{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420135011","title":"ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-05-01","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.202, 195.205, 195.402(a), 195.404(b)(2), 195.505(a), 195.505(b), 195.505(h), 195.565, 195.573(d), 195.581(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135011.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135011.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135011","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420135011","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.202,  195.205,  195.402(a),  195.404(b)(2),  195.505(a),  195.505(b),  195.505(h),  195.565,  195.573(d),  195.581(a). The case was opened on 2013-05-01 and is reported as closed as of 2016-05-10. Proposed civil penalty: $106,100. Assessed civil penalty: $77,400. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420135011_Closure Letter_05102016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Closure%20Letter_05102016.pdf\n\n420135011_Closure Letter_05102016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Closure%20Letter_05102016_text.pdf\n\n420135011_Final Order_02042016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Final%20Order_02042016.pdf\n\n420135011_Final Order_02042016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Final%20Order_02042016_text.pdf\n\n420135011_NOPV PCP PCO_05012013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_05012013.pdf\n\n420135011_NOPV PCP PCO_05012013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_05012013_text.pdf\n\n420135011_Operator_Response_to_Notice_and_Request_for__Hearing_08282013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Operator_Response_to_Notice_and_Request_for__Hearing_08282013.pdf\n\n420135011_Closure Letter_05102016_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMay 10, 2016\nMr. Graham Bacon\nExecutive Vice President, Operating & Engineering\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002-5227\nCPF 4-2013-5011\nDear Mr. Bacon:\nOn February 4, 2016, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Enterprise Products Operating, LLC a Final Order in the above-referenced case. The\nOrder included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our review of the\ndocumentation you provided to satisfy the Compliance Order (CO) and confirmation of payment\nof the civil penalty, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, SW Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n420135011_NOPV PCP PCO_05012013_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL- RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMay 1, 2013\nMr. Terry Hurlburt\nSenior Vice President of Operations\nEnterprise Products Operating LLC\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nDear Mr. Hurlburt: CPF 4-2013-5011\nOn multiple occasions between April 30 and August 24, 2012, a representative of the Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) was onsite and inspected Enterprise\nProducts Operating, LLC (Enterprise) procedures, records, and pipeline facilities in Texas,\nLouisiana, and Arkansas operating areas pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the\nprobable violations are:\n1. §195.202 Compliance with specifications or standards:\nEach pipeline system must be constructed in accordance with comprehensive written\nspecifications or standards that are consistent with the requirements of this part.\nEnterprise could not demonstrate that they followed all requirements of their specifications when\nconstructing a tank in 2011. PHMSA requested that Enterprise provide the construction\nspecifications along with the test results of the water quality used for the purpose of hydrostatic\ntesting of breakout tank # 772. Tank 772 was to be built in accordance with API 650 as\n\n\n\nreferenced by the Enterprise specifications. Specifically, API 650, 7.3.6.3 states, The purchaser\nshall be responsible for:\nSpecifying the test water quality. Potable water is preferred for hydro-testing. This does not preclude the\nuse of condensate, reverse osmosis water, well water, river water, or sea water. The purchaser shall\nconsider issues such as low temperature brittle facture, freeze damage, amount of suspended solids,\nsanitation issues, animal/plant incubation and/or growth, acidity, general corrosion, pitting, protecting\nagainst cathodic cells, microbiologically-induced corrosion, material dependent sensitivity to trace\nchemical attack, disposal, rinsing, and residuals left in the tank after emptying. If the purchaser supplied\ntest water causes corrosion, the purchaser is responsible for the required repairs.\nEnterprise provided only a water permit which does not contain a description of the quality of the\nwater.\n2. §195.202 Compliance with specifications or standards:\nEach pipeline system must be constructed in accordance with comprehensive written\nspecifications or standards that are consistent with the requirements of this part.\nEnterprise could not demonstrate that they followed all requirements of their specifications when\nconstructing a tank in 2011. PHMSA requested that Enterprise provide the construction\nspecifications along with the Vacuum Box testing report of breakout tank# 772. Tank 772 was\nto be built in accordance with API 650 as referenced by the Enterprise specifications.