# ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 420135011
- **title:** ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2013-05-01
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.202, 195.205, 195.402(a), 195.404(b)(2), 195.505(a), 195.505(b), 195.505(h), 195.565, 195.573(d), 195.581(a).
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135011.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135011.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420135011
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420135011
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.202,  195.205,  195.402(a),  195.404(b)(2),  195.505(a),  195.505(b),  195.505(h),  195.565,  195.573(d),  195.581(a). The case was opened on 2013-05-01 and is reported as closed as of 2016-05-10. Proposed civil penalty: $106,100. Assessed civil penalty: $77,400. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420135011_Closure Letter_05102016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Closure%20Letter_05102016.pdf

420135011_Closure Letter_05102016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Closure%20Letter_05102016_text.pdf

420135011_Final Order_02042016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Final%20Order_02042016.pdf

420135011_Final Order_02042016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Final%20Order_02042016_text.pdf

420135011_NOPV PCP PCO_05012013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_05012013.pdf

420135011_NOPV PCP PCO_05012013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_05012013_text.pdf

420135011_Operator_Response_to_Notice_and_Request_for__Hearing_08282013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420135011/420135011_Operator_Response_to_Notice_and_Request_for__Hearing_08282013.pdf

420135011_Closure Letter_05102016_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
May 10, 2016
Mr. Graham Bacon
Executive Vice President, Operating & Engineering
1100 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002-5227
CPF 4-2013-5011
Dear Mr. Bacon:
On February 4, 2016, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
issued to Enterprise Products Operating, LLC a Final Order in the above-referenced case. The
Order included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our review of the
documentation you provided to satisfy the Compliance Order (CO) and confirmation of payment
of the civil penalty, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.
Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the
matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
R. M. Seeley
Director, SW Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

420135011_NOPV PCP PCO_05012013_text.pdf

NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
CERTIFIED MAIL- RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
May 1, 2013
Mr. Terry Hurlburt
Senior Vice President of Operations
Enterprise Products Operating LLC
1100 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002
Dear Mr. Hurlburt: CPF 4-2013-5011
On multiple occasions between April 30 and August 24, 2012, a representative of the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) was onsite and inspected Enterprise
Products Operating, LLC (Enterprise) procedures, records, and pipeline facilities in Texas,
Louisiana, and Arkansas operating areas pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code.
As a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the
Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the
probable violations are:
1. §195.202 Compliance with specifications or standards:
Each pipeline system must be constructed in accordance with comprehensive written
specifications or standards that are consistent with the requirements of this part.
Enterprise could not demonstrate that they followed all requirements of their specifications when
constructing a tank in 2011. PHMSA requested that Enterprise provide the construction
specifications along with the test results of the water quality used for the purpose of hydrostatic
testing of breakout tank # 772. Tank 772 was to be built in accordance with API 650 as



