{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420175032","title":"DCP MIDSTREAM — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2017-08-24","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.452(i)(4), 195.567(c), 195.573(a)(1), 195.579(c), 195.581(a), 195.64(c)(2)(v).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420175032.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420175032.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420175032","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420175032","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving DCP MIDSTREAM. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.452(i)(4),  195.567(c),  195.573(a)(1),  195.579(c),  195.581(a),  195.64(c)(2)(v). The case was opened on 2017-08-24 and is reported as closed as of 2018-11-05. Proposed civil penalty: $27,600. Assessed civil penalty: $27,600. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420175032_Closure Letter_11052018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420175032/420175032_Closure%20Letter_11052018.pdf\n\n420175032_Closure Letter_11052018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420175032/420175032_Closure%20Letter_11052018_text.pdf\n\n420175032_Final Order_04122018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420175032/420175032_Final%20Order_04122018.pdf\n\n420175032_Final Order__04122018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420175032/420175032_Final%20Order__04122018_text.pdf\n\n420175032_NOPV PCP PCO_08242017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420175032/420175032_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_08242017.pdf\n\n420175032_NOPV PCP PCO_08242017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420175032/420175032_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_08242017_text.pdf\n\n420175032_Operator Response to Notice_10272017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420175032/420175032_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_10272017.pdf\n\n420175032_Final Order__04122018_text.pdf\n\nApril 12, 2018\nMr. Wouter van Kempen\nChairman and CEO\nDCP Midstream, LP\n370 17th Street, Suite 2500\nDenver, CO 80202\nRe: CPF No. 4-2017-5032\nDear Mr. van Kempen:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and assesses a civil penalty of $27,600. It further specifies actions that need to be taken\nby DCP Midstream, LP, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment\nterms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the\ncompliance order satisfied, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement\naction will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is effective upon the date of\nmailing, as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Mary McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. Brent Backes, Group Vice President and General Counsel, DCP Midstream, LP\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nDCP Midstream, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2017-5032\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn multiple dates between May and December, 2016, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a\nrepresentative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office\nof Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and\nrecords of DCP Midstream, LP (DCP or Respondent), in Texas and Oklahoma. DCP is a limited\npartnership owned by Phillips 66 and Enbridge, Inc., that operates more than 64,000 miles of\nnatural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline and 12 natural gas processing facilities in approximately 16\nstates.1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated August 24, 2017, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice), which also included warnings pursuant to 49\nC.F.R. § 190.205. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that\nDCP had committed four violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and proposed assessing a civil penalty\nof $27,600 for one alleged violation. The Notice also proposed ordering Respondent to take\ncertain measures to correct the alleged violations. The warning items required no further action\nbut warned the operator to correct the probable violations or face possible future enforcement\naction.\nAfter requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond, DCP responded to the Notice by\nletter dated October 27, 2017 (Response). The company did not contest the allegations of\nviolation, and agreed to complete certain corrective actions, as provided in the proposed\ncompliance order. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to\none.\n1 DCP Midstream website, available at http://www.dcpmidstream.com/getattachment/Utility-Pages/Explore-\nFootprint/DCP Mid Corp Glance Fact Sheet Q32016 Enbridge Consolidation.pdf.aspx (last accessed January 3,\n2018).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2017-5032\nPage 2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nIn its Response, DCP did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49 C.F.R. Part\n195, as follows:\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area? - (1) . . . .\n(4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator\ndetermines that an EFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high\nconsequence area in the event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release, an\noperator must install the EFRD. In making this determination, an operator\nmust, at least, consider the following factors—the swiftness of leak\ndetection and pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type of commodity\ncarried, the rate of potential leakage, the volume that can be released,\ntopography or pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, proximity to power\nsources, location of nearest response personnel, specific terrain between the\npipeline segment and the high consequence area, and benefits expected by\nreducing the spill size.