{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420151006H","title":"NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CO OF AMERICA (KMI) — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-04-17","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420151006h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420151006h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420151006h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420151006H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CO OF AMERICA (KMI). The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2015-04-17 and is reported as closed as of 2015-12-22. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420151006H_Closure Letter_12222015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420151006H/420151006H_Closure%20Letter_12222015.pdf\n\n420151006H_Closure Letter_12222015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420151006H/420151006H_Closure%20Letter_12222015_text.pdf\n\n420151006H_Corrective Action Order_04172015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420151006H/420151006H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_04172015.pdf\n\n420151006H_Corrective Action Order_04172015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420151006H/420151006H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_04172015_text.pdf\n\n420151006H_Corrective Action Order_04172015_text.pdf\n\nApril 17, 2015\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: [insert fax #]\nMr. Gary Buchler\nVice President of Gas Operations\nNatural Gas Pipeline Company of America, LLC\n1001 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX, 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nDear Mr. Buchler:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It requires Natural\nGas Pipeline Company of America, LLC, to take certain corrective actions with respect to the\nAmarillo #4 natural gas pipeline, which failed on April 13, 2015, in Hutchinson County, Texas.\nService is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Service by electronic transmission is\ndeemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as otherwise provided\nunder 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon completion\nof service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. R. M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\nMr. Michael Catt, Vice President, Gas Pipeline Operations, Natural Gas Pipeline\nCompany of America, LLC\nMr. Reji George, Director, Compliance Codes and Standards, Natural Gas Pipeline\nCompany of America, LLC\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nNatural Gas Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nof America, LLC )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 to\nrequire Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, LLC (NGPL or Respondent), to take the\nnecessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential\nhazards associated with the recent failure on Respondent’s Amarillo No. 4 natural gas pipeline.1\nA reportable incident occurred on the Amarillo No. 4 pipeline in Hutchinson County, Texas, on\nApril 13, 2015, resulting in the release of an estimated 750,000 million cubic feet (mmcf) of\nnatural gas which ignited causing an explosion and fire. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The preliminary findings of the ongoing\ninvestigation are as follows.\nPreliminary Findings:\n• On April 13, 2015, at approximately 10:55 a.m. Central Standard Time (CST), a failure\noccurred on the 30-inch diameter Amarillo #4 pipeline approximately 7.7 miles west of\nthe town of Stinnett, Texas at 101.4454354 Longitude, 35.9862413 Latitude. The\naccident was reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report # 1113463) on April\n13, 2015, at approximately 12:17 p.m. CST.\n• The Amarillo #4 pipeline extends approximately 20.47 miles from Compressor Station\n112 to just beyond Compressor Station 191 and is part of Respondent’s “Fritch Unit,”\n1 Kinder Morgan, Inc. operates NGPL and owns a 20 percent interest in the pipeline company. Myria Holdings,\nInc. owns the remaining interest. See http://www.kindermorgan.com/business/gas_pipelines/central/NGPL/ (last\naccessed April 16, 2015).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nPage 2\nconsisting of approximately 515 miles of various pipelines running from Texas to Ohio.\nThe Amarillo #4 pipeline crosses public roads and traverses areas near residences.\nPortions of the pipeline are located in High Consequence Areas (HCAs).\n• As a result of the failure, an estimated 75,000 mmcf of natural gas was released in the\nblowout which ignited. A 60-foot section and a 30-foot section of pipe were ejected and\nlanded approximately 60-feet and 100-feet from the failure site, respectively.\n• The failure site is located approximately 9 miles downstream of Valve 1203 and\napproximately 0.5 miles upstream of Valve 1204. Local emergency responders closed\nnearby State Highway 152 and set up incident command of firefighting activities.\n• In response, NGPL shut down the pipeline at Station 169 and worked to isolate the 9.5\nmile section between Valve 1203, which had to be closed manually, and Valve 1204.\nRespondent’s Amarillo #2 pipeline was also shut down to verify that it had not been\ndamaged in the incident.\n• The Amarillo #4 pipeline remains shut down. The cause of the failure has not yet been\nconfirmed, but NGPL’s pipeline systems in the area have some history of Stress\nCorrosion Cracking (SCC). The failed pipe sections are being transported to a\nmetallurgist for testing and failure analysis.\n• The Amarillo #4 pipeline was originally constructed in 1968. It consists of Grade X-52\n30-inch diameter double submerged arc weld seam pipe manufactured by Republic Steel\nand has a nominal wall thickness of 0.289,” with an asphalt coating and an impressed\ncurrent cathodic protection system.\n• The maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline is 712 psig. The\nMAOP was established by hydrostatic testing. The operating pressure at the time of the\nfailure was approximately 702 psig.\n• NGPL experienced an SCC failure in 2003 in another of Respondent’s pipeline units\nknown as the Oklahoma Extension pipeline system resulting in the issuance of Corrective\nAction Order 4-2003-1008H. Near neutral SCC was determined to be a causal factor in\nthat failure. In 2012, a hard spot failure occurred in this unit on the Oklahoma Extension\n#1 line resulting in the issuance of Corrective Action Order 4-2012-1011H.\n• NGPL conducted an in-line inspection (ILI) of the Amarillo #4 pipeline in 2011. It\nappears that the model used by NGPL in its risk analysis may have incorrectly\ncharacterized the pipeline as not susceptible to SCC due to erroneous data on the soil\ntype. There are an estimated 14 miles of “like” pipe in this 20.47 mile segment.\n• PHMSA issued Advisory Bulletin ADB-03-05 in October 2003, advising owners and\noperators of natural gas and hazardous liquids pipelines to consider the threat from stress\ncorrosion cracking when developing and implementing their Integrity Management Plans.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nPage 3\nThe operators were to determine whether their pipelines were susceptible to SCC and\nassess the impact of SCC on pipeline integrity.