referenced by the Enterprise specifications. Specifically, API 650, 7.3.6.3 states, The purchaser
shall be responsible for:
Specifying the test water quality. Potable water is preferred for hydro-testing. This does not preclude the
use of condensate, reverse osmosis water, well water, river water, or sea water. The purchaser shall
consider issues such as low temperature brittle facture, freeze damage, amount of suspended solids,
sanitation issues, animal/plant incubation and/or growth, acidity, general corrosion, pitting, protecting
against cathodic cells, microbiologically-induced corrosion, material dependent sensitivity to trace
chemical attack, disposal, rinsing, and residuals left in the tank after emptying. If the purchaser supplied
test water causes corrosion, the purchaser is responsible for the required repairs.
Enterprise provided only a water permit which does not contain a description of the quality of the
water.
2. §195.202 Compliance with specifications or standards:
Each pipeline system must be constructed in accordance with comprehensive written
specifications or standards that are consistent with the requirements of this part.
Enterprise could not demonstrate that they followed all requirements of their specifications when
constructing a tank in 2011. PHMSA requested that Enterprise provide the construction
specifications along with the Vacuum Box testing report of breakout tank# 772. Tank 772 was
to be built in accordance with API 650 as referenced by the Enterprise specifications.
Specifically, API 650, Section 8.6.6 states:
“The metal surface temperature limits 4ºC and 52ºC, unless the film solution is proven to work at
temperature outsides these limits either by testing or manufacturer’s recommendations.”
API 650, Section 8.6.7 states:
“A minimum light intensity of 1000 LUX at the point of examination is required during the application
of the examination and evaluation for leaks.”
API 650, Section 8.6.10 states:
“A record or report of the test including a statement addressing temperature and light intensity shall be
completed and furnished to the purchaser upon request.”
The Vacuum Box test report of the breakout tank# 772 provided by Enterprise does not satisfy
the requirements of API 650, Sections 8.6.6, 8.6.7, and 8.6.10. The report does not reflect the
recording of metal surface temperature, minimum light intensity.
3. §195.565 How do I install cathodic protection on breakout tanks?
After October 2, 2000, when you install cathodic protection under Sec. 195.563(a) to
protect the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank of more than 500 barrels (79.5m3)
capacity built to API Specification 12F, API Standard 620, or API Standard 650 (or its
predecessor Standard 12C), you must install the system in accordance with API
Recommended Practice 651. However, installation of the system need not comply with API
Recommended Practice 651 on any tank for which you note in the corrosion control
procedures established under Sec. 195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or certain
provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for the safety of the tank.
2



Enterprise could not demonstrate that they installed a cathodic protection system in accordance
with API 651 following the construction of a tank in 2011. API 651, Section 5.3.2.1.k (Sand Pad
Materials) states:
Random testing of the sand material should be conducted at the supply source to determine if the
electrical resistivity and chemical properties are at acceptable levels. …
Upon request Enterprise failed to provide the chemical analysis of the sand materials backfilled
underneath the breakout tank (# 772) bottom.
According to §195.565, the installation of cathodic protection system in compliance with API
Recommended Practice 651 is not required as long as Enterprise has the proper justification why
compliance with all or certain provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for
the safety of the tank. When requested, Enterprise could not provide documentation whether the
chemical analysis of the sand materials was conducted or the justification for not complying with
API recommended Practice 651 Standard.
4. §195.205 Repair, alteration and reconstruction of aboveground breakout tanks that have
been in service.
(a) Aboveground breakout tanks that have been repaired, altered, or reconstructed and
returned to service must be capable of withstanding the internal pressure produced by the
hazardous liquid to be stored therein and any anticipated external loads.
(b) After October 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section requires the
following for the tanks specified:
(1) For tanks designed for approximately atmospheric pressure constructed of carbon and
low alloy steel, welded or riveted, and non-refrigerated and tanks built to API Standard
650 or its predecessor Standard 12C, repair, alteration, and reconstruction must be in
accordance with API Standard 653.
Enterprise could not demonstrate that they followed all requirements of their specifications when
repairing a tank in 2008. PHMSA requested that Enterprise provide the Vacuum Box testing
report as required by API 653 for breakout tank #741. API 653, Section 12.1.7.1 states:
“ … In addition, all new welds, including the weld attaching a patch plate to the bottom, the
areas of bottom plate restored by welding, and the restoration of welds found with defects
during an internal inspection shall be inspected by one of the methods specified in API 650,
Section 7.3.3. …”
API 650, Section 7.3.3: Examination and Testing of the Tank Bottom states: “… In addition, all
welds shall be tested by one of the following methods”.
a) b) c) A vacuum-box test in accordance with 8.6
A tracer gas test in accordance with 8.6.11
After at least the lowest shell course has been attached …
Enterprise chose to follow option (a) vacuum box test. API 650, Section 8.6.6 states that the
metal surface temperature limits 4ºC and 52ºC, unless the film solution is proven to work at
temperature outsides these limits either by testing or manufacturer’s recommendations. API 650,
Section 8.6.7 states that a minimum light intensity of 1000 LUX at the point of examination is
required during the application of the examination and evaluation for leaks. API 650, Section
3



