{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420191002W","title":"EAGLE US 2 LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2019-02-13","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 191.29, 192.605(a), 192.909(a), 192.917(b), 192.935(c), 192.945(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420191002w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420191002w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420191002w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420191002W","body":"Warning Letter involving EAGLE US 2 LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 191.29,  192.605(a),  192.909(a),  192.917(b),  192.935(c),  192.945(a). The case was opened on 2019-02-13 and is reported as closed as of 2019-02-13. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420191002W_Warning Letter_02132019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191002W/420191002W_Warning%20Letter_02132019.pdf\n\n420191002W_Warning Letter_02132019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191002W/420191002W_Warning%20Letter_02132019_text.pdf\n\n420191002W_Warning Letter_02132019_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 13, 2019\nAndrew Kenner\nVice President of Manufacturing\nEagle US 2 LLC\n2801 Post Oak Blvd.\nHouston, Texas 77056\nCPF 4-2019-1002W\nDear Mr. Kenner:\nOn August 14 – 18, 2017; December 4 – 8, 2017; and January 30 – February 2, 2018, a\nrepresentative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office\nof Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) inspected\nyour Eagle US 2 LLC (Eagle), LA-TX Ethylene Pipeline in Lake Charles, Louisiana and Orange,\nTexas.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n1. §191.29 National Pipeline Mapping System.\n(a) Each operator of a gas transmission pipeline or liquefied natural gas facility must\nprovide the following geospatial data to PHMSA for that pipeline or facility:\n(b) The information required in paragraph (a) of this section must be submitted each\nyear, on or before March 15, representing assets as of December 31 of the previous\nyear. If no changes have occurred since the previous year's submission, the operator\nmust comply with the guidance provided in the NPMS Operator Standards manual\navailable at www.npms.phmsa.dot.gov or contact the PHMSA Geographic\nInformation Systems Manager at (202) 366-4595.\n\n\n\nEagle failed to submit the NPMS information required by §191.29(a) on or before March 15\nrepresenting its assets as of December 31 of the previous year.\nSpecifically, in 2016 Eagle failed to submit geospatial data, attributes, metadata and a transmittal letter\nappropriate for use in the National Pipeline Mapping System NPMS in a timely manner. Eagle\nsubmitted their NPMS update on September 21, 2016, which was 191 days after the deadline.\n2. §192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities and for\nemergency response. For transmission lines, the manual must also include\nprocedures for handling abnormal operations. This manual must be reviewed and\nupdated by the operator at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each\ncalendar year. This manual must be prepared before operations of a pipeline system\ncommence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations where\noperations and maintenance activities