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4) by failing to determine\nwhether EFRDs were needed on two DCP pipeline segments running through high consequence\nareas (HCAs). Specifically, the Notice alleged that DCP failed to perform an initial evaluation\non the company’s Panova to Red River and Red River to Mount Belvieu segments. Both\n§ 195.452(i)(4) and section IP 008 of DCP’s own written Integrity Procedure, IP 008 (version\n3.1, dated December 2012), required that DCP consider whether EFRDs should be added as a\npreventive and mitigative measure on the listed pipeline segments.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4) by failing to determine\nwhether EFRDs were needed on two pipeline segments in order to protect HCAs.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581, which states, in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric\ncorrosion and what coating material may I use?\n(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is\nexposed to the atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this\nsection.\n(b) Coating material must be suitable for the prevention of atmospheric\ncorrosion.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a) by failing to clean and coat\neach pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere. Specifically, the Notice alleged that DCP\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2017-5032\nPage 3\ndiscovered numerous instances of deteriorated coating on its pipeline when conducting\natmospheric pipe inspections. However, for 40 of the pipeline portions identified as having\ndeteriorated coatings, DCP failed to remediate the deteriorated coatings by cleaning and coating\nthe pipeline.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a) by failing to clean and\ncoat numerous portions of its pipeline that were exposed to the atmosphere.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made\nas necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be\nprepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that DCP failed to follow Section 4 of its Integrity Management\nManual – Risk Management Manual, Subsection 4.4.5: Pipeline Facilities Risk Assessment.\nSubsection 4.4.5 provides, in relevant part, that Respondent must use the checklist in DCP Form\n50 to assist in “determining the most credible release scenario and impact on any affected\nHCAs.”\nDuring its inspection, PHMSA noted that DCP had facilities in Teague, Lockwood, and Panova,\nall of which are in HCA or HCA-could-affect areas. When the PHMSA inspector asked DCP for\ncopies of the Form 50 checklist generated for these three facilities, as required under Subsection\n4.4.5, DCP was not able to provide them.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its\nown manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities.\nItem 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(a)(1), which states:\n§ 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(a) Protected pipelines. You must do the following to determine\nwhether cathodic protection required by this subpart complies with\n§195.571:\n(1) Conduct tests on the protected pipeline at least once each calendar\nyear, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months. . . .\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2017-5032\nPage 4\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(a)(1) by failing to conduct\ntests on one of its cathodically protected pipelines at least once each calendar year, but with\nintervals not exceeding 15 months. Specifically, the Notice alleged that DCP failed to conduct\ntests at five locations on its 16-inch Lockwood Station to Teague Station pipeline at least once\neach calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months. By failing to test at these five\nlocations, DCP was unable to demonstrate adequate levels of cathodic protection under\n§ 195.573(a)(1).\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(a)(1) by failing to conduct\ntests on one of its cathodically protected pipelines at least once per calendar year, but with\nintervals not exceeding 15 months.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.2\nIn determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I\nmust consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,\nincluding adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history\nof Respondent’s prior offenses; and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue\ndoing business; and the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline\nsafety regulations. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation\nwithout any reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may\nrequire. The Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $27,600 for the violation in Item 8 above.\nItem 8: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $27,600 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.573(a)(1), for failing to conduct tests on one of its cathodically protected pipelines at least\nonce per calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months. DCP neither contested the\nallegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying a reduction in the proposed penalty.\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a civil penalty of $27,600 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(a)(1).\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for the Item cited\nabove, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $27,600.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal\n2 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See, e.g., Pipeline Safety: Inflation Adjustment of Maximum\nCivil Penalties, 82 Fed. Reg. 19325 (April 27, 2017).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2017-5032\nPage 5\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169.\nThe Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.