# SABINE PASS LNG, L.P. (Cheniere) — Corrective Action Order

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 420183001H
- **title:** SABINE PASS LNG, L.P. (Cheniere) — Corrective Action Order
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** current
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2018-02-08
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** OPEN corrective action order.
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- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420183001h.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420183001h
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420183001H
**body:**

Corrective Action Order involving SABINE PASS LNG, L.P. (Cheniere). The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2018-02-08 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420183001H_Corrective Action Order_02082018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420183001H/420183001H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_02082018.pdf

420183001H_Corrective Action Order_02082018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420183001H/420183001H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_02082018_text.pdf

420183001H_Operator Request for Hearing And Request For Case File (Statement of Issues)_02162018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420183001H/420183001H_Operator%20Request%20for%20Hearing%20And%20Request%20For%20Case%20File%20(Statement%20of%20Issues)_02162018.pdf

420183001H_PHC Consent Agreement And Order_04202018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420183001H/420183001H_PHC%20Consent%20Agreement%20And%20Order_04202018.pdf

420183001H_PHC Consent Agreement And Order_04202018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420183001H/420183001H_PHC%20Consent%20Agreement%20And%20Order_04202018_text.pdf

420183001H_PHC Final Determination Redacted_02112019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420183001H/420183001H_PHC%20Final%20Determination%20Redacted_02112019.pdf

420183001H_PHC Hearing Scheduled_03062018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420183001H/420183001H_PHC%20Hearing%20Scheduled_03062018.pdf

420183001H_PHC Hearing Scheduled_03062018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420183001H/420183001H_PHC%20Hearing%20Scheduled_03062018_text.pdf

420183001H_PHC Hearing Scheduled_03062018_text.pdf

March 6, 2018
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND EMAIL TO: Michael.Weller@cheniere.com and
Mary.McDaniel@dot.gov
Mr. Michael Weller
Senior Counsel
Cheniere Energy, Inc.
700 Milam Street, Suite 1900
Houston, TX 77002
Ms. Mary McDaniel
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
8701 South Gessner, Suite 630
Houston, Texas 77074
Re: Notice of Hearing, Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC
CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Dear Mr. Weller and Ms. McDaniel:
In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, an informal hearing will be held regarding the Corrective
Action Order issued by the Office of Pipeline Safety in the above-referenced case. The hearing will
take place on March 21, 2018, beginning at 9:00 a.m. Central Time.
The hearing will be held at the PHMSA Southwest Region office, 8701 South Gessner, Suite 630,
Houston, TX 77074. Upon arrival at the building, attendees will be required to present photo
identification to security personnel. A contact phone number for the day of the hearing is
(713) 272-2859.
Both parties must submit and exchange any additional written materials they intend to present at
least 10 calendar days prior to the hearing (March 11, 2018), along with a list of attendees, and the
names of any witnesses who may testify. You may provide this information electronically. If you
have any questions, please contact me at (202) 366-6139 or at kristin.baldwin@dot.gov.



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Page 2
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
Kristin Baldwin
Presiding Official
cc (email): Mr. Adam Phillips, Counsel, Southwest Region, OPS
Ms. Lauren Clegg, Counsel, Southwest Region, OPS

420183001H_Corrective Action Order_02082018_text.pdf

February 8, 2018
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND EMAIL TO: (703) 375-6000
Mr. Douglas D. Shanda
President, Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC &
Senior Vice President, Operations, Cheniere Energy, Inc.
700 Milam Street
Suite 1900
Houston, TX 77002
CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Dear Mr. Shanda:
Enclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (CAO) issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), in the above-
referenced case. It requires Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, to take certain corrective actions with
respect to LNG tanks in the Sabine Pass Liquefaction Facility operating in Cameron Parish,
Louisiana, that experienced an LNG and natural gas release on January 22, 2018.
Service of this CAO is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Service of the CAO by
electronic transmission is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt,
or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are
effective upon completion of service.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure: CAO
cc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Mr. Frank Causey, Acting Region Director, Southwestern Region, OPS
Mr. Jack A. Fusco, President and Chief Executive Officer, Cheniere Energy, Inc.
Mr. Paul Nielson, Lead Advisor, Compliance, Cheniere Energy, Inc.



