# TARGA NGL PIPE LINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 420185023
- **title:** TARGA NGL PIPE LINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2018-11-14
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.446(c)(4), 195.452(g), 195.452(j)(2), 195.452(k).
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420185023.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420185023.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420185023
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420185023
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving TARGA NGL PIPE LINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.446(c)(4),  195.452(g),  195.452(j)(2),  195.452(k). The case was opened on 2018-11-14 and is reported as closed as of 2021-12-07. Proposed civil penalty: $146,100. Assessed civil penalty: $146,100. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420185023_Closure Letter_12072021_(16-153611S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420185023/420185023_Closure%20Letter_12072021_(16-153611S).pdf

420185023_Closure Letter_12072021_(16-153611S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420185023/420185023_Closure%20Letter_12072021_(16-153611S)_text.pdf

420185023_Final Order_09112020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420185023/420185023_Final%20Order_09112020.pdf

420185023_Final Order_09112020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420185023/420185023_Final%20Order_09112020_text.pdf

420185023_NOPV PCP PCO_11142018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420185023/420185023_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_11142018.pdf

420185023_NOPV PCP PCO_11142018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420185023/420185023_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_11142018_text.pdf

420185023_Operator Request for Hearing and Statement of Issues_01312019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420185023/420185023_Operator%20Request%20for%20Hearing%20and%20Statement%20of%20Issues_01312019.pdf

420185023_Operator Response to Notice and Request for Hearing_01312019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420185023/420185023_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Request%20for%20Hearing_01312019.pdf

420185023_Final Order_09112020_text.pdf

September 11, 2020
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: bgrantham@targaresources.com
Mr. Bill Grantham
Vice President - Operations
Targa NGL Pipeline Company, LLC
811 Louisiana, Suite 2100
Houston, Texas 77002
Re: CPF No. 4-2018-5023
Dear Mr. Grantham:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, assesses a civil penalty of $146,100, and specifies actions that need to be taken by
Targa NGL Pipeline Company, LLC, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The
penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and
the terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region,
this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by electronic mail is effective
upon the date of transmission as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Mary L. McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
Mr. Matthew J. Meloy, Chief Executive Officer, Targa Resources Operating, LLC,
mmeloy@targaresources.com
Mr. Gregg Johnson, Director of Pipeline Compliance, Targa Resources Corporation,
gjohnson@targaresources.com
Ms. Julie Pabon, Senior Counsel, Targa Resources Corporation, jpabon@targaresources.com
CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
__________________________________________
In the Matter of )
Targa NGL Pipeline Company, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2018-5023
a subsidiary of Targa Resources Corporation, )
)
)
)
Respondent. )
__________________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
From June 13 through June 30, 2016, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of Targa NGL Pipeline Company, LLC’s
(Targa or Respondent) facilities and records pertaining to the company’s Product Pipeline
System, which includes a 12-inch natural gas liquids (NGL) pipeline running from Sulphur,
Louisiana, to Mont Belvieu, Texas, and a control room located in Hackberry, Louisiana.1 Targa
is a subsidiary of Targa Resources Corporation,2 which provides integrated midstream services
in North America.3
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated November 14, 2018, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the
Notice proposed finding that Targa had committed four violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and
proposed assessing a civil penalty of $146,100 for the alleged violations. The Notice also
proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.
After requesting and receiving an extension of time, Targa responded to the Notice by letter
dated January 31, 2019 (Response). Targa contested all of the allegations and requested a
hearing. Targa also requested an informal meeting with Southwest Region staff to resolve the
Notice. On April 3, 2019, Targa met with Southwest Region at Southwest Region’s Office in
1 See Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), (November 14, 2018) (on file with PHMSA), at 1.
2 Targa Resources Corporation, 10-K, 2019 Annual Report, filed February 20, 2020, available at
https://www.targaresources.com/sec-filings/sec-filing/10-k/0001564590-20-005598 (last accessed on September 2,
2020).
3 Targa Resources Corporation website, available at https://www.targaresources.com/about-us/overview (last
accessed on September 2, 2020).



