{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420135006H","title":"MOBIL  PIPE  LINE COMPANY — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2013-04-02","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135006h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135006h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135006h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420135006H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving MOBIL  PIPE  LINE COMPANY. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2013-04-02 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420135006H_Corrective Action Order_04022013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135006H/420135006H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_04022013.pdf\n\n420135006H_Corrective Action Order_04022013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135006H/420135006H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_04022013_text.pdf\n\n420135006H_Post-Hearing Decision on Corrective Action Order_05102013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135006H/420135006H_Post-Hearing%20Decision%20on%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_05102013.pdf\n\n420135006H_Post-Hearing Decision on Corrective Action Order_05102013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135006H/420135006H_Post-Hearing%20Decision%20on%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_05102013_text.pdf\n\n420135006H_Post-Hearing Decision on Corrective Action Order_05102013_text.pdf\n\nMAY 10, 2013\nMr. Gary Pruessing\nPresident\nExxonMobil Pipeline Company\n800 Bell St., Room 741-D\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2013-5006H\nDear Mr. Pruessing:\nPlease find enclosed the Post-Hearing Decision regarding the Corrective Action Order issued to\nExxonMobil Pipeline Company on April 2, 2013. The Decision confirms the Corrective Action\nOrder with respect to the Pegasus Pipeline from Patoka, Illinois, to Nederland, Texas, and\nclarifies the pressure restrictions upon restart. This Decision is being served by facsimile and\ncertified mail under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5, and its terms and conditions are effective upon receipt.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. RM Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\nMr. Jim Stevens, General Counsel, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (via email to\njames.r.stevens@exxonmobil.com)\nMs. Catherine Little, Hunton & Williams LLP (via email to clittle@hunton.com)\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n___________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nExxonMobil Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 4-2013-5006H\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\nPOST-HEARING DECISION CONFIRMING\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nOn April 2, 2013, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), issued a Corrective\nAction Order (CAO) under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233 finding that\ncontinued operation by ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (EMPCo or Respondent) of its crude oil\ntransmission pipeline known as the Pegasus Pipeline would be hazardous to life, property, and\nthe environment. The CAO made preliminary findings that the potential hazards arose from a\nMarch 29, 2013 failure of EMPCo’s pipeline and would continue unless certain corrective\nmeasures were taken. The CAO further found that failure to issue the order expeditiously\nwithout prior notice would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the\nenvironment.\nFollowing issuance of the CAO, Respondent requested a hearing by letter dated April 12, 2013.\nIn accordance with 49 C.F.R. §§ 190.211 and 190.233(c), a hearing was held on May 2, 2013, in\nHouston, Texas.\nBackground\nOn March 29, 2013, at 3:15 pm, a failure occurred on the Pegasus Pipeline in the town of\nMayflower, Arkansas. The failure resulted in the release of approximately 3500 to 5000 barrels\nof crude oil in a residential area. The accident did not cause any known injuries, fatalities, or\nfires. Local police evacuated 21 homes. Oil from the pipeline entered the community’s storm\ndrainage system. EMPCo initiated spill response to recover the spilled crude oil. There is no\nindication at this time that oil contaminated a lake approximately one mile away.\nWhen the failure occurred, operating pressure of the pipeline at the failure site was calculated to\nbe 708 psig, which is less than the maximum operating pressure (MOP) of 820 psig established\nby hydrostatic test in 2006. EMPCo learned of the failure when a drop in pipeline pressure\noccurred. Upon learning of the pressure drop, EMPCo closed valves upstream and downstream\nand isolated the failure site. Valves were closed within 16 minutes of the pressure drop. The\n\n\n\n2\ndistance between the isolating valves is 18 miles. The Pegasus Pipeline currently remains out of\nservice.\nThe cause of the failure is still undetermined and the investigation is ongoing. The pipe has been\nexcavated and removed and a visual examination of the pipe indicates failure at or near the\nlongitudinal seam. The failed pipe section has been sent to a metallurgist for examination and\nfailure analysis.