# MID - VALLEY PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 420145026H
- **title:** MID - VALLEY PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2014-10-17
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED corrective action order.
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- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420145026h.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420145026h
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420145026H
**body:**

Corrective Action Order involving MID - VALLEY PIPELINE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2014-10-17 and is reported as closed as of 2016-04-11. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420145026H_Closure Letter_03232016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Closure%20Letter_03232016.pdf

420145026H_Closure Letter_03232016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Closure%20Letter_03232016_text.pdf

420145026H_Closure Letter_04112016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Closure%20Letter_04112016.pdf

420145026H_Closure Letter_04112016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Closure%20Letter_04112016_text.pdf

420145026H_Corrective Action Order_10172014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_10172014.pdf

420145026H_Corrective Action Order_10172014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420145026H/420145026H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_10172014_text.pdf

420145026H_Corrective Action Order_10172014_text.pdf

OCTOBER 17, 2014
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (866) 547-7490
Mr. Charles E. Maser
President
Mid-Valley Pipeline Company
1818 Market Street, Suite 1500
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Re: CPF No. 4-2014-5026H
Dear Mr. Maser:
Enclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration in the above-referenced case. It requires Mid-Valley Pipeline Company to take
certain corrective actions with respect to its 20-inch diameter crude oil pipeline that failed on
October 13, 2014, near the town of Mooringsport, Louisiana. Service is being made by certified
mail and facsimile. Service of this Corrective Action Order by facsimile or other electronic
means is complete upon receipt, as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions
of this Order are effective immediately upon service.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Rod Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety
Mr. David Chalson, Vice President, Operations, Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P.,
4041 Market Street, Aston, PA 19014
Mr. Todd Nardozzi, DOT Compliance Manager, Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P.
CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
_________________________________________
In the Matter of )
Mid-Valley Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 4-2014-5026H
)
)
)
Respondent. )
_________________________________________ )
CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
Purpose and Background
This Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112
and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, to require Mid-Valley Pipeline Company (Mid-Valley or Respondent),
to take the necessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from
potential hazards associated with a recent failure involving Respondent’s 20-inch diameter
hazardous liquid pipeline transporting crude oil from Longview, Texas, to Samaria, Michigan
(Mid-Valley Pipeline).
On October 13, 2014, a failure occurred on Respondent’s Mid-Valley Pipeline near the town of
Mooringsport in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, resulting in the release of up to 4,000 barrels of crude
oil into the environment. The cause of the failure has not yet been determined.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the incident. The
preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are set forth below.
Preliminary Findings
• The Mid-Valley Pipeline extends approximately 1,000 miles from Longview, Texas, to
Samaria, Michigan, and has a stated capacity of approximately 238,000 barrels per day in
transporting crude oil from the Gulf of Mexico region to Midwest refineries.
• Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP (Sunoco Logistics), holds a majority interest in the Mid-
Valley Pipeline. Sunoco Logistics’ pipeline facilities include approximately 4,900 miles
of crude-oil trunk lines and 500 miles of crude-oil gathering lines in the Southwest and



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Midwest regions of the United States. Sunoco Logistics’ general partner is owned by
Energy Transfer Partners, LP.1
• Based on the sudden pressure drop indications in Respondent’s control room, the Mid-
Valley Pipeline failed on October 13, 2014, at approximately 8:00 a.m. CDT downstream
of the Karnack Pump Station. Respondent dispatched personnel to the area and identified
the failure site to be near Mile Post (MP) 51.5, approximately three miles southwest of
Mooringsport, Louisiana, and approximately one mile west of State Highway 169.
• As a result of the failure, crude oil was released into the Tete Bayou, a tributary to Caddo
Lake, and migrated at least four miles from the source. The failure occurred in a High
Consequence Area (HCA) based on environmental sensitivity and proximity to drinking
water intakes.
• The pump units were shut down at 8:02 a.m., CDT, and the failed section was isolated by
closure of the nearest upstream and downstream main line valves at MP 37.2 and 55,
respectively. Respondent reported the failure to the National Response Center at 2:17
p.m. CDT, on October 13, 2014 (NRC Report No. 1098151). Respondent submitted an
updated report to the NRC on October 15, 2014, at 9:19 p.m. CDT (NRC Report No.
1098153).
• Various federal, state and local agencies, including PHMSA, responded to the scene of
the failure. Booms were deployed in an effort to keep the oil from reaching Caddo Lake
and Respondent stationed vacuum trucks to collect oil from two roadway stream
crossings to begin skimming operations. Three residences were evacuated due to the
potential for highly flammable vapor levels.
• The portion of the Mid-Valley Pipeline on which the failure occurred, and which runs
from the Longview Pump Station (MP 10.6) to the Haynesville Pump Station (MP
103.6), was originally constructed in 1950. It consists of Grade X52 flash-welded seam
pipe manufactured by A.O. Smith, has a wall thickness of 0.250,” and has a coal-tar
coating. The control center for the pipeline is located in Sugarland, Texas.
• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the segment on which the failure occurred is
936 psig. At the time of the failure, the discharge pressure of the Karnack Pump Station
was 802 psig and the actual operating pressure of the pipeline at the failure site was
approximately 750 psig.
• Following the failure, Respondent took the portion of the Mid-Valley Pipeline running
from Longview, Texas, to Lima, Ohio, out of service. Respondent intends to remove a
portion of the pipeline, including the failure origin, and transport it to a metallurgical lab
for failure analysis. Pipeline operations north of the Haynesville Pump Station are
expected to resume and will be operated at a reduced pressure.
1 See http://www.sunocologistics.com/investors/faq/41/ question 2. Who owns Sunoco Logistics? and
http://www.energytransfer.com/overview sunl.aspx (last accessed October 16, 2014).