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
_______________________________________________
In the Matter of )
Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC,
a subsidiary of Cheniere Energy, Inc.,
)
)
)
)
Respondent. )
)
)
_______________________________________________ )
) CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
Purpose and Background:
This Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) is being issued under the authority of 49 U.S.C.
§ 60112 to require Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, a subsidiary of Cheniere Energy, Inc. (Sabine
or Respondent), to take the necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the
environment from potential hazards associated with the January 22, 2018 release from Tank S-
103 in the company’s Sabine Pass Liquefaction Facility (Sabine Pass Facility or Facility).1
On January 22, 2018, workers discovered a release of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is
natural gas having methane (CH4) as its major constituent and that is converted to a liquid (or
“cryogenic”) state of -260º F from Tank S-103. Tank S-103 experienced a release of LNG into
the annulus (i.e., the space between the inner and outer tank walls), which eventually caused
cracks in the outer tank wall and the pooling of LNG in the secondary containment area
surrounding the tank (Incident). Exposure of LNG to the carbon steel outer tank resulted in the
cooling of the outer tank wall to a temperature far below its design temperature of -25º F and the
formation of four separately-identifiable cracks. These cracks propagated to a length of
approximately one to six feet in length in a short amount of time.
After launching an investigation into the release, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), learned that Tank S-1012 had also
1 Tank S-103 is one of five operating LNG storage tanks at the Facility in Cameron Parish, Louisiana. The other
tanks (S-101 / S-102 / S-104 / S-105) are all designed to the same specifications. Tanks S-101, S-102 and S-103 were
manufactured by a different manufacturer than Tanks S-104 and S-105.
2 Tank S-102 has also experienced releases of LNG from the inner tank into the annular space, but Tank S-102 is
not included as one of the “Affected Tanks” described below.



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Page 2
experienced releases of LNG from the inner tank into the annular space. This raises the
possibility that the conditions which resulted in the Incident may be present in multiple tanks.
Sabine reported no injuries or fatalities as a result of the Incident, and there were no reported
fires or explosions. The cause of the Incident has not yet been determined. Pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), has initiated an investigation of the
Incident. The preliminary findings of the agency's ongoing investigation are as follows:
Preliminary Findings:
 Sabine owns and operates two major LNG terminals, i.e., the Sabine Pass Facility and
the Corpus Christi LNG Terminal. The Sabine Pass Facility is located on a site
consisting of more than 1,000 acres along the Sabine Pass River between Texas and
Louisiana in Cameron Parish, Louisiana. The nearest town is Johnson Bayou,
Louisiana. There are approximately 500 Sabine employees and contractors onsite to
support the Facility’s operations.
 There are two berths and five LNG storage tanks at the Facility. All five LNG
storage tanks were designed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI). Tanks S-
101, S-102, and S-103 were fabricated by Matrix Service, Inc., from 2005-2008 and
placed in service in 2008. Tanks S-104 and S-105 were fabricated by Zachry
Industrial, Inc., from 2006-2009 and placed in service in 2009. The Facility has been
used for import since 2008, and liquefaction capabilities have been going into service
for export since 2016.3 All tanks tie into an interconnected boil-off gas system.
 The Incident occurred in Tank S-103, one of the five on-site storage tanks that each
have 3.4 billion cubic feet equivalent capacity (Bcfe) for LNG (total of 17 Bcfe).
PHMSA was notified of the release of LNG from Tank S-103 via NRC Report No.
1202595, but only after PHMSA initiated its investigation into the release did
PHMSA learn that Tank S-101 had also experienced releases of LNG into its annular
space, and was actively leaking natural gas vapors at 14 sites along the base of the
tank. (Tank S-103 and Tank S-101 are referred to herein as the “Affected Tanks.”)
 On January 22, 2018, Sabine workers discovered a release of LNG from Tank S-103.
Tank S-103 experienced a release of LNG into the annulus and the LNG eventually
escaped through four separate cracks in the outer tank and pooled in the secondary
containment area surrounding the tank. Exposure of LNG to the carbon steel outer
tank resulted in cooling of the outer tank wall to a temperature far below its design
temperature of -25º F. These cracks propagated to a length of approximately one to
six feet in length in a short amount of time, because when steel fails at low
temperatures, it fails in a brittle manner. Brittle failures do not leak before failing so
there is no warning before failure.
3 See http://www.cheniere.com/terminals/sabine-pass/. Current as of 2/6/2018.



