# WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 420165022
- **title:** WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2016-07-07
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.204, 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(13), 195.402(c)(3), 195.402(c)(5), 195.402(c)(6), 195.402(e)(9), 195.505, 195.505(a), 195.505(b), 195.505(d), 199.105(b), 199.225(a)(1).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420165022
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.204,  195.402(a),  195.402(c)(13),  195.402(c)(3),  195.402(c)(5),  195.402(c)(6),  195.402(e)(9),  195.505,  195.505(a),  195.505(b),  195.505(d),  199.105(b),  199.225(a)(1). The case was opened on 2016-07-07 and is reported as closed as of 2019-12-09. Proposed civil penalty: $1,539,800. Assessed civil penalty: $1,019,200. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420165022_Corrected Final Order_12092019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Corrected%20Final%20Order_12092019.pdf

420165022_Corrected Final Order_12092019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Corrected%20Final%20Order_12092019_text.pdf

420165022_Final Order_11082019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Final%20Order_11082019.pdf

420165022_Final Order_11082019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Final%20Order_11082019_text.pdf

420165022_NOPV PCP PCO_07072016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_07072016.pdf

420165022_NOPV PCP PCO_07072016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_07072016_text.pdf

420165022_Operator Response to Notice and Request for Hearing_08042016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Request%20for%20Hearing_08042016.pdf

420165022_Final Order_11082019_text.pdf

November 8, 2019
Mr. Kelcy L. Warren
Chief Executive Officer
Energy Transfer Partners, LP
8111 Westchester Drive
Dallas, Texas 75225
Re: CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Dear Mr. Warren:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case to your subsidiary,
Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP. It withdraws three allegations of violation, makes other findings
of violation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $1,019,200, and withdraws the proposed
compliance order. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil
penalty has been paid, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement action
will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is effective upon the date of mailing,
as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Mary McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
__________________________________________
In the Matter of )
Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2016-5022
a subsidiary of Energy Transfer Partners, LP, )
)
)
)
Respondent. )
__________________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
From March to September 2015, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),
conducted an accident investigation of the facilities and records of Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP
(Respondent), in Wortham, Texas. Sunoco owned1 the West Texas Gulf Pipeline Company
(WTG), a 26-inch, 580-mile pipeline system that transports crude oil from Colorado City to
Longview, Texas, with additional delivery points along the Gulf Coast. On March 4, 2015,
following an information request from the public, OPS initiated an investigation into an accident
at Respondent’s Wortham facility in Texas. On or about February 19, 2013, vapors ignited while
welders were performing a pipeline modification, resulting in a serious injury.
As a result of the investigation, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated July 7, 2016, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty,
and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice
proposed finding that Sunoco committed violations of 49 C.F.R. Parts 195 and 199 and proposed
assessing a civil penalty of $1,539,800 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed
ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.
Sunoco responded to the Notice by letter dated August 4, 2016 (Response). Sunoco contested all
of the allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and requested a
hearing. A hearing was subsequently held on March 28, 2017, in Houston, Texas, with an
attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. At the hearing, Respondent was
represented by counsel.
1 At the time of the accident, Sunoco owned WTG. On April 28, 2017, Energy Transfer Partners (ETP) and Sunoco
Logistics Partners merged. This pipeline is now fully owned by Energy Transfer Partners (ETP). See
https://ir.energytransfer.com/news-releases/news-release-details/sunoco-logistics-partners-and-energy-transfer-
partners-announce/. (last accessed October 1, 2019).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Parts 195 and 199, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.204, which states:
§ 195.204 Inspection–general.
Inspection must be provided to ensure that the installation of pipe or
pipeline systems is in accordance with the requirements of this subpart. Any
operator personnel used to perform the inspection must be trained and
qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected. An operator must not
use operator personnel to perform a required inspection if the operator
personnel performed the construction task requiring inspection. Nothing in
this section prohibits the operator from inspecting construction tasks with
operator personnel who are involved in other construction tasks.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.204 by failing to ensure that the
operator personnel, or third-party inspector, that it used to perform inspections was trained and
qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected. On the day of the accident, Respondent’s
third-party contractor, Sprint Pipeline Services (Sprint), was tying in a 50-foot section of pipe.
Mustang Engineering (Mustang) was overseeing the construction work as a third-party inspector.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Mr. Tolbert (Mustang employee) was performing
inspections on February 18-19, 2013, despite the fact that he was neither trained nor qualified in
the construction tasks being performed.
At the hearing, Sunoco acknowledged that it was unable to present any evidence that Mr. Tolbert
was qualified at the time of OPS’ accident investigation. However, Sunoco produced some
evidence in support of its contention that Mr. Tolbert was trained to the regulatory standard.
First, Sunoco noted that OPS’ investigator, Ms. Molly Atkins, had attached Mr. Tolbert’s 2010
resume to the Violation Report. This resume lists various qualifications. Second, Sunoco
pointed to a deposition transcript2 that discusses the general process that Mustang used to qualify
its inspectors. It argued that, even if it was not able to produce any direct evidence linking this
process to Mr. Tolbert, given the time frame of the inspection services (February 18-19, 2013),
Mr. Tolbert would have undergone a training and qualification process. Third, Respondent
stated that its contract with Mustang required them to ensure that its inspectors were
appropriately qualified.
OPS countered that Sunoco is ultimately responsible for ensuring that its personnel, including its
third-party contractors, are “trained and qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected.”
Sunoco provided no direct evidence that Mr. Tolbert was qualified to oversee the work being
performed on February 18-19, 2013. While the regulation does not require an operator to have a
specific qualification process, it must ensure that its personnel are “trained and qualified” to the
task by establishing a standardized process that itemizes the training and qualification process for
2Sunoco presented evidence throughout the hearing that was produced pursuant to a third-party civil litigation
related to the Wortham accident. This litigation will be referred to as “the Talbot litigation.”