\n• NGPL operates one of the largest interstate pipeline systems in the country consisting of\napproximately 9,200 miles pipeline.2\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set\nforth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,\nproperty, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing and expedited review\nwill be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\npipeline without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the\nenvironment. Additionally, having considered the nature of the failure; the proximity of the\npipeline to public road crossings and residences; the location of portions of the pipeline in\nHCAs; the age and manufacture of the pipeline; the hazardous nature of the product the pipeline\ntransports; the pressure required for transporting the material; the uncertainties as to the cause of\nthe failure; the potential for SCC not previously identified; and the ongoing investigation to\ndetermine the cause of the failure, I find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require\nimmediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the\nenvironment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may contest its issuance obtain expedited\nreview either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, to be\nheld as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the Associate\nAdministrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Southwest Region,\nPHMSA (Director). If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held telephonically or in-person\nin Southwest Region Office or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, PHMSA will notify\nRespondent of any additional measures that are required and an amended Order issued, if\n2 See http://www.kindermorgan.com/business/gas_pipelines/central/NGPL/ (last accessed April 16, 2015).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nPage 4\n1. necessary. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an\nopportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions:\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order NGPL to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions on the Amarillo #4 pipeline:\nDefinitions:\n“Affected Segment” - The “Affected Segment” means NGPL's Amarillo #4 pipeline\nextending 20.47 miles from Compressor Station 112 to Compressor Station 191.\n\"Isolated Segment\" - The \"Isolated Segment\" means the 9.5-mile segment of NGLP’s 30-\ninch Amarillo #4 from Valve 1203 to Valve 1204.\n\"Director\"\n- The \"Director\" means the Director, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety, Southwest Region. The Director’s\naddress is 8701 S. Gessner, Suite 1110, Housotn, Texas 77074.\nOperating Restriction. NGPL must not operate the Isolated Segment until authorized to do\nso by the Director.\n2. Pressure Restriction. NGPL must reduce and maintain a twenty percent (20%) pressure\nreduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected Segment\nsuch that the operating pressure along the Affected Segment will not exceed eighty percent\n(80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure on April 13,\n2015.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the\nDirector.\nb. By April 20, 2015, NGPL must provide the Director the actual operating pressures of\neach compressor station and each main line pressure regulating station on the Affected\nSegment at the time of failure and the reduced pressure restriction set-points at these same\nlocations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to be\nadjusted accordingly.\nWhen determining the pressure restriction set-points, NGPL must take into account any\n“like pipe” locations, in-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected\nSegment to provide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are\ncompleted.\n3. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Affected Segment develop and submit a\nwritten Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\nd.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nPage 5\na. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the entire\nplan but the Affected Segment cannot resume operation until the Restart Plan is approved\nin its entirety.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Affected Segment during the\nrestart process and must include incremental pressure increases during start up, with each\nincrement to be held for at least 2 hours.\nd. The Restart Plan must include sufficient surveillance of the pipeline during each pressure\nincrement to ensure that no leaks are present when operation of the line resumes.\ne. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance communications\nwith local emergency response officials.\nf. The Restart Plan must provide for a review of the Affected Segment for conditions similar\nto those of the failure including a review of construction, operating and maintenance\n(O&M) and integrity management records such as in-line inspection (ILI) results,\nhydrostatic tests, root cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial and ground patrols,\ncorrosion, cathodic protection, excavations and pipe replacements. NGPL must address\nany findings that require remedial measures to be implemented prior to restart.\ng. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all mandated\nactions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural modifications are\nincorporated into NGPL’s operations and maintenance procedures manual.\nh. The Restart Plan must provide for hydrostatic pressure testing of the Affected Segment.\n4. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, NGPL may return the\nIsolated Segment to service but the operating pressure must not exceed eighty percent (80%)\nof the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure on April 13, 2015 in\naccordance with Item 2 above.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction.\na. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction upon a\nwritten request from NGPL demonstrating that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure\noperating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the\npressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and operating\nparameters of the pipeline.\n6. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restrictions\nupon a written request from NGPL demonstrating that temporary mitigative and preventive\nmeasures are implemented prior to and during the temporary removal or modification of the\npressure restriction. The Director's determination will be based on the failure cause and\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nPage 6\nprovision of evidence that preventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide\nfor the safe operation of the Affected Segment during the temporary removal or modification\nof the pressure restriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director in this regard will be\ndecided by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n7. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete\nmechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including an\nanalysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and analysis as\nfollows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section\nand other evidence from the failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and the\nproposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with the\nscheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS representative to\nwitness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their entirety\nto the Director at the same time they are made available to NGPL.\n8. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, complete a\nroot cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the Director.\nThe RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an independent third-party acceptable to the\nDirector and must document the decision making process and all factors contributing to the\nfailure. The final report must include findings and any lessons learned and whether the\nfindings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within NGPL’s pipeline\nsystem.