{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420131018","title":"ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-11-05","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.303, 192.467(d), 192.491(a), 192.605(a), 192.709(b), 192.719(a), 192.731(c), 192.739(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131018.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131018.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420131018","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420131018","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ENABLE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.303,  192.467(d),  192.491(a),  192.605(a),  192.709(b),  192.719(a),  192.731(c),  192.739(a). The case was opened on 2013-11-05 and is reported as closed as of 2016-04-25. Proposed civil penalty: $118,200. Assessed civil penalty: $118,200. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420131018_Closure Letter_04252016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131018/420131018_Closure%20Letter_04252016.pdf\n\n420131018_Closure Letter_04252016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131018/420131018_Closure%20Letter_04252016_text.pdf\n\n420131018_Final Order_01292015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131018/420131018_Final%20Order_01292015.pdf\n\n420131018_Final Order_01292015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131018/420131018_Final%20Order_01292015_text.pdf\n\n420131018_NOPV PCP PCO_11052013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131018/420131018_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_11052013.pdf\n\n420131018_NOPV PCP PCO_11052013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131018/420131018_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_11052013_text.pdf\n\n420131018_Operator Response to Notice_ 01202014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420131018/420131018_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_%2001202014.pdf\n\n420131018_Final Order_01292015_text.pdf\n\nJanuary 29, 2015\nMr. Lynn L. Bourdon III\nPresident and CEO\nEnable Midstream Partners, LP\nOne Leadership Square\n211 N Robinson Ave., Suite 950\nOklahoma City, OK 73102\nRe: CPF No. 4-2013-1018\nDear Mr. Bourdon:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a civil penalty of $118,200, and specifies actions that need to be taken by your\nsubsidiary, Enable Gas Transmission, LLC, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The\npenalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and\nthe terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region,\nOPS, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is\ndeemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Rodrick M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\nMr. Chris Bullock, Director, DOT Compliance, Enable Midstream Partners, LP\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nEnable Gas Transmission, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2013-1018\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn multiple dates in February and March, 2013, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives\nof the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of\nCenterpoint Energy Gas Transmission Company, LLC (CEGT), in Arkansas, Louisiana, and\nOklahoma. Since the date of that inspection, CEGT has been renamed Enable Gas Transmission,\nLLC (EGT or Respondent).1 EGT is one of two wholly-owned subsidiaries of Enable\nMidstream Partners, LP, which operates more than 8,000 miles of interstate pipeline located in\nArkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas.\n2\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated November 5, 2013, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice), which also included warnings pursuant to\n49 C.F.R. § 190.205. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that\nEGT had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and assessing a civil penalty of\n$118,200 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed ordering Respondent to take\ncertain measures to correct the alleged violations. The warning items required no further action,\nbut warned the operator to correct the probable violations or face future potential enforcement\naction.\nEGT responded to the Notice by letter dated January 20, 2014 (Response). The company\ncontested some of the allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and\nrequested that the proposed civil penalty be reduced. Respondent did not request a hearing and\ntherefore has waived its right to one.\n1 Centerpoint Energy Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 78 (Feb. 26, 2014), available at\nhttp://investors.centerpointenergy.com/annuals.cfm.\n2 http://www.centerpointenergy.com/services/pipelines/egt/ (last accessed on July 28, 2014).\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-1018\nPage 2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.467(d), which states:\n§ 192.467 External corrosion control: Electrical isolation.\n(a) Each buried or submerged pipeline must be electrically isolated\nfrom other underground metallic structures, unless the pipeline and the\nother structures are electrically interconnected and cathodically protected\nas a single unit.