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 3
different construction phases. Despite the fact that Sunoco was able to produce Mr. Tolbert’s
resume and provide evidence that it established an inspector vetting process around the time of
the accident, it has no direct evidence that Mustang (or Sunoco) followed any process to
establish Mr. Tolbert’s qualifications for the specific phases of work that he was overseeing on
February 18-19, 2013.3 In its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco focuses on the phase of construction
(demagnetization) that was occurring at the time of the accident. However, the Notice alleges,
and I agree, that Mr. Tolbert was required to be properly qualified for all of the phases of
construction that he was overseeing on February 18-19, 2013.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Sunoco failed to ensure that the
operator personnel used to perform inspections were trained and qualified in the phases of
construction to be inspected.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to
determine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and
maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to follow its
own procedures for periodically reviewing its work and determining the effectiveness of the
procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and taking corrective action where
deficiencies are found. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow these
procedures at the Wortham facility: Hot Work Procedure HS-P-009, Lockout-Tagout Program
HS-P-005, and Overview of Work Permits Procedure HS-G-012. Each procedure required
Sunoco to conduct evaluations at certain intervals to ascertain whether Hot Work,
Lockout/Tagout (LOTO), and Work Permit procedures were being followed. During OPS’
3 “Mr. Herring: Right, he didn’t specifically mention Mr. Tolbert…What we have available is Mustang’s
representations of the process that they followed (Hearing Transcript, at 44).”