\nSpecifically, API 650, Section 8.6.6 states:\n“The metal surface temperature limits 4ºC and 52ºC, unless the film solution is proven to work at\ntemperature outsides these limits either by testing or manufacturer’s recommendations.”\nAPI 650, Section 8.6.7 states:\n“A minimum light intensity of 1000 LUX at the point of examination is required during the application\nof the examination and evaluation for leaks.”\nAPI 650, Section 8.6.10 states:\n“A record or report of the test including a statement addressing temperature and light intensity shall be\ncompleted and furnished to the purchaser upon request.”\nThe Vacuum Box test report of the breakout tank# 772 provided by Enterprise does not satisfy\nthe requirements of API 650, Sections 8.6.6, 8.6.7, and 8.6.10. The report does not reflect the\nrecording of metal surface temperature, minimum light intensity.\n3. §195.565 How do I install cathodic protection on breakout tanks?\nAfter October 2, 2000, when you install cathodic protection under Sec. 195.563(a) to\nprotect the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank of more than 500 barrels (79.5m3)\ncapacity built to API Specification 12F, API Standard 620, or API Standard 650 (or its\npredecessor Standard 12C), you must install the system in accordance with API\nRecommended Practice 651. However, installation of the system need not comply with API\nRecommended Practice 651 on any tank for which you note in the corrosion control\nprocedures established under Sec. 195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or certain\nprovisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for the safety of the tank.\n2\n\n\n\nEnterprise could not demonstrate that they installed a cathodic protection system in accordance\nwith API 651 following the construction of a tank in 2011. API 651, Section 5.3.2.1.k (Sand Pad\nMaterials) states:\nRandom testing of the sand material should be conducted at the supply source to determine if the\nelectrical resistivity and chemical properties are at acceptable levels. …\nUpon request Enterprise failed to provide the chemical analysis of the sand materials backfilled\nunderneath the breakout tank (# 772) bottom.\nAccording to §195.565, the installation of cathodic protection system in compliance with API\nRecommended Practice 651 is not required as long as Enterprise has the proper justification why\ncompliance with all or certain provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for\nthe safety of the tank. When requested, Enterprise could not provide documentation whether the\nchemical analysis of the sand materials was conducted or the justification for not complying with\nAPI recommended Practice 651 Standard.\n4. §195.205 Repair, alteration and reconstruction of aboveground breakout tanks that have\nbeen in service.\n(a) Aboveground breakout tanks that have been repaired, altered, or reconstructed and\nreturned to service must be capable of withstanding the internal pressure produced by the\nhazardous liquid to be stored therein and any anticipated external loads.\n(b) After October 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section requires the\nfollowing for the tanks specified:\n(1) For tanks designed for approximately atmospheric pressure constructed of carbon and\nlow alloy steel, welded or riveted, and non-refrigerated and tanks built to API Standard\n650 or its predecessor Standard 12C, repair, alteration, and reconstruction must be in\naccordance with API Standard 653.\nEnterprise could not demonstrate that they followed all requirements of their specifications when\nrepairing a tank in 2008. PHMSA requested that Enterprise provide the Vacuum Box testing\nreport as required by API 653 for breakout tank #741. API 653, Section 12.1.7.1 states:\n“ … In addition, all new welds, including the weld attaching a patch plate to the bottom, the\nareas of bottom plate restored by welding, and the restoration of welds found with defects\nduring an internal inspection shall be inspected by one of the methods specified in API 650,\nSection 7.3.3. …”\nAPI 650, Section 7.3.3: Examination and Testing of the Tank Bottom states: “… In addition, all\nwelds shall be tested by one of the following methods”.\na) b) c) A vacuum-box test in accordance with 8.6\nA tracer gas test in accordance with 8.6.11\nAfter at least the lowest shell course has been attached …\nEnterprise chose to follow option (a) vacuum box test. API 650, Section 8.6.6 states that the\nmetal surface temperature limits 4ºC and 52ºC, unless the film solution is proven to work at\ntemperature outsides these limits either by testing or manufacturer’s recommendations. API 650,\nSection 8.6.7 states that a minimum light intensity of 1000 LUX at the point of examination is\nrequired during the application of the examination and evaluation for leaks. API 650, Section\n3\n\n\n\n8.6.10 states that “A record or report of the test including a statement addressing temperature and\nlight intensity shall be completed and furnished to the purchaser upon request.”\nThe Vacuum Box test report of breakout tank# 741 provided by Enterprise lacks the specificity\nrequired to show that the requirements of API 650 were met.\n5. §195.402 Procedural Manual for Operations, Maintenance, and Emergencies\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and\nhandling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals\nnot exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared\nbefore initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be\nkept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\nEnterprise did not follow their O&M procedures for conducting post-accident investigations.