced operating pressures in the Pressure Restricted Segment will not exceed 65% of\nspecified minimum yield strength (SMYS) for this segment. This pressure restriction\n\n\n\nrequires that any relevant pressure control equipment, including remote or local alarm\nlimits, software programming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure\nprotection devices, be adjusted accordingly. If the results of any action undertaken\npursuant to the Order necessitate a reduction in the operating pressure permitted by the\nOrder, FGT must further reduce the operating pressure accordingly and notify the\nDirector. This pressure restriction will remain in effect on the Pressure Restricted\nSegment until written approval to increase the pressure or return the segment to its pre-\nfailure operating pressure is obtained from the Director.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification of\nthe pressure restriction set forth above upon a written request from Respondent\ndemonstrating that restoring the Pressure Restricted Segment to its pre-failure operating\npressure is justified, based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure\nincrease is safe, considering all known defects, anomalies and operating parameters of the\npipe in this segment.\n6. Remedial Work Plan. Within 90 days after completing the metallurgical testing and\nRCFA, submit a remedial work plan (“Work Plan”) to the Director for approval. The\nWork Plan must provide for the verification of the integrity of the 30-inch section of Line\n200 and must address all factors known or suspected in the failure, including but not\nlimited to the following:\nA. A written plan for: (1) the identification and remediation of areas of failed coating\nthrough methods capable of finding failed coating; and (2) the re-evaluation of\nFGT’s integrity management process for determining corrosion growth rates and\ndetermining appropriate inspection and integrity assessment intervals in areas\nwhere failed coating may exist, to ensure that assessments and repairs are\ncompleted prior to external corrosion failures.\nB. The integration of the results of the failure analyses and other actions required by\nthis Order with all relevant operating data for the 30-inch section of Line 200,\nincluding all historical repair information, construction, operating, maintenance,\ntesting, metallurgical analysis or other third-party consultation information, and\nassessment data;\nC. The performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations, to\ndetermine whether and to what extent the conditions associated with the failure or\nany other integrity-threatening conditions are present elsewhere on the pipeline.\nThe results of the inspections, field excavations, and evaluations must be made\navailable to PHMSA or its representative;\nD. The performance of repairs or other corrective measures that fully remediate the\nidentified risk conditions associated with the pipeline failure and any other\nintegrity-threatening condition identified under this Order. Based on the known\nhistory and condition of the pipeline, the plans for repairs must include continuing\nlong-term periodic testing and integrity verification measures to ensure the\nongoing safe operation of the pipeline, considering the results of the analyses,\ninspections, and corrective measures undertaken pursuant to the Order;\n\n\n\nE. A proposed schedule for completion of Items A−D.\n7. Incorporation and Revisions. The Work Plan will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder. Respondent must revise the Work Plan as necessary to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever necessary to incorporate new\ninformation obtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities. Submit any\nsuch plan revisions to the Director for prior approval. The Director may approve plan\nelements incrementally.\n8. Implementation. Implement the Work Plan as approved by the Director, including any\nrevisions to the plan.\n9. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and\nresults of the testing and evaluations conducted pursuant to this Order; and (2) describe\nthe progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly\nreport is due on September 15, 2013. The Director may change the interval for the\nsubmission of these reports.\n10. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Corrective Action\nOrder. Include in each monthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with:\n(1) preparation and revision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to\npipeline facilities, including repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3)\nenvironmental remediation, if applicable.\n11. Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval\nof the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b)\napprove the submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any\ndeficiencies; (d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent\nmodify the submission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval,\napproval upon conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to\ntake all action required by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the\nDirector disapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all\ndeficiencies within the time specified by the Director, and resubmit it for approval.\n12. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\nThe actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 192, under any\nother order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other\nprovision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\n\n\n\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 4-2013-1014H and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\n__________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":22256}