CPF No. 4-2018-5023
Page 2
Houston, Texas, and as a result of these discussions, Targa withdrew its request for a hearing and
submitted a written response dated April 30, 2019.4 Accordingly, pursuant to 49 C.F.R.
§ 190.208, the submission of a written response authorizes the Associate Administrator to issue
this Final Order without further proceedings.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(c)(4), which states:
§ 195.446 Control room management.
(a) . . .
(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its
controllers with the information, tools, processes and procedures necessary
for the controllers to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has
defined by performing each of the following:
(1) . . .
(4) Test any backup SCADA systems at least once each calendar year,
but at intervals not to exceed 15 months; and . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(c)(4) by failing to test its
backup Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system in 2013, 2014, or 2015.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Targa had not performed the required test on its backup
SCADA system since the regulation first came into effect on August 1, 2012 (74 FR 63329).
During their inspection, OPS inspectors requested copies of any documentation demonstrating
that the tests had been performed on the backup SCADA system. Targa was unable to provide
any documentation indicating that it had performed such testing.
In its Response, Targa contested the alleged violation and requested that it be withdrawn. Targa
argued that it does not have a “backup SCADA system” and claimed that the at-issue server is
actually a “replacement server” located in the Hackberry Control Center, and does not meet the
Part 195 definition of a SCADA system.5 Targa explained that the at-issue server “is only one
part of the ‘computer-based system’ that Targa uses to perform [Control Room Management
(CRM)]-related functions, and Targa has tested all aspects of its primary SCADA system,
including the server, on an annual basis.”6 The company also claimed “that the replacement
server does not serve as a substitute for the primary SCADA system under any ordinary
understanding of the term ‘backup,’” but “simply provides Targa with the ability to continue
4 The Response also addressed a separate Notice of Amendment, CPF 4-2018-5024M, which was closed April 30,
2020.
5 See 49 C.F.R. § 195.2.
6 Response, at 3.



CPF No. 4-2018-5023
Page 3
operating the primary SCADA system if the primary server becomes unavailable.” It is for these
reasons that Targa contended that its CRM procedures “state that the Company does not have a
backup SCADA system.”7
Targa further argued that its replacement server is not part of an “independent or redundant
syste[m] that provide[s] similar functionality to the primary SCADA system,” as described in
PHMSA’s CRM Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) guidance.8 Specifically, Targa argued that
“[t]he replacement server does not operate independently from the primary SCADA system – it
only operates as part of and in conjunction with the primary system” and is “no different than
any other spare part or component that Targa keeps in stock for future use.”9
I disagree. First, I find that within Targa’s own argument against the “replacement server” being
a “back-up SCADA system,” the company has in fact described a SCADA system that serves the
purpose of a backup server. Part 195 defines the term “SCADA system” as a “computer-based
system or systems used by a controller in a control room that collects and displays information
about a pipeline facility and may have the ability to send commands back to the pipeline
facility,” but does not define the term “backup SCADA system.” See 49 C.F.R. § 195.2.
However, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “backup” as something “that serves as a
substitute or support.”10 In its Response, the company describes its “replacement server” as
allowing the primary SCADA system to continue to operate when the primary SCADA server
becomes unavailable.11 This description supports the plain language definitional meaning of
“backup.”
Second, I also find Targa’s assertion that its replacement server is not part of an “independent or
redundant syste[m] that provide[s] similar functionality to the primary SCADA system,” as
described in PHMSA’s CRM FAQs, to be misplaced.12 By its own admission, Targa has
described its replacement server as a redundant server. Targa specifically stated that the
replacement server “only operates as part of and in conjunction with the primary system,” and
“[i]n other words,…is no different than any other spare part or component that Targa keeps in
stock for potential future use.”13 Through this explanation, Targa has described the “replacement
server” as providing “similar functionality to the primary SCADA system” as described in
PHMSA’s CRM FAQs.14
7 Id.
8 PHMSA CRM FAQ C.08, available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/control-room-management/control-
room-management-faqs (last accessed on September 2, 2020).
9 Response, at 3.
10 https://www merriam-webster.com/dictionary/backup (last accessed on September 2, 2020).
11 Id.
12 PHMSA CRM FAQ C.08; and Response, at 3.
13 Response, at 3.
14 PHMSA CRM FAQ C.08.