\nFailure to pay the $27,600 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate\nin accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 4, 5, and 6 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.452(i)(4), 195.581(a), and 195.402(a), respectively. Under 49\nU.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids or who\nowns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards\nestablished under chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the\npipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(i)(4) (Item 4), Respondent must\nperform a study, based on a current high consequence area list, to determine whether\nEFRDs are needed on pipeline segments to protect high consequence areas in the\nevent of a hazardous liquid pipeline release to enhance public safety. Respondent\nmust complete this compliance item and submit documentation to the Director within\n90 days of receipt of this Order.\n2. With respect to the violation of § 195.581(a) (Item 5), Respondent must provide\nevidence that the 40 identified locations with deteriorated coating have been\nadequately cleaned and coated. Respondent must complete this compliance item and\nsubmit documentation to the Director within 180 days of receipt of this Order.\n3. With respect to the violation of § 195.402(a) (Item 6), Respondent must conduct a\nthorough review using the Form 50 checklist to determine the most credible release\nscenario and impact on HCAs and HCA-could-affect areas to enhance public safety.\nRespondent must complete this compliance item and submit documentation to the\nDirector within 90 days of receipt of this Order.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nIt is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs\nassociated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the Director. It is\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2017-5032\nPage 6\nrequested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated with\npreparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated with\nreplacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nnot to exceed $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (49 C.F.R. § 190.223), for each violation for\neach day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a\ndistrict court of the United States.\nWARNING ITEMS\nWith respect to Items 1, 2, 3, and 7, the Notice alleged probable violations of Part 195 but did\nnot propose a civil penalty or compliance order for these items. Therefore, these are considered\nto be warning items. The warnings were for:\n49 C.F.R. § 195.64(c) (Item 1) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to notify PHMSA\nthat DCP had divested a pipeline asset;\n49 C.F.R. § 195.579(c) (Item 2) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to perform an\ninspection of the internal surface of a segment of pipeline removed during a “hot\ntap;”\n49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) (Item 3) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to follow its own\nmanual of written procedures with respect to pipeline-assessment scheduling; and\n49 C.F.R. § 195.567(c) (Item 7) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to maintain test\nlead wires in a condition that enabled DCP to determine whether cathodic\nprotection complied with § 195.571.\nDCP presented information in its Response showing that it had taken certain actions to address\nthe cited items. If OPS finds a violation of any of these items in a subsequent inspection,\nRespondent may be subject to future enforcement action.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nApril 12, 2018\n___________________________________ __________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n420175032_NOPV PCP PCO_08242017_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nAugust 24, 2017\nDCP Midstream\nMr. Bent Backes\nGeneral Counsel and Vice President\n370, 17th Street Suite 2500\nDenver, CO 80202\nCPF 4-2017-5032\nDear Mr. Backes:\nOn multiple dates between the months of May and December 2016, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to\nChapter 601 of 49 United States Code inspected DCP Midstream (DCP) NGL Pipeline systems in Texas\nand Oklahoma.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the Pipeline Safety\nRegulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the probable violation(s)\nare:\n1. § 195.64 National Registry of Pipeline and LNG Operators.\n(c) Changes. Each operator must notify PHMSA electronically through the National Registry\nof Pipeline and LNG Operators at http://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov, of certain events.\n\n\n\n(2) An operator must notify PHMSA of any following event not later than 60 days after the\nevent occurs:\n(v) The acquisition or divestiture of an existing pipeline facility subject to this part.\nDCP Southern Hills sold the Galena Park extension (12.1 miles) of the Southern Hills Pipeline System to\nPhillips 66 on April 22, 2014. A Type D notification (divestiture of asset) is required to filed by no later\nthan June 23, 2014.\nDCP submitted this notification to PHMSA on June 7, 2016 only after the PHMSA inspector brought this\nto their attention.\n2. §195.579 What must I do to mitigate internal corrosion?\n(c) Removing pipe. Whenever you remove pipe from a pipeline, you must inspect the internal\nsurface of the pipe for evidence of corrosion. If you find internal corrosion requiring\ncorrective action under §195.585, you must investigate circumferentially and longitudinally\nbeyond the removed pipe (by visual examination, indirect method, or both) to determine\nwhether additional corrosion requiring remedial action exists in the vicinity of the removed\npipe.\nDCP Southern Hills failed to perform an inspection of the internal surface of a hot tap coupon from their\npipeline system for evidence of corrosion.\nDuring the inspection, DCP did not have information or documentation to support that an internal\ninspection was performed when DCP made a hot tap to connect new Woodford Express Meter Station to\nthe Chitwood lateral pipeline at 2.8 miles southeast from MLV 58C. DCP performed the hot tap January\n2015 and a coupon was removed. However, this inspection report was not available, and an internal\ninspection was not performed during this project.