\nEnterprise’s written O&M procedure in Section 702 (Investigations of Failures), revised on\nNovember 10, 2011, requires that “All Operational failures and accidents … shall be investigated\n…” The procedure goes on to state that information gained by investigation shall be considered\nand utilized to prevent recurrence of failures. The Operations Manager is responsible for\nensuring this work is complete and documentation is made and retained. The local field office\nshall retain these reports and documents.\nEnterprise reported an accident to the National Response Center (NRC #996202) on November\n22, 2011, in Sulphur, Louisiana. The Enterprise Sulphur facility was shut down due to a leak on\na pig trap. During the inspection, PHMSA requested the post-accident review for this accident.\nEnterprise stated that this was never completed and could not provide the post-accident review.\n6. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and\nhandling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals\nnot exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared\nbefore initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be\nkept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\nEnterprise failed to follow their written O&M procedure for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Enterprise O&M\nprocedure CPP-DR-01 (Deficiency Reporting and Remedial Action Development), Section 1.2\nstates:\nDeficiencies identified that are not immediately corrected should be documented and submitted by the\ncorrosion technician within two weeks.\nEnterprise O&M procedure CPP-DR-01, Section 2.1 also states:\n4\n\n\n\nThe corrosion technician will report the deficiency or deficiencies on the Company Remedial Action\nForm with recommendations on how the deficiency is to be corrected.\nDuring the inspection, PHMSA reviewed the Remedial Action Forms on line P-1(16” Baytown\nto Beaumont) and P-63(20” Baytown to Beaumont). The review revealed that all the Deficiency\nAction Forms did not reflect any submission dates to the corrosion supervisor which should be\nwithin two (2) weeks after the discovery as mentioned in Section 1.2. Delayed reporting of\ndeficiencies could lengthen the time of necessary repairs and could jeopardize the integrity of the\npipeline system.\n7. §195.404 Maps and Records\n(b) Each operator shall maintain for at least 3 years daily operating records that indicate –\n(2) Any emergency or abnormal operation to which the procedures under §195.402 apply.\nEnterprise failed to maintain a record of an abnormal operation. Enterprise O&M Procedure,\nSection 811(Abnormal Operation Procedures) states:\nNote - When field personnel have given notification to Control Room that they are at a site and are\ntesting or “DOT’ing” equipment in the field, and they cause a critical alarm which is false, this will\nnot require an AOC. However, after verifying with the field personnel that the conditions associated\nwith those alarms truly are false, the controller is required to match Electronic Logger entry\nexplaining personnel on site caused the false alarm.\nEnterprise O&M Procedure, HCC-PCOT-002(Abnormal Operating Condition), Section 1.4\nstates:\nMake an entry in the Electronic Logger of all the abnormal operating conditions. These will then be\nreported to the affected field technician. If an abnormal condition occurs at any facility manned or\nunmanned, and if the problem is corrected by the field, the field personnel are responsible for\ncompleting the AOC form on the Electronic Logger. If the AOC is corrected by the Network\nOperations Center or a controller, the Controller will fill out the AOC form on the Electronic\nLogger.\nOn May 3, 2012, during the field evaluation of the Orange pump station, PHMSA and Enterprise\ncreated an abnormal operation with the two gas detectors being tested at 20% LEL. One was\ntested at 2:38 PM and other was tested at 2:48 PM. On May 8, 2012, PHMSA requested the\nalarm log sheet of the events that were created on May 3, 2012. The Controller could not\nprovide the acknowledgement of the second gas detector activation (activated at 2:48 PM).\nWhen questioned about the missing acknowledgement of the gas detector activation, the\nController contended that there would be the possibility of not having properly activated the gas\ndetector or not activated the gas detector at all.\n8. §195.505 Qualification program\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The program shall\ninclude provisions to:\n(a) Identify covered tasks;\n(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are qualified\n5\n\n\n\n(h) After December 16, 2004, provide training, as appropriate, to ensure that individuals\nperforming covered tasks have the necessary knowledge and skills to perform the tasks in a\nmanner that ensures the safe operation of pipeline facilities; and\nEnterprise did not ensure that individuals performing covered tasks had the necessary knowledge\nand skills. Enterprise has in its Operator Qualification (OQ) program a covered task identified as\n“1.1 Measure structure to soil potentials”. At Enterprise’ Baytown terminal this task was\nperformed by a Mr. Olason on several tanks. During the inspection in 2012, PHMSA observed\nthat several breakout tanks in the Baytown Tank terminal, have zinc reference electrodes\npermanently installed underneath the tank bottom. The OQ program is limited to measuring\ncatholic protection by utilizing a Copper/Copper Sulfate reference half-cell. The Enterprise OQ\nprogram did not provide a written qualification program specifically dealing with the\nmeasurement of cathodic protection systems which utilize zinc reference electrodes.