\nIn July 2010, Respondent performed an in-line inspection of the portion of the Pegasus Pipeline\nsurrounding the failure site using a magnetic flux leakage and caliper tool. Respondent has\nreported that no significant anomalies in the area of failure site were found. In February 2013,\nRespondent performed a transverse flux in-line inspection of the Pegasus Pipeline in the area of\nthe failure site. Results from that inspection have not yet been provided.\nThe Pegasus Pipeline is approximately 850 miles long and has transported crude oil south from\nPatoka, Illinois, to the Gulf Coast in Nederland, Texas, since 2006. The pipeline was originally\nconstructed and operated as three separate pipeline systems. The first system (the Northern\nSection) was constructed in 1947 and 1948 and consists of 648 miles of 20-inch diameter,\n0.312” wall thickness, grade API 5LX-42, low frequency electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe\nmanufactured by Youngstown. From 1948 to 2002, the pipeline transported product north from\nCorsicana, Texas, to Patoka, Illinois. In 2002, the system was idled and purged of product until\n2006 when it was reactivated and reversed to flow south.\nThe second system was constructed in 1954 and consists of 205 miles of 20-inch diameter, grade\nX-46, electric flash welded pipe manufactured by A.O. Smith. From 1954 to 1995, the system\ntransported product south from Corsicana to Beaumont, Texas.\nThe third system was constructed in 1973 and consists of 6 miles of 16-inch diameter, grade\nX-52, ERW pipe. The manufacturer is not known at this time. From 1973 to 1995, the system\ntransported product north from Nederland to Beaumont. In 1995, the second system reversed\nflow and was “tight-lined” with the third system, creating a single pipeline operation transporting\nproduct north from Nederland to the hub in Corsicana (collectively, the Southern Section).\nIn 2005, the Southern Section reversed flow to the south, and in 2006, the Northern Section was\nreactivated and reversed flow to the south. From 2006 to 2013, the Northern and Southern\nSections were “tight-lined” creating a single 850-mile pipeline operation transporting product\nsouth from Patoka to Nederland. During this time the system was re-named the Pegasus\nPipeline. Prior to the failure on March 29, 2013, Respondent had made arrangements to separate\nthe systems again at Corsicana to permit diverting flow from Patoka to tankage at Corsicana and\nto accept product from a third-party connection at Corsicana. Deliveries from the third-party\npipeline were scheduled to take place in April 2013, but were postponed following the accident.\nStandard for Reviewing a Corrective Action Order\nThe legal bases for issuance of a CAO are specified in 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.233. Under those provisions, the Associate Administrator may issue a CAO if he finds a\n\n\n\n3\nparticular pipeline facility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment.1 The\nterms of a CAO may include suspended or restricted use of a facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or any other appropriate action.2 A CAO may be issued without\nprior notice to the operator if the Associate Administrator further determines that failure to do so\nwould result in the likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the environment.3\nThe primary purpose of a hearing following issuance of a CAO without prior notice is for the\nAssociate Administrator to determine whether the CAO should remain in effect or be rescinded\nor suspended.4 In making this determination, the Associate Administrator must consider among\nother things: the characteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility,\nincluding its age, manufacturer, physical properties (including its resistance to corrosion and\ndeterioration), and method of its manufacture; the nature of the materials transported; the\ncharacteristics of the geographical areas in which the pipeline facility is located; and such other\nfactors as the Associate Administrator may consider appropriate.5\nIf after the hearing, the Associate Administrator continues to find the facility is or would be\nhazardous to life, property, or the environment, the CAO is confirmed. If the Associate\nAdministrator finds the facility is not hazardous, or if there is insufficient information to support\nfinding a hazard, the CAO must be withdrawn.6\nIssues Raised at the Hearing\nRespondent requested a hearing on four discrete issues that affect the scope of the CAO and the\nactions Respondent must take to restart the pipeline. Specifically, EMPCo requested that\nPHMSA clarify or modify the CAO to address the following issues: (1) the restart pressure\nrestriction at the failure site; (2) the definition of “Affected Pipeline” subject to the CAO; (3) the\nrestart pressure restriction at other stations along the pipeline; and (4) the restart pressure at\nseveral stations that were not operating at the time of the failure.