{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420165034","title":"WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-10-27","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(3).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420165034.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420165034.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420165034","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420165034","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.402(c)(3). The case was opened on 2016-10-27 and is reported as closed as of 2019-11-27. Proposed civil penalty: $251,800. Assessed civil penalty: $251,800. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420165034_Final Order_11142019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165034/420165034_Final%20Order_11142019.pdf\n\n420165034_Final Order_11142019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165034/420165034_Final%20Order_11142019_text.pdf\n\n420165034_NOPV PCP_10272016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165034/420165034_NOPV%20PCP_10272016.pdf\n\n420165034_NOPV PCP_10272016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165034/420165034_NOPV%20PCP_10272016_text.pdf\n\n420165034_Operator Response to Notice and Request for Hearing_11302016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165034/420165034_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Request%20for%20Hearing_11302016.pdf\n\n420165034_Final Order_11142019_text.pdf\n\nNovember 14, 2019\nMr. Kelcy L. Warren\nChief Executive Officer\nEnergy Transfer, LP\n8111 Westchester Drive\nDallas, Texas 75225\nRe: CPF No. 4-2016-5034\nDear Mr. Warren:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and assesses a civil penalty of $251,800. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the\nFinal Order. This enforcement action closes automatically upon receipt of payment. Service of\nthe Final Order by certified mail is effective upon the date of mailing as provided under 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosures (Final Order and NOPV)\ncc: Ms. Mary McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. Todd Nardozzi, Senior Manager, DoT Compliance, Energy Transfer, LP, 1300 Main\nStreet, Houston, Texas 77002\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nSunoco Logistics Partners, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2016-5034\na subsidiary of Energy Transfer, LP, )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom November 2015 to March 2016, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an accident investigation into the facilities and records of Sunoco Logistics\nPartners, LP (Respondent), in Wortham, Texas. Sunoco owned1 the West Texas Gulf Pipeline\nCompany (WTG), a 26-inch, 580-mile pipeline system that transports crude oil from Colorado\nCity to Longview, Texas, with additional delivery points along the Gulf Coast.2 On November\n10, 2015, employees attempted to disassemble a pressurized 10-inch flow control valve (“the\ncontrol valve”), resulting in a release of crude oil.3 Five employees, including operator\npersonnel and contractors, were injured.\nAs a result of the investigation, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated October 27, 2016, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil\nPenalty (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that\nSunoco committed violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and proposed assessing a civil penalty of\n$251,800 for the alleged violations.\nSunoco responded to the Notice by letter dated November 30, 2016 (Response). Sunoco\ncontested all of the allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and\n1 At the time of the accident, Sunoco owned WTG. This pipeline is now a fully owned subsidiary of Energy\nTransfer (ET). See https://www.energytransfer.com/crude-oil/ (last accessed October 4, 2019).\n2 On April 28, 2017, Energy Transfer Partners (ETP) and Sunoco Logistics Partners merged, leaving ETP. See\nhttps://ir.energytransfer.com/news-releases/news-release-details/sunoco-logistics-partners-and-energy-transfer-\npartners-announce/. (last accessed October 4, 2019).\n3 “As a result of the release, five persons were injured with bruises, scrapes, and oil spray into to [sic] eyes and onto\nbody. None of these injuries required admittance into the hospital.” Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation\nReport), (October 27, 2016)(on file with PHMSA), at 4.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2016-5034\nPage 2\nrequested a hearing. A hearing was subsequently held on March 28, 2017, in Houston, Texas,\nwith an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. At the hearing,\nRespondent was represented by counsel.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and\nemergencies\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made\nas necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be\nprepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(1) ….\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance\nwith each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to prepare and\nfollow a manual of written procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline\nsystem in accordance with each of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and Maintenance)\nand Subpart H (Corrosion Control). Specifically, the Notice alleged that the Respondent did not\nhave a written procedure for the operation and maintenance of the failed control valve.\nDuring the accident investigation, OPS interviewed Respondent’s third-party contractors and the\noperator’s own personnel that were involved in the work on November 10, 2015. No procedure,\ndetailed job plan, or manufacturer’s instruction for the flow control valve was shared with any of\nthe workers prior to beginning work.4\nAt the hearing, Sunoco acknowledged that poor work planning had occurred and that the failed\nvalve should not have been selected for operation. However, Sunoco denied that it should have\nhad a written procedure for this kind of work and argued that “over-proceduralization” dilutes\nthe overall effectiveness of its written procedural manual.\n4 Violation Report, at 5.