{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420135005M","title":"ENBRIDGE PIPELINES (OZARK) L.L.C. — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-03-04","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.132(b), 195.205(b), 195.264(b), 195.264(c), 195.307(d), 195.405(a), 195.430, 195.571, 195.573(c).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135005m.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135005m.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135005m","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420135005M","body":"Notice of Amendment involving ENBRIDGE PIPELINES (OZARK) L.L.C.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.132(b),  195.205(b),  195.264(b),  195.264(c),  195.307(d),  195.405(a),  195.430,  195.571,  195.573(c). The case was opened on 2013-03-04 and is reported as closed as of 2016-05-26. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420135005M_Closure Letter_05262016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135005M/420135005M_Closure%20Letter_05262016.pdf\n\n420135005M_Closure Letter_05262016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135005M/420135005M_Closure%20Letter_05262016_text.pdf\n\n420135005M_NOA_03042013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135005M/420135005M_NOA_03042013.pdf\n\n420135005M_NOA_03042013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135005M/420135005M_NOA_03042013_text.pdf\n\n420135005M_Operator Response to Notice_04262013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135005M/420135005M_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_04262013.pdf\n\n420135005M_Order Directing Amendment_03032015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135005M/420135005M_Order%20Directing%20Amendment_03032015.pdf\n\n420135005M_Order Directing Amendment_03032015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135005M/420135005M_Order%20Directing%20Amendment_03032015_text.pdf\n\n420135005M_Closure Letter_05262016_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMay 26, 2016\nMr. Brad Shamla\nVice President, US Operations\nEnbridge Storage (Cushing), L.L.C.\n1100 Louisiana Street, Suite 3300\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 4-2013-5005M\nDear Mr. Shamla:\nOn In November 2011, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), inspected\nthe operating and maintenance procedures for Enbridge Pipelines (Ozark), LLC (Enbridge), a\nsubsidiary of Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., at its facilities in Cushing, Oklahoma. This facility\nhas since been reincorporated under the name Enbridge Storage (Cushing), L.L.C. As a result of\nthe inspection, Enbridge was issued a Notice of Amendment (NOA) on March 4, 2013, which\nproposed amendment of your procedures. The Enbridge responses to the NOA were not adequate\nand on March 23, 2015, PHMSA issued an Order Directing Amendment.\nEnbridge responded by submitting revised procedures on July 31, 2015, August 19, 2015, and\nSeptember 12, 2015. A PHMSA review of the Enbridge response found the procedure revisions\nto be acceptable.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you\nfor your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n420135005M_Order Directing Amendment_03032015_text.pdf\n\nMarch 3, 2015\nMr. Mark Maki\nPresident\nEnbridge Energy Partners, LP\n1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3300\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2013-5005M\nDear Mr. Maki:\nEnclosed please find the Order Directing Amendment issued in the above-referenced case. It\nmakes findings of inadequate procedures and requires that your subsidiary, Enbridge Pipelines\n(Ozark), LLC, amend certain operating and maintenance procedures. When these procedures\nhave been properly amended, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement\naction will be closed. Service of the Order Directing Amendment by certified mail is effective\nupon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Rodrick M. Seeley, Southwest Region Director, OPS\nMr. Shaun Kavajecz, US Pipeline Compliance, Enbridge Energy,\n26 E. Superior Street, Suite 309, Duluth, Minnesota 55811\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n__________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nEnbridge Pipelines (Ozark), LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2013-5005M\na subsidiary of Enbridge Energy Partners, LP, )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n__________________________________________)\nORDER DIRECTING AMENDMENT\nIn November 2011, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\ninspected the operating and maintenance procedures