\n(b) . . . .\n(d) Inspection and electrical tests must be made to assure that electrical\nisolation is adequate.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.467(d) by failing to inspect and\nelectrically test each buried pipeline to assure that electrical isolation was adequate. Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that EGT’s corrosion control program procedure required testing of insulating\ndevices at custody-transfer locations on both the foreign side and the EGT side of the line, but\nthat the company had failed to take readings on the foreign side of insulating devices at 11\ndifferent locations for a total of 29 times during 2010, 2011, and 2012.\nIn its Response, EGT stated that the company missed only eight of the required readings, and\nrequested that PHMSA reduce the level of the proposed civil penalty and the scope of the\nproposed compliance order accordingly. EGT stated that 13 of the readings were at test points\n“categorized as ‘Normal’ rather than ‘Insulated’ and thus no ‘foreign side’ electric potential\nreading was required.”3 EGT stated that the eight missing readings were at test points that “had\nbeen mistakenly identified as ‘Insulated’ in EGT’s Maintenance Management System,” that EGT\nhad already identified and corrected the data error prior to PHMSA’s inspection, and that\ntherefore these missing readings should not be considered violations of the regulation. In\nsupport of this argument, EGT provided a report listing test-point inspection results.4\nEGT’s Response and attached report, however, do not explicitly identify which test readings the\ncompany believes fall into each category. My review of the report shows the following:\nTest Point Location Dates of tests with test-point\ntype listed as “Insulated”\nDates of tests with test-point\ntype listed as “Normal”\nTP 21250 5/6/2010 and 5/11/2011\nTP 24316 5/6/2010 and 5/11/2011 5/15/2012\nTP 26318 4/28/2010 and 4/18/2011\nTP 27667 12/21/2010 and 4/18/2011 4/10/2012\nTP 27668 12/21/2010 and 4/18/2011 4/10/2012\nTP 27669 12/21/2010 4/18/2011 and 4/10/2012\n3 Response at 5.\n4 Response Attachment 2-1.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-1018\nPage 3\nTP 27671 12/21/2010 4/18/2011 and 4/10/2012\nTP 27672 12/21/2010 4/18/2011 and 4/10/2012\nTP 27673 12/21/2010 4/18/2011 and 4/10/2012\nTP 4085 6/18/2010 6/13/2011 and 6/14/2012\nTP 8242 8/7/2010\nThis review does show eight locations where the test-point type was changed from “Insulated” to\n“Normal.” However, EGT did not provide an explanation as to why the test points that had been\nmistakenly identified as “Insulated” were later changed to “Normal” and why they were not\ncorrected on the report at the time of the inspections if they were not, in fact, insulated. If EGT\ndiscovered during a test that a test point was identified incorrectly, the test record should have\nmade a note of this data error.\nAt least one test was conducted at each of the 11 test-point locations that had been identified as\n“Insulated,” but EGT neither conducted a “foreign-side” test at these sites nor corrected the\nidentification of the test point. In each of these 11 locations, the company’s records fail to\ndemonstrate that EGT was able to assure that electrical isolation was indeed adequate.\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence and the legal issues presented, I find that\nRespondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.467(d) by failing to inspect and electrically test each buried\npipeline to assure that electrical isolation was adequate.\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a), which states:\n§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance\nactivities and for emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual\nmust also include procedures for handling abnormal operations. This\nmanual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at intervals not\nexceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. This manual\nmust be prepared before operations of a pipeline system commence.\nAppropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations where operations\nand maintenance activities are conducted.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) by failing to follow its own\nmanual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities. Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that EGT’s procedures required it to periodically evaluate pipeline “dead legs”\nfor corrosivity through gas sampling, coupons, and liquid sampling, but that the company failed\nto conduct evaluations at five such locations, at facilities with piping that was defined as “U-\nshaped” or “L-shaped.”\nIn its Response, EGT stated that it had “complied with its procedures for evaluating the risk of\ncorrosion in dead legs identified” in the Notice.\n5 EGT explained that its Corrosion Control\n5 Response at 8.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-1018\nPage 4\nProgram Procedure PS-03-02-002 did not require that the company inspect each dead leg.