{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420145026H","title":"MID - VALLEY PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2014-10-17","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420145026h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420145026h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420145026h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420145026H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving MID - VALLEY PIPELINE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2014-10-17 and is reported as closed as of 2016-04-11. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420145026H_Closure Letter_03232016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Closure%20Letter_03232016.pdf\n\n420145026H_Closure Letter_03232016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Closure%20Letter_03232016_text.pdf\n\n420145026H_Closure Letter_04112016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Closure%20Letter_04112016.pdf\n\n420145026H_Closure Letter_04112016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Closure%20Letter_04112016_text.pdf\n\n420145026H_Corrective Action Order_10172014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_10172014.pdf\n\n420145026H_Corrective Action Order_10172014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_10172014_text.pdf\n\n420145026H_Corrective Action Order_10172014_text.pdf\n\nOCTOBER 17, 2014\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (866) 547-7490\nMr. Charles E. Maser\nPresident\nMid-Valley Pipeline Company\n1818 Market Street, Suite 1500\nPhiladelphia, PA 19103\nRe: CPF No. 4-2014-5026H\nDear Mr. Maser:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration in the above-referenced case. It requires Mid-Valley Pipeline Company to take\ncertain corrective actions with respect to its 20-inch diameter crude oil pipeline that failed on\nOctober 13, 2014, near the town of Mooringsport, Louisiana. Service is being made by certified\nmail and facsimile. Service of this Corrective Action Order by facsimile or other electronic\nmeans is complete upon receipt, as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions\nof this Order are effective immediately upon service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Rod Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety\nMr. David Chalson, Vice President, Operations, Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P.,\n4041 Market Street, Aston, PA 19014\nMr. Todd Nardozzi, DOT Compliance Manager, Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P.\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n_________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nMid-Valley Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 4-2014-5026H\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n_________________________________________ )\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112\nand 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, to require Mid-Valley Pipeline Company (Mid-Valley or Respondent),\nto take the necessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from\npotential hazards associated with a recent failure involving Respondent’s 20-inch diameter\nhazardous liquid pipeline transporting crude oil from Longview, Texas, to Samaria, Michigan\n(Mid-Valley Pipeline).\nOn October 13, 2014, a failure occurred on Respondent’s Mid-Valley Pipeline near the town of\nMooringsport in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, resulting in the release of up to 4,000 barrels of crude\noil into the environment. The cause of the failure has not yet been determined.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the incident. The\npreliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are set forth below.\nPreliminary Findings\n• The Mid-Valley Pipeline extends approximately 1,000 miles from Longview, Texas, to\nSamaria, Michigan, and has a stated capacity of approximately 238,000 barrels per day in\ntransporting crude oil from the Gulf of Mexico region to Midwest refineries.\n• Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP (Sunoco Logistics), holds a majority interest in the Mid-\nValley Pipeline. Sunoco Logistics’ pipeline facilities include approximately 4,900 miles\nof crude-oil trunk lines and 500 miles of crude-oil gathering lines in the Southwest and\n\n\n\nC P F N o : 4 - 2 0 1 4 - 5 0 2 6 H\nP a g e | 2\nMidwest regions of the United States. Sunoco Logistics’ general partner is owned by\nEnergy Transfer Partners, LP.1\n• Based on the sudden pressure drop indications in Respondent’s control room, the Mid-\nValley Pipeline failed on October 13, 2014, at approximately 8:00 a.m. CDT downstream\nof the Karnack Pump Station. Respondent dispatched personnel to the area and identified\nthe failure site to be near Mile Post (MP) 51.5, approximately three miles southwest of\nMooringsport, Louisiana, and approximately one mile west of State Highway 169.\n• As a result of the failure, crude oil was released into the Tete Bayou, a tributary to Caddo\nLake, and migrated at least four miles from the source. The failure occurred in a High\nConsequence Area (HCA) based on environmental sensitivity and proximity to drinking\nwater intakes.\n• The pump units were shut down at 8:02 a.m., CDT, and the failed section was isolated by\nclosure of the nearest upstream and downstream main line valves at MP 37.2 and 55,\nrespectively. Respondent reported the failure to the National Response Center at 2:17\np.m. CDT, on October 13, 2014 (NRC Report No. 1098151). Respondent submitted an\nupdated report to the NRC on October 15, 2014, at 9:19 p.m. CDT (NRC Report No.\n1098153).\n• Various federal, state and local agencies, including PHMSA, responded to the scene of\nthe failure. Booms were deployed in an effort to keep the oil from reaching Caddo Lake\nand Respondent stationed vacuum trucks to collect oil from two roadway stream\ncrossings to begin skimming operations. Three residences were evacuated due to the\npotential for highly flammable vapor levels.\n• The portion of the Mid-Valley Pipeline on which the failure occurred, and which runs\nfrom the Longview Pump Station (MP 10.6) to the Haynesville Pump Station (MP\n103.6), was originally constructed in 1950. It consists of Grade X52 flash-welded seam\npipe manufactured by A.O. Smith, has a wall thickness of 0.250,” and has a coal-tar\ncoating. The control center for the pipeline is located in Sugarland, Texas.