for Enbridge Pipelines (Ozark), LLC\n(Enbridge or Respondent), a subsidiary of Enbridge Energy Partners, LP,1 at its facilities in\nCushing, Oklahoma. Enbridge Energy Partners, LP, owns and operates approximately 3,386\nmiles of liquid pipelines running from Oklahoma to Illinois, North Dakota to Illinois, Montana to\nMinnesota, and across Louisiana and Mississippi.2\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated March 4, 2013, a Notice of Amendment (Notice). The Notice\nalleged certain inadequacies in Respondent’s written procedures for operations, maintenance and\nemergencies and requested, in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.237, that Respondent amend\nseveral of them.\nEnbridge responded to the Notice by letter dated April 26, 2013 (Response), and submitted\namended procedures. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to\none. Upon review of the amended procedures submitted by Respondent and for the reasons\ndiscussed below, I find the amendments still do not adequately address Items 1-9 in the Notice.\n1 See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/containers/fix069/880285/000119312509033100/dex211 htm (last\naccessed on January 7, 2015).\n2 See http://enbridgepartners.com/Delivering-Energy/Pipeline-Svstems/Liquids-Pipelines/ (last accessed on\nDecember 17, 2014).\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 2\nFINDINGS OF INADEQUATE PROCEDURES\nRespondent contested the allegations in the Notice but submitted amended procedures to address\nthe alleged inadequacies. I have reviewed the revised procedures and considered the following:\nrelevant available pipeline safety data; whether the plans or procedures are adequate for\nEnbridge’s unique facilities and in their particular location(s); the reasonableness of the\nprocedures; and the extent to which the procedures contribute to public safety. Upon such\nreview of the revised procedures under 49 C.F.R. § 190.237, I find as follows:\nItems 1 and 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures are inadequate to ensure safe\noperation of its pipeline facilities because they fail to include proper procedures addressing\n49 C.F.R. §§ 195.132 and 195.205, which state:\n§ 195.132 Design and construction of aboveground breakout tanks.\n(a) Each aboveground breakout tank must be designed and\nconstructed to withstand the internal pressure produced by the hazardous\nliquid to be stored therein and any anticipated external loads.\n(b) For aboveground breakout tank first placed in service after\nOctober 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section requires\none of the following:\n(1) Shop-fabricated, vertical, cylindrical, closed top, welded steel\ntanks with nominal capacities of 90 to 750 barrels (14.3 to 119.2 m3) and\nwith internal vapor space pressures that are approximately atmospheric\nmust be designed and constructed in accordance with [American\nPetroleum Institute (API)] Specification 12F.\n(2) Welded, low-pressure (i.e., internal vapor space pressure not\ngreater than 15 psig (103.4 kPa)), carbon steel tanks that have wall shapes\nthat can be generated by a single vertical axis of revolution must be\ndesigned and constructed in accordance with API Standard 620.\n(3) Vertical, cylindrical, welded steel tanks with internal pressures at\nthe tank top approximating atmospheric pressures (i.e., internal vapor\nspace pressures not greater than 2.5 psig (17.2 kPa), or not greater than the\npressure developed by the weight of the tank roof) must be designed and\nconstructed in accordance with API Standard 650.\n(4) High pressure steel tanks (i.e., internal gas or vapor space\npressures greater than 15 psig (103.4 kPa)) with a nominal capacity of\n2000 gallons (7571 liters) or more of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) must\nbe designed and constructed in accordance with API Standard 2510.\n§ 195.205 Repair, alteration and reconstruction of aboveground\nbreakout tanks that have been in service.\n(a) Aboveground breakout tanks that have been repaired, altered, or\nreconstructed and returned to service must be capable of withstanding the\ninternal pressure produced by the hazardous liquid to be stored therein and\nany anticipated external loads.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 3\n(b) After October 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this\nsection requires the following for the tanks specified:\n(1) For tanks designed for approximately atmospheric pressure\nconstructed of carbon and low alloy steel or riveted, and non-refrigerated\nand tanks built to API Standard 650 or its predecessor Standard 12C,\nrepair, alteration, and reconstruction must be in accordance with API\nStandard 653.