\nIn considering the issues raised by Respondent, I have reviewed the evidence to determine\nwhether the CAO should remain in effect or be rescinded or suspended. Respondent did not\ncontest the CAO as to the Northern Section of the Pegasus Pipeline. Based on the evidence in\nthe record, I continue to find the 648-mile Northern Section would be hazardous to life, property,\nor the environment unless corrective measures are taken. The CAO will remain in effect with\nregard to that portion of the facility, subject to the clarifications and modifications set forth\nbelow.\n1 49 U.S.C. § 60112(a).\n2 49 C.F.R. § 190.233(a).\n3 § 190.233(b).\n4 § 190.233(b).\n5 § 190.233(e)(1).\n6 § 190.233(c)(4).\n\n\n\n4\nIssue 1: Restart Pressure at the Failure Site\nAt the hearing Respondent requested that the CAO be amended to clarify that the restart pressure\nat the failure site should be 80% of the actual operating pressure immediately prior to the\naccident, rather than 656 psig as stated in the order. Respondent explained that at the time of the\nfailure, operating pressure at the failure site was calculated to be 708 psig. Eighty percent of the\nactual operating pressure would be 566 psig.\nThe Director did not object to this clarification and confirmed the intent of the CAO was to limit\npressure upon restart to 80% of the actual operating pressure at the failure site when the accident\noccurred. Accordingly, Item 7 of the CAO is amended as set forth below.\nIssue 2: Definition of the “Affected Pipeline”\nAt the hearing, Respondent requested that the CAO be amended to redefine the “Affected\nPipeline” as the 648-mile portion of the Pegasus Pipeline between Patoka, Illinois and Corsicana,\nTexas (the Northern Section). Respondent explained that the differences between the Northern\nand Southern Sections preclude any broad correlations to be drawn between the hazardous\ncondition at the failure site on the Northern Section and the separate 211-mile Southern Section.\nThe CAO defined the “Affected Pipeline” as the entire 850-mile Pegasus Pipeline. The CAO\nconsidered the entire pipeline to be constructed of 1947 and 1948, 20-inch diameter, 0.312” wall\nthickness, API 5LX-42 pipe, containing both seamless pipe and low frequency ERW pipe. On\nthat basis, in addition to several other factors, the CAO concluded that the entire pipeline should\nbe subject to the CAO. The other factors considered were: “the uncertainties as to the cause of\nthe failure, the age of the pipeline, the unavailability of the results of the February 2013 in-line\ninspection, the 2006 change in direction of flow, the location of the Failure Site in a High\nConsequence Area, and the proximity of the pipeline to navigable waterways, environmentally\nsensitive areas and populated areas.”7\nCharacteristics of the Northern and Southern Sections\nAt the hearing, Respondent explained that only the Northern Section was constructed in\n1947 and 1948 of 20-inch diameter, grade API 5LX-42, low frequency ERW pipe manufactured\nby Youngstown. Almost all of the Southern Section was constructed in 1954 of 20-inch\ndiameter, grade X-46, flash welded pipe manufactured by A.O. Smith. A small portion was\nconstructed in 1973 of 16-inch, grade X-52 ERW pipe. Respondent explained that flash welded\npipe did not present the same integrity risk as pre-1970 ERW pipe and introduced evidence of an\nhistorical account of pipe manufacturing processes.\n8\nAs explained in the literature, which is consistent with information on PHMSA’s website, ERW\npipe was manufactured by cold-forming a sheet of steel into a cylindrical shape and then passing\ncurrent between the two edges to heat the steel to a point at which the edges are forced together\n7 CAO at 3.\n8 J. F. Kiefner & E. B. Clark, History of Line Pipe Manufacturing in North America (1996).\n\n\n\n5\nto form a bond.9 Initially this manufacturing process used low frequency A.C. current to heat the\nedges. In 1970, the low frequency process was superseded by a high frequency ERW process\nwhich produced a higher quality weld. Over time, the welds of low frequency ERW pipe have\nbeen found to be susceptible to selective seam corrosion, hook cracks, and inadequate bonding of\nthe seams. Based on a history of increased risk of failure, PHMSA has deemed pre-1970 ERW\npipe to be susceptible to longitudinal seam failure unless an engineering analysis shows\notherwise.10\nElectric flash welded pipe was manufactured by forming a steel sheet into a cylindrical shape.\nThe edges were heated until semi-molten, then forced together. Like low frequency ERW pipe,\nflash welded pipe is susceptible to selective seam corrosion and hook cracks, but to a lesser\nextent than low frequency ERW pipe.11 Flash welding and low frequency ERW are no longer\nused to manufacture pipe.\nRespondent contended that in addition to the differences in manufacturing methods, metallurgy,\nmanufacturer, and years of construction, hydrostatic pressure tests and in-line inspections\ndemonstrate the integrity of the Southern Section has been verified. For example, the Northern\nSection had 11 seam failures over its 648 miles during a hydrostatic test in 2005-2006, whereas\nthe Southern Section had only 1 seam failure over 205 miles during a pressure test in 1991. This\nwas despite the Southern Section being tested to a higher stress pressure (90-95% SMYS\ncompared to only 86-92% in the Northern Section). Furthermore, the Northern Section had 12\nconfirmed seam cracks identified during an in-line seam assessment in 2010. The Southern\nSection did not have any weld cracks or preferential seam corrosion identified by an in-line\ninspection in 2003-2004. The Southern Section has experienced no in-service seam related\nfailures.