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• The cause of the failure is still undetermined and the investigation is ongoing. Pipe
manufactured prior to 1970 with flash-welded seams have a known history of seam
integrity concerns under certain conditions. PHMSA has issued multiple Advisory
Bulletins on the subject of low-frequency electric resistance welded and flash welded
pipe. A. O. Smith pipe of that vintage also has a known history of hard spots in the pipe
body.
• While metallurgical testing of the failed pipe has not yet been completed, the Mid-Valley
Pipeline has some history of internal corrosion failures, a known concern that cannot yet
be ruled out as a possible cause. In addition, no records of a hydrotest subsequent to
original construction are available.
• This is the second failure on the Mid-Valley Pipeline in the past seven months. On
March 18, 2014, a failure occurred on the pipeline in a nature preserve in Hamilton,
County, Ohio, caused by cracking of pipe material, although this failure involved pipe of
a different type (seamless) manufacture.
2
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing
Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action
Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,
which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,
testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the
determination that a pipeline facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in
the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.
Section 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a
Corrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing, upon a finding that
failure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the
environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable
after the issuance of the Order.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the
pipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.
Additionally, having considered the manufacture of the pipeline and seam type; the unknown
cause of the failure; the location of the failure; the proximity of the pipeline to HCAs including
environmentally sensitive areas and drinking water intakes; the history of the pipeline, and the
nature of the product being transported; I find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to
require immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,
property, or the environment.
Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued
without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are
effective upon receipt.
2 See In the Matter of Mid-Valley Pipeline Company, Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 3-2014-5002H (March 25,
2014). The pipe that failed in the March 18, 2014 release event was seamless pipe manufactured by National Tube.



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Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as
practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy
to the Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held
telephonically or in-person in Houston, Texas, or Washington, D.C.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may
identify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be
notified of any additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered.
To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a
hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.
Required Corrective Actions
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Mid-Valley Pipeline Company to immediately
take the following corrective actions with respect to the Mid-Valley Pipeline:
1. Operating Restriction. Respondent must not operate the 25.8-mile pipeline segment
running from the Karnack Pump Station (MP 37.2) to the Benton Pump Station (MP
63) (Karnack to Benton Segment) until authorized in writing to do so by the Director
pursuant to Item 4.
2. Operating Pressure Restriction. Respondent must reduce and maintain a twenty
percent (20%) pressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire
length of the Longview Pump Station to Haynesville Pump Station Segment (Longview
to Haynesville Segment) such that the operating pressure on this segment will not
exceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately
prior to the failure on October 13, 2014.
a. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase
the pressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is
obtained from the Director.
This pressure restriction requires that any relevant remote or local alarm limits,
software programming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-
pressure devices be adjusted accordingly.
Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Karnack to Benton Segment, develop
and submit a written Restart Plan to the Director for approval.
The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the
entire plan, but the Karnack to Benton Segment cannot resume operation until
the Restart Plan is approved in its entirety.
b. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by
reference into this Order.
b. 3. a.