\n(2) For tanks built to API Specification 12F or API Standard 620, the\nrepair, alteration, and reconstruction must be in accordance with the\ndesign, welding, examination, and material requirements of those\nrespective standards.\n(3) For high pressure tanks built to API Standard 2510, repairs,\nalterations, and reconstruction must be in accordance with API 510.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures implementing §§ 195.132 and 195.205 are\ninadequate because they specify that the most recent editions of industry standards API\nStandards 650 and 653, respectively, shall apply rather than the versions of such standards that\nPHMSA has incorporated by reference into 49 C.F.R. Part 195. Specifically, the Notice alleges\nthat 49 C.F.R. § 195.3 incorporates API Standard 650, “Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage”\n(11th edition, June 2007, addendum 1, November 2008) (API 650, 11th Edition) and API\nStandard 653, “Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction” (3rd edition, December\n2001, including addendum 1 (September 2003), addendum 2 (November 2005), addendum 3\n(February 2008), and errata (April 2008)) (API 653, 3rd Edition), but that Enbridge’s procedures\nuse the more recent editions of both standards.\nIn its Response, Enbridge acknowledges that it uses the latest editions of Standards 650 and 653\nbut argues that by using the more recent editions, Enbridge is “meeting or exceeding the\nrequirements” of Part 195 for the construction and inspection of above-ground breakout tanks.3\nThe company puts forth the argument that the current API Standards 650 and 653 have been\nrigorously vetted through their respective API committees, which are composed of a “cross\nsection of the foremost industry tank experts.” According to Enbridge, any changes made to the\nexisting standards must be approved by the majority of the committee and are done with the\nsafety of the public as a top priority.4 Enbridge argues that the more recent editions of API\nStandards 650 and 653 move the industry to build and maintain above-ground storage tanks at a\nmore consistent and increased level of safety than previous versions.\nFor example, the company contends that the 2008 version of API Standard 653 allows for a Risk\nBased Inspection (RBI) analysis to establish inspection intervals, which, in many cases, “would\nachieve the same or possibly less conservative results as using the latest version.” According to\nEnbridge, the latest version of API Standard 653 takes this RBI assessment process and\n3 Response at 2.\n4 Id.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 4\ntranslates it “into more tangible criteria as related to the key risk variables (i.e., cathodic\nprotection, linings, leak detection, etc.).”5\nRespondent further argues that the present case is similar to an earlier PHMSA enforcement\naction where, in December 2008, PHMSA issued a stay of enforcement regarding API 5L and\nAPI 1104, two other standards where the agency had indicated its intention to incorporate the\nmore recent editions of the standards and declared, in the interim, that it would not enforce the\nthen-current standards. Enbridge argues that the latest versions of API Standards 650 and 653 are\nsimilarly preferable to API 650, 11th Edition, and API 653, 3rd Edition, and that the company\nwould prefer to reference the latest editions of both standards.\nWhile PHMSA appreciates the argument that the latest versions of consensus standards often\n“raise the bar” for safety and call for a higher level of safety than older consensus standards, this\nis not always the case and is why PHMSA frequently declines to incorporate all parts of newly-\nrevised standards. I cannot agree that a pipeline operator’s adoption of a recently-revised\nconsensus standard is sufficient per se to assure the safe operation of a pipeline facility when that\nnew standard has not gone through the formal review and scrutiny of a PHMSA rulemaking, as\nis true for all standards incorporated by reference into 49 C.F.R. Part 195. Also, the regulation in\nquestion here is quite clear insofar as it specifies what edition of a standard must be followed.\nAccordingly, I find that both of Enbridge’s procedures using the most recent editions of API\nStandards 650 and 653 were inadequate at the time of the inspection because they did not use the\nAPI standards that had been incorporated by reference into 49 C.F.R. Part 195 as of that date.