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 4
yearlong investigation4, Sunoco was unable to provide any records for the Wortham facility that
demonstrated it performed these evaluations.
At the hearing, Sunoco produced records that it claimed were discovered in paper form just prior
to the hearing. These included: (1) a collection of executed permits (Hearing Exhibit 1) and (2) a
collection of lockout-tagout inspection checklists (Hearing Exhibit 2). In the Regional Director’s
written evaluation of the response material submitted in the Post-Hearing Brief, the Director
noted that Exhibit 1 does not indicate whether the required audit occurred or include the required
review. After reviewing the documents submitted in these exhibits, the Director stated that each
form either lacked specific detail or was not signed by authorized representatives.
After conducting a review of these documents and Sunoco’s own procedures, I find that Sunoco
did not fully comply with any of these procedures. The Respondent argues that, as an unmanned
facility, Wortham was not required to comply with the annual evaluation requirements
enumerated in these three procedures. I do not agree. The procedures themselves do not include
an exception for unmanned facilities, and there is no question that the Wortham facility did not
conduct an evaluation of the Hot Work Procedure in 2013. In addition, as noted by the Director,
the evaluations that were submitted appear incomplete (unsigned).
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to follow its own procedures for periodically reviewing its
work and determining the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and
maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety when an
emergency condition occurs:
(1) ….
(9) Providing for a post accident review of employee activities to
determine whether the procedures were effective in each emergency and
taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
4 The investigation was initiated on March 4, 2015, and continued until issuance of the Notice on July 7, 2016.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 5
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(9) by failing to follow its
own procedures to provide for a post-accident review of employee activities to determine
whether the procedures were effective in an emergency and taking corrective action where
deficiencies are found. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to conduct a review
following the Wortham accident to determine whether its procedures were effective or to take
any corrective action. Sunoco’s procedure OPER-PR-002 (Paragraph 4.3.3), Spill Reporting,
Root Cause Analysis and Documentation, required Sunoco to prepare a Serious Incident
Investigation Report (SII) following the Wortham accident. Pursuant to the SII, Sunoco was to
develop a “Lessons Learned” document that complies with § 195.402(e)(9), or “provide(s) for a
post-accident review of employee activities to determine whether the procedures were effective
in each emergency and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.” However, at the
time of OPS’ inspection, Mr. Todd Nardozzi, Compliance Manager, Sunoco, stated that Sunoco
had never completed a “Lessons Learned” document.5
At the hearing and in its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco acknowledged that it never developed a
“Lessons Learned” document and therefore failed to follow its own procedure.6 However, it
contended that Item 3 was duplicative of the allegation in Item 4 and relies on the same failure to
follow OPER-PR-002, or to prepare a complete and accurate Serious Incident Investigation
Report for the Wortham accident. I will discuss this argument further in the discussion of Item
4. However, this Item alleges, and I so find, that Sunoco failed to complete its Serious Incident
Investigation Report, an integral part of complying with the regulatory requirement to conduct a
post-accident review.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(9) by failing to follow its own procedures to provide a post-accident review
of employee activities to determine whether its procedures were effective and taking corrective
action where deficiencies were found.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
5 Violation Report, at 22.
6 “Mr. Dunleavy: We have not located a lessons-learned (Transcript, at 76).”