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Page 3
 Upon discovery of the Incident, Sabine isolated Tank S-103, commenced de-
inventorying of LNG from the tank, and lowered the pressure in the tank annulus and
boil-off gas system. The level of LNG in the inner tank is currently oscillating
between 1-3 feet to maintain the thermal condition needed for the inner nickel steel
tank which contains the LNG. The operator’s Emergency Management Team (EMT)
was deployed to control the access point to Tank S-103 around the clock. The EMT
has real-time monitoring and reporting for gas emissions, and is maintaining 24-hour
coverage around the containment dike. The area around Tank S-103 was roped-off to
limit potential ignition sources and the road closest to the tank was closed to vehicle
traffic. Sabine also notified the occupants of the adjacent property of the situation.
Sabine then issued “hot work” permits so that personnel could enter the area where
there are gas vapors to better assess the tank. The fire and water systems were not
activated. Other plant operations continue as normal.
 Both the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and PHMSA have
responded to the scene to assess the situation.
 The vertical through-wall cracks in approximately four separate areas on the carbon
steel outer shell of Tank S-103 were a result of the exposure of the outer wall to
liquid at temperatures significantly below the outer tank’s design temperature of -25º
F. However, the cause of the release of LNG into the annulus is unknown. No
external cracking was observed on any other tanks to date. To date, neither Tank S-
103 nor Tank S-101 has been completely removed from LNG service.
 After initiating its investigation, PHMSA received from Sabine a copy of a prior
investigative report that Sabine commissioned from Matrix and received in March
2017. That report documented 11 past upsets (dating from 2008-2016) on Tank S-103
and surmised that under certain flow conditions, when using the bottom fill line, LNG
might splash over the top of the inner tank into the annular space ("geyser-type
effect"). The operator has indicated that it believes this geyser-type effect also
occurred on Tank S-101, as both tanks are designed and operated in the same manner.
 Tanks S-104 & S-105 appear to be unaffected by the Incident on January 22, 2018 as
reported by the operator.
 Unintended releases of LNG are rare and are described as “low-frequency, high-
consequence” events.
 To date, Sabine has been unable to correct the long-standing safety concerns
described above involving the Affected Tanks, cannot validate the exact source or
amount of the LNG that may have leaked into the annulus of the Affected Tanks, and
cannot identify the circumstances that allowed the LNG to escape containment in the
first place. Unintentional release of LNG can result in a serious hazard to people and
property.



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Page 4
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:
Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action
Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,
which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,
testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the
determination that a pipeline facility is hazardous and requiring corrective action is set forth both
in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R.§ 190.233.
Section 60112, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, provide for the issuance of a
Corrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that
failure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property or the
environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable
after the issuance of the Order.
The Sabine Pass Facility is governed by Section 60101 of Title 49, United States Code, as
detailed in 49 C.F.R. Section 193.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact and considering the ongoing
investigation of the Incident, I find that the continued operation of the Affected Tanks without
corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property and the environment.
Additionally, after considering the presence of approximately 500 Sabine employees and
contractors onsite, the potential for disruption to major transportation modes (including highways
and waterways), the hazardous nature of the product being stored, the unpredictability of brittle
failures and ignition sources, the newly-discovered history (2008-2016) of similar problems that
have been present since the Facility came on-line, the uncertainties as to the cause of the
Incident, and the ongoing investigations to determine the cause of the Incident, I find that a
failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in
likely serious harm to life, property, and the environment.
Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued
without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are
effective upon receipt.
Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as
practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy
to the Director, Southwestern Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be
held telephonically or in-person in Houston, Texas, unless a different location is expressly
agreed to in writing by the Director.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may
identify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any
additional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider amending this Order. To
the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a
hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Page 5
Required Corrective Actions:
Definitions:
Affected Tanks – Means Respondent’s Tank S-103 and Tank S-101 and their Tank
Systems at the Facility.
Director – Means the Director, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
Office of Pipeline Safety, Southwest Region.
Remove from Service – Means to isolate and purge hydrocarbons so that the internal and
external environment is in such a state where inspection, assessment and remedial repair
work can safely occur.
Tank System – Means the tank system for each LNG tank at the Facility and includes the
nickel steel inner tank and the carbon steel outer tank and related facilities and
appurtenances.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, I hereby order Sabine to immediately take the following corrective
actions for the Affected Tanks:
1. Remove from Service: Within seven days following receipt of this Order, Sabine
must provide to the Director, for approval, a timeline and plan for removing the
Affected Tanks from service.
Work Plan: Within 30 days following receipt of this Order, Sabine must develop
and submit a detailed comprehensive work plan that includes tank-specific
purging plans, a root-cause analysis plan, a detailed repair and modification plan,
a continuing operation plan for facilities that remain in service, and a plan to
return the Affected Tanks to service (Work Plan). This plan must be submitted to
the Director for prior approval.
Qualified Independent Third-Parties: Sabine must engage the services of
qualified independent third-parties to assist in the development of the Work Plan
and to perform the work in the approved Work Plan. Sabine must submit the
proposed third-party experts and their qualifications to the Director for prior
concurrence. The third parties performing the work identified in the Work Plan
must provide all reports to the Director at the same time as they are provided to
Sabine.
Root Cause Failure Analysis: Within 120 days following receipt of this Order,
Sabine must complete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) that is facilitated and
validated by an independent third-party vendor acceptable to the Director. The
RCFA must document all contributory factors and the decision-making process.
Sabine must submit a final report of the RCFA to the Director, including any
2. 3. 4.