\nEnterprise contended that the field technicians are well trained on zinc reference electrodes\nconversion. During the field visit, technicians could not interpret the zinc conversion accurately.\nBecause the zinc reference electrodes are not covered in the OQ program, Enterprise did not\nensure through evaluation that individuals performing this covered task were qualified and had\nthe knowledge required to perform this covered task.\n9. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(d) Breakout tanks. You must inspect each cathodic protection system used to control\ncorrosion on the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank to ensure that operation and\nmaintenance of the system are in accordance with API Recommended Practice 651.\nHowever, this inspection is not required if you note in the corrosion control procedures\nestablished under Sec. 195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or certain operation and\nmaintenance provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for the safety\nof the tank.\nEnterprise failed to properly inspect the cathodic protection system of breakout tanks for three\nyears. Enterprise O&M Procedure, CP-13 (Onshore Pipeline and Facility Annual Cathodic\nProtection Survey), revised on June 24, 2011, states:\nSection 2.8 (Cathodic Protection Criteria):\nA negative (cathodic) potential of at least -850mV with cathodic protection applied (Cu/CuSO4\nreference electrode). This criterion shall be used as the primary criteria for all facilities. This\ncriterion must take voltage drops (IR) into consideration. Note: NACE SP0169-2007 states a\nnegative (cathodic) potential of at least -850 mV with the cathodic protection applied.\nSection 2.8.1Considering IR Drop for -850 mV Criterion\n“Voltage drops other than those across the structure-to-electrolyte boundary must be considered for\nvalid interpretation of IR-Drop measurement. One method is to conduct the annual survey while all\nCP current sources are interrupted. This method will be utilized at all Company pipelines/facilities\non a rotating 5 to 7 year schedule.”\n6\n\n\n\nWhile reviewing the records for the cathodic protection of several breakout tanks PHMSA noted\nthat for three years (2009, 2010, and 2011) the records indicate that Enterprise failed to properly\nconsider IR-Drop. Enterprise could not provide any documentation where they measured the IR-\ndrop on these facilities in order to properly consider it in the annual measurements. Enterprise\nalso stated that this IR-Drop measurement has never been performed.\nThe locations and tanks where with improper cathodic protection measurements are:\n• 3 breakout tanks at McRae, AR\n• 1 breakout tank at Jacksonville, AR\n• 2 breakout tanks at N. Little Rock, AR\n• 21 breakout tanks at El Dorado, AR\n• 13 Breakout tanks at Baytown, TX*\n• 4 Breakout tanks at Shreveport, LA**\n* Enterprise provided the records of IR-drop measurement taken on July 11, 2012 (which was\nduring the PHMSA audit). Considering this the measurements satisfy the -850 mV criterion.\n** Enterprise provided the records of IR-drop measurement taken on September 28, 2012 (which\nwas after the PHMSA audit). Considering this the measurement satisfy the -850 mV criterion.\n10. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(d) Breakout tanks. You must inspect each cathodic protection system used to control\ncorrosion on the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank to ensure that operation and\nmaintenance of the system are in accordance with API Recommended Practice 651.\nHowever, this inspection is not required if you note in the corrosion control procedures\nestablished under Sec. 195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or certain operation and\nmaintenance provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for the safety\nof the tank.\nEnterprise failed to inspect the cathodic protection system used to control corrosion on the\nbottom of the aboveground breakout tank # 1305 to ensure that operation and maintenance of the\nsystem are in accordance with API Recommended Practice 651. Enterprise O&M Procedure,\nSection 1307 (Breakout tanks, Miscellaneous Operating Procedure) states:\nInspection of Cathodic Protection System on Breakout Tanks:\nWhere cathodic protection is used to protect the bottoms of breakout tanks (with capacities of more\nthan 500 barrels, built to API specification 12F, API Standard 620, API Standard 650 or API\nStandard 12c), inspections of the cathodic protection system shall be conducted in accordance with\nAPI Recommended Practice 651 and the Company Corrosion Prevention Program.