\nHowever, with regard to API Standard 650, 11th Edition, circumstances have changed since the\ntime of the 2011 inspection of Enbridge’s facilities. The American Petroleum Institute has\ncontinued to update this standard with certain addenda. PHMSA has recently completed its\nreview of this revised standard, along with roughly 21 other updated industry standards, and has\ndecided to incorporate it by reference into the pipeline safety regulations, by final rule published\non January 5, 2015 (Final Rule).\n6 Therefore, Enbridge may now cite and follow this particular\nedition of the standard.7\nOn the other hand, PHMSA specifically chose not to incorporate the updated 4th Edition of API\nStandard 653 in this same rulemaking.\n8 Therefore, I find that Enbridge’s procedures\nimplementing § 195.132 remain inadequate because the company has continued to use the most\nrecent edition of API Standard 653, rather than the version that has been incorporated by\nreference into 49 C.F.R. Part 195.\n5 Id.\n6 Pipeline Safety: Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to Technical Standards and Miscellaneous\nAmendments, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 168 (January 5, 2015).\n7 API Standard 650, “Welded Tanks for Oil Storage” (11th edition, June 2007, effective February 1, 2012), includes\naddendum 1 (November 2008), addendum 2 (November 2009), addendum 3 (August 2011), and errata (October\n2011).\n8 Id. at 171.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 5\nAccordingly, Enbridge is hereby ordered to amend its procedures implementing 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.132 to use the versions of API Standards 650 and 653 currently incorporated by reference\ninto Part 195.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures are inadequate to ensure safe operation\nof its pipeline facilities because they fail to include proper procedures addressing 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.264, which states, in relevant part:\n§ 195.264 Impoundment, protection against entry, normal/emergency\nventing or pressure/vacuum relief for aboveground breakout\ntanks.\n(a) A means must be provided for containing hazardous liquids in the\nevent of spillage or failure of an aboveground breakout tanks.\n(b) After October 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this\nsection requires the following for the aboveground breakout tanks\nspecified:\n(1) For tanks built to API Specification 12F, API Standard 620, and\nothers (such as API Standard 650 or its predecessor Standard 12C), the\ninstallation of impoundment must be in accordance with the following\nsections of [National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)] NFPA 30:\n(i) Impoundment around a breakout tank must be installed in\naccordance with section 4.3.2.3.2; and\n(ii) Impoundment by drainage to a remote impounding area must be\ninstalled in accordance with section 4.3.2.3.1.\n(2) For tanks built to API 2510, the installation of impoundment must\nbe in accordance with section 5 or 11 of API 2510 (incorporated by\nreference, see § 195.3). . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedure, DO5-101-2008, Facility and Tank Containment\nSystems, is inadequate because it does not indicate that breakout tank impoundments are\ngoverned by 49 C.F.R. § 195.264; instead, it merely states that “tank containment is regulated by\nNFPA.” Specifically, the Notice alleges that because 49 C.F.R. Part 195 incorporates NFPA 30\nby reference, Enbridge’s procedures should reference the particular edition of NFPA 30 that has\nbeen approved by PHMSA and not suggest that tank containment procedures are determined by\nthe NFPA. In addition, the Notice alleged that Enbridge’s procedure specifies the most recent\nedition of NFPA 30 shall apply, rather than the version incorporated by reference into Part 195.\nEnbridge stated in its Response that it would modify D05-101-2008 to reflect that PHMSA is the\nregulating body for tank impoundment and that NFPA 30 is incorporated by reference. As in its\nResponse for Items 1 and 2 above, Enbridge indicated that the latest version of NFPA 30 should\napply, as opposed to the 2008 edition incorporated by reference into Part 195.9\n9 Enbridge also noted that certain sections of NFPA 30 cited in § 195.264(b)(i) and (ii) are incorrect as they pertain\nto impoundment. According to Enbridge, previous editions of this standard addressed impoundment in Chapter 4,\nwhile the 2008 and later editions have moved this information to Chapter 22.