\n3. §195. 402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and\nhandling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals\nnot exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared\nbefore initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept\nat locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\nDCP failed to follow their Integrity Manual.\n2\n\n\n\nDCP’s procedure, IP-002: Integrity Assessment Method Selection states,\nTo select appropriate assessment method, PIPELINE SERVICES DEPARTMENT will:\n Conduct a risk assessment and perform information analysis (review leak and repair history,\nresults of previous assessments, exposed pipe reports, and other pertinent information). See\nIntegrity Management Plan – Hazardous Liquids and Integrity Management Plan – Gas\nTransmission, Section 5 Continual Assessment Process.\n Identify risk drivers and applicable threats.\n Complete DCP Form 55: Integrity Assessment Method.\n Use the decision flow in the flowcharts presented as Figures 1 through 6 in DCP Form 55:\nIntegrity Assessment Method to make a selection. When selecting a specific ILI technology, or\nwhen both pressure test and ILI are acceptable as assessment methods, use Tables 1 and 2 as\nfurther guidance in making the determination.\n Justify and document the reason if different method is chosen than indicated by the flowcharts.\nObtain an approval from the DIRECTOR, PIPELINE COMPLIANCE & INTEGRITY.\n Document the final assessment method and schedule in the BAP and the IAP.\n Inform PIPELINE INSPECTION MANAGER about selected method(s) and proposed assessment\nschedule.\nDocument results in DCP Midstream Form 55: Integrity Assessment Method.\nWhile reviewing DCP’s Integrity Assessment Method, Form 55 dated February 28, 2014, for Southern\nHills pipeline, Segment SOH-1 – Jacksboro to Teague, the PHMSA inspector learned that DCP scheduled\nthe next assessment for June 2014. DCP documented the rationale indicating this line is susceptible to\nSCC, External Corrosion and Third Party Damage. When the PHMSA inspector reviewed the assessment\nfor this pipeline, it was found that it was not assessed until December 2015. As a result, this assessment\nwas late by 18 months.\n4. § 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(i) What preventative and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the high\nconsequence area?\n(4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator determines that an EFRD\nis needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high consequence area in the event of a\nhazardous liquid pipeline release, an operator must install the EFRD. In making this\ndetermination, an operator must, at least, consider the following factors-the swiftness of leak\ndetection and pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type of commodity carried, the rate of\npotential leakage, the volume that can be released, topography or pipeline profile, the\npotential for ignition, proximity to power sources, location of nearest response personnel,\nspecific terrain between the pipeline segment and the high consequence area, and benefits\nexpected by reducing the spill size.\nDCP delayed its process to determine if EFRDs were needed on certain pipeline segments to protect high\nconsequence areas in the event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release.3\n\n\n\nDCP’s Integrity Procedure, IP 008 (version 3.1 dated December 2012) states preventative and mitigative\nmeasures should include consideration of Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD) or Emergency\nFlow Valves (EFVs). In general, EFRDs and EFVs are an added optional safety device that has no effect\non the flow resulting from a small leak, such as a leak caused by corrosion or a small crack. These valves\ndo not prevent accidents; instead, they help mitigate the consequences of accidents where there has been\na substantial or catastrophic line break. Where installed, they are complementary to damage prevention\nprograms, one-call systems, and other pipeline safety efforts that focus on preventing accidents caused by\noutside forces.\nIn reviewing potential mitigation options, DCP Midstream should consider if automatic shut-off valves or\nremote control valves represent an efficient means of adding protection to potentially affected high\nconsequence areas.\nDuring the inspection, the PHMSA inspector learned that DCP failed to perform the initial EFRD\nevaluation on the following pipelines:\nPanova to Red River\nRed River to Mount Belvieu.\n5. §195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric corrosion and what coating\nmaterial may I use?\n(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the\natmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this section.\nDCP did not adequately clean and coat portions of pipeline that were exposed to the atmosphere and at\nsoil-to-air interfaces (transition zone) to protect against atmospheric corrosion.\nDCP’s standard operating procedure, CORR-5020: Atmospheric Pipe Inspection (dated 10/31/2014),\nSection 1.1.3 Soil-to-Air Interface states:\n1.1.3.1 Inspect all piping that is located at the soil-to-air interface.\n1.1.3.1.1 Piping that is located in the soil-to-air interface is especially prone to coating damage.\n1.1.3.1.2 If visual examination of the piping at the soil-to-air interface shows evidence of corrosion or\ncoating damage, excavation of the interface may be necessary to complete the inspection.\nSection 2.2.3 Poor states:\nExtensive visible deterioration of coating. (21 – 99% deterioration)\n2.2.3.1: If left unremediated, pitting corrosion may develop which affect the safe operation of the pipeline\nbefore the next scheduled inspection.