8.6.10 states that “A record or report of the test including a statement addressing temperature and
light intensity shall be completed and furnished to the purchaser upon request.”
The Vacuum Box test report of breakout tank# 741 provided by Enterprise lacks the specificity
required to show that the requirements of API 650 were met.
5. §195.402 Procedural Manual for Operations, Maintenance, and Emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals
not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared
before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be
kept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
Enterprise did not follow their O&M procedures for conducting post-accident investigations.
Enterprise’s written O&M procedure in Section 702 (Investigations of Failures), revised on
November 10, 2011, requires that “All Operational failures and accidents … shall be investigated
…” The procedure goes on to state that information gained by investigation shall be considered
and utilized to prevent recurrence of failures. The Operations Manager is responsible for
ensuring this work is complete and documentation is made and retained. The local field office
shall retain these reports and documents.
Enterprise reported an accident to the National Response Center (NRC #996202) on November
22, 2011, in Sulphur, Louisiana. The Enterprise Sulphur facility was shut down due to a leak on
a pig trap. During the inspection, PHMSA requested the post-accident review for this accident.
Enterprise stated that this was never completed and could not provide the post-accident review.
6. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals
not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared
before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be
kept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
Enterprise failed to follow their written O&M procedure for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Enterprise O&M
procedure CPP-DR-01 (Deficiency Reporting and Remedial Action Development), Section 1.2
states:
Deficiencies identified that are not immediately corrected should be documented and submitted by the
corrosion technician within two weeks.
Enterprise O&M procedure CPP-DR-01, Section 2.1 also states:
4



The corrosion technician will report the deficiency or deficiencies on the Company Remedial Action
Form with recommendations on how the deficiency is to be corrected.
During the inspection, PHMSA reviewed the Remedial Action Forms on line P-1(16” Baytown
to Beaumont) and P-63(20” Baytown to Beaumont). The review revealed that all the Deficiency
Action Forms did not reflect any submission dates to the corrosion supervisor which should be
within two (2) weeks after the discovery as mentioned in Section 1.2. Delayed reporting of
deficiencies could lengthen the time of necessary repairs and could jeopardize the integrity of the
pipeline system.
7. §195.404 Maps and Records
(b) Each operator shall maintain for at least 3 years daily operating records that indicate –
(2) Any emergency or abnormal operation to which the procedures under §195.402 apply.
Enterprise failed to maintain a record of an abnormal operation. Enterprise O&M Procedure,
Section 811(Abnormal Operation Procedures) states:
Note - When field personnel have given notification to Control Room that they are at a site and are
testing or “DOT’ing” equipment in the field, and they cause a critical alarm which is false, this will
not require an AOC. However, after verifying with the field personnel that the conditions associated
with those alarms truly are false, the controller is required to match Electronic Logger entry
explaining personnel on site caused the false alarm.
Enterprise O&M Procedure, HCC-PCOT-002(Abnormal Operating Condition), Section 1.4
states:
Make an entry in the Electronic Logger of all the abnormal operating conditions. These will then be
reported to the affected field technician. If an abnormal condition occurs at any facility manned or
unmanned, and if the problem is corrected by the field, the field personnel are responsible for
completing the AOC form on the Electronic Logger. If the AOC is corrected by the Network
Operations Center or a controller, the Controller will fill out the AOC form on the Electronic
Logger.
On May 3, 2012, during the field evaluation of the Orange pump station, PHMSA and Enterprise
created an abnormal operation with the two gas detectors being tested at 20% LEL. One was
tested at 2:38 PM and other was tested at 2:48 PM. On May 8, 2012, PHMSA requested the
alarm log sheet of the events that were created on May 3, 2012. The Controller could not
provide the acknowledgement of the second gas detector activation (activated at 2:48 PM).
When questioned about the missing acknowledgement of the gas detector activation, the
Controller contended that there would be the possibility of not having properly activated the gas
detector or not activated the gas detector at all.
8. §195.505 Qualification program
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The program shall
include provisions to:
(a) Identify covered tasks;
(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are qualified
5