\nBreakout tank # 1305 at McRae terminal has the permanently installed reference electrodes\nunderneath its bottom. PHMSA requested that Enterprise provide three years (2009, 2010, and\n2011) of records of the cathodic protection inspection (annual pipe-to-soil readings) to verify the\nadequacy of the cathodic protection of the entire span of the tank bottom. According to the\nrecords, PHMSA noted that Enterprise has been ignoring the use of reference electrodes\n7\n\n\n\nunderneath the tank bottom and only performing the cathodic protection inspection utilizing the\ntank’s perimeter in the past several years. Even though, the annual pipe-to-soil readings of the\ntank perimeter meet the – 850 mV criterion, it does not ensure that the center and/or middle of\nthe tank bottom is cathodically protected. Breakout tank# 1305 was built in 2007 and is\nscheduled for internal inspection in 2016.\nAccording to §195.573, the installation of cathodic protection system in compliance with API\nRecommended Practice 651 is not required as long as Enterprise has the proper justification why\ncompliance with all or certain provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for\nthe safety of the tank. PHMSA also advised Enterprise to provide the O&M procedure where the\njustification for not complying with API Recommended Practice 651 Standard has been noted.\nEnterprise could not provide answer.\n11. §195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric corrosion and what\ncoating material may I use?\n(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the\natmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this section.\n(b) Coating material must be suitable for the prevention of atmospheric corrosion.\nDuring the September field visit of Fitch pump station, in Louisiana, PHMSA noted that the\nbolts and nuts of the valve’s flange and the residual sample collection pipe on the ILI receiver\nside have been experiencing coating deterioration and rusted. PHMSA noted this to field\npersonnel who responded that the issue has already been captured during the routine survey and\nplaced in company’s 2012 budget.\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $200,000\nper violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for a related series of\nviolations. For violations occurring prior to January 3, 2012, the maximum penalty may not\nexceed $100,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000,000 for a\nrelated series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and\nsupporting documentation involved in the above probable violations and has recommended that\nyou be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $106,100 as follows:\nItem number PENALTY\n5 $28,700\n8 $26,200\n9 $51,200\nWarning Items\nWith respect to item 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10 and 11 we have reviewed the circumstances and\nsupporting documents involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional\nenforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly\n8\n\n\n\ncorrect these item(s). Be advised that failure to do so may result in Enterprise Products\nOperating LLC being subject to additional enforcement action.\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to item(s) 8 pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to Enterprise Products\nOperating LLC. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a\npart of this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators\nin Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. All\nmaterial you submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly available. If\nyou believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment\nunder 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second\ncopy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted\nand an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential\ntreatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this Notice,\nthis constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and authorizes the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice without further\nnotice to you and to issue a Final Order.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 4-2013-5011 and for each document\nyou submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n9\n\n\n\nProposed Compliance Order\nPursuant to 49 United States Code §60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Enterprise Products Operating, LLC (Enterprise) a\nCompliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance\nof Enterprise with the pipeline safety regulations:\n1. In regard to Item 8 of the Notice pertaining to no written qualification program for\nqualifying individuals being responsible for the testing and maintenance of zinc reference\nelectrodes, the operator is to develop a written program specifically for testing and\nmaintenance of the zinc reference electrodes. This is also to include taking steps to\nqualify the individuals to ensure that each individual understands the zinc reference\nelectrodes, instead of the copper/copper sulfate electrode and the conversion factor\nequivalent to copper/copper sulfate reference electrode. This shall be completed within\n90 days following receipt of the Final Order.\n2. It is requested (not mandated) that Enterprise Products Operating LLC maintains\ndocumentation of the safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance\nOrder and submit the total to R. M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration. It is requested that these costs be reported in\ntwo categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures,\nstudies, and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions, and other\nchanges to pipeline infrastructure.