\n• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the segment on which the failure occurred is\n936 psig. At the time of the failure, the discharge pressure of the Karnack Pump Station\nwas 802 psig and the actual operating pressure of the pipeline at the failure site was\napproximately 750 psig.\n• Following the failure, Respondent took the portion of the Mid-Valley Pipeline running\nfrom Longview, Texas, to Lima, Ohio, out of service. Respondent intends to remove a\nportion of the pipeline, including the failure origin, and transport it to a metallurgical lab\nfor failure analysis. Pipeline operations north of the Haynesville Pump Station are\nexpected to resume and will be operated at a reduced pressure.\n1 See http://www.sunocologistics.com/investors/faq/41/ question 2. Who owns Sunoco Logistics? and\nhttp://www.energytransfer.com/overview sunl.aspx (last accessed October 16, 2014).\n\n\n\nC P F N o : 4 - 2 0 1 4 - 5 0 2 6 H\nP a g e | 3\n• The cause of the failure is still undetermined and the investigation is ongoing. Pipe\nmanufactured prior to 1970 with flash-welded seams have a known history of seam\nintegrity concerns under certain conditions. PHMSA has issued multiple Advisory\nBulletins on the subject of low-frequency electric resistance welded and flash welded\npipe. A. O. Smith pipe of that vintage also has a known history of hard spots in the pipe\nbody.\n• While metallurgical testing of the failed pipe has not yet been completed, the Mid-Valley\nPipeline has some history of internal corrosion failures, a known concern that cannot yet\nbe ruled out as a possible cause. In addition, no records of a hydrotest subsequent to\noriginal construction are available.\n• This is the second failure on the Mid-Valley Pipeline in the past seven months. On\nMarch 18, 2014, a failure occurred on the pipeline in a nature preserve in Hamilton,\nCounty, Ohio, caused by cracking of pipe material, although this failure involved pipe of\na different type (seamless) manufacture.\n2\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in\nthe above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the\nenvironment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable\nafter the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\npipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.\nAdditionally, having considered the manufacture of the pipeline and seam type; the unknown\ncause of the failure; the location of the failure; the proximity of the pipeline to HCAs including\nenvironmentally sensitive areas and drinking water intakes; the history of the pipeline, and the\nnature of the product being transported; I find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to\nrequire immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,\nproperty, or the environment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\n2 See In the Matter of Mid-Valley Pipeline Company, Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 3-2014-5002H (March 25,\n2014). The pipe that failed in the March 18, 2014 release event was seamless pipe manufactured by National Tube.\n\n\n\nC P F N o : 4 - 2 0 1 4 - 5 0 2 6 H\nP a g e | 4\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held\ntelephonically or in-person in Houston, Texas, or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be\nnotified of any additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Mid-Valley Pipeline Company to immediately\ntake the following corrective actions with respect to the Mid-Valley Pipeline:\n1. Operating Restriction. Respondent must not operate the 25.8-mile pipeline segment\nrunning from the Karnack Pump Station (MP 37.2) to the Benton Pump Station (MP\n63) (Karnack to Benton Segment) until authorized in writing to do so by the Director\npursuant to Item 4.\n2. Operating Pressure Restriction. Respondent must reduce and maintain a twenty\npercent (20%) pressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire\nlength of the Longview Pump Station to Haynesville Pump Station Segment (Longview\nto Haynesville Segment) such that the operating pressure on this segment will not\nexceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately\nprior to the failure on October 13, 2014.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase\nthe pressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is\nobtained from the Director.\nThis pressure restriction requires that any relevant remote or local alarm limits,\nsoftware programming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-\npressure devices be adjusted accordingly.\nRestart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Karnack to Benton Segment, develop\nand submit a written Restart Plan to the Director for approval.\nThe Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the\nentire plan, but the Karnack to Benton Segment cannot resume operation until\nthe Restart Plan is approved in its entirety.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by\nreference into this Order.\nb. 3. a.\n\n\n\nC P F N o : 4 - 2 0 1 4 - 5 0 2 6 H\nP a g e | 5\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Karnack to Benton\nSegment during the restart process and must include incremental pressure\nincreases during start-up, with each increment to be held for at least one hour.\nd. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials.\ne. The Restart Plan must provide for a review of the Karnack to Benton Segment\nfor conditions similar to those of the failure, including a review of construction,\noperating and maintenance (O&M) and integrity management records. These\nwould include such records as in-line inspection (ILI) results, hydrostatic tests,\nroot-cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial and ground patrols, corrosion,\ncathodic protection, excavations and pipe replacements. Respondent must\naddress any findings that require remedial measures to be implemented prior to\nrestart.\nf. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all\nmandated actions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all\nprocedural modifications are incorporated into Mid-Valley’s operations and\nmaintenance procedures manual.\ng. The Restart Plan must provide for hydrostatic pressure testing of the Karnack to\nBenton Segment.