(h) After December 16, 2004, provide training, as appropriate, to ensure that individuals
performing covered tasks have the necessary knowledge and skills to perform the tasks in a
manner that ensures the safe operation of pipeline facilities; and
Enterprise did not ensure that individuals performing covered tasks had the necessary knowledge
and skills. Enterprise has in its Operator Qualification (OQ) program a covered task identified as
“1.1 Measure structure to soil potentials”. At Enterprise’ Baytown terminal this task was
performed by a Mr. Olason on several tanks. During the inspection in 2012, PHMSA observed
that several breakout tanks in the Baytown Tank terminal, have zinc reference electrodes
permanently installed underneath the tank bottom. The OQ program is limited to measuring
catholic protection by utilizing a Copper/Copper Sulfate reference half-cell. The Enterprise OQ
program did not provide a written qualification program specifically dealing with the
measurement of cathodic protection systems which utilize zinc reference electrodes.
Enterprise contended that the field technicians are well trained on zinc reference electrodes
conversion. During the field visit, technicians could not interpret the zinc conversion accurately.
Because the zinc reference electrodes are not covered in the OQ program, Enterprise did not
ensure through evaluation that individuals performing this covered task were qualified and had
the knowledge required to perform this covered task.
9. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?
(d) Breakout tanks. You must inspect each cathodic protection system used to control
corrosion on the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank to ensure that operation and
maintenance of the system are in accordance with API Recommended Practice 651.
However, this inspection is not required if you note in the corrosion control procedures
established under Sec. 195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or certain operation and
maintenance provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for the safety
of the tank.
Enterprise failed to properly inspect the cathodic protection system of breakout tanks for three
years. Enterprise O&M Procedure, CP-13 (Onshore Pipeline and Facility Annual Cathodic
Protection Survey), revised on June 24, 2011, states:
Section 2.8 (Cathodic Protection Criteria):
A negative (cathodic) potential of at least -850mV with cathodic protection applied (Cu/CuSO4
reference electrode). This criterion shall be used as the primary criteria for all facilities. This
criterion must take voltage drops (IR) into consideration. Note: NACE SP0169-2007 states a
negative (cathodic) potential of at least -850 mV with the cathodic protection applied.
Section 2.8.1Considering IR Drop for -850 mV Criterion
“Voltage drops other than those across the structure-to-electrolyte boundary must be considered for
valid interpretation of IR-Drop measurement. One method is to conduct the annual survey while all
CP current sources are interrupted. This method will be utilized at all Company pipelines/facilities
on a rotating 5 to 7 year schedule.”
6



While reviewing the records for the cathodic protection of several breakout tanks PHMSA noted
that for three years (2009, 2010, and 2011) the records indicate that Enterprise failed to properly
consider IR-Drop. Enterprise could not provide any documentation where they measured the IR-
drop on these facilities in order to properly consider it in the annual measurements. Enterprise
also stated that this IR-Drop measurement has never been performed.
The locations and tanks where with improper cathodic protection measurements are:
• 3 breakout tanks at McRae, AR
• 1 breakout tank at Jacksonville, AR
• 2 breakout tanks at N. Little Rock, AR
• 21 breakout tanks at El Dorado, AR
• 13 Breakout tanks at Baytown, TX*
• 4 Breakout tanks at Shreveport, LA**
* Enterprise provided the records of IR-drop measurement taken on July 11, 2012 (which was
during the PHMSA audit). Considering this the measurements satisfy the -850 mV criterion.
** Enterprise provided the records of IR-drop measurement taken on September 28, 2012 (which
was after the PHMSA audit). Considering this the measurement satisfy the -850 mV criterion.
10. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?
(d) Breakout tanks. You must inspect each cathodic protection system used to control
corrosion on the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank to ensure that operation and
maintenance of the system are in accordance with API Recommended Practice 651.
However, this inspection is not required if you note in the corrosion control procedures
established under Sec. 195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or certain operation and
maintenance provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for the safety
of the tank.
Enterprise failed to inspect the cathodic protection system used to control corrosion on the
bottom of the aboveground breakout tank # 1305 to ensure that operation and maintenance of the
system are in accordance with API Recommended Practice 651. Enterprise O&M Procedure,
Section 1307 (Breakout tanks, Miscellaneous Operating Procedure) states:
Inspection of Cathodic Protection System on Breakout Tanks:
Where cathodic protection is used to protect the bottoms of breakout tanks (with capacities of more
than 500 barrels, built to API specification 12F, API Standard 620, API Standard 650 or API
Standard 12c), inspections of the cathodic protection system shall be conducted in accordance with
API Recommended Practice 651 and the Company Corrosion Prevention Program.
Breakout tank # 1305 at McRae terminal has the permanently installed reference electrodes
underneath its bottom. PHMSA requested that Enterprise provide three years (2009, 2010, and
2011) of records of the cathodic protection inspection (annual pipe-to-soil readings) to verify the
adequacy of the cathodic protection of the entire span of the tank bottom. According to the
records, PHMSA noted that Enterprise has been ignoring the use of reference electrodes
7