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 6
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(5) Analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5) by failing to follow its
own procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes. Specifically, the
Notice alleged that the Respondent failed to perform a complete analysis into the cause of the
accident, as required by OPER-PR-002. This procedure comprises 11 pages and “defines the
process by which spills are reported and documented.” The Notice alleges that the operator
failed to comply in the following ways: (1) failure to provide complete and accurate photographs
from the accident scene, as required by OPER-PR-002, Section 4.2; and (2) failure to assemble
an investigation team composed of cross functional employees, as required by OPER-PR-002,
Paragraph 4.3.3. The Notice also alleges various failures to adequately evaluate the Project
Work Plan.
At the hearing, the Respondent did not contend that it abided by OPER-PR-002. However, it
stated that § 195.402(e)(9) and § 195.402(c)(5) required the same post-accident review and
therefore Sunoco’s collective failure to follow the procedure should constitute a single violation.
OPS argued that § 195.402(e)(9) and § 195.402(c)(5) required the completion of different
analyses. Item 3 focused on Sunoco’s failure to complete a Lessons Learned document that
would have put Sunoco into compliance with the required post-accident review (§ 195.402(e)(9))
when an emergency condition occurs (emphasis added). Item 4, however, (§ 195.402(c)(5))
focuses on Sunoco’s failure to analyze the cause of this accident pursuant to its manual for
maintenance and normal operations (emphasis added). In OPS’ view, Items 3 and 4 are
therefore properly the basis of two separate violations of two separate procedures required by
different parts of § 195.402.
Admittedly, Item 4 refers to Sunoco’s failure to complete the Lessons Learned document (Item
3) and how this failure also violates § 195.402(c)(5). Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932) requires a determination of whether there are two offenses or only one. 7 The
relevant test is to determine whether the multiple alleged violations “each require proof of any
additional fact or have their own ‘evidentiary basis.’”8 I find that there is a separate evidentiary
basis for Item 4 – apart from the failure to complete the Lessons Learned document.
The Violation Report details multiple instances where Sunoco failed to follow its own procedural
requirements. Simply because these actions are required by the same 11-page procedure that
also required the “Lessons Learned” document does not mean that Sunoco’s failure cannot form
the basis of separate violations. In this case, there are two separate acts, including: (1) failure to
provide complete and accurate photographs from the accident scene, as required by OPER-PR-
002, Section 4.2; and (2) failure to assemble an investigation team composed of cross functional
7 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
8 In re Colo. Interstate Gas, Final Order, CPF No. 5-2008-1005, 2009 WL 5538649, at **11-13 (D.O.T Nov. 23,
2009).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 7
employees, as required by OPER-PR-002, Paragraph 4.3.3. These acts are separate from the
“act” of failing to complete the Lessons Learned document.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5) by failing to follow its own procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents to
determine their causes.
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(6) Minimizing the potential for hazards identified under paragraph
(c)(4) of this section and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed
under paragraph (c)(5) of this section.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(6) by failing to prepare and
follow its own procedure for minimizing the potential for hazards identified under paragraph
(c)(4) and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5).
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco’s procedure OPER-PR-002 (Paragraph 4.3.3), Spill
Reporting, Root Cause Analysis and Documentation, required Sunoco to take prompt remedial
action to minimize the possibility of accident recurrence. In 2009, Sunoco experienced an
accident on the West Texas Gulf Pipeline in Colorado City. In the Violation Report, OPS stated
that the circumstances of the 2009 Colorado City accident were similar in nature to the 2013
Wortham accident in the following ways: failure (1) to make required notice to the NRC; (2) to
timely submit a Form 7000-1; (3) to take corrective actions where deficiencies were found in
determining the effectiveness of procedures; (4) to perform annual audits of work processes; (5)
to prevent ignition of vapors; (6) to properly isolate or make safe for welding, cutting, and
associated hot work activities; and (7) to follow operating and maintenance procedures. On
account of the 2009 Colorado City accident, a Final Order was issued to Sunoco on August 1,
2012.9 It found that Sunoco, among other things, failed to follow its procedures and adequately
9 See In the Matter of Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP, Final Order, CPF No. 4-2010-5010 (Aug. 1, 2012). Decision
on Petition for Reconsideration (Dec. 31, 2012).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 8
investigate the accident.
At the hearing, Sunoco stated that the Colorado City and Wortham accidents were different in
nature and circumstance, despite the fact that both accidents involved a failure to follow
procedures during hot work,10 leading to a fire that caused injuries. Sunoco stated that the
Wortham accident happened solely due to human error, or the fact that its contractor personnel
failed to properly ground his equipment. In Colorado City, the explosion occurred when vapors
passed through a mud plug during welding, allowing the explosion to occur. In its view, there
was nothing in the 2009 Colorado City accident to learn from that would have prevented the
2013 Wortham accident because the contractor employee simply made a mistake in the latter
accident. Given these differences, the Respondent argued that OPS did not meet its burden of
proving that, even if Sunoco had identified the issues in Colorado City, that the Wortham
accident would not have occurred.11
This regulation does not require OPS to prove that the failures in Colorado City and Wortham
are identical, or even largely similar. It simply requires that, when an operator experiences a
failure, it take steps to minimize the potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) of
§ 195.402 and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed under (c)(5) of § 195.402.
§ 195.402 (c)(4) requires that an operator’s manual for maintenance and normal operations
include a procedure for “Determining which pipeline facilities are located in areas that would
require an immediate response by the operator to prevent hazards to the public if the facilities