\nAt the hearing, OPS acknowledged that the Northern and Southern Sections had different\nprofiles and risks. OPS clarified that it was not the intent to classify them as identical, but\ncontended there was still cause to include the Southern Section in the order based on the age of\nthe pipe and the older manufacturing process. OPS noted that both have had seam failures (at\nleast during pressure tests), which implies some uncertainty regarding the integrity of the seams.\nThe Director also noted there was uncertainly with regard to the in-line assessments which had\npreviously missed identifying anomalies or potential threats at the locations of the seam failures.\nAnalysis\nTo confirm the issuance of the CAO with respect to the Southern Section, I must find the facility\nis or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment without corrective measures.\nRespondent has demonstrated there are distinguishing characteristics between the Southern and\nNorthern Sections, including differences in the type of pipe, method of manufacturing,\noperational histories, and integrity characteristics. These differences support Respondent’s\n9 PHMSA Fact Sheet: “Pipe Manufacturing Process” available at\nhttp://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSPipeManufacturingProcess.htm (last accessed May 3, 2013).\n10 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 195.303(d).\n11 PHMSA Fact Sheet: “Pipe Manufacturing Process.”\n\n\n\n6\nposition that the Northern and Southern Sections are two separate systems, despite the common\nPegasus name.\nSeparating the Northern and Southern Sections of the Pegasus Pipeline, however, is not\ndeterminative when deciding whether the CAO should remain in place. In reviewing the other\nfactors that must be considered, I find several weigh in favor of confirming the CAO as to the\nSouthern Section.\nThe characteristics of the pipe used in the Southern Section, while different from the pre-1970\nERW pipe used in the Northern Section, present a similar integrity concern. Flash welded pipe\nof that vintage is known to be susceptible to seam failure, even if to a lesser extent than low\nfrequency ERW pipe. Although Respondent argued that it has evaluated the pipeline according\nto a valid method and concluded that the Southern Section is not susceptible to seam failure,\nOPS raised some question as to the appropriateness of this conclusion given the age of the pipe,\nwhich was manufactured in 1954, and the fact that it has experienced a seam failure during a\nhydrostatic test.\nIn addition, OPS raised some question as to the adequacy of Respondent’s procedures for\nassessing seam integrity across the Pegasus Pipeline, including the Southern Section. For\nexample, in-line inspections performed on the Northern Section in 2010 did not identify an\nanomaly at the location of the failure on March 29, 2013. Results from a February 2013 in-line\nseam assessment using a transverse flux inspection tool on the Northern Section are not yet\navailable. The Southern Section has never had an in-line seam assessment using a transverse\nflux inspection tool, although Respondent had scheduled one prior to the failure. The uncertainty\nas to the cause of the failure on March 29, 2013, and the uncertainty as to the current seam\nintegrity on the entire Pegasus Pipeline weigh in favor of confirming the CAO until additional\ninformation can be gathered.\nThe nature of the materials transported by the Southern Section is identical to that transported by\nthe Northern Section. Crude oil when released into the environment is a hazard to persons,\nproperty and the environment. Although the cause of the failure on March 29, 2013, is not yet\nknown, Respondent stated at the hearing that early indications from the metallurgist are the\nproduct did not cause the failure (e.g., there was no sign of internal corrosion).\nThe hazardous liquid pipeline is located in proximity to environmentally sensitive areas and\npopulated areas.\nFor the reasons stated above, I find the factors weigh in favor of confirming the CAO with\nrespect to the Southern Section pending further investigation of the cause of the failure and\nassessment as to whether and what extent the Southern Section is similarly affected. If at such\ntime evidence of the cause(s) of the failure rule out the possibility that the Southern Section is\nsimilarly affected, the Director will permit appropriate modification to the corrective action\nitems, or otherwise proceed to close the CAO for that Section.\nIssue 3: Restart Pressure at Other Stations\nRespondent requested that the CAO be amended to clarify that the restart pressure at other\nstations along the Affected Pipeline should be 80% of their actual operating pressure\n\n\n\n7\nimmediately prior to the accident. Respondent explained that segments of the pipeline had\nvarious operating pressures when the failure occurred based on hydrostatic tests and different\nMOPs.