underneath the tank bottom and only performing the cathodic protection inspection utilizing the
tank’s perimeter in the past several years. Even though, the annual pipe-to-soil readings of the
tank perimeter meet the – 850 mV criterion, it does not ensure that the center and/or middle of
the tank bottom is cathodically protected. Breakout tank# 1305 was built in 2007 and is
scheduled for internal inspection in 2016.
According to §195.573, the installation of cathodic protection system in compliance with API
Recommended Practice 651 is not required as long as Enterprise has the proper justification why
compliance with all or certain provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for
the safety of the tank. PHMSA also advised Enterprise to provide the O&M procedure where the
justification for not complying with API Recommended Practice 651 Standard has been noted.
Enterprise could not provide answer.
11. §195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric corrosion and what
coating material may I use?
(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the
atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this section.
(b) Coating material must be suitable for the prevention of atmospheric corrosion.
During the September field visit of Fitch pump station, in Louisiana, PHMSA noted that the
bolts and nuts of the valve’s flange and the residual sample collection pipe on the ILI receiver
side have been experiencing coating deterioration and rusted. PHMSA noted this to field
personnel who responded that the issue has already been captured during the routine survey and
placed in company’s 2012 budget.
Proposed Civil Penalty
Under 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $200,000
per violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for a related series of
violations. For violations occurring prior to January 3, 2012, the maximum penalty may not
exceed $100,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000,000 for a
related series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and
supporting documentation involved in the above probable violations and has recommended that
you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $106,100 as follows:
Item number PENALTY
5 $28,700
8 $26,200
9 $51,200
Warning Items
With respect to item 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10 and 11 we have reviewed the circumstances and
supporting documents involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional
enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly
8



correct these item(s). Be advised that failure to do so may result in Enterprise Products
Operating LLC being subject to additional enforcement action.
Proposed Compliance Order
With respect to item(s) 8 pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to Enterprise Products
Operating LLC. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a
part of this Notice.
Response to this Notice
Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators
in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. All
material you submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly available. If
you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment
under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second
copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted
and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential
treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this Notice,
this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and authorizes the
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice without further
notice to you and to issue a Final Order.
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 4-2013-5011 and for each document
you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
R. M. Seeley
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosures: Proposed Compliance Order
Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
9



Proposed Compliance Order
Pursuant to 49 United States Code §60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Enterprise Products Operating, LLC (Enterprise) a
Compliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance
of Enterprise with the pipeline safety regulations:
1. In regard to Item 8 of the Notice pertaining to no written qualification program for
qualifying individuals being responsible for the testing and maintenance of zinc reference
electrodes, the operator is to develop a written program specifically for testing and
maintenance of the zinc reference electrodes. This is also to include taking steps to
qualify the individuals to ensure that each individual understands the zinc reference
electrodes, instead of the copper/copper sulfate electrode and the conversion factor
equivalent to copper/copper sulfate reference electrode. This shall be completed within
90 days following receipt of the Final Order.
2. It is requested (not mandated) that Enterprise Products Operating LLC maintains
documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance
Order and submit the total to R. M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. It is requested that these costs be reported in
two categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures,
studies, and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions, and other
changes to pipeline infrastructure.
10