failed or malfunctioned.” Section 195.402 (c)(5) requires that an operator’s manual for
maintenance and normal operations include a procedure for “Analyzing pipeline accidents to
determine their causes.” Sunoco’s procedure OPER-PR-002 (Paragraph 4.3.3), Spill Reporting,
Root Cause Analysis and Documentation is the procedure that Sunoco implemented to fulfill the
regulatory requirements of § 195.402 (c)(5).
OPS argued that Sunoco’s failure to perform a root cause analysis following the 2009 accident
allowed the Wortham accident to occur because Sunoco failed to complete its Serious Incident
Investigation or its Lessons Learned document in order to properly minimize the potential for
future hazards, as required by § 195.402(c)(6). I agree. It is enough that OPS establish that
Sunoco failed to take any action, as required by OPER-PR-002, to produce a complete root cause
failure analysis following the Colorado City accident. If Sunoco had completed this analysis, it
could have argued that it fulfilled its obligation to minimize the potential for a future incident. It
is evident that Sunoco failed to take any action following the Colorado City accident to minimize
the potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) or the possibility of recurrence of
accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5).
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(6) by failing to prepare and follow its own procedure for minimizing the
10 Hot work is any work that involves burning, welding, using fire- or spark-producing tools, or that produces a
source of ignition. See https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/general safety/hot work welding html (last
accessed October 1, 2019).
11 Mr. Nordozzi (Senior Manager, DOT Compliance): “There wasn’t a failure of the mud plug itself like we saw in
Colorado City where the vapors passed by vapor barrier. So I think that’s the distinction between the two that we
are trying to illustrate.” (Transcript, at 74).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 9
potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) and the possibility of recurrence of
accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5).
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b), which states:
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) ….
(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks
are qualified;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program with provisions to ensure through evaluation that
individuals performing covered tasks are qualified. Specifically, the Notice alleged that two
welders directly involved in the Wortham accident did not have proper qualifications.
At the hearing, Sunoco stated that its welders were properly qualified to weld despite the fact
that their ISNetworld records showed that their qualifications were expired. Sunoco’s written
Operator Qualification procedures, Section 5.3, detail requalification frequency and afford a
three-month grace period (beyond the standard 36 months). It is undisputed that both welders
were within the three-month grace period. OPS argued that ISNetworld, the record keeper for
Sunoco’s OQ records, does not permit a three-month grace period, and therefore both welders
were unqualified at the time of the accident.
Despite the contradiction between the procedures and the ISNetworld records, the Respondent
was not out of compliance, per its own procedures. Both welders were within the three-month
grace period. Based upon the foregoing, I hereby order that Item 6 be withdrawn.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(d):
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) ….
(d) Evaluate an individual if the operator has reason to believe that the
individual's performance of a covered task contributed to an accident as
defined in Part 195;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(d) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program with provisions to evaluate an individual if the operator
has reason to believe that the individual’s performance of a covered task contributed to an
accident, as defined in Part 195. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco allowed Mr. Vern
Tolbert, Mr. Waymen Casey, and Mr. Danny Tant, all of whom were involved in the February
19 accident, to complete tie-in welds on February 20, 2013 (the day after the accident), without
conducting the requisite evaluation into their performance.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 10
At the hearing, Sunoco argued that this violation is duplicative of Item 6, relies on the same
regulatory provision, and involves the same qualification issues. As stated above, I withdrew
Item 6, rendering the duplication issue moot.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.505(d) by failing to have and follow a written qualification program with
provisions to evaluate an individual if the operator has reason to believe that the individual’s
performance of a covered task contributed to an accident, as defined in Part 195.
Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b), which states:
§ 199.105 Drug tests required.
Each operator shall conduct the following drug tests for the presence of
a prohibited drug:
(a) ….
(b) Post-accident testing. As soon as possible but no later than 32 hours
after an accident, an operator must drug test each surviving covered
employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to
the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to
the accident. An operator may decide not to test under this paragraph but
such a decision must be based on specific information that the covered
employee's performance had no role in the cause(s) or severity of the
accident.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b) by failing to conduct post-
accident drug testing for each surviving covered employee whose performance of a covered
function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing
factor to the accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco reported on PHMSA Form
7000-1 that it did not conduct any testing on employees or contractors following the Wortham
accident. Sunoco also did not justify its decision not to test based on specific information that
the covered employee’s performance had no role in the cause or severity of the Wortham
accident.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation.
Accordingly, based upon a review of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 199.105(b) by failing to conduct post-accident drug testing for each surviving covered
employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot
be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident.
Item 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.225, which states in
relevant part:
§ 199.225 Alcohol tests required.
Each operator must conduct the following types of alcohol tests for the
presence of alcohol:
(a) Post-accident.