\nThe Director did not object to this clarification and confirmed the intent of the CAO was to limit\npressure upon restart to 80% of the actual operating pressure at each station when the accident\noccurred. Accordingly, Item 7 of the CAO is amended as set forth below.\nIssue 4: Restart Pressure for Stations Not Operating at the Time of the Failure\nAt the hearing Respondent requested that the CAO be modified to permit restart of several\nstations with a pressure restriction of 80% of their operating pressure measured four days prior to\nthe accident. Respondent explained that these stations are intended to accommodate deliveries\nfrom a third-party pipeline into Corsicana, but the stations were not operating at the time of the\nfailure. They had been operating as recently as four days prior to the accident.\nThe Director did not object to this modification and confirmed it would be consistent with the\nintent of the CAO to maintain a safety margin throughout the system using a 20% pressure\nreduction.\nAccordingly, Item 7 of the CAO is amended to read as follows:\n7. Pressure Restriction. After receiving approval from the Director to restart the Affected\nPipeline, operating pressure may not exceed 80% of the actual operating pressure in\neffect immediately prior to the failure. Pressure at the failure site may not exceed 566\npsig. For each pump station on the Affected Pipeline, submit the operating pressure at\nthe time of failure and the reduced discharge pressure limit in the restart plan referenced\nin Item 2. If a station was not operating at the moment of failure, the reduced discharge\npressure limit may be calculated from its most recent operating pressure prior to the\nfailure. The pressure restriction required by this Order requires that any relevant remote\nor local alarm limits, software programming set-points or control points, and mechanical\nover-pressure devices be adjusted accordingly. The pressure restriction will remain in\neffect until written approval to increase the pressure or return the pipeline, or a portion\nthereof, to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the Director pursuant to\nItem 8.\nConclusion\nThe CAO issued to EMPCo on April 2, 2013, is confirmed and will remain in effect subject to\nthe modifications set forth above.\n_______________________________ _______________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese, Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n420135006H_Corrective Action Order_04022013_text.pdf\n\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL [71791000164304602744] AND FAX TO: [713-656-9579]\nApril 02 2013\nMr. Gary Pruessing\nPresident\nExxonMobil Pipeline Company\n800 Bell St., Room 741-D\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2013-5006H\nDear Mr. Pruessing:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It requires\nExxonMobil Pipeline Company to take certain corrective actions with respect to the Pegasus\nPipeline that failed on March 29, 2013, in Mayflower, Arkansas. Service is being made by\ncertified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of this Corrective Action Order constitutes service of\nthat document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon receipt.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. RM Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\nMr. Thad Massengale, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (via email to\nthad.massengale@exxonmobil.com)\nMr. James Stevens, Senior Counsel, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (via email to\njames.r.stevens@exxonmobil.com)\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nExxonMobil Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 4-2013-5006H\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112,\nto require ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (EMPCO or Respondent), to take necessary corrective\naction to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with\nthe recent failure on the crude oil transmission pipeline known as the Pegasus Pipeline.1\nOn March 29, 2013, an accident reportable under 49 CFR § 195.52 occurred on the Pegasus\nPipeline, resulting in the release of approximately 3500 to 5000 barrels of crude oil (Failure).\nThe Pegasus Pipeline is a 20-inch diameter pipeline approximately 850 miles in length that\ntransports crude oil from Patoka, Illinois, to Nederland, Texas. The cause of the Failure has not\nyet been determined. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), has initiated an investigation\nof the accident. The preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are as follows.\nPreliminary Findings\n• EMPCO is an affiliate of ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, LP, and transports over 2.7\nmillion barrels of crude oil and refined products every day through over 8000 miles of\npipelines.2\n• EMPCO’s Pegasus Pipeline is a 20-inch diameter pipeline, approximately 850 miles in\nlength, which transports crude oil from Patoka, Illinois, to the Texas Gulf Coast.\n1 The Pegasus Pipeline is owned by Mobil Pipe Line Company and operated by EMPCO.\n2 See http://www.exxonmobilpipeline.com/USA-English/EMPCo/ourcompany.aspx (last accessed April 1, 2013).\n\n\n\n2\n• The Pegasus Pipeline was originally constructed in 1947 and 1948 and consists of 20-\ninch diameter, 0.312” wall thickness, API 5LX-42 pipe, and contains both seamless pipe\nand low frequency electric resistance welded pipe.