\nRather, it argued that its procedure required that EGT “evaluate the risk of internal corrosion\nbased on multiple factors and the presence of corrosive gas…. Applying these procedures, EGT\n‘evaluates’ its entire system, of which the dead legs addressed in the [Notice] would be a part of\n[sic], based on these factors.”6 EGT went on to explain that the procedure also referenced the\ncompany’s Integrity Management Program to assess and evaluate the risk of internal corrosion.\nFinally, EGT stated that its “systematic evaluations showed no corrosive gas conditions upstream\nof the dead leg locations addressed in [the Notice], so no further evaluation within those dead leg\nlocations was required by EGT’s procedures.”7\nI disagree, for two reasons. First, EGT did not provide a copy of its evaluation or analysis of\nupstream conditions that supposedly determined there were no corrosive conditions and that the\ndead legs in question here did not need to be evaluated for internal corrosion. In fact, the\nprocedure that was available during the OPS inspection and the version that EGT provided in its\nResponse could readily support the opposite conclusion. It identified several factors that\ninfluence the formation of internal corrosion, including dead legs, and stated: “Because of the\nabove factors, the Company will periodically evaluate gas pipelines for corrosivity through gas\nsampling, coupons, and liquid sampling as required.”\nSecond, EGT stated that it complied with its procedure by performing system-wide evaluations,\nbut did not identify how the company evaluated the “U-shaped” and “L-shaped” dead legs\nidentified in the Notice. In its Response, EGT provided a copy of its 2009 Dead Leg Inspection\nProgram – Final Summary Report, which states: “The typical dead leg configuration we are\ntrying to evaluate is one of the following where a section of pipe has been stubbed or capped\nsuch that there is no/low flow gas conditions.” The report goes on: “Five or 6 representative\ndead legs were selected from each region with the intention of developing a diversified sampling\nof the dead legs across the company pipeline system. The location of these dead legs was\nidentified based on feedback from personnel from each region.”8\nWhile such a systematic approach is commendable, EGT still failed to follow its own procedures\nfor evaluating each type of dead leg that existed on its system. Notably, the dead legs that were\nidentified in the Notice were all oriented in the vertical plane, and there is no indication that EGT\nevaluated other dead legs with similar characteristics or considered the orientation of the dead\nlegs as a factor to be considered in its inspection program\nAs a consequence, EGT failed to demonstrate that it had evaluated all types of dead legs in its\nsystem, including “U-shaped” and “L-shaped” dead legs and those oriented in the vertical plane,\nfor internal corrosion through gas sampling, coupons, and liquid sampling as required by its\nCorrosion Control Program Procedure PS-03-02-001. Accordingly, after considering all of the\nevidence and the legal issues presented, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a)\nby failing to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance\n6 Response at 9.\n7 Id.\n8 Response, Attachment 7-4, at 1.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-1018\nPage 5\nactivities.\nItem 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.739(a), which states:\n§ 192.739 Pressure limiting and regulating stations: Inspection and\ntesting.\n(a) Each pressure limiting station, relief device (except rupture discs),\nand pressure regulating station and its equipment must be subjected at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, to\ninspections and tests to determine that it is—\n(1) In good mechanical condition;\n(2) Adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of\noperation for the service in which it is employed;\n(3) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, set to control or\nrelieve at the correct pressure consistent with the pressure limits of\n§ 192.201(a); and\n(4) Properly installed and protected from dirt, liquids, or other\nconditions that might prevent proper operation.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.739(a) by failing to inspect and test\neach pressure regulating station at least once each calendar year to determine that it is set to\ncontrol or relieve at the correct pressure consistent with the pressure limits of § 192.201(a).\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that from 2007 to 2011, EGT failed to inspect regulating station\nMSM11007 to ensure it was set to control or relieve pressure consistent with the pressure limits\nof the downstream plastic pipeline RM-5.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.739(a) by failing to inspect and\ntest each pressure regulating station to determine that it is set to control or relieve at the correct\npressure consistent with the pressure limits of § 192.201(a).\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.9 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; and any effect\n9 The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, § 2(a)(1), 125 Stat.\n1904, January 3, 2012, increased the civil penalty liability for violating a pipeline safety standard to $200,000 per\nviolation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any related series of violations.