\n4\n\n\n\nWhile reviewing records associated with the DCP’s atmospheric corrosion inspection, the PHMSA\ninspector noted that, at the following locations, DCP failed to remediate poor coating condition prior to\nthe next inspection cycle as noted below:\n1) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 0.449 had poor coating on 9/10/2012. It was not checked\nagain until the time of the inspection. DCP also failed to document the condition of corrosion at\nthis location\n2) 3) 4) 5) 6) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 0.730, had poor coating on 11/14/2013 and 7/14/2016\nPanova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 6.147, had poor transition zone on 11/14/2013 and 7/14/2016\nPanova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 6.147, had poor coating on 11/14/2013 and 7/14/2016\nPanova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 11.632, had poor coating on 9/11/2012 and 7/19/2016\nPanova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 11.632, had poor transition zone on 9/11/2012 and 7/19/2016\n7) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 11.632, was rated as “poor” in corrosion category on\n9/11/2012 and 7/19/2016\n8) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 13.480, had poor coating on 11/15/2013 and 7/19/2016\n9) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 13.480, had poor transition zone on 11/15/2013 and\n7/19/2016\n10) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 16.999, had poor coating on 9/12/2012 and 7/19/2016\n11) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 16.999, had poor transition zone on 11/14/2013 and\n7/19/2016\n12) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 17.559, had poor coating on 9/12/2012 and 7/19/2016\n13) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 17.559, had poor transition zone on 11/14/2013 and\n7/19/2016\n14) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 18.265, had poor coating on 11/14/2013 and 7/20/2016\n15) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 18.265, had poor transition zone on 9/12/2012 and 7/20/2016\n16) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 19.290, had poor coating on 9/13/2012 and 8/27/2016\n17) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 19.290, had poor transition zone on 11/14/2013 and\n8/27/2016\n18) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 20.517, had poor coating on 9/13/2012 and 7/20/2016\n19) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 20.517, had poor transition zone on 11/14/2013 and\n7/20/2016\n20) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 23.383, had poor transition zone on 11/15/2013 and\n7/22/2016\n21) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 24.894, had poor coating on 9/14/2012 and 7/22/2016\n22) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 24.894, had poor transition zone on 9/14/2012 and 7/22/2016\n23) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 24.894, was rated as “poor” in corrosion category on\n9/14/2012 and 7/22/2016\n24) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 24.894, was rated as “poor” in corrosion category on\n9/14/2012 and 7/22/2016\n25) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 28.058, had poor coating on 9/18/2012 and 7/22/2016\n5\n\n\n\n26) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 28.058, had poor transition zone on 11/14/2013 and\n7/22/2016\n27) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 31.730, had poor coating on 11/15/2013 and 7/25/2016\n28) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 31.730, had poor transition zone on 11/15/2013 and\n7/25/2016\n29) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 32.206, had poor coating on 9/19/2012 and 7/25/2016\n30) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 32.206, had poor transition zone on 9/19/2012 and 7/25/2016\n31) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 35.675, had poor coating on 11/14/2013 and 7/27/2016\n32) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 35.975, had poor transition zone on 11/14/2013 and\n7/27/2016\n33) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 35.770, had poor coating on 9/19/2012 and 7/27/2016\n34) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 35.770, had poor transition zone on 11/14/2013 and\n7/27/2016\n35) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 44.410, had poor coating on 11/15/2013 and 7/28/2016\n36) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 44.410, had poor transition zone on 11/15/2013 and\n7/28/2016\n37) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 44.504, had poor coating on 9/19/2012 and 7/28/2016\n38) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 44.523, had poor coating on 9/19/2012 and 7/28/2016\n39) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 44.523, was rated as “poor” in corrosion category on\n9/19/2012 and 7/28/2016\n40) Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipe, MP 44.523, had poor transition zone on 9/19/2012 and 7/28/2016\n6. §195. 402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and\nhandling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals\nnot exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared\nbefore initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept\nat locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\nDCP did not follow their Integrity Manual.\nDCP’s Integrity Management Manual, Section 4 – Risk Management Manual, Sub Section 4.4.5: Pipeline\nFacilities Risk Assessment, states:\nThe comprehensive risk assessment process for the pipeline stations includes a thorough review of the\nincident history of the pipeline stations. One example of the difference between the line pipe and facilities6\n\n\n\nis that for the line pipe, the primary cause for a release is corrosion, while for a station the primary cause\nof a release is equipment leaks at pumps, valves and fittings. The checklist in DCP Form 50: Pipeline\nFacilities Checklist assists in determining the most credible release scenario and impact on any affected\nHCAs.