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(1) As soon as practicable following an accident, each operator must test
each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee's
performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or
cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident.
The decision not to administer a test under this section must be based on
specific information that the covered employee's performance had no role
in the cause(s) or severity of the accident.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.225(a)(1) by failing to conduct
post-accident alcohol testing for each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee's
performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely
discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco
did not perform any post-accident alcohol testing following the Wortham accident or justify the
decision not to conduct testing.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 199.225(a)(1) by failing to conduct post-accident alcohol testing for each surviving
covered employee for alcohol if that employee's performance of a covered function either
contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the
accident.
Item 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to include
procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each
of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
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Control). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco did not have a procedure for the
installation and operation of bentonite mud plugs that were installed on this Project.
At the hearing, Sunoco presented a recommended practice (RP)12 that it contended met the
regulatory requirement for two reasons. First, Sunoco asserted that the RP was compulsory, as it
was included in its contract with the subcontractor performing the work and the contractor
treated the RP as a procedure. In addition, the Respondent pointed to deposition testimony in
which the subcontractor discussed the RP and verified that it was followed.
OPS declined to treat the RP as a procedure and maintains that Item 10 should be upheld as a
violation. During the hearing, I questioned Respondent’s counsel about whether and how an RP
constitutes a procedure. I am not convinced that, simply because the RP was presented to the
contractor as compulsory for this project, Respondent achieved regulatory compliance. Sunoco
must have a procedure (not an RP) that is prepared and followed for its pipeline system. Even if
I accept that the RP was compulsory for this project, that does not meet the regulatory
requirement, which requires that there be a procedure for Sunoco’s pipeline system as a whole.
In its Post-Hearing brief, Sunoco also argues that it was not required to have a procedure for the
installation of mud plugs. I disagree. At the hearing, both parties agreed that operators must
have a procedure to isolate hot zones from potential vapors and that mud plugs are one way to
achieve such isolation. During the hearing, the Regional Director stated: “[E]very operator, I
would think – feel free to contradict me – would have a way of isolating work areas from the
product. That’s a common thing. Mr. Dresh (Sunoco, Director of Integrity Projects): I agree a
hundred percent with that statement…”13 It is not necessary for every operator to have a
procedure for the installation of mud plugs. However, once Sunoco determined that it would use
mud plugs as an isolation device, it was required to have a procedure. Since I find that the RP
was not a procedure for the purposes of determining compliance with § 195.402(c)(3), I find that
Respondent did not achieve regulatory compliance.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing
the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and
Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion Control).
Item 11: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
12 Fire Clay mudpack RP dated 5/30/08.
13 Transcript, at 133.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
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months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in a
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