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 6\nAs with API Standard 650 discussed above, circumstances have changed regarding NFPA 30\nsince the date the Notice was issued. PHMSA has recently reviewed the latest edition of NFPA\n30 and decided in the Final Rule to incorporate it by reference into Part 195. Therefore, I find\nthat Enbridge’s procedures referencing “the most recent edition of NFPA 30” were inadequate at\nthe time of the inspection because they did not use the correct edition of the NFPA standard that\nhad been incorporated by reference into 49 C.F.R. Part 195 as of that date. Accordingly,\nEnbridge is hereby ordered to amend its procedures implementing 49 C.F.R. § 195.264 to use the\nversion of NFPA 30 that is now incorporated by reference into Part 195.10\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures are inadequate to ensure safe operation\nof its pipeline facilities because they fail to include proper procedures addressing 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.264, which states, in relevant part:\n§ 195.264 Impoundment, protection against entry, normal/emergency\nventing or pressure/vacuum relief for aboveground breakout\ntanks.\n(a) . . .\n(c) Aboveground breakout tanks areas must be adequately protected\nagainst unauthorized entry.\nThe Notice alleged that Enbridge’s procedure, 01-02-01, General Site Security, is inadequate\nbecause it does not specify that breakout tanks areas will be protected from unauthorized entry.\nSpecifically, it alleged that the procedure does not identify the security measures that can be\nemployed or provide a methodology for determining what security measures are needed at a\ngiven site.\nIn its Response, Enbridge stated that it provides gated access control and fencing around the\nperimeter of its facilities, including breakout tank areas. Also, security is established through\nsignage, camera systems and/or security guards. The Corporate Security Management\nDepartment evaluates threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences on a continuous basis. Enbridge\nstated that its Region Specific Security Plan categorizes baseline requirements and preparedness\nshould there be an imminent threat. According to Enbridge, this Plan was in the process of being\nreviewed and updated and, when completed, a copy would be provided to PHMSA.\nI have reviewed the Response and find that while it provides information about the security\nmeasures employed generally by Enbridge, it does not specifically state how the company will\nupdate its Operations and Maintenance procedures or indicate a specific procedure where this\ninformation can be found. In addition, PHMSA has yet to receive a copy of the updated\nprocedures. Therefore, Enbridge is ordered to amend its procedures indicating that breakout\ntanks will be protected from unauthorized entry, what security measures can be employed, and a\n10 The Final Rule adopted NFPA 30 (2012), “Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code,” includes Errata 1, Errata\n2 (2012 edition, June 20, 2011), into 49 CFR §§ 192.7, 192.735(b), 195.3, and 195.264(b)(1). Enbridge’s Facility\nand Tank Containment Systems procedure must also be modified, if applicable, to specify that for breakout tanks\nbuilt to API Standard 2510, impoundment must be in accordance with section 5 or 11 of the version of that standard\nincorporated by reference into Part 195.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 7\nmethodology or process for determining what security measures are needed at a given site to\nensure that breakout tanks are adequately protected against unauthorized entry.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures are inadequate to ensure safe operation\nof its pipeline facilities because they do not include proper procedures addressing 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.307, which states, in relevant part:\n§ 195.307 Pressure testing aboveground breakout tanks.\n(a) . . .\n(d) For aboveground atmospheric pressure breakout tanks\nconstructed of carbon and low alloy steel, welded or riveted, and non-\nrefrigerated and tanks built to API Standard 650 or its predecessor\nStandard 12C that are returned to service after October 2, 2000, the\nnecessity for the hydrostatic testing of repair, alteration, and\nreconstruction is covered in section 10.3 of API Standard 653.\n(e) For aboveground breakout tanks built to API Standard 2510 and\nfirst placed in service after October 2, 2000, pressure testing must be in\naccordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII,\nDivision 1 or 2.\nThe Notice alleged that Enbridge’s procedures covering the hydrostatic testing of above-ground\nbreakout tanks, CQS001-2006, Tank Hydrostatic Test Specifications and D03-102-2001,\nIntegrity Assessment, Oil Tank, are inadequate because they specify that the most recent edition\nof industry standards will apply, rather than the one incorporated by reference in 49 C.F.R. §\n195.3. In addition, the Notice alleged that Enbridge’s hydrostatic testing procedures do not state\nthat the test records for breakout tanks must be maintained for the life of the tanks, as required by\n49 C.F.R. § 195.310.