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-1018\nPage 6\nthat the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of\nRespondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may\nconsider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of\nsubsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total\ncivil penalty of $118,200 for the violations cited above.\nItem 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $72,700 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.467(d), for failing to inspect and electrically test each buried pipeline to assure\nthat electrical isolation was adequate. The Notice alleged that Respondent failed to take readings\non the foreign side of insulating devices at 11 different locations a total of 29 times, and\naccordingly proposed a civil penalty based on 11 violations of the regulation.\nIn its Response, EGT stated that the company missed only eight of the required readings and\nrequested that the civil penalty be reduced accordingly. However, as discussed above, I found\nthat at all 11 test point locations, at least one test was conducted during a time when it was\nidentified as “Insulated,” yet neither a “foreign-side” test was conducted nor was the\nidentification of the test point corrected. I have reviewed the original penalty that was proposed\nand find that it was reasonably based on the 11 test sites in question, not the total number of tests\nthat were allegedly missed.\nElectrical isolation is necessary to protect against external corrosion, which can cause pipeline\nfailure if left unchecked. Respondent was fully culpable for its failure to conduct the tests\naccording to its own procedures and records. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and\nconsidered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $72,700 for violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.467(d).\nItem 10: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $45,500 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.739(a), for failing to inspect and test each pressure regulating station to\ndetermine that it is set to control or relieve at the correct pressure consistent with the pressure\nlimits of § 192.201(a). Respondent did not contest either the allegation or the proposed penalty.\nPressure limiting devices are necessary to prevent over-pressurization, which can cause a\npipeline failure. Respondent’s failure to inspect this pressure regulating station for five years\ncould have resulted in a serious pipeline accident. Respondent was fully aware of the\nrequirement and fully culpable for the violation. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and\nconsidered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $45,500 for violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.739(a).\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the\nItems cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $118,200.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, P. O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125. The\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-1018\nPage 7\nFinancial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.\nFailure to pay the $118,200 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual\nrate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 2 and 7 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.467(d) and 192.605(a), respectively. Under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns or operates a\npipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established under\nchapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217,\nRespondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety\nregulations applicable to its operations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 192.467(d) (Item 2), Respondent must evaluate\nits pipeline system and locate all custody-transfer electrical isolation points. At each\nsuch location, Respondent must confirm that electrical isolation is adequate and take\nprompt action to correct any deficiencies. Respondent must complete this item and\nprovide a report detailing any deficiencies and remediation to the Director within 180\ndays after receipt of this Final Order.\n2. With respect to the violation of § 192.605(a) (Item 7), Respondent must develop a\nplan to locate and evaluate all types of dead legs within its pipeline system for\ninternal corrosion, and must submit this plan to the Director within 90 days after\nreceipt of this Final Order. Respondent must document the evaluation of each dead\nleg location and any corrective actions taken as a result of these evaluations, and\nsubmit the results to the Director within one year after receipt of this Final Order.