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Page 6
5. 6. lessons learned and whether the findings are applicable to other tanks within the
Facility.
Review of Other Tank Systems: Within 60 days of the completion of the final
RCFA, Sabine must evaluate Tank S-102, Tank S-104 and Tank S-105 and their
Tank Systems within the Facility to determine if they are subject to the same
causal factors identified in the RCFA. Sabine must document this evaluation,
describe what actions will be taken to address the results of the evaluation, and
submit the documentation to the Director. If the evaluation finds that the other
tanks are subject to the same causal factors, Sabine must explain how it will
ensure these other tanks are operated safely while they develop the Work Plan
under the requirements of #2 above.
Return to Service: Sabine may not return to service the Affected Tanks until
authorized to do so by the Director. Prior to returning the Affected Tanks to
service, Sabine must develop a fitness-for-service plan, that meets the
requirements of API RP 579-1 / ASME FFS-1, Fitness-For-Service (3rd edition),
issued in June 2016; complete all permanent repairs in accordance with 49 C.F.R.
§ 193.2617 and API Standard 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and
Reconstruction (5th edition), issued in November 2014; and complete all
recommendations from the RCFA.
Emergency Response Plan and Training Review. Sabine must review and
assess the effectiveness of its emergency response plan and emergency response
training with regards to the Incident. This must include on-scene response,
support, coordination, and communication with state and local emergency
responders and public officials. Sabine must amend its emergency response plan
and emergency training, if necessary, to reflect the results of this review. The
documentation of this review must be available for inspection by PHMSA or
provided to the Director, if requested.
Other Requirements:
8. Request for Information of Prior Known Events: Within 30 days following the
receipt of this Order, Sabine must provide the Director with all previous known
events in which any of Sabine’s tank systems at the Facility were operated outside
of design specifications and/or LNG has spilled into the annulus or vapor escaped
from the outer tank, including conditions that existed, actions taken to mitigate
events, all inspections and assessments performed to ensure the integrity of the
tanks after the events, and modifications that were made to prevent future
exceedances or incidents.
Reporting. Sabine must submit monthly reports to the Director that: (1) include
all available data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order;
and (2) describe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being
7. 9.