420135011_Final Order_02042016_text.pdf

February 4, 2016
Mr. Michael A. Creel
Chief Executive Officer
Enterprise Products Operating LLC
1100 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002
Re: CPF No. 4-2013-5011
Dear Mr. Creel:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, withdraws one allegation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $77,400, and specifies
corrective action that must be completed. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final
Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed,
as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement action will be closed.
Service of the Final Order is made pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. R. M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA, OPS
Mr. Vince Murchison, Murchison Law Firm, PLLC
325 N Saint Paul St, Suite 2700, Dallas, TX 75201-3892
CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
___________________________________
In the Matter of )
Enterprise Products Operating LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2013-5011
)
)
)
Respondent. )
___________________________________ )
FINAL ORDER
Between April 30 and August 24, 2012, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), conducted an inspection of the pipeline facilities and records of Enterprise Products
Operating LLC (Enterprise or Respondent) in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas.
1
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS, issued a Notice of Probable
Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order on May 1, 2013 (Notice). In
accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice alleged three violations of the hazardous liquid
pipeline safety standards, proposed a civil penalty of $106,100, and proposed a compliance
order. In accordance with § 190.205, the Notice also included eight warning items.
Enterprise responded on August 28, 2013, and requested a hearing. Additional written materials
were submitted by Respondent on January 27, 2014. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, a
hearing was held in Houston, Texas, on February 6, 2014, before a Presiding Official from the
Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA. After the hearing, Enterprise submitted further written
materials on April 30 and November 12, 2014. Pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), the Director
submitted a written evaluation of Respondent’s response material on June 16, 2014.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
Items 5, 8, and 9 of the Notice alleged that Respondent committed violations of the pipeline
safety standards in 49 C.F.R. Part 195. The alleged violations were as follows:
1 Enterprise is a subsidiary of Enterprise Products Partners L.P. and operates about 23,000 miles of
pipeline transporting primarily highly volatile liquids, as reported by Respondent for calendar year 2014.



CPF No. 4-2013-5011
Page 2
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies . . . .
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations . . .
(5) Analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes.
(6) Minimizing . . . the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed
under paragraph (c)(5) of this section.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its written
procedures when investigating an accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent’s
procedures required that all accidents be investigated and that additional actions be taken to
prevent recurrence. When OPS inspectors requested documentation related to an accident that
had occurred on November 22, 2011, in Sulphur, Louisiana, OPS inspectors concluded that
Respondent never completed a post-accident review.
At the hearing, OPS explained that Respondent conducted a preliminary investigation of the
accident and prepared a report titled Preliminary Incident Report (PIR) 11410. OPS contended
the PIR proved Respondent did not perform a complete incident investigation because
Respondent had checked a box labeled “No” next to the phrase “Incident Investigation.”2 OPS
also stated that the title of the PIR has the word “Preliminary” in it, implying the document itself
is not a complete investigation report. Finally, OPS noted that a Company employee said that an
investigation was not conducted.
In response, Respondent argued that it complied with its procedures. The Company stated that it
had completed an investigation of the accident, identified the root cause, documented the
investigation in the PIR, and took action to prevent recurrence by having a safety meeting with
operating personnel. Respondent explained that the box checked “No” in the PIR simply
indicated that no further investigation was required. Likewise, Respondent explained the word
“Preliminary” in the title of the PIR was not in regard to the report’s completeness, but rather
reflected the purpose of the report, which is to determine whether additional investigation is
required. Respondent denied an employee had ever said an investigation was not completed,
claiming that the employee had provided the PIR to OPS.
2 Violation Report, Exhibit A-5: Enterprise Preliminary Incident Report (PIR) 11410 (Nov. 22, 2011).