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nnot to exceed $200,000 for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the\nAttorney General for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-1018\nPage 8\nWARNING ITEMS\nWith respect to Items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9, the Notice alleged probable violations of Part 192 but\ndid not propose a civil penalty or compliance order for these items. Therefore, these are\nconsidered to be warning items. The warnings were for:\n49 C.F.R. § 192.476(d) (Item 1) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to maintain\nrecords demonstrating compliance with § 192.476(d) regarding internal corrosion\ncontrol in the design and construction of transmission lines; and\n49 C.F.R. § 192.491(a) (Item 3) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to maintain\nrecords or maps showing the location of anodes used to provide cathodic\nprotection to an isolated section of its pipeline; and\n49 C.F.R. § 192.731(c) (Item 4) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to inspect and\ntest each remote control shutdown device at intervals not exceeding 15 months,\nbut at least once each calendar year; and\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) (Items 5 and 6) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to follow\nits manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance\nactivities;10\n49 C.F.R. § 192.709(b) (Item 8) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to maintain\nrecords associated with the replacement of a safety valve for at least five years;\nand\n49 C.F.R. § 192.719(a) (Item 9) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to test\nreplacement pipe used to repair a segment of transmission line, to the pressure\nrequired for a new line installed in the same location.\nEGT presented information in its Response showing that it had taken certain actions to address\nthe cited items. If OPS finds a violation of any of these items in a subsequent inspection,\nRespondent may be subject to future enforcement action.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be sent to: Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC\n20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. PHMSA\nwill accept petitions received no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this Final Order by\nthe Respondent, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and meet all other\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. The filing of a petition automatically stays the payment of\nany civil penalty assessed. Unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay, all\n10 In its Response to Item 6, EGT noted that it had identified and corrected this violation prior to the OPS\ninspection, and requested that PHMSA take such efforts into account as a mitigating factor to reduce a proposed\ncivil penalty or proposed compliance order requirement. The NOPV did not propose a civil penalty or compliance\norder for this alleged violation, so no mitigation or revision is needed. See Response at 2-3.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-1018\nPage 9\nother terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n420131018_Closure Letter_04252016_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nApril 25, 2016\nMr. Paul Brewer\nSenior VP Operations and EH&S\nEnable Gas Transmission, LLC\nOne Leadership Square\n211 N Robinson Ave., Suite 150\nOklahoma City, OK 7310\nCPF 4-2013-1018\nDear Mr. Brewer:\nFrom February through March 2013, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) issued to Enable Gas Transmission, LLC a Final Order in the above-\nreferenced case. This Order included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based\non our review of the documentation you provided and confirmation of payment of the civil\npenalty, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, SW Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n420131018_NOPV PCP PCO_11052013_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nNovember 5, 2013\nMr. Pete Kirsch\nSr. VP - Pipeline Operations and Engineering\nEnable Gas Transmission, LLC\n1111 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 4-2013-1018\nDear Mr. Kirsch:\nOn multiple dates in February and March, 2013, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter\n601 of 49 United States Code inspected portions of Centerpoint Energy Gas Transmission Co\n(CEGT) pipeline system located in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. PHMSA understands\nthat CEGT is now known as Enable Gas Transmission, LLC.\nAs a result of the inspections, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the\nprobable violations are:\n1. §192.303 Compliance with specifications or standards.\nEach transmission line or main must be constructed in accordance with\ncomprehensive written specifications or standards that are consistent with this part.\n§192.476 Internal corrosion control: Design and construction of transmission line.\n(d) Records. An operator must maintain records demonstrating compliance with this\nsection. Provided the records show why incorporating design features addressing\nparagraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of this section is impracticable or unnecessary, an\n\n\n\n2. operator may fulfill this requirement through written procedures supported by as-\nbuilt drawings or other construction records.\nCenterpoint Energy Gas Transmission Co. (CEGT) failed to demonstrate compliance\nwith their procedure and did not complete Form PS8256 (9-2009) or file the form in the\ndesign and line files.