CPF No. 4-2018-5023
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Third, Targa's own Lake Charles Area Hurricane Preparedness Plan states that its IT group must
“remove the back-up SCADA I/O server from the Hackberry and relocate it to the offsite control
room, at the Frac Plan, on standby” (emphasis added).15 Therefore, contrary to Targa’s
arguments, its own procedures refer to its “replacement server” as a backup SCADA server.
Notably, Targa does not contest the allegation that it failed to test its backup SCADA system, but
simply contests that it has a backup SCADA system. Given that I find Targa’s “replacement
server” to be a “backup SCADA system” for the foregoing reasons, I further find, after
considering all of the evidence, including the lack of documentation, that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.446(c)(4) by failing to test its backup SCADA system in 2013, 2014, and 2015.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(g), which states:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the
integrity of each pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator
must analyze all available information about the integrity of the entire
pipeline and the consequences of a failure. This information includes:
(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing,
damage due to excavation, including current and planned damage
prevention activities, and development or planned development along the
pipeline segment;
(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this
section;
(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests,
surveillance and patrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control
monitoring and cathodic protection surveys; and
(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence
area, such as location of the water intake.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(g) by failing to analyze all
available information about the integrity of Targa’s entire pipeline and the consequences of a
potential failure. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Targa was unable to provide any records
demonstrating that it had actually performed this type of information analysis to identify risks
relating to the integrity of its pipeline. Instead, Targa provided a single three-page document
from 2008 that was hand-labeled “2008 Risk Analysis” and that contained a list of variables and
codes that appear to have been part of some risk analysis process conducted that year. Based on
this information, the Notice alleged that Targa had failed to conduct an information analysis
about the integrity of the pipeline since 2008 that (1) integrated all relevant threats in Targa’s
risk model and risk ranking, including the results of integrity assessments, (2) compared how
threats had been eliminated and/or reduced from higher to lower risks during that period, and (3)
15 Violation Report, Exhibit A.



CPF No. 4-2018-5023
Page 5
showed a progression of the risk models over the last three years to ensure that new information
had been properly integrated into the risk models.
In its Response, Targa contested the allegation of violation, presenting several arguments why it
believed that it had complied with § 195.452(g). First, it contended that paragraph (g) “identifies
four broad categories of information and data that an operator must consider” in meeting its
obligation to conduct an information analysis and argued that the Notice did not allege a failure
to analyze any of those four categories.16 Instead, Targa contended that the allegations all related
to the sufficiency of Targa’s process for conducting periodic evaluations and assessments of
pipeline integrity, and that the obligation to conduct evaluations and assessments actually fell
under a different integrity management (IM) regulation, § 195.452(j). Second, Targa argued that
none of the evidence in the record shows that Targa failed to comply with § 195.452(g). The
2011 events cited in the Violation Report17 were purportedly outside the five-year statute of
limitations and, therefore, could not be relied upon as evidence to substantiate the alleged
violation. According to Targa, the only event cited in the Violation Report that occurred within
the five-year statute of limitations was a 2015 pipeline modification project for the removal of an
above-ground casing, which did not constitute a repair, but, rather, was aimed at reducing the
likelihood of atmospheric corrosion or third-party damage and was therefore unrelated to the
requirements of § 195.452(g).18
Third, Targa contended that it had provided OPS with evidence indicating that it had analyzed
“integrity-related information” by producing certain reports for the company’s Risk Management
and Insurance Department. Targa stated that it had also “analyzed integrity-related information
in completing a risk analysis in accordance with § 195.452(e) to establish an integrity assessment
schedule, address integrity issues, and identify additional [preventive and mitigative (P&M)]
measures.”19
I find Targa’s arguments to be unpersuasive. First, it appears that Targa is misinterpreting the
alleged violation and, consequently, conflating the obligations of §§ 195.452(g) and 195.452(j).
Section 195.452(g) requires an operator to conduct a discrete analysis that integrates all available
information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure, while
§ 195.452(j) requires an operator to continue to assess and periodically evaluate its line pipe
segments to maintain their integrity. Specifically, under § 195.452(g), the term “information
analysis” constitutes a defined process that serves as the fundamental mechanism for assembling
and analyzing the broadest possible range of available information about the integrity of a
pipeline and using that information to evaluate periodically the condition or integrity of each
pipeline segment under paragraph (j). An adequate information analysis is not just a collection
of data but an actual analysis of that data in a coherent and integrated manner. Paragraph (g) lists
16 Response, at 6.
17 Violation Report, at 12.
18 Response, at 6.
19 Id., at 6-7.