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c. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Karnack to Benton
Segment during the restart process and must include incremental pressure
increases during start-up, with each increment to be held for at least one hour.
d. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance
communications with local emergency response officials.
e. The Restart Plan must provide for a review of the Karnack to Benton Segment
for conditions similar to those of the failure, including a review of construction,
operating and maintenance (O&M) and integrity management records. These
would include such records as in-line inspection (ILI) results, hydrostatic tests,
root-cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial and ground patrols, corrosion,
cathodic protection, excavations and pipe replacements. Respondent must
address any findings that require remedial measures to be implemented prior to
restart.
f. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all
mandated actions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all
procedural modifications are incorporated into Mid-Valley’s operations and
maintenance procedures manual.
g. The Restart Plan must provide for hydrostatic pressure testing of the Karnack to
Benton Segment.
4. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, Respondent may
return the Karnack to Benton Segment to service, but the operating pressure on the
Longview to Haynesville Segment must not exceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual
operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure on October 13, 2014, in
accordance with Item 2 above.
5. Removal of Pressure Restriction.
a. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction
upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that restoring the
pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified, based on a reliable
engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all
known defects, anomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.
b. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure
restrictions upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that
temporary mitigative and preventive measures are implemented prior to and
during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The
Director's determination will be based on the failure cause and provision of
evidence that preventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide
for the safe operation of the Longview to Haynesville Segment during the
temporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. Appeals to
determinations of the Director in this regard will be decided by the Associate
Administrator for Pipeline Safety.



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6. 7. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, Mid-
Valley must complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the
failed pipe, including an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. The
company must complete the testing and analysis as follows:
a. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe
section and other evidence from the failure site;
b. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol
and the proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval;
c. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the
Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for
an OPS representative to witness the testing; and
d. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports, whether draft or final, in
their entirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to
Respondent.
Integrity Verification and Remediation Plan (IVRP).
a. Within 45 days following receipt of the final report from the metallurgical
testing laboratory, Respondent must submit an Integrity Verification and
Remediation Plan (IVRP) for the Longview to Haynesville Segment to the
Director for approval.
b. The Director may approve the IVRP incrementally without approving the entire
IVRP.
c. Once approved by the Director, the IVRP will be incorporated by reference into
this Order.
d. The IVRP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and
remedial measures Respondent will use to verify the integrity of the Longview
to Haynesville Segment. It must address all known or suspected factors and
causes of the October 13, 2014 failure. Respondent should consider both the
risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to develop a
prioritized schedule for IVRP related work.
e. The IVRP must include a procedure or process to:
i. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and
pressure test failures) of the Longview to Haynesville Segment and to
prepare a written summary containing all the available information such
as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures;
ii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure
analysis, and other corrective actions required by this Order with all



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relevant pre-existing operational and assessment data for the Longview
to Haynesville Segment. Pre-existing operational data includes, but is
not limited to, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs,
prior metallurgical analyses, and any third party consultation
information. Pre-existing assessment data includes, but is not limited to,
ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close
interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys;
iii. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the failure on
October 13, 2014, are likely to exist elsewhere on the Longview to
Haynesville Segment.
iv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or
evaluations to determine whether, and to what extent, the conditions
associated with the failure on October 13, 2014, and other failures from
the failure history (see [(e)(ii)] above) or any other integrity threats are
present elsewhere on the Longview to Haynesville Segment. At a
minimum, this process must consider all failure causes and specify the
use of one or more of the following:
1. Inline inspection (ILI) tools that are technically appropriate for
assessing the pipeline system based on the cause of failure on
October 13, 2014 and that can reliably detect and identify
anomalies;
2. Hydrostatic pressure testing;
3. Close-interval surveys;
4. Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in
coordination with other utilities (e.g. underground utilities,
overhead power lines, etc.) in the area;
5. Coating surveys;
6. Stress corrosion cracking surveys;
7. Selective seam corrosion surveys; and
8. Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate
for the failure causes.
Note: Respondent may use the results of previous tests, inspections,
assessments, and evaluations, if approved by the Director, provided the results
of the tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard
to the factors known or suspected to have caused the October 13, 2014 failure.