\nCEGT Corrosion Control Program Procedure PS-06-01-205 Design and Construction of\nNew Pipeline or Replacement Sections - to Reduce the Risk of Internal Corrosion, section\n2.7 Record Keeping states,\n“The design for new gas transmission and/or new gas transmission\npipeline segments shall be documented on Form PS8256 Design and\nConstruction of New Pipeline or Replacement Sections - to reduce the risk\nof internal corrosion, including at least one selection under each of the\nfollowing parts -...”\nIt further states,\n“This documentation will be filed in the design file and line file…”\nWhile reviewing CEGT project AFE #11583, Line F-625, the PHMSA inspector learned\nthat CEGT did not complete the Form PS8256 (9-2009). CEGT completed and provided\nthis document on 2/6/2013 only after the PHMSA inspector requested a copy at the time\nof the inspection.\n§192.467 External corrosion control: Electrical isolation.\n(d) Inspection and electrical tests must be made to assure that electrical isolation is\nadequate.\nCEGT failed to conduct electrical tests on the foreign pipeline side at custody transfer\npoints to assure adequate electrical isolation.\nAccording to the CEGT Corrosion Control Program, Procedure PS-03-02-232\nInstallation of Insulating Devices, section 2.2 Locations states,\n“Typical locations where electrical insulating devices may be installed\ninclude the following:\n…\nPoint at which facilities change ownership, such as meter stations and\nwell heads.\n…”\nSection 2.4 Compressor Station Piping, Insulating flanges and Solid State Decouplers\n(SSD): states,\n2\n\n\n\n“… The required monitoring of cathodic protection systems and the\nevaluation of test data is sufficient to ensure that electrical isolation is\nadequate and the SSD are functioning properly…\n… If the potentials are more than 100 mv apart, this is generally an\nindication that the device is functioning properly. If the potentials are\nwithin 100mv of each other, additional evaluations are required to\ndetermine the condition of the insulation and for possible repair.”\nThe CEGT Corrosion Control Program Procedure PS-03-02-230 Pipe-to-Soil Potential\nSurvey, revised date 02/02/2011, section 2.5 Electrode Placement states,\n“… Insulating devices: (See Figure 4)\n- Place the electrode in a position where both the foreign-side and the\npipeline side of the insulating fittings can be reached to ensure isolation.\nDo not move the electrode during this test. Take and document the\npotential readings for storage in the MMS.…”\nDuring the inspection, the PHMSA inspector noted CEGT failed to take potential\nreadings on the foreign-side of insulating devices at the following sites during the\ncalendar years 2010, 2011, and 2012:\nTP 21250 on 5/6/2010 and 5/11/2011 - STEEL SCAPE.\nTP 24316 on 5/6/2010, 5/11/2011, 5/15/2012 - PRAT.\nTP 26318 on 4/28/2010, 4/18/2011 - REGENCY.\nTP 27667 on 12/21/2010, 4/18/2011, 4/10/2012 - SWEPCO POWER PLANT.\nTP 27668 on 12/21/2010, 4/18/2011, 4/10/2012 - SWEPCO POWER PLANT.\nTP 27669 on 12/21/2010, 4/18/2011, 4/10/2012 - SWEPCO POWER PLANT.\nTP 27671 on 12/21/2010, 4/18/2011, 4/10/2012 - SWEPCO POWER PLANT.\nTP 27672 on 12/21/2010, 4/18/2011, 4/10/2012 - SWEPCO POWER PLANT.\nTP 27673 on 12/21/2010, 4/18/2011, 4/10/2012 - SWEPCO POWER PLANT.\nTP 4085 on 6/18/2010, 6/13/2011, 6/14/2012 - LIEBERMAN POWER PLANT.\nTP 8242 on 8/7/2010 - IP DOMINO.\n3. §192.491 Corrosion control records.\n(a) Each operator shall maintain records or maps to show the location of\ncathodically protected piping, cathodic protection facilities, galvanic anodes,\nand neighboring structures bonded to the cathodic protection system. Records\nor maps showing a stated number of anodes, installed in a stated manner or\nspacing, need not show specific distances to each buried anode.\nCEGT did not maintain maps or records showing the anode locations or note the number\nof anodes and the spacing used to provide cathodic protection to an isolated section of\nLine 634-2.\n3\n\n\n\n4. 5. CEGT’s Line 634-2 has a section of 2 inch steel pipeline that is isolated from the\nimpressed current cathodic protection system by a section of 2 inch plastic pipe. The\nisolated section of Line 634-2 is protected by galvanic anodes. CP records for 2009,\n2010, 2011, and 2012 verified that the isolated section of pipeline had adequate cathodic\nprotection. Per §192.491(a), CEGT records and/or maps should state the number of\nanodes installed in a stated manner or spacing.\n§192.731 Compressor stations: Inspection and testing of relief devices.\n(c) Each remote control shutdown device must be inspected and tested at intervals\nnot exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, to determine that\nit functions properly.\nCEGT personnel failed to inspect and test at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at\nleast once each calendar year, the Remote Control Shutdown devices (ESD) at the Allen\nCompressor Station in calendar year 2010.\nPHMSA reviewed the ESD maintenance and testing records for Allen Compressor\nStation for the years 2008 through 2012 during this inspection of the Ada Team area.\nThe 2008 and 2009 ESD maintenance was performed in December of each year. The\n2010 ESD maintenance should have been completed by December 31, 2010. No\nmaintenance was performed in the calendar year 2010 for the 9 ESD activation locations\nat the compressor station. The 2011 ESD maintenance was performed in January and the\n2012 ESD maintenance was performed in February.