\nIn its Response, Enbridge stated again that using the most recent versions of API Standard 650\nand API Standard 653 meets or exceeds the requirements incorporated in 49 C.F.R. § 195.3.\nHowever, the company did indicate that it would modify its procedures to reflect that hydrostatic\ntest records for breakout tanks must be maintained for the life of the tank and that it would send a\ncopy of the revised procedures to PHMSA.\nAs discussed in Items 1 and 2 above, PHMSA has now incorporated by reference the revised\nAPI Standard 650, so Enbridge may now refer to the most recent edition in its procedures.\nHowever, Enbridge is ordered to modify its procedures to reference the edition of API Standard\n653 that has been incorporated by reference into Part 195 and send a copy of the revised test\nrecord procedures to PHMSA.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures are inadequate to ensure safe operation\nof its pipeline facilities because they fail to include adequate procedures addressing 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.405(a), which states:\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 8\n§ 195.405 Protection against ignitions and safe access/egress\ninvolving floating roofs.\n(a) After October 2, 2000, protection provided against ignitions\narising out of static electricity, lightning, and stray currents during\noperation and maintenance activities involving aboveground\nbreakout tanks must be in accordance with API Recommended\nPractice 2003, unless the operator notes in the procedural manual (§\n195.402(c)) why compliance with all or certain provisions of API\nRecommended Practice 2003 is not necessary for the safety of a\nparticular breakout tank.\nThe Notice alleged that the Enbridge’s procedure, D10-202-1999, Grounding Methods, is\ninadequate because it lists the latest version of API Recommended Practice (RP) 2003 as a\nreferenced industry standard but does not specifically require that the grounding of breakout\ntanks be in accordance with this standard, nor does it indicate, in the alternative, why compliance\nwith this standard is unnecessary. The Notice also alleged that Enbridge’s procedure states the\nmost recent edition of API RP 2003 shall apply, rather than the one that has been incorporated by\nreference into Part 195.\nIn its Response, Enbridge stated that while it agrees protection from static electricity, lightning,\nand stray currents is “mandatory,” it does not believe that API RP 2003 should be. The company\nalso contends that “API RP 2003 is a broad standard and only a small portion applies to\naboveground storage tanks.” According to Enbridge, its subject matter experts have deemed that\nlightning protection is not required for new tanks (TSP-009-2004) because the ground shunts on\nthe floating roof provide adequate protection from lightning strikes. Moreover, Enbridge stated\nthat API has issued a more recent recommended practice (API RP 545) in 2009 that may be more\napplicable to aboveground storage tanks than API RP 2003. Finally, Enbridge reiterated its\nbelief that the latest edition of API RP 2003 should apply.11\nI do not find Respondent’s arguments persuasive. First, 49 C.F.R. § 195.405(a) does not state\nthat adherence to API RP 2300 is mandatory in every instance. On the contrary, it states that an\noperator may note in its manual of written procedures why compliance with all or certain\nprovisions of API RP 2003 is not necessary for the safety of a particular breakout tank. In the\npresent case, if Enbridge does not believe that it needs to follow certain provisions of API RP\n2003, it must explain why those provisions are not necessary for the safety of each particular\ntank.\nSecond, as discussed above, Enbridge does not have the flexibility to decide whether it wants to\nfollow the edition of an industry standard that has been incorporated by reference into Part 195\nor whether it wants to follow a more recent edition. Where an operator is required under Part 195\nto follow a specific edition of a consensus standard, then that standard assumes the force of a law\nor regulation and constitutes a legal requirement until abandoned or updated by PHMSA,\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, Enbridge is ordered to modify its\nprocedures either to follow API RP 2003 or explain why it is unnecessary, for the safety of each\n11 Response at 6.