\nDuring the inspection, the PHMSA inspector noted DCP has facilities located at Teague, Lockwood and\nPanova, all in HCA or in HCA could-affect zones. When the PHMSA inspector requested Form 50:\nPipeline Facilities Checklist, DCP was not able to provide it.\n7. §195.567 Which pipelines must have test leads and what must I do to install and maintain\nthe leads?\n(c) Maintenance. You must maintain the test lead wires in a condition that enables you to\nobtain electrical measurements to determine whether cathodic protection complies with\n§195.571.\nDCP failed to maintain all CP test leads in a condition that enabled it to obtain electrical measurements to\ndetermine whether cathodic protection complies with §195.571.\nThe December 2013 and September 2014 annual CP surveys at mile post (MP) 42.080 along the 16-inch\nJacksboro Station to Teague Station pipeline showed p/s readings of 0.000mV and 0.000mV, respectively.\nThese p/s readings were indicative of a broken test lead. DCP corrected this and determined there was\nadequate cathodic protection during July 2015 annual survey.\n8. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(a) Protected pipelines. You must do the following to determine whether cathodic protection\nrequired by this subpart complies with §195.571:\n(1) Conduct tests on the protected pipeline at least once each calendar year, but with intervals\nnot exceeding 15 months. However, if tests at those intervals are impractical for separately\nprotected short sections of bare or ineffectively coated pipelines, testing may be done at least\nonce every 3 calendar years, but with intervals not exceeding 39 months.\nDCP did not conduct tests on the cathodically protected pipeline segments to monitor external corrosion\ncontrol, at least once each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months.\nDuring the inspection, DCP provided records that demonstrated that the 16” Lockwood Station to Teague\nStation pipeline at MP 31.330, 65.840, 88.990, 90.760 and 97.840 were not tested as required by\n§195.573(a)(1) to demonstrate adequate levels of cathodic protection.\nMP 31.330 was last surveyed on 12/13/2014 and was not surveyed again until 1/22/2016\nMP 65.840 was last surveyed on 12/12/2013 and was not surveyed again until 1/25/2016\n7\n\n\n\nMP 88.990 was last surveyed on 12/12/2013 (no access) and was not surveyed again until 7/28/2015\nMP 90.760 was last surveyed on 12/12/2013 and was not surveyed again until 7/28/2015\nMP 97.840 was last surveyed on 12/12/2013 and was not surveyed again until 7/28/2015\nProposed Civil Penalty\nAs of April 27, 2017, under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty\nnot to exceed $209,002 per violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,090,022 for a\nrelated series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and supporting\ndocumentation involved in the above probable violation(s) and has recommended that you be preliminarily\nassessed a civil penalty of $27,600 as follows:\nItem number PENALTY\n8 $ 27,600\nWarning Items\nWith respect to items 1, 2, 3, and 7 we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents\ninvolved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment\nproceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly correct these item(s). Failure to do so may result in\nadditional enforcement action.\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to item 4, 5 and 6 pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to DCP Southern Hills. Please\nrefer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a part of this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. All material you\nsubmit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly available. If you believe that any\nportion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with\nthe complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you\nbelieve qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30\ndays of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice\nand authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice\nwithout further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.\n8\n\n\n\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 4-2017-5032 and for each document you\nsubmit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nFrank Causey\nActing Director, SW Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n9\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) proposes to issue to DCP Southern Hills (DCP) a Compliance Order incorporating the\nfollowing remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of DCP with the pipeline safety regulations:\n1. 2. 3. 4. 5. In regard to Item Number 4 of the Notice pertaining to DCP failure to determine if EFRDs\nwere needed on pipeline segments to protect high consequence areas in the event of a\nhazardous liquid pipeline release, DCP must perform a study based on a current high\nconsequence area list to determine that an EFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect\na high consequence area in the event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release to enhance\npublic safety.\nIn regard to Item Number 5 of the Notice pertaining to inadequately cleaned and coated\nsoil-to-air interfaces on the portions of Panova to Cushing, 18” idle pipeline which is\nidentified in DCP’s atmospheric inspection records (2012 to 2016). DCP must provide\nevidence when the coating at these locations have been completed to verify that DCP has\ncomplied with this compliance order item.\nIn regard to Item Number 6 of the Notice pertaining to DCP’s failure to perform the\ncomprehensive risk assessment process for the pipeline stations that includes a thorough\nreview using the checklist provided in DCP’s Form 50, DCP must determine the most\ncredible release scenario and impact on HCAs to enhance public safety\nDCP must complete item 1 and 3 in 90 days and item 2 in 180 days.\nIt is requested (not ma","truncated":true,"body_characters":58672}