\n10\n\n420135011_Final Order_02042016_text.pdf\n\nFebruary 4, 2016\nMr. Michael A. Creel\nChief Executive Officer\nEnterprise Products Operating LLC\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2013-5011\nDear Mr. Creel:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, withdraws one allegation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $77,400, and specifies\ncorrective action that must be completed. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final\nOrder. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed,\nas determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement action will be closed.\nService of the Final Order is made pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. R. M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA, OPS\nMr. Vince Murchison, Murchison Law Firm, PLLC\n325 N Saint Paul St, Suite 2700, Dallas, TX 75201-3892\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n___________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nEnterprise Products Operating LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2013-5011\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\nFINAL ORDER\nBetween April 30 and August 24, 2012, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an inspection of the pipeline facilities and records of Enterprise Products\nOperating LLC (Enterprise or Respondent) in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas.\n1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS, issued a Notice of Probable\nViolation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order on May 1, 2013 (Notice). In\naccordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice alleged three violations of the hazardous liquid\npipeline safety standards, proposed a civil penalty of $106,100, and proposed a compliance\norder. In accordance with § 190.205, the Notice also included eight warning items.\nEnterprise responded on August 28, 2013, and requested a hearing. Additional written materials\nwere submitted by Respondent on January 27, 2014. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, a\nhearing was held in Houston, Texas, on February 6, 2014, before a Presiding Official from the\nOffice of Chief Counsel, PHMSA. After the hearing, Enterprise submitted further written\nmaterials on April 30 and November 12, 2014. Pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), the Director\nsubmitted a written evaluation of Respondent’s response material on June 16, 2014.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nItems 5, 8, and 9 of the Notice alleged that Respondent committed violations of the pipeline\nsafety standards in 49 C.F.R. Part 195. The alleged violations were as follows:\n1 Enterprise is a subsidiary of Enterprise Products Partners L.P. and operates about 23,000 miles of\npipeline transporting primarily highly volatile liquids, as reported by Respondent for calendar year 2014.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2013-5011\nPage 2\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies . . . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety during maintenance and normal operations . . .\n(5) Analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes.\n(6) Minimizing . . . the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed\nunder paragraph (c)(5) of this section.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its written\nprocedures when investigating an accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent’s\nprocedures required that all accidents be investigated and that additional actions be taken to\nprevent recurrence. When OPS inspectors requested documentation related to an accident that\nhad occurred on November 22, 2011, in Sulphur, Louisiana, OPS inspectors concluded that\nRespondent never completed a post-accident review.\nAt the hearing, OPS explained that Respondent conducted a preliminary investigation of the\naccident and prepared a report titled Preliminary Incident Report (PIR) 11410. OPS contended\nthe PIR proved Respondent did not perform a complete incident investigation because\nRespondent had checked a box labeled “No” next to the phrase “Incident Investigation.”2 OPS\nalso stated that the title of the PIR has the word “Preliminary” in it, implying the document itself\nis not a complete investigation report. Finally, OPS noted that a Company employee said that an\ninvestigation was not conducted.\nIn response, Respondent argued that it complied with its procedures. The Company stated that it\nhad completed an investigation of the accident, identified the root cause, documented the\ninvestigation in the PIR, and took action to prevent recurrence by having a safety meeting with\noperating personnel. Respondent explained that the box checked “No” in the PIR simply\nindicated that no further investigation was required. Likewise, Respondent explained the word\n“Preliminary” in the title of the PIR was not in regard to the report’s completeness, but rather\nreflected the purpose of the report, which is to determine whether additional investigation is\nrequired. Respondent denied an employee had ever said an investigation was not completed,\nclaiming that the employee had provided the PIR to OPS.\n2 Violation Report, Exhibit A-5: Enterprise Preliminary Incident Report (PIR) 11410 (Nov. 22, 2011).