{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420165012W","title":"TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-04-27","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.402(e)(9), 195.420(c), 195.446(f)(1), 195.565.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420165012w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420165012w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420165012w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420165012W","body":"Warning Letter involving TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(e)(9),  195.420(c),  195.446(f)(1),  195.565. The case was opened on 2016-04-27 and is reported as closed as of 2016-04-27. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420165012W_Warning Letter_04272016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165012W/420165012W_Warning%20Letter_04272016.pdf\n\n420165012W_Warning Letter_04272016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165012W/420165012W_Warning%20Letter_04272016_text.pdf\n\n420165012W_Warning Letter_04272016_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nApril 27, 2016\nMr. Paul Miller\nExecutive-Vice President/President, Liquids Pipelines\nTC Oil Pipeline Operations Inc.\n450-1 Street SW\nCalgary, Alberta, Canada\nT2P 5H1\nCPF 4-2016-5012W\nDear Mr. Miller:\nOn March 3, 2015 – May 14, 2015, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code inspected your\nprocedures, records, and pipeline facilities for the Keystone XL – Gulf Coast Pipeline.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed § 195.420(c) of the Pipeline Safety\nRegulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the probable\nviolation(s) are:\n1. § 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section must include\nprocedures for the following to provide safety when an emergency condition occurs:\n(9) Providing for a post-accident review of employee activities to determine whether\nthe procedures were effective in each emergency and taking corrective action where\ndeficiencies are found.\nTransCanada did not perform a timely post-accident review of its procedures to determine their\neffectiveness in each emergency. During the review of TransCanada’s Incident Investigation\n\n\n\nReport, issued on 8/29/14, an incident occurred on 7/29/14 at the Bryan Pump Station when oil\nbacked up on the sump drain piping and released 20 gallons of oil onto the surrounding area. Post-\naccident, TransCanada completed a review of its procedures on 8/26/14, and those procedures\nwere modified and recommended for approval on 9/3/14. The revised procedures were\nimplemented almost three months after accident on 11/14/14. TransCanada needs to evaluate its\ncorrective action process when deficiencies are found in order to expedite the time for\nimplementing recommended procedural changes.\n2. § 195.420 Valve maintenance.\n(c) Each operator shall provide protection for each valve from unauthorized\noperation and from vandalism.\nTransCanada did not adequately secure each valve from unauthorized operation. TransCanada’s\npipeline facilities had a fence with locked gates to prevent entry, and main line valves were chained\nwith locks at the time of the inspection. Valve controls that disable the remote operation of the\nvalve and valve operation that were not locked at the time of the inspection are as follows: Bryan\n1A, Bryan 1B, Delta 4A, WNSBR 2A, LIBRT 4A, LUFKN 2A and LKTLR 2A. PHMSA brought\nthis to the attention of the company representative on site, and they agreed to lock all control boxes.\n3. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(f) Change management. Each operator must assure that changes that could affect\ncontrol room operations are coordinated with the control room personnel by\nperforming each of the following:\n(1) Implement section 7 of API RP 1168 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3) for\ncontrol room management change and require coordination between control room\nrepresentatives, operator's management, and associated field personnel when\nplanning and implementing physical changes to pipeline equipment or configuration;\nand…\nTransCanada did not perform an adequate review of a control room management change that could\naffect control room operations. Based on TransCanada’s “Record of Change Review by Oil\nControl Centre” document, the controller Douglas Robertson reviewed and approved a CRM\nchange on the same date and time. The record indicates that the change was reviewed on 5/28/14\nat 08:11:13, and approved on 5/28/14 at 08:11:13. This indicates the controller did not review the\nchange before approving or the system utilized to document the process did not accurately record\n\n\n\nthe time between reviewing and approving the change. TransCanada must ensure proper review\nof any changes that could affect control room operations.\n4. § 195.565 How do I install cathodic protection on breakout tanks?\nAfter October 2, 2000, when you install cathodic protection under § 195.563(a) to\nprotect the bottom of an aboveground breakout tank of more than 500 barrels\n(79.5m3 ) capacity built to API Specification 12F, API Standard 620, or API Standard\n650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C), you must install the system in accordance with\nAPI Recommended Practice 651. However, installation of the system need not comply\nwith API Recommended Practice 651 on any tank for which you note in the corrosion\ncontrol procedures established under § 195.402(c)(3) why compliance with all or\ncertain provisions of API Recommended Practice 651 is not necessary for the safety\nof the tank.\nTransCanada did not adequately design its cathodic protection system for newly constructed\nbreakout tanks on the Keystone Gulf Coast Pipeline North system. During the inspection of the\ncathodic protection potentials for Tanks #5 and #7, there were issues identified with the cp readings\nvarying between the 850 mV and 100 mV polarization criteria. Once the operator has established\ncp criteria as specified by API 651, he cannot arbitrarily switch from one criteria (850 mV) to\nanother (100 mV polarization) during a survey cycle. Furthermore, the 2015 native surveys\ndocument cp potentials between 237 mV to 669 mV for both tanks which would be considered\nconsiderably low for a new tank bottom.\nBased on these findings TransCanada needs to evaluate the tank bottoms of these tanks for\ncorrosion; determine if there is possible stray current near the tank facility; determine if grounding\nfor the electrical equipment has been installed correctly at the site; and re-evaluate the design of\nthe cathodic protection system for the breakout tanks.\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $200,000\nper violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for a related series of\nviolations. For violations occurring prior to January 4, 2012, the maximum penalty may not exceed\n$100,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000,000 for a related\nseries of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents involved in\nthis case, and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment\nproceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the item(s) identified in this letter. Failure to\ndo so will result in TC Oil Pipeline Operations Inc. being subject to additional enforcement action.\n\n\n\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer to\nCPF 4-2016-5012W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement\naction is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your\nresponsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the\ncomplete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions\nyou believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the\nredacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nSincerely,\nR. M. Seeley\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","truncated":false,"body_characters":7956}