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2016-5034\nPage 3\nOPS countered that Sunoco was performing an “uncommon” operation that should have been\nincorporated into Sunoco’s written procedural manual. In the Director’s Recommendation, OPS\npointed to Sunoco’s admission that there was inadequate development or review of the work\nplan. In its view, this is ample evidence that the Respondent should have had a written\nprocedure for operation and maintenance of this valve. I agree. A written procedure would have\nmandated the secondary review and detailed job plan that is needed to safely operate, maintain,\nand repair this valve, which is located in an area where the piping is poorly designed and difficult\nto isolate.5 This position is supported by the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) of this accident\ncommissioned by Sunoco. DNV GL produced the RCA, which included six recommendations,\nthe fourth of which was to “update company safe isolation procedures and educate workforce\nand contractors.”6 While the RCA does not explicitly find that operation of this particular valve\nbe proceduralized, it does recommend that Sunoco update its safe isolation procedures. This\nrecommendation supports OPS’ position that operation and maintenance of this valve, which was\nused as a positive isolation, should have been included in the Respondent’s manual.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Sunoco failed to prepare and follow\na manual of written procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and\nemergencies\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made\nas necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be\nprepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(1) ….\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance\nwith each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow\nprocedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each\nof the requirements of Subpart F (operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion\n5 The poor design in this area was discussed extensively both at the hearing and in the DNVGL RCA.\n6 Violation Report, at Exhibit A.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2016-5034\nPage 4\nControl). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow its Lock Out Tag Out\nprocedure prior to beginning work on November 10, 2015.\nAt the hearing, Sunoco did not contest this Item.\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49\nC.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing\nthe pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and\nMaintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion Control).\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.7 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that\nthe penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent\nin attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the\neconomic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent\ndamages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil\npenalty of $251,800 for the violations cited above.\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $51,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.402(c)(3), for failing to include a procedure for operating, maintaining, and repairing the\ncontrol valve in its manual of written procedures. Specifically, the respondent did not prepare\ndetailed procedures for operating and maintaining the control valve in accordance with\nmanufacturer and operator safety specifications, nor did it have complete procedures to ensure\nsafe repair per 195.422, Subpart F. At the hearing, Sunoco maintained that it should not have\nhad a procedure for the operation of this valve. However, as I stated above, I am finding a\nviolation of Item 1 since failure to have an adequate procedure specific to this type of control\nvalve contributed to the occurrence of the accident. In considering the nature, circumstances,\nand gravity of the accident here, I do not think a reduction in the civil penalty is warranted.\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a civil penalty of $51,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3).\nItem 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $200,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49\nC.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3), for failing to follow its Lock Out Tag Out procedure. Sunoco argued\nthat the civil penalty should be withdrawn or, in the alternative, reduced because the RCA did\nnot find that the failure to follow the Lock Out Tag Out procedure was a casual factor in the\naccident. However, the RCA states that “the direct cause of the release was that PRV-1111 had\n7 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223; Revisions to Civil Penalty Amounts,\n83 Fed. Reg. 60732, 60744 (Nov. 27, 2018).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2016-5034\nPage 5\nnot been de-energized (a part of the Lock Out Tag Out procedure).”8 Thus, the RCA supports\nOPS’ decision to treat the failure to follow the Lock Out Tag Out procedure as causal. I will also\nnote here that this valve blew out under pressure, spewing crude oil 15 feet into the air. The\nRCA notes that the “combination of release pressure and oil spray knocked some team members\nto the ground, causing some injuries such as cuts, bruises, injuries to the eyes from oil spray, and\nringing in the ears from the loud ‘pop’ that was heard.”9 The circumstances of this accident were\nvery serious – both because of the injury count and the potential that existed here for more\nserious injuries. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment\ncriteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $200,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.402(c)(3).\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final\nOrder to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey\nAvenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of\nChief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address, no later than 20 days after receipt of service of the\nFinal Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a brief statement of the issue(s)\nand meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically\nstays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including any\ncorrective action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a\nstay. If Respondent submits payment of the civil penalty, the Final Order becomes the final\nadministrative decision and the right to petition for reconsideration is waived.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\nNovember 14, 2019\n___________________________________ __________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n8 Violation Report, at Exhibit A (DNGL RCA, 18).\n9 Id.","truncated":false,"body_characters":15755}