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2013-5011\nPage 3\nApplicable Safety Standards\nSection 195.402 of the hazardous liquid pipeline safety standards requires pipeline operators to\nprepare a manual of written procedures for the operation and maintenance (O&M) of their\npipeline facility. The manual must include procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents to\ndetermine their cause and for minimizing the possibility of recurrence.\n3 Operators are required\nto follow their written O&M procedures.4\nAnalysis\nPHMSA reviews the record to determine whether Respondent followed its written procedures for\ninvestigating the accident that occurred on November 22, 2011. Respondent’s O&M manual\ncontained Section 702, titled “Investigation of Failures.”5 Section 702 stated that all accidents\n“shall be investigated and analyzed for the purpose of determining the cause and to minimize the\npotential for hazards and possibility of a recurrence.”6 The procedure required that the\ninformation acquired from an investigation be “utilized as soon as possible to prevent a\nrecurrence of failures or accidents from the same cause.”7 Section 702 also specified that\naccidents must be “documented using Company forms or reports where applicable. These forms\nor reports shall be supplemented by a written report when requested by Pipeline Management.”8\nThese are the procedures that governed Respondent’s investigation of the accident that occurred\non November 22, 2011.\nOn the day of the accident, Respondent’s personnel responded to the station where the accident\noccurred and found a leak on a pig trap door.9 The station was shut down and the pig trap was\nclosed, which stopped the leak. The root cause of the leak was determined to be the o-ring on\nthe trap door, and the o-ring was replaced. Respondent completed the PIR form the same day.\nThe form stated that a discussion would take place with all employees at a safety meeting. That\nsafety meeting was held on December 6, 2011, and covered the cause of the accident and\ninstructions for preventing recurrence.\n10\nPHMSA finds the evidence demonstrates that Respondent performed an accident investigation,\nwhich identified the cause of the failure, and Respondent took action to prevent recurrence by\n3 § 195.402(c)(5) and (c)(6).\n4 § 195.402(a).\n5 Violation Report, Exhibit A-5: Enterprise Procedures Manual for Hazardous Liquids Pipeline\nOperations, Maintenance, and Emergencies (OM&E): Section 702 (Investigation of Failures).\n6 OM&E Section 702.\n7 Id.\n8 Id.\n9 PIR 11410.\n10 Respondent Hearing Exhibit 7: Enterprise Form SF30 “Safety Meeting Minutes” (Dec. 6, 2011).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2013-5011\nPage 4\ndiscussing the information with personnel. These actions were consistent with Respondent’s\nwritten procedures in Section 702 of the O&M manual.\nAlthough OPS took issue with the box checked “No” next to the phrase “Incident Investigation”\non the PIR form, the evidence shows that Respondent did perform an investigation for the\npurpose of completing the form, consistent with its procedures for documenting an accident\ninvestigation. Under these procedures, an additional written supplement to the PIR form could\nbe prepared, but was only required “when requested by Pipeline Management.”11 In this case,\nRespondent had determined that supplementing the form was not necessary because the root\ncause had already been identified and actions were planned to prevent recurrence.\nThe word “Preliminary” in the title of PIR form cannot be the sole basis for a violation, as\nRespondent has plausibly explained how the form is used to determine whether or not additional\ninvestigation is needed, which is consistent with its procedures. Respondent is encouraged,\nhowever, to amend its Section 702 to clarify when appropriate boxes should be checked and\nunder what circumstances management will request supplementing the PIR form.\nHaving found that Respondent investigated and analyzed the accident, determined the cause,\ncompleted the designated investigation form, and took action to minimize the potential for\nrecurrence, there is insufficient evidence to prove Respondent failed to follow its procedures.\nAccordingly, the allegation that Respondent violated § 195.402(a) is withdrawn.\nItem 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505, which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.505 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.\nThe program shall include provisions to:\n(a) Identify covered tasks;\n(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered\ntasks are qualified . . .\n(h) After December 16, 2004, provide training, as appropriate, to\nensure that individuals performing covered tasks have the necessary\nknowledge and skills to perform the tasks in a manner that ensures the safe\noperation of pipeline facilities . . . .\n§195.501 Scope.\n(a) . . . .\n(b) For the purpose of this subpart, a covered task is an activity,\nidentified by the operator, that:\n(1) Is performed on a pipeline facility;\n(2) Is an operations or maintenance task;\n(3) Is performed as a requirement of this part; and\n11 OM&E Section 702.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2013-5011\nPage 5\n(4) Affects the operation or integrity of the pipeline.\n§195.503 Definitions.\nQualified means that an individual has been evaluated and can:\n(a) Perform assigned covered tasks and\n(b) Recognize and re","truncated":true,"body_characters":75765}