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 9\nparticular tank, to follow the standard. In addition, Enbridge must amend its procedures to\nreflect that breakout-tank grounding must be done in accordance with the edition of API RP\n2003 that has been incorporated by reference into Part 195.\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures are inadequate to ensure safe operation\nof its pipeline facilities because they fail to include proper procedures addressing 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.430, which states:\n§ 195.430 Firefighting equipment.\nEach operator shall maintain adequate firefighting equipment at each\npump station and breakout tank area. The equipment must be –\n(a) In proper operating condition at all times;\n(b) Plainly marked so that its identity as firefighting equipment is\nclear; and,\n(c) Located so that it is easily accessible during a fire.\nThe Notice alleged that the Enbridge’s procedure, 14-02-04, Firefighting Equipment, is\ninadequate because it lists several OSHA regulations as a reference but does not refer to the\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. § 195.430.\nEnbridge responded that during the PHMSA inspection, a version of its Operations &\nMaintenance Procedures Manual Book 6 was reviewed and that within Book 6, Procedure 04-\n03-02, Fire Extinguishers – Inspection, references a related Enbridge standard in Book 2,\nProcedure 14-02-04, Safety. According to the company, the requirements of 49 C.F.R. §\n195.430 are spelled out in 14-02-04.\nI have reviewed the procedure provided to PHMSA during the inspection (Book 2, Procedure\n14-02-04, Firefighting Equipment Standard) dated July 15, 2010, and find that it includes only\nreferences to OSHA regulations and does not refer to the requirements of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.430. In its Response, Enbridge provided a revised Book 2 procedure, dated\nMarch 1, 2013. Contrary to Enbridge’s assertion, this standard still does not address the\nperformance requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 195.430. It does list the firefighting equipment each\npump station and compressor building must have, but does not adequately address the need to\nmaintain such equipment at each pump station and breakout tank area. Further, it fails to meet\nthe performance-based requirement of 49 C.F.R. § 195.430 that the firefighting equipment be\nadequate for each such area. Specifically, the list of equipment in Enbridge’s procedure is not\ndependent on the type and size of the facility, the number of pumping or compressor units, the\nnumber of breakout tanks, the commodities present, or other factors that could influence the type\nand quantity of firefighting equipment needed.\nFinally, the additional procedure from Book 6 included in the Response does not specify the\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. § 195.430, but simply provides a cross-reference to Book 2, 14-02-04,\nFirefighting Equipment. The additional procedure from Book 6 and the revised procedure from\nBook 2 still do not completely address the procedural deficiencies; therefore, Enbridge is ordered\nto amend its procedures to include or refer to the requirements of § 195.430, as discussed above.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 10\nItem 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures are inadequate to ensure safe operation\nof its pipeline facilities because they fail to include proper procedures addressing 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.571, which states:\n§ 195.571 What criteria must I use to determine the adequacy of\ncathodic protection?\nCathodic protection required by this Subpart must comply with one or\nmore of the applicable criteria and other considerations for cathodic\nprotection contained in paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 of NACE SP 0169\n(incorporated by reference, see § 195.3).\nThe Notice alleged that Enbridge’s procedure, Corrosion Control Guidelines, Chapter 4,\nCathodic Protection, is inadequate because it specifies that NACE SP0169-2007 (or latest\nrevision) is to be used instead of the version of NACE SP0169 incorporated by reference into\nPart 195. The Notice further alleged that in section 4.3 of that procedure, Enbridge lists certain\nallowable cathodic protection criteria that are not specifically included in NACE SP0169 or\nNACE RP651 (for breakout tanks), such as E-Log-1 and net protective current. According to\nPHMSA, these criteria are not allowed for hazardous liquid pipelines unless the operator has\nalready been using them on specific pipelines and can show that the results are comparable to\nthose attained by the criteria specified in NACE SP0169. Enbridge, however, did not specify\nwhere these criteria were in use on any of its hazardous liquid pipelines.