CPF No. 4-2018-5023
Page 6
examples of the types of information that must be included in this data-gathering process and
includes such things as damage prevention data, in-line inspection (ILI) data, patrolling data,
cathodic protection surveys, and information related to the potential consequences of a pipeline
failure within a High Consequence Area (HCA). Here, the alleged violation relates to Targa’s
failure to conduct an analysis of all available information, such as third-party damage incidents,
hydrotest ruptures, and the discovery of hook cracks on longitudinal seam welds in 2011,20 as
required by § 195.452(g).
Second, regarding the contention that there is no evidence in the record to support an alleged
violation of § 195.452(g), that is exactly the basis for the allegation. Targa was unable to
provide any documentation or other evidence to demonstrate how it had complied with
§ 195.452(g), given the events and new information that had arisen since 2008. Therefore, the
very lack of evidence demonstrating that it had performed an information analysis since 2008
supports a finding of violation. Third, Targa claims that it had provided OPS with reports that it
had submitted to its Risk Management and Insurance Department, yet it is unclear what reports
Targa is referring to nor is there any evidence of any such reports in the record. Finally, I find
that Targa’s statute of limitation argument lacks merit. Section 195.452(g) creates an on-going
obligation for operators to analyze all available information about the integrity of the entire
pipeline and the consequences of a failure. The failure of Targa to perform any information
analysis since 2008, especially in light of the events that occurred in 2011 and 2015 and should
have triggered an information analysis, provides further indication that Respondent did not
comply with § 195.452(g).
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, including the lack of documentation
demonstrating compliance, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(g) by failing to
analyze all available information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences
of a failure.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2), which states:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to
maintain a pipeline's integrity? –
(1) . . .
(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as
frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the
frequency of evaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the
factors specified in paragraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must
consider the results of the baseline and periodic integrity assessments,
information analysis (paragraph (g) of this section), and decisions about
remediation, and preventive and mitigative actions (paragraphs (h) and (i)
of this section).
20 Violation Report at 12.



CPF No. 4-2018-5023
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The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2) by failing to conduct
periodic evaluations and failing to set a frequency for periodic evaluations to be performed on a
consistent basis to ensure pipeline integrity. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Targa was
unable to provide PHMSA inspectors with copies of any periodic evaluations that had been
performed. The Notice further alleged that Targa’s Manager of Regulatory Compliance stated to
the PHMSA inspectors that he did not believe that several of the risk factors identified on its
pipeline were significant enough to warrant a periodic evaluation. Finally, the Notice also
identified the following four instances of integrity issues for which there was no documentation
of an evaluation having been performed or being included in any evaluation: (1) a safety-related
condition report about third-party damage that occurred in 2011 and resulted in the replacement
of over 820 feet of pipe; (2) multiple ruptures as a result of a 2011 hydro-test; (3) the 2011
discovery of hook cracks on longitudinal seam welds; and (4) several other pipeline
modifications/repairs in each of 2011 and 2015.
In its Response, Targa contested the alleged violation and requested that it be withdrawn. Targa
argued that the evidence shows that it met the requirements of § 195.452(j)(2) and “that any
shortcomings that may exist relate solely to maintaining appropriate documentation.”21
Specifically, Targa claimed that its Integrity Management Plan (IMP) included a process for
performing periodic pipeline integrity evaluations, and that the frequency of such evaluations
was dependent on changes in specific risk factors.22 The company further argued that OPS’
interpretation of § 195.452(j) in the Notice was “flawed” and “overbroad and unduly
burdensome.”23
In particular, Targa contended that there is nothing in the IM regulations that would require
Targa to perform a periodic evaluation when the above-cited events occurred, including ones that
fall outside the five-year statute of limitations. Targa claimed that it followed it IMP and
satisfied the requirements of § 195.452(j)(2) when it conducted “periodic evaluations in
connection with reports submitted to its Risk Management and Insurance Department, including
results of integrity assessments, information analyses, remediation measures, and [preventive and
mitigative (P&M)] measures.”24 Finally, Targa reiterated its statute of limitations argument for a
majority of the evidence used to support the alleged violation, and further claimed that the 2015
pipeline modification project mentioned in the Notice, which falls within the five-year statute of
limitations, would not have warranted a periodic pipeline integrity evaluation.
I am unpersuaded by Targa’s arguments. Section 195.452(j)(2) requires operators to conduct
periodic evaluations “as frequently as needed” to ensure pipeline integrity. While the Notice
identified four specific instances when such evaluations should have been completed, there is no
evidence that Targa conducted any periodic assessments and evaluations in order to maintain the
integrity of its pipeline. Therefore, Targa cannot substantiate its claim that it completed periodic
21 Response, at 9.
22 Id.
23 Response, at 10.
24 Id.