\n§192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities and\nfor emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual must also include\nprocedures for handling abnormal operations. This manual must be reviewed\nand updated by the operator at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least\none each calendar year. This manual must be prepared before operations of a\npipeline system commence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at\nlocations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\nCEGT failed to follow their procedure and ensure that no permanent structure will be\nallowed on the Company’s pipeline right-of-ways that may obstruct maintenance or\nimmediate access to the pipeline. There are two (2) permanent structures on the pipeline\nright-of-way placed directly over Line JM-19.\nCEGT Operating and Maintenance Plan Procedure No.: 244 Encroachment, section A.\nPermanent Structures states,\n“No permanent structure will be allowed on the Company’s pipeline right-\nof-ways that may obstruct maintenance or immediate access to the\n4\n\n\n\n6. pipeline. These structures include (but are not limited to) houses, trailer\nhouses, mobile homes, camp houses, camping structures, patios, carports,\nsheds, barns, silos, chicken houses, water wells and non-skidded auxiliary\nbuildings.”\nFurthermore section J. Reimbursement, 3. states,\n“The following form shall be completed where applicable: Form PS-7989\n– Report of Encroachment on Pipeline Right of Way.”\nDuring the Wynne Team area inspection, PHMSA visited a small commercial/industrial\narea along Line JM-19, a 12 inch pipeline. At 334 Phillips Road 311, the pipeline\ntraverses the parking lot in front of NORAC, one of the businesses in the area. The\npipeline is approximately 15 feet to the east side of Phillips Road 311. Situated on\nNORAC property along each side property line (perpendicular to Phillips Rd 311) and\ndirectly over Line JM-19, there are two enclosed structures housing water metering\nfacilities.\nOn March 11, 2013, the PHMSA inspector checked with the CEGT Compliance\nSpecialist for the Northern Business area to see if past patrolling records would have\nnoted the sheds. CEGT personnel stated that the structures were in place for\napproximately 8 years. Patrolling records from 2004 to the present date were checked\nand did not note the structures over the pipeline. Also, CEGT was unable to locate\ncompleted forms 7989, Report of Encroachment on Pipeline Right of Way, for these\nlocations. Report of Encroachment on Pipeline Right of Way forms were initiated for the\ntwo encroachments along Phillips Road 311 on March 4, 2013 following this inspection.\n§192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities and\nfor emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual must also include\nprocedures for handling abnormal operations. This manual must be reviewed\nand updated by the operator at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least\none each calendar year. This manual must be prepared before operations of a\npipeline system commence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at\nlocations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\n§192.745 Valve maintenance: Transmission lines.\n(a) Each transmission line valve that might be required during any emergency must be\ninspected and partially operated at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least\nonce each calendar year.\nCEGT failed to follow their procedures and maintain valve BV82309 as required by\n§192.745(a). According to CEGT, this valve is an essential valve that would be\nnecessary in an emergency situation.\n5\n\n\n\n7. CEGT Operations and Maintenance Plan Procedure No. 232, Emergency Valve\nOperation and Maintenance, A. Requirement, states\n“1. The following are designated as emergency valves:\n…\nd. Valves at branches or intracompany pipeline connections.\n…\nEach of these valves shall be partially operated at intervals not exceeding\n15 months, but at least once each calendar year.”\nDuring this inspection, PHMSA noted that CEGT failed to maintain valve BV82309 (4”\ntie-in for Line 1-F-7) and could not provide the records indicating the valve was\ninspected prior to 2011. According to the documents provided, the valve was first\ninspected on 3/1/2011. CEGT advised the PHMSA inspector that the valve was operated\nnumerous times since the valve was installed, but could not provide any documentation to\nindicate that it was inspected.\n§192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities and\nfor emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual must also include\nprocedures for handling abnormal operations. This manual must be reviewed\nand updated by the operator at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least\none each calendar year. This manual must be prepared before operations of a\npipeline system commence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at\nlocations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\n§192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies\n(b) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this\nsection must include procedures for the f","truncated":true,"body_characters":53098}