\n4. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, Respondent may\nreturn the Karnack to Benton Segment to service, but the operating pressure on the\nLongview to Haynesville Segment must not exceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual\noperating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure on October 13, 2014, in\naccordance with Item 2 above.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction.\na. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction\nupon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that restoring the\npipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified, based on a reliable\nengineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all\nknown defects, anomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.\nb. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestrictions upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that\ntemporary mitigative and preventive measures are implemented prior to and\nduring the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The\nDirector's determination will be based on the failure cause and provision of\nevidence that preventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide\nfor the safe operation of the Longview to Haynesville Segment during the\ntemporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. Appeals to\ndeterminations of the Director in this regard will be decided by the Associate\nAdministrator for Pipeline Safety.\n\n\n\nC P F N o : 4 - 2 0 1 4 - 5 0 2 6 H\nP a g e | 6\n6. 7. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, Mid-\nValley must complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the\nfailed pipe, including an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. The\ncompany must complete the testing and analysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site;\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol\nand the proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval;\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for\nan OPS representative to witness the testing; and\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports, whether draft or final, in\ntheir entirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to\nRespondent.\nIntegrity Verification and Remediation Plan (IVRP).\na. Within 45 days following receipt of the final report from the metallurgical\ntesting laboratory, Respondent must submit an Integrity Verification and\nRemediation Plan (IVRP) for the Longview to Haynesville Segment to the\nDirector for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the IVRP incrementally without approving the entire\nIVRP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the IVRP will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\nd. The IVRP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and\nremedial measures Respondent will use to verify the integrity of the Longview\nto Haynesville Segment. It must address all known or suspected factors and\ncauses of the October 13, 2014 failure. Respondent should consider both the\nrisk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to develop a\nprioritized schedule for IVRP related work.\ne. The IVRP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and\npressure test failures) of the Longview to Haynesville Segment and to\nprepare a written summary containing all the available information such\nas the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures;\nii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure\nanalysis, and other corrective actions required by this Order with all\n\n\n\nC P F N o : 4 - 2 0 1 4 - 5 0 2 6 H\nP a g e | 7\nrelevant pre-existing operational and assessment data for the Longview\nto Haynesville Segment. Pre-existing operational data includes, but is\nnot limited to, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs,\nprior metallurgical analyses, and any third party consultation\ninformation. Pre-existing assessment data includes, but is not limited to,\nILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close\ninterval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys;\niii. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the failure on\nOctober 13, 2014, are likely to exist elsewhere on the Longview to\nHaynesville Segment.\niv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or\nevaluations to determine whether, and to what extent, the conditions\nassociated with the failure on October 13, 2014, and other failures from\nthe failure history (see [(e)(ii)] above) or any other integrity threats are\npresent elsewhere on the Longview to Haynesville Segment. At a\nminimum, this process must consider all failure causes and specify the\nuse of one or more of the following:\n1. Inline inspection (ILI) tools that are technically appropriate for\nassessing the pipeline system based on the cause of failure on\nOctober 13, 2014 and that can reliably detect and identify\nanomalies;\n2. Hydrostatic pressure testing;\n3. Close-interval surveys;\n4. Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in\ncoordination with other utilities (e.g. underground utilities,\noverhead power lines, etc.) in the area;\n5. Coating surveys;\n6. Stress corrosion cracking surveys;\n7. Selective seam corrosion surveys; and\n8. Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate\nfor the failure causes.\nNote: Respondent may use the results of previous tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations, if approved by the Director, provided the results\nof the tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard\nto the factors known or suspected to have caused the October 13, 2014 failure.\n\n\n\nC P F N o : 4 - 2 0 1 4 - 5 0 2 6 H\nP a g e | 8\nf. Mid-Valley must describe the inspection and repair criteria Respondent will use\nto prioritize, excavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other\nidentified integrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be\ngraded and a schedule for repairs or replacement.\ng. Based on the known history and condition of the Longview to Haynesville\nSegment, Respondent must describe the methods it will use to repair, replace, or\ntake other corrective measures to remediate the conditions associated with the\npipeline failure on October 13, 2014, and to address other known integrity\nthreats along the Longview to Haynesville Segment.