CPF No. 4-2018-5023
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evaluations and made appropriate changes to the assessment method and schedule based on
changes in identified risk factors.
As for the argument that Targa satisfied the requirements of § 195.452(j)(2) by conducting
periodic evaluations in connection with reports submitted to its Risk Management and Insurance
Department, again it is unclear what reports Targa is referring to, plus there is no evidence of
these reports anywhere in the record. Furthermore, Targa’s claim that this alleged violation is
barred due to the statute of limitations is unfounded. As discussed for Item 2 above, the
obligation for operators to conduct periodic evaluations is on-going and covers risk factors that
are not tied to a single fixed date but are continuing in nature.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, including the lack of documentation
demonstrating compliance, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2) by failing
to conduct periodic evaluations and failing to set a frequency for periodic evaluations to be
performed on a consistent basis to ensure pipeline integrity.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(k), which states:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(k) What methods to measure program effectiveness must be used? An
operator's program must include methods to measure whether the program
is effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline
segment and in protecting the high consequence areas. See Appendix C of
this part for guidance on methods that can be used to evaluate a program's
effectiveness.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(k) by failing to measure the
effectiveness of its IMP in order to protect HCAs. Specifically, the Notice provided the
following examples to support its allegation that Targa failed to measure the effectiveness of its
IMP: (1) the metrics in Targa’s IMP did not consider measures that reflect the effectiveness of
existing P&M measures; (2) the failure to identify deficiencies that were indicative of
programmatic breakdowns in Targa’s IMP; and (3) the failure to provide evidence of feedback
on corrective action programs, P&M measure decisions, and the threat and risk analysis
process.25
In its Response, Targa contested this alleged violation and requested that it be withdrawn. Targa
argued that § 195.452(k) is a performance-based regulation that provides operators with the
ability “to determine how best to comply with the requirements given their unique pipeline
25 See Appendix C of Part 195, Section V, Methods to measure performance, and API 1160, Managing System
Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, for examples of metrics that operators can utilize to measure performance
under § 195.452(k). For examples of published final orders applying paragraph (k), see
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Hazardous Liquid IM Enforcement Guidance 12 7 2
015.pdf, at 145-147.



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systems.”26 Targa argued that that there are no prescriptive requirements in § 195.452(k), but,
rather, minimum methods of measuring IMP program effectiveness. In this case, Targa claimed
that the evidence shows that it satisfied that requirement and “that any shortcomings in the
program relate solely to maintain adequate documentation.”27 To support its claim, Targa
explained that its “IMP provides the metrics used to evaluate the company’s IMP at section 8,”
and that it “updates its performance metrics on an annual basis.”28 Targa further stated that it
“applies these performance metrics in completing a report submitted to Targa’s Risk
Management and Insurance Department.”29 The company explained that this report is then used
by management to assess the performance of its IMP and improve it as necessary. Finally, Targa
claimed its performance metrics demonstrated that its IMP is effective because the metrics allow
for tracking of integrity issues.
Once again, I am unpersuaded by Targa’s arguments. While Respondent is correct that
§ 195.452(k) is a performance-based regulation, there is no evidence that Targa either complied
with the requirements of § 195.452(k) or followed its own IMP, as described in its Response.
Specifically, Targa has presented no evidence to support its argument that it actually utilized the
metrics it had established to conduct reviews of its IMP effectiveness. The company claims that
Section 8 of its IMP provides the metrics that it uses for program evaluation but presented no
evidence that such evaluations were actually conducted or what were the results of those
evaluations. It claimed that its performance metrics were updated on an annual basis, but did not
submit any of them for the record. It claimed that these metrics were applied in reports
submitted to its Risk Management and Insurance Department, but submitted no copies of those
reports as part of this proceeding. It claimed that these reports were then used by its
management to assess the performance of its IMP and improve the IMP as necessary, but
submitted no such reports into evidence. Finally, the company argued that “any shortcomings in
the program relate solely to maintaining adequate documentation.”30 However, Targa failed to
present any other proof, parole or otherwise, to show that these program evaluations actually
took place. In short, it appears that Targa had a whole program on paper to measure program
effectiveness but no evidence that it actually performed such evaluations.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Targa violated § 195.452(k) by
failing to measure whether its IMP was effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity of each
pipeline segment and in protecting HCAs.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
action taken against Respondent.
26 Response, at 12.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.