\nIn its Response, Enbridge indicated that it has revised its Corrosion Control Guidelines, Chapter\n4, Cathodic Protection, in 2012 to remove the E-Log-I reference and net protective current\ncriteria because they are no longer being used in the Enbridge system. In addition, Enbridge\nindicated that it has created an Engineering Standard, Cathodic Protection – Tanks, D04-103,\nwhich was slated for final review by the end of April 2013.\nEnbridge attached a draft of its Cathodic Protection - Tanks procedures, but it still states in\nSection 3.3 that the cathodic protection criteria will be in accordance with the latest edition of\nNACE SP0169. For the reasons discussed in Items 1 and 2 above, Enbridge is hereby ordered to\namend its procedures implementing 49 C.F.R. § 195.571 to use the version of NFPA SP016930\nthat is currently incorporated by reference into Part 195.\nItem 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures are inadequate to ensure safe operation\nof its pipeline facilities because they fail to include proper procedures addressing 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.573, which states, in relevant part :\n§ 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(a) …\n(d) Breakout tanks. You must inspect each cathodic protection system\nused to control corrosion on the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank\nto ensure that operation and maintenance of the system are in accordance\nwith API Recommended Practice 651. However, this inspection is not\nrequired if you note in the corrosion control procedures established under\nSec. 195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or certain operation and\n\n\n\nCPF No: 4-2013-5005M\nPage 11\nmaintenance provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not\nnecessary for the safety of the tank.\nThe Notice alleged that Enbridge’s procedure, Corrosion Control Guidelines, Cathodic\nProtection, Chapter 4, is inadequate because it lists API RP 651 as a referenced standard but\ndoes not specifically require that operation and maintenance of cathodic protection systems on\nbreakout tanks must be in accordance with API RP 651.\nAs with Item 8 above, Enbridge indicated in its Response that it had revised its Corrosion\nControl Guidelines in 2012 to specify that the cathodic protection systems on breakout tanks\nmust be operated and maintained in accordance with API RP 651. The company stated that the\nrequirements were also outlined in the General Requirements found in its Draft Engineering\nStandard, Cathodic Protection – Tanks, D04-103, Section 1.0, Scope.\nPHMSA has reviewed both documents included with the Response and found that the documents\nstill show that API RP 651 is listed simply as a referenced standard. In addition, the Enbridge\nprocedure, Corrosion Control Guidelines, includes the following note: “In the USA, tanks\nmoved or constructed on a new location after October 2, 2000 shall have cathodic protection\nsystem installed in accordance with API Recommended Practice 651.”12 Under\n49 C.F.R. § 195.573(d), all corrosion control systems on the bottoms of breakouts tanks must be\ninspected “to ensure that operation and maintenance of the system are in accordance with API\nRecommended Practice 651.” There are no exceptions for tanks installed prior to\nOctober 2, 2000. Enbridge has apparently confused the Part 195 construction requirements with\nits inspection requirements. Accordingly, it is ordered that Enbridge amend its procedures to\nspecify that corrosion control systems to protect the bottoms of breakout tanks must be operated\nand maintained in accordance with API RP 651 and to delete any exception for tanks moved or\nconstructed prior to October 2, 2000.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Order Directing Amendment. The petition must be sent to: Associate Administrator, Office\nof Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor,\nWashington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same\naddress. PHMSA will accept petitions received no later than 20 days after receipt of service of\nthis Order Directing Amendment by the Respondent, provided they contain a brief statement of\nthe issue(s) and meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. Unless the Associate\nAdministrator, upon request, grants a stay, all other terms and conditions of this Order Directing\nAmendment are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n12 Response, at Attachment, Corrosion Control Guidance, Chapter 4.1 Scope, p. 4-3.","truncated":false,"body_characters":36485}