\nh. Mid-Valley must implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity\nverification measures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Longview to\nHaynesville Segment, considering the results of the analyses, inspections,\nevaluations, and corrective measures undertaken pursuant to the Order.\ni. Respondent must include a proposed schedule for completion of the IVRP.\nj. Respondent must revise the IVRP as necessary to incorporate new information\nobtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate\nthe results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate\nmodifications required by the Director.\nk. Mid-Valley must submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\nl. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\nm. Mid-Valley must implement the IVRP as it is approved by the Director,\nincluding any revisions to the plan.\n8. Record Keeping. Respondent must maintain records demonstrating its progress in\ncompleting all requirements of this Order, make them available to the Director, and\nretain them for a period of at least five years following completion of all work to be\nperformed. When Respondent believes it has concluded all the items in this Order, it\nwill submit a proposed completion report to the Director.\nDocumentation of the Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each\nmonthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline facilities, including repairs,\nreplacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.\nApprovals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of the\nDirector, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the\nsubmission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the submission,\nor (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval with conditions, or\n\n\n\nC P F N o : 4 - 2 0 1 4 - 5 0 2 6 H\nP a g e | 9\nmodification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action required by the\nsubmission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any\nportion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies within the time specified by\nthe Director, and resubmit it for approval.\nExtensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the\nterms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nThe actions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that\napply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, under any other order issued to\nRespondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other provision of Federal\nor State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 4-2014-5026H and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\n__________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n420145026H_Closure Letter_03232016_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMarch 23, 2016\nMr. Charles E. Maser\nPresident\nMid-Valley Pipeline Company\n1818 Market Street, Suite 1500\nPhiladelphia, PA 19103\nCPF No. 4-2014-5026H\nDear Mr. Maser:\nOn October 13, 2014, a failure occurred on Mid-Valley Pipeline Company’s (MVPC) pipeline at\napproximately milepost 51.5, near the town of Mooringsport in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, resulting in\nthe release of roughly 4,500 barrels of crude oil into the environment. The accident was initially\nreported to the National Response Center (NRC Report # 1098151) on April 13, 2015, at\napproximately 13:17 local time.\nPHMSA issued the Corrective Action Order (CAO) CPF 4-2014-5026H, to MVPC on October 17,\n2014, requiring a pressure restriction on the affected segment, development of an integrity\nverification plan and mitigative actions necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline.\nThe cause of the failure was determined to be near neutral pH stress corrosion cracking (SCC).\nMVPC has included the SSC threat to this segment of the pipeline in their Integrity Management\nPlan for future assessments of the affected pipeline system as corrective measures designed to\nprevent additional in-service failures.\nPHMSA monitored the actions taken within the integrity verification process and reviewed records\nsubmitted by MVPC. PHMSA has determined that MVPC has completed the requirements of the\nCAO.\nConsequently, PHMSA has closed the CAO, CPF 4-2014-5026H.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: David Chalson via e-mail DRChalson@SunocoLogistics.com\nTodd Nardozzi via e-mail TGNardozzi@SunocoLogistics.com\n\n420145026H_Closure Letter_04112016_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nApril 11, 2016\nGary MacDonald\nPresident\nMid-Valley Pipeline Company\n1 Fluor Daniel Dr\nBuilding A Level 3\nSugar Land, TX 77478\nCPF No. 4-2014-5026H\nDear Mr. Maser:\nOn October 13, 2014, a failure occurred on Mid-Valley Pipeline Company’s (MVPC) pipeline at\napproximately milepost 51.5, near the town of Mooringsport in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, resulting in\nthe release of roughly 4,500 barrels of crude oil into the environment. The accident was initially\nreported to the National Response Center (NRC Report # 1098151) on April 13, 2015, at\napproximately 13:17 local time.\nPHMSA issued the Corrective Action Order (CAO) CPF 4-2014-5026H, to MVPC on October 17,\n2014, requiring a pressure restriction on the affected segment, development of an integrity\nverification plan and mitigative actions necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline.\nThe cause of the failure was determined to be near neutral pH stress corrosion cracking (SCC).\nMVPC has included the SSC threat to this segment of the pipeline in their Integrity Management\nPlan for future assessments of the affected pipeline system as corrective measures designed to\nprevent additional in-service failures.\nPHMSA monitored the actions taken within the integrity verification process and reviewed records\nsubmitted by MVPC. PHMSA has determined that MVPC has completed the requirements of the\nCAO.\nConsequently, PHMSA has closed the CAO, CPF 4-2014-5026H.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: David Chalson via e-mail DRChalson@SunocoLogistics.com\nTodd Nardozzi via e-mail TGNardozzi@SunocoLogistics.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":29242}