CPF No. 4-2018-5023
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ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed
$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any
related series of violations.31 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.
§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,
circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the
degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that
the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent
in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the
economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent
damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil
penalty of $146,100 for the violations cited above.
Item 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $38,100 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.446(c), for failing to test its backup SCADA system in 2013, 2014, and 2015. In its
Response, Targa requested that the proposed civil penalty associated with Item 2 be reduced or
withdrawn should PHMSA find that Respondent violated § 195.446(c). Targa contended that
OPS had incorrectly assessed the gravity of the violation by selecting the criterion that stated
“[p]ipeline safety or integrity was compromised in an HCA or an HCA ‘could affect’ segment.”
Targa argued that pipeline safety would only be minimally affected by a failure to conduct
annual testing of a backup SCADA system, and that the control room regulations are not
specifically linked to HCA segments. The company further argued that there is no evidence in
the record that “Targa’s failure to treat the replacement server as a backup SCADA system
compromised the integrity of any HCA segments.”32 Additionally, Targa argued that it was not
afforded “a good faith credit for reasonably interpreting the regulation as not applying to a
replacement server for SCADA system.”33 Further, Targa argued that OPS’ interpretation was
inconsistent with the “text, structure, and history of § 195.446(c), and the CRM FAQs do not
provide Targa with fair notice of PHMSA’s contrary position prior to the inspection.”34 For the
reasons detailed below, I am not persuaded that either elimination or reduction of the proposed
penalty is warranted.
First, OPS is correct in its assertion that more than half of Targa’s pipeline system is located in
HCAs.35 A failure to test a backup SCADA system, whose purpose is to collect and display
information about a pipeline facility located in an HCA and to send commands back to that
31 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223.
32 Response, at 4.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Hazardous Liquid Annual Data – 2010 to Present, Targa NGL Pipe Line Company (OPID 30626), available at
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/gas-distribution-gas-gathering-gas-transmission-hazardous-
liquids (last accessed on August 27, 2020).