\n• In 2006, EMPCO reversed the system flow on the Pegasus Pipeline. The pipeline now\nflows south from Illinois to Texas. A change in the direction of flow can affect the\nhydraulic and stress demands on the pipeline.\n• At approximately 3:15pm CDT, on March 29, 2013, a failure occurred on Respondent’s\nPegasus Pipeline in Faulkner County, Arkansas, resulting in the release of crude oil into a\nresidential neighborhood. The Failure occurred near milepost 315 in a residential area in\nthe town of Mayflower, Arkansas (Failure Site). EMPCO reported the Failure to the\nNational Response Center on March 29, 2013, at approximately 4pm CDT (NRC Report\nNo. 1042466). EMPCO estimates that approximately 3500-5000 barrels of crude oil was\nreleased as a result of the Failure.\n• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline at the Failure Site is 820 psig, as\nestablished by hydrostatic test in 2006. At the time of the Failure, the actual operating\npressure of the pipeline was 708 psig.\n• EMPCO learned of the Failure due to a drop in pressure on the pipeline. Upon learning\nof the pressure drop, EMPCO began to close the valves upstream and downstream and\nisolated the Failure Site. The valves were closed within 16 minutes of the pressure drop.\nThe valves isolating this section of the pipeline are 18 miles apart.\n• Various state and federal agencies responded to the scene, including PHMSA, the U.S.\nEnvironmental Protection Agency, and local police.\n• The accident did not cause any known injuries, fatalities, or fires. Local police evacuated\n21 homes.\n• The entire Pegasus Pipeline currently remains out of service.\n• The cause of the failure is still undetermined and the investigation is ongoing. The pipe\nhas not yet been excavated to allow for visual examination of the pipe. EMPCO is\npreparing to install stopple valves to allow for the removal of the damaged section of\npipe. The failed pipe section will be sent to a metallurgist for examination and failure\nanalysis.\n• The Failure Site is in a High Consequence Area that has been identified as directly\naffecting a high population area under PHMSA’s integrity management regulations.3\nThe released product entered the community’s storm drainage system, which has been\nblocked off.\n3 High population area and High Consequence Area are defined in § 195.450.\n\n\n\n3\n• The Failure Site is approximately one mile from Lake Conway, a 6,700-acre man-made\nlake that is connected to several creeks and used for recreational fishing. As of this time,\nit appears that none of the crude oil has contaminated the lake.\n• EMPCO has initiated spill response to recover the spilled crude oil.\n• In July 2010, EMPCO performed an in-line inspection of the portion of the Pegasus\nPipeline surrounding the Failure Site using a magnetic flux leakage and caliper tool.\nEMPCO has reported that no significant anomalies in the area of Failure Site were found.\nIn February 2013, EMPCO performed a transverse flux in-line inspection of the Pegasus\nPipeline in the area of the Failure Site. EMPCO has not yet received the results from this\nin-line inspection.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in\nthe above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the\nenvironment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable\nafter the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\nPegasus Pipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the\nenvironment. Additionally, having considered the uncertainties as to the cause of the Failure, the\nage of the pipeline, the unavailability of the results of the February 2013 in-line inspection, the\n2006 change in direction of flow, the location of the Failure Site in a High Consequence Area,\nand the proximity of the pipeline to navigable waterways, environmentally sensitive areas and\npopulated areas, I find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate\ncorrective action would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the\nenvironment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held\ntelephonically or in-person in Houston, Texas, or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be\n\n\n\n4\n3. notified of any additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order EMPCO to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions on the Pegasus Pipeline (Affected Pipeline):\n1. Return to Service. Obtain written approval from the Director prior to resuming operation.\n2. Restart Plan. Develop and submit a written re-start plan for prior approval of the\nDirector, Southwest Region. The restart plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the\nAffected Pipeline during the restart process and include measures to confirm the integrity\nof the pipeline facilities that were damaged or are suspected of being damaged as a result\nof the Failure. The restart plan must specify a daylight restart and provide for advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials.\nMetallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete mechanical and\nmetallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe. Complete the testing and\nanalysis as follows:\nA. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site;\nB. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit to the Director the\ntesting protocol, including selection of the testing laboratory, for prior approval.\nC. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a\nPHMSA representative to witness the testing; and\nD. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety\n(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same time as\nthey are made available to Respondent.\n4. Remedial Work Plan. Within 90 days after completing the metallurgical testing and\nanalysis, submit a remedial work plan (“Work Plan”) to the Director for approval. The\nWork Plan must provide for the verification of the integrity of the Affected Pipeline and\nmust address all factors known or suspected in the Failure, including but not limited to\nthe following:\nA. The integration of the results of the failure analyses and other actions required by\nthis Order with all relevant operating data including all historical repair\ninformation, results of past in-line inspections, construction, operating,\nmaintenance, testing, metallurgical analysis or other third party consultation\ninformation, and assessment data for the Affected Pipeline;\n\n\n\n5\nB. The performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether and to what extent the conditions associated with the Failure or\nany other integrity-threatening conditions are present elsewhere on the Affected\nPipeline. The results of the inspections, field excavations, and evaluations must\nbe made available to PHMSA or its representative;\nC. The performance of repairs or other corrective measures that fully remediate the\nidentified risk conditions associated with the Failure and any other integrity-\nthreatening condition everywhere along the Affected Pipeline. Based on the\nknown history and condition of the pipeline, the plans for repairs must include\ncontinuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification measures to ensure\nthe ongoing safe operation of the pipeline considering the results of the analyses,\ninspections, and corrective measures undertaken pursuant to the Order;\nD. A proposed schedule for completion of Items A−C.\n5. The Work Plan will be incorporated by reference into this Order. Respondent must\nrevise the Work Plan as necessary to incorporate the results of actions undertaken\npursuant to this Order and whenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities. Submit any such plan revisions to\nthe Director for prior approval. The Director may approve plan elements incrementally.\n6. Implement the Work Plan as approved by the Director, including any revisions to the\nplan.\n7. Pressure Restriction. After receiving approval from the Director to restart the Affected\nPipeline, the pressure is not to exceed 80% of the actual operating pressure in effect\nimmediately prior to the Failure, or 656 psig. This pressure reduction requires that any\nrelevant remote or local alarm limits, software programming set-points or control points,\nand mechanical over-pressure devices be adjusted accordingly. This pressure restriction\nwill remain in effect until written approval to increase the pressure or return the pipeline\nto its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the Director.\n8. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification of\nthe pressure restriction upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that\nrestoring the Affected Pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based on a\nreliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all\nknown defects, anomalies and operating parameters of the pipeline.\n9. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and\nresults of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress\nof the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due\non July 1, 2013. The Director may change the interval for the submission of these\nreports.\n10. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Corrective Action\nOrder. Include in each monthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with:\n\n\n\n6\n(1) preparation and revision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to\npipeline infrastructure, including repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3)\nenvironmental remediation, if applicable.\n11. Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval\nof the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b)\napprove the submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any\ndeficiencies; (d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent\nmodify the submission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval,\napproval upon conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to\ntake all action required by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the\nDirector disapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all\ndeficiencies within the time specified by the Director, and resubmit it for approval.\n12. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\nThe actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, under any\nother order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other\nprovision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second cop","truncated":true,"body_characters":40806}