CPF No. 4-2013-5011
Page 3
Applicable Safety Standards
Section 195.402 of the hazardous liquid pipeline safety standards requires pipeline operators to
prepare a manual of written procedures for the operation and maintenance (O&M) of their
pipeline facility. The manual must include procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents to
determine their cause and for minimizing the possibility of recurrence.
3 Operators are required
to follow their written O&M procedures.4
Analysis
PHMSA reviews the record to determine whether Respondent followed its written procedures for
investigating the accident that occurred on November 22, 2011. Respondent’s O&M manual
contained Section 702, titled “Investigation of Failures.”5 Section 702 stated that all accidents
“shall be investigated and analyzed for the purpose of determining the cause and to minimize the
potential for hazards and possibility of a recurrence.”6 The procedure required that the
information acquired from an investigation be “utilized as soon as possible to prevent a
recurrence of failures or accidents from the same cause.”7 Section 702 also specified that
accidents must be “documented using Company forms or reports where applicable. These forms
or reports shall be supplemented by a written report when requested by Pipeline Management.”8
These are the procedures that governed Respondent’s investigation of the accident that occurred
on November 22, 2011.
On the day of the accident, Respondent’s personnel responded to the station where the accident
occurred and found a leak on a pig trap door.9 The station was shut down and the pig trap was
closed, which stopped the leak. The root cause of the leak was determined to be the o-ring on
the trap door, and the o-ring was replaced. Respondent completed the PIR form the same day.
The form stated that a discussion would take place with all employees at a safety meeting. That
safety meeting was held on December 6, 2011, and covered the cause of the accident and
instructions for preventing recurrence.
10
PHMSA finds the evidence demonstrates that Respondent performed an accident investigation,
which identified the cause of the failure, and Respondent took action to prevent recurrence by
3 § 195.402(c)(5) and (c)(6).
4 § 195.402(a).
5 Violation Report, Exhibit A-5: Enterprise Procedures Manual for Hazardous Liquids Pipeline
Operations, Maintenance, and Emergencies (OM&E): Section 702 (Investigation of Failures).
6 OM&E Section 702.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 PIR 11410.
10 Respondent Hearing Exhibit 7: Enterprise Form SF30 “Safety Meeting Minutes” (Dec. 6, 2011).



CPF No. 4-2013-5011
Page 4
discussing the information with personnel. These actions were consistent with Respondent’s
written procedures in Section 702 of the O&M manual.
Although OPS took issue with the box checked “No” next to the phrase “Incident Investigation”
on the PIR form, the evidence shows that Respondent did perform an investigation for the
purpose of completing the form, consistent with its procedures for documenting an accident
investigation. Under these procedures, an additional written supplement to the PIR form could
be prepared, but was only required “when requested by Pipeline Management.”11 In this case,
Respondent had determined that supplementing the form was not necessary because the root
cause had already been identified and actions were planned to prevent recurrence.
The word “Preliminary” in the title of PIR form cannot be the sole basis for a violation, as
Respondent has plausibly explained how the form is used to determine whether or not additional
investigation is needed, which is consistent with its procedures. Respondent is encouraged,
however, to amend its Section 702 to clarify when appropriate boxes should be checked and
under what circumstances management will request supplementing the PIR form.
Having found that Respondent investigated and analyzed the accident, determined the cause,
completed the designated investigation form, and took action to minimize the potential for
recurrence, there is insufficient evidence to prove Respondent failed to follow its procedures.
Accordingly, the allegation that Respondent violated § 195.402(a) is withdrawn.
Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) Identify covered tasks;
(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered
tasks are qualified . . .
(h) After December 16, 2004, provide training, as appropriate, to
ensure that individuals performing covered tasks have the necessary
knowledge and skills to perform the tasks in a manner that ensures the safe
operation of pipeline facilities . . . .
§195.501 Scope.
(a) . . . .
(b) For the purpose of this subpart, a covered task is an activity,
identified by the operator, that:
(1) Is performed on a pipeline facility;
(2) Is an operations or maintenance task;
(3) Is performed as a requirement of this part; and
11 OM&E Section 702.



CPF No. 4-2013-5011
Page 5
(4) Affects the operation or integrity of the pipeline.
§195.503 Definitions.
Qualified means that an individual has been evaluated and can:
(a) Perform assigned covered tasks and
(b) Recognize and re
- **truncated:** true
- **body characters:** 75765