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facility, inherently compromises the integrity of such facilities by increasing the likelihood of a
release in an environmentally sensitive area. Since the company presented no evidence that it
tested its backup SCADA system at the required annual interval, there is no indication whether
the backup SCADA system would have properly worked if Targa’s SCADA system had failed.
Furthermore, the fact that § 195.446(c) is not specifically tied to an HCA requirement, unlike the
IM regulations, is insufficient to support the argument that pipeline safety was only minimally
impacted. Therefore, I find that the violation compromised pipeline safety in an HCA, and thus,
the violation was properly assessed under the “Gravity” criterion.
I also find Targa’s request for a “good faith” credit to be unjustified. Targa’s own Lake Charles
Area Hurricane Preparedness Plan labeled the system in the Hackberry Control Center as a
“backup server.” Pursuant to its own procedures, Targa had an obligation to test the at-issue
server at the required intervals, based on the plain language of §195.446(c). Additionally, as
discussed above in the “Findings of Violation” section, Targa’s own interpretation of a “backup
SCADA system” is inconsistent with the Part 195 definition of a “SCADA system,” the plain
language meaning of “backup,” and PHMSA’s published CRM FAQs. As such, a “good faith”
credit should not be given on this basis, nor is there any merit in the company’s fair notice
argument as the company’s own designation or description of its backup system is consistent
with the plain-language reading of the regulation. I therefore find Targa’s interpretation of the
requirement of § 195.446(c) to be unreasonable and that the company failed to provide a credible
justification for its lack of compliance. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered
the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $38,100 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.446(c).
Item 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $36,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.452(g), for failing to analyze all available information about the integrity of the entire
pipeline and the consequences of a failure. In its Response, Targa requested that the proposed
civil penalty associated with Item 2 be reduced or eliminated should PHMSA decline to
withdraw the alleged violation. Targa argued that, “[a]t best, the record shows that Targa failed
to properly document the results of its information analysis,” and, thus, OPS selected the wrong
penalty criterion under the “Part E5 – Nature” section of the Violation Report.36 Targa also
argued that the alleged violation had a minimal impact on pipeline safety because the evidence
that OPS relied upon was either “legally irrelevant, relates to events that occurred outside the
five-year statute of limitations period, or [was] contradicted by other evidence submitted by
Targa.”37 Finally, the company argued that it should be awarded a “good faith” credit for the
company’s reasonable interpretation of § 195.452(g). Targa specifically argued that there was
no indication in the regulatory text that the company was required “to conduct risk comparison
studies or analyze progressions of risk models to conduct information analysis.” On the contrary,
it argued that its understanding that such actions were not necessary reflected “a reasonable
understanding of the regulation.”38 For the reasons detailed below, I am not persuaded that
either elimination or reduction of the proposed penalty is warranted.
36 Response, at 7.
37 Id.
38 Id.



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As discussed above in the “Findings of Violation” section, Targa failed to provide PHMSA with
any documentation showing that the company actually conducted an analysis of all available
information about the integrity of its pipeline and the consequences of a failure, as required by
§ 195.452(g). The record also does not support Targa’s claim that this alleged violation is
merely a records violation. On the contrary, the violation relates to Targa’s failure to perform a
required activity, which, in this case, was an analysis of all available information. Therefore, I
find that this violation is not simply a records violation, but, instead, an activities violation as
correctly selected under the “Nature” criterion in the Violation Report.
I also do not accept Targa’s argument that pipeline safety was minimally impacted. Targa failed
to conduct an analysis of information about the integrity of its entire pipeline system, and as
such, the entirety of Targa’s pipeline system located in HCAs was compromised by Targa’s
failure to evaluate the consequences of a failure, as required by § 195.452(g). The evidence in
the record, including the lack of documentation showing that Targa performed the required
analysis, supports OPS' assertion that pipeline safety or integrity was compromised in an HCA.
Therefore, I find that the violation was properly assessed under the “Gravity” criterion.
Finally, while Targa is correct that “risk comparison studies” and “progressions of risk models to
conduct information analysis” are not specifically delineated in the text of § 195.452(g), its
argument that it did not understand the aforementioned actions to be necessary for compliance is
misplaced. The Notice provides these actions as simply examples of the types of measures that
an operator must take to demonstrate compliance with this performance-based regulation. So
even though Targa may not have performed a risk comparison study or analysis of risk model
progression, it does not negate the above finding of violation, which is based on Targa’s lack of
any discernible action to analyze and integrate all available information about the integrity of the
pipeline and the consequence of a failure. I therefore find that Targa has provided no reasonable
interpretation or credible justification for its failure to comply with § 195.452(g), and that
elimination or reduction of the penalty under good faith is not warranted.
Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess
Respondent a civil penalty of $36,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(g).
Item 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $36,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.452(j)(2), for failing to conduct periodic evaluations and to set a frequency for when
periodic evaluations are to be performed on a consistent basis to ensure pipeline integrity. In its
Response, Targa requested that the proposed civil penalty associated with Item 3 be reduced or
eliminated should PHMSA decline to withdraw the alleged violation. Targa argued that “[a]t
best, the nature of the probable violation [is] missing or incomplete records documenting the
results of Targa’s periodic evaluations” after determining that one was not necessary.39 The
company also argued that the alleged violation had a minimal impact on pipeline safety because
“the gravity of the alleged violation is limited to records only.”40 
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