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Page 7
10. 11. 12. 13. undertaken. The first monthly report is due on March 15, 2018. The Director
may change the interval for the submission of these reports.
Documentation of Costs. It is requested, but not required, that Respondent
maintain documentation of the costs associated with implementation of this
Order. Sabine should include in each monthly report the to-date total costs
associated with: (1) physical changes to Sabine’s LNG tank system, including
repairs, replacements and other modifications; (2) preparation and revision of
procedures, studies and analyses; and (3) environmental remediation, if
applicable.
Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the
approval of the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the
submission; (b) approve the submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the
submission to cure any deficiencies; (d) disapprove, in whole or in part, the
submission, directing that Sabine modify the submission; or (e) any combination
of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon conditions, or modification
by the Director, Respondent will proceed to take all action required by the
submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves
all or any portion of the submission, Respondent will correct all deficiencies
within the time specified by the Director, and resubmit it for approval. If a
resubmitted item is disapproved in whole or in part, the Director may again
require Respondent to correct the deficiencies in accordance with the foregoing
procedure, and the Director may otherwise proceed to enforce the terms of this
Order.
Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance
with any of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted
demonstrating good cause for an extension.
Document Production. To expedite the review and assessment of relevant
documentation, Sabine must produce electronic versions (in their original format)
of any and all records requested by the Director and related to this CAO in a
physical medium, such CD-ROM, DVD, or flash drive, unless specifically asked
to do otherwise. Since FERC and PHMSA both have jurisdiction over the
Facility and are coordinating their investigations of the Incident, Sabine must
provide all such records to FERC simultaneously as they are provided to PHMSA.
Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you
must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information
qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Page 8
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to "CPF No. 4-2018-3001H” and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The
actions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to
Respondent's pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any other order
issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of
Federal or State law.
Respondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to
the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 60120.
The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R.
§ 190.5.
February 8, 2018
_________________________________ ________________________
Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

420183001H_PHC Consent Agreement And Order_04202018_text.pdf

VIA EMAIL AND CERTIFIED MAIL:
Mr. Douglas D. Shanda
President, Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC &
Senior Vice President, Operations, Cheniere Energy, Inc.
700 Milam Street, Suite 1900
Houston, Texas 77002
RE: In the Matter of Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC – CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Dear Mr. Shanda:
Enclosed please find the fully executed Consent Agreement and Order that resolves the issues
underlying the Corrective Action Order issued by PHMSA on February 8, 2018, in the above-
referenced proceeding. Service of the Consent Agreement and Order by email and certified mail
is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Mary McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, OPS
Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, Pipeline
Safety, OPS
Mr. Michael Weller, Senior Counsel, Cheniere Energy, Inc.



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
In the Matter of )
Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
a subsidiary of Cheniere Energy Partners, LP, )
Respondent. )
)
)
)
)
CONSENT AGREEMENT AND ORDER
On February 8, 2018, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R.
§ 190.233, to require Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, a subsidiary of Cheniere Energy Partners,
LP (Sabine or Respondent), to take the necessary corrective actions to protect the public,
property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with a release of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) from Tank S-103 at the company’s Sabine Pass Liquefaction Facility (Sabine
Pass Facility or Facility) that occurred on January 22, 2018.
On February 16, 2018, Sabine submitted to PHMSA a Request for Hearing and Statement
of Issues, challenging the terms, findings and determinations of the CAO. A Presiding Official
from PHMSA’s Office of Chief Counsel scheduled a hearing for March 21, 2018, in accordance
with 49 C.F.R. §§ 190.211 and 190.233(c).
On March 21, 2018, a hearing was held in Houston, Texas, at PHMSA’s Southwest
Region Office before the Presiding Official. Following the hearing, PHMSA and Sabine
(collectively, Parties) entered into discussions to potentially resolve the CAO through an
administrative consent agreement, thereby avoiding further administrative proceedings or
litigation, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 190. Accordingly, upon consent and agreement of the
Parties and in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.219, PHMSA and Sabine hereby agree to the
terms and conditions set forth in this Consent Agreement and Order (Agreement and Order) to
resolve the issues underlying the CAO and to replace and supersede the CAO, as provided in
Paragraph 10 below.
I. General Provisions
1. Respondent acknowledges that the Facility located in Cameron Parish, Louisiana,
is subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal pipeline safety laws, 49 U.S.C. 60101, et seq., and the
regulations and administrative orders issued thereunder. Respondent further acknowledges that
it received proper notice of PHMSA’s action in this proceeding and that the CAO states claims