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f. Mid-Valley must describe the inspection and repair criteria Respondent will use
to prioritize, excavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other
identified integrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be
graded and a schedule for repairs or replacement.
g. Based on the known history and condition of the Longview to Haynesville
Segment, Respondent must describe the methods it will use to repair, replace, or
take other corrective measures to remediate the conditions associated with the
pipeline failure on October 13, 2014, and to address other known integrity
threats along the Longview to Haynesville Segment.
h. Mid-Valley must implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity
verification measures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Longview to
Haynesville Segment, considering the results of the analyses, inspections,
evaluations, and corrective measures undertaken pursuant to the Order.
i. Respondent must include a proposed schedule for completion of the IVRP.
j. Respondent must revise the IVRP as necessary to incorporate new information
obtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate
the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate
modifications required by the Director.
k. Mid-Valley must submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.
l. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.
m. Mid-Valley must implement the IVRP as it is approved by the Director,
including any revisions to the plan.
8. Record Keeping. Respondent must maintain records demonstrating its progress in
completing all requirements of this Order, make them available to the Director, and
retain them for a period of at least five years following completion of all work to be
performed. When Respondent believes it has concluded all the items in this Order, it
will submit a proposed completion report to the Director.
Documentation of the Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain
documentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each
monthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of
procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline facilities, including repairs,
replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.
Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of the
Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the
submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)
disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the submission,
or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval with conditions, or



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modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action required by the
submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any
portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies within the time specified by
the Director, and resubmit it for approval.
Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the
terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an
extension.
The actions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that
apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, under any other order issued to
Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other provision of Federal
or State law.
Respondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.
Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you
must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information
qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to
the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 60120.
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 4-2014-5026H and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
The terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.
__________________________________ __________________
Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

420145026H_Closure Letter_03232016_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
March 23, 2016
Mr. Charles E. Maser
President
Mid-Valley Pipeline Company
1818 Market Street, Suite 1500
Philadelphia, PA 19103
CPF No. 4-2014-5026H
Dear Mr. Maser:
On October 13, 2014, a failure occurred on Mid-Valley Pipeline Company’s (MVPC) pipeline at
approximately milepost 51.5, near the town of Mooringsport in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, resulting in
the release of roughly 4,500 barrels of crude oil into the environment. The accident was initially
reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report # 1098151) on April 13, 2015, at
approximately 13:17 local time.
PHMSA issued the Corrective Action Order (CAO) CPF 4-2014-5026H, to MVPC on October 17,
2014, requiring a pressure restriction on the affected segment, development of an integrity
verification plan and mitigative actions necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline.
The cause of the failure was determined to be near neutral pH stress corrosion cracking (SCC).
MVPC has included the SSC threat to this segment of the pipeline in their Integrity Management
Plan for future assessments of the affected pipeline system as corrective measures designed to
prevent additional in-service failures.
PHMSA monitored the actions taken within the integrity verification process and reviewed records
submitted by MVPC. PHMSA has determined that MVPC has completed the requirements of the
CAO.
Consequently, PHMSA has closed the CAO, CPF 4-2014-5026H.
Sincerely,
R. M. Seeley
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc: David Chalson via e-mail DRChalson@SunocoLogistics.com
Todd Nardozzi via e-mail TGNardozzi@SunocoLogistics.com

420145026H_Closure Letter_04112016_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
April 11, 2016
Gary MacDonald
President
Mid-Valley Pipeline Company
1 Fluor Daniel Dr
Building A Level 3
Sugar Land, TX 77478
CPF No. 4-2014-5026H
Dear Mr. Maser:
On October 13, 2014, a failure occurred on Mid-Valley Pipeline Company’s (MVPC) pipeline at
approximately milepost 51.5, near the town of Mooringsport in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, resulting in
the release of roughly 4,500 barrels of crude oil into the environment. The accident was initially
reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report # 1098151) on April 13, 2015, at
approximately 13:17 local time.
PHMSA issued the Corrective Action Order (CAO) CPF 4-2014-5026H, to MVPC on October 17,
2014, requiring a pressure restriction on the affected segment, development of an integrity
verification plan and mitigative actions necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline.
The cause of the failure was determined to be near neutral pH stress corrosion cracking (SCC).
MVPC has included the SSC threat to this segment of the pipeline in their Integrity Management
Plan for future assessments of the affected pipeline system as corrective measures designed to
prevent additional in-service failures.
PHMSA monitored the actions taken within the integrity verification process and reviewed records
submitted by MVPC. PHMSA has determined that MVPC has completed the requirements of the
CAO.
Consequently, PHMSA has closed the CAO, CPF 4-2014-5026H.
Sincerely,
R. M. Seeley
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc: David Chalson via e-mail DRChalson@SunocoLogistics.com
Todd Nardozzi via e-mail TGNardozzi@SunocoLogistics.com
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