\n9. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, NGPL must submit a Remedial Work\nPlan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial\nmeasures NGPL will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment. It must address\nall known or suspected factors and causes of the April 13, 2015 failure. NGPL should\nconsider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to develop\na prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Affected Segment.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the contributing\nfactors identified for the April 13, 2015 failure.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nPage 7\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test\nfailures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written report containing all the\navailable information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis, and other\ncorrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-existing operational and\nassessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-existing operational data includes, but\nis not limited to, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior\nmetallurgical analyses, and any third party consultation information. Pre-existing\nassessment data includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure\ntesting, direct assessments, close interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the failure on April 13, 2015\nare likely to exist elsewhere within the NGPL pipeline systems.\nv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the failure on\nApril 13, 2015 and other failures from the failure history or any other integrity threats\nare present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At a minimum, this process must\nconsider all failure causes and specify the use of one or more of the following:\n1) Inline inspection (ILI) tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the\npipeline system based on the cause of failure on April 13, 2015 and that can\nreliably detect and identify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Close-interval surveys,\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in coordination with\nother utilities (e.g. underground utilities, overhead power lines, etc.) in the area,\n5) Coating surveys,\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys,\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and,\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the failure\ncauses.\nNote: NGPL may use the results of previous tests, inspections, assessments, and\nevaluations if approved by the Director, provided the results of the tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard to the factors known or\nsuspected to have caused the April 13, 2015 failure.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria NGPL will use to prioritize, excavate,\nevaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified integrity threats.\nInclude a description of how any defects will be graded and a schedule for repairs or\nreplacement.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nPage 8\nf. g. h. vii. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment, describe the\nmethods NGPL will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective measures to\nremediate the conditions associated with the pipeline failure on April 13, 2015 and to\naddress other known integrity threats along the Affected Segment.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification measures\nto ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment considering the results\nof the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective measures undertaken\npursuant to the Order.\nInclude a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\nNGPL must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained during\nthe failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of actions\nundertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate modifications required by the\nDirector.\ni. ii. iii. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\nThe Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\nAny and all revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Order will be fully described and documented.\nImplement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to the plan\nand maintain records of all actions taken pursuant to this Corrective Action Order for a\nperiod not less than 10 years.\nOther Requirements:\n1. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and\nresults of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; (2) document any approved\nrevisions to the RWP and their implementation; and (3) describe the progress of the\nrepairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due on\nJuly 1, 2015. The Director may change the interval for the submission of these reports.\n2. Documentation of Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each\nmonthly report the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies and analyses; and (2) physical changes to pipeline facilities, including\nrepairs, replacements and other modifications.\n3. Approvals. With respect to each submission requiring the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve the submission in whole or in part; (b) approve the submission\non specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove the submission in whole or in part and direct Respondent to modify the\nsubmission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nPage 9\nrequired by the submission, as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of a submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n4. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted and demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\nThe actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190-199, under\nany other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., or under any\nother provision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 4-2015-1006H and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\n__________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n420151006H_Closure Letter_12222015_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nDecember 22, 2015\nMr. Gary Buchler\nVice President of Gas Operations\nNatural Gas Pipeline Company of America, LLC\n1001 Louisiana Street, Suite 1000\nHouston, TX, 77002\nCPF No. 4-2015-1006H\nDear Mr. Buchler:\nOn April 13, 2015, at approximately 10:55 a.m. CST, a failure occurred on Natural Gas Pipeline\nCompany of America, LLC (NGPL)’s 30-inch diameter Amarillo #4 pipeline, approximately 7.7\nmiles west of the town of Stinnett, Texas. The accident was reported to the National Response\nCenter (NRC Report # 1113463) on April 13, 2015, at approximately 12:17 p.m. CST.\nPHMSA issued the Corrective Action Order (CAO), to NGPL on April 17, 2015 requiring a pressure\nrestriction on the affected segment, development of an integrity verification plan and mitigative\nactions necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline.\nThe cause of the failure was determined to be near neutral SCC. NGPL has included SSC threat to\nthis segment of Class 1 pipeline in their Integrity Management Plan for future assessments of the\naffected pipeline system as corrective measures designed to prevent additional in-service failures.\nPHMSA monitored the actions taken within the integrity verification process and reviewed records\nsubmitted by NGPL. PHMSA has determined that NGPL has substantially completed the\nrequirements of the CAO.\nConsequently, PHMSA has closed the CAO, CPF 4-2015-1006H.\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","truncated":false,"body_characters":27810}