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
Page 2
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60101, et seq., and the regulations and
orders issued thereunder.
2. Respondent agrees to complete the corrective actions specified in Section II of
this Agreement and Order (Corrective Measures) and to abide by the terms of this Agreement
and Order. This Agreement and Order does not constitute a finding of violation of any Federal
law or regulation and may not be used in any civil or administrative proceeding of any kind as
evidence or proof of any fact, fault or liability, or as evidence of the violation of any law, rule,
regulation or requirement, except in a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this Agreement
and Order.
3. Respondent consents to the issuance of this Agreement and Order, and hereby
waives any further procedural requirements with respect to its issuance. Respondent waives all
rights to contest the adequacy of notice, or the validity of this Agreement and Order, including
all rights to administrative or judicial hearings, reviews, or appeals.
4. This Agreement and Order shall apply to, and be binding upon, PHMSA and
Sabine, its officers, directors, and employees, and its successors, assigns, or other entities or
persons otherwise bound by law. Respondent agrees to provide a copy of this Agreement and
Order and any incorporated work plans and schedules to all of Sabine’s officers, employees, and
agents whose duties might reasonably include compliance with this Agreement and Order.
5. For any transfer of ownership or operating responsibility of the Sabine Facility
occurring during the term of this Agreement and Order, Respondent will provide a copy of this
document to the prospective transferee at least 30 days prior to such transfer and simultaneously
provide written notice of the prospective transfer to the PHMSA Southwest Region Director
(Director).
6. This Agreement and Order constitutes the final, complete and exclusive agreement
and understanding between the Parties with respect to the settlement embodied herein. The
Parties acknowledge that there are no representations, agreements, or understandings relating to
settlement other than those expressly contained in this Agreement and Order, except that the terms
of the CAO and the administrative case file may be used to construe the terms of this Agreement
and Order.
7. Nothing in this Agreement and Order affects or relieves Respondent of its
responsibility to comply with all applicable requirements of the Federal pipeline safety laws, 49
U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., and the regulations and orders issued thereunder. Nothing in this
Agreement and Order alters PHMSA’s right of access, entry, inspection, and information
gathering, or PHMSA’s authority to bring enforcement action(s) against Sabine pursuant to the
Federal pipeline safety laws, the regulations and orders issued thereunder, or any other provision
of Federal or State law, including additional enforcement action relating to the January 2018
release.
8. This Agreement and Order does not waive or modify any Federal, State, or local
law or regulation applicable to Respondent’s Facility. This Agreement and Order is not a permit,



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
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or a modification of any permit, under any Federal, State, or local laws or regulations. Sabine
remains responsible for achieving and maintaining compliance with all applicable Federal, State,
and local laws, regulations and permits.
9. This Agreement and Order does not create rights in, or grant any cause of action
to, any third party not party to this Agreement and Order. PHMSA is not liable for any injuries
or damages to persons or property arising from acts or omissions of Respondent or its officers,
employees, or agents carrying out the work required by this Agreement and Order. Sabine agrees
to hold harmless PHMSA, its officers, employees, agents, and representatives from any and all
causes of action arising from any acts or omissions of Respondent or its contractors in carrying
out any work required by this Agreement and Order.
10. in all respects.
Upon the Effective Date of this Agreement and Order, the Parties agree that the
CAO will be of no further force or effect and this Agreement and Order shall supersede the CAO
II. Corrective Measures
11. Definitions. For purposes of this Section II, the following definitions shall apply:
Removal from Service – Means the isolating and purging of hydrocarbons from an LNG tank so
that inspection, assessment and remedial repair work can safely occur.
Removed from Operation – Means to have removed an LNG tank from its commercial and
operational service.
Tank System – Means the tank system for each LNG tank at the Facility and includes the nickel
steel inner tank, the carbon steel outer tank, and related facilities.
12. Tank S-103.
i. Removal from Service: The Parties acknowledge that Sabine has removed Tank
S-103 from operation and provided to the Director an initial timeline and plan for removing Tank
S-103 from service to facilitate a full investigation. On April 12, 2018, the Director approved
Sabine’s LNG Tank S-103 Piping De-Inventory, Inerting and Isolation, Tank S-103 Warm-Up
Using Defrost Gas From Liquefaction, and Tank S-103 LNG Tank Hydrocarbon Freeing with
Nitrogen Plans.
ii. Work Plan: The Parties acknowledge that Sabine has submitted to the Director
for approval a work plan that includes a removal-from-service plan for Tank S-103 (including a
specific purging plan), a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) plan, a repair and modification plan,
and a plan to return Tank S-103 to operation (collectively, Tank S-103 Work Plan). The Director
shall promptly review the Tank S-103 Work Plan and either approve, reject, or request
modification of it in accordance with Paragraph 19 below, with the goal of allowing the orderly
commencement of the removal-from-service plan and for the return of Tank S-103 to operation
as soon as practicable. Any rejection or request for modification of the Tank S-103 Work Plan



CPF No. 4-2018-3001H
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shall be in writing and state with specificity the basis for the decision and the requirements to
secure approval of a revised Tank S-103 Work Plan.
iii. Return to Operation: Sabine may not return Tank S-103 to operation until
authorized to do so by the Director. Prior to returning Tank S-103 to operation, Sabine must
develop a fitness-for-service plan that meets the requirements of API RP 579-1 / ASME FFS-1,
Fitness-For-Service (3rd edition), issued in June 2016. All permanent repairs to Tank S-103 shall
be completed in manner consistent with 49 C.F.R. Part 193.
13. Tank S-101.
i. Submission and Approval of Tank S-101 Temporary Operations Plan: The
Parties acknowledge that Sabine has removed Tank S-101 from operation and must submit to
the Director for approval a Tank S-101 Temporary Operations Plan that includes, but is not
limited to, any measures already taken to allow for the safe operation of Tank S-101 in
accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 193, as follows: (1) resealing the annular plate of Tank S-101 in
accordance with relevant industry standards; (2) preparing a fitness-for-service plan that meets
the requirements of API RP 579-1 / ASME FFS-1, Fitness-For-Service (3rd edition), issued in
June 2016; (3) mechanically disabling the bottom-fill line valve; and (4) providing for the
monitoring of annular space temperatures set to alarm when conditions exceed Tank S-101’s
design parameters. The Director shall promptly review the Temporary Operations Plan and
either approve, reject, or request modification of it in accordance with Paragraph 19 below.
Sabine may not return Tank S-101 to operation until the Director approves the Temporary
Operations Plan.
ii. Evaluation of the RCFA and Submission and Approval of Tank S-101 Work
Plan: Within 60 days of the completion of the final RCFA under Paragraph 14 below, Sabine
must evaluate Tank S-101 to determine if Tank S-101 is subject to similar causal factors
identified for Tank S-103 in the RCFA and what factors have already been addressed for Tank
S-101 in the Temporary Operations Plan. Sabine must document this evaluation, describe what
actions it intends to take to address the results of the evaluation, and submit to the Director for
approval a proposed Tank S-101 Work Plan. The Tank S-101 Work Plan may include temporary
mitigation measures confirmed by a qualified independent third-party expert as being
appropriate to maintain Tank S-101 in safe operation pending implementation of the Tank S-101
Work Plan. The Tank S-101 Work Plan shall also include an evaluation of the cause of the
unexpected vapor seepage from the bottom of Tank S-101 and a repair plan, if required, that is
consistent with 49 C.F.R. Part 193 and relevant industry standards. The Director shall promptly
review the Tank S-101 Work Plan and either approve, reject, or request modification of it in
accordance with Paragraph 19 below. Any rejection or request for modification of the Tank S-
101 Work Plan shall be in writing and state with specificity the basis for the decision and the
requirements to secure approval of a revised Tank S-101 Work Plan.
14. Root Cause Failure Analysis: The Parties acknowledge that the RCFA
developed by a qualified independent third-party is currently underway. The scope of the RCFA
includes an assessment of all five LNG storage tanks at the Facility for similar events pertinent
to the causal factors of the incident on January 22, 2018. The RCFA shall be completed by May



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31, 2018, and shall document all contributory factors (including any pertinent operating
information from other tanks at the Sabine Pass Facility) and the report’s decision-making
process. Sabine must submit a final report of the RCFA to the Director and shall include any
recommendations and the applicability of the recommendations to the five LNG storage tanks
within the Facility.
15. Reporting and Review of Other Tank Systems. Commencing on the Effective
Date, Sabine shall promptly report to the Director any unanticipated or sustained operation of
the other tanks at the Facility (i.e., Tanks S-102, S-104, and S-105) outside their design
parameters. Within 120 days of the completion of the final RCFA on Tank S-103, Sabine must
evaluate Tanks S-102, Tank S-104, Tank S-105 and their associated Tank Systems, considering
the findings of the RCFA. Sabine must provide a copy of that evaluation to the Director.
16. Qualified Independent Third-Parties. Sabine must continue to engage the
services of qualified independent third-parties to assist in the development and performance of
the Tank S-103 Work Plan and the Tank S-101 Work Plan, except as otherwise specifically noted
in this Agreement and Order. Sabine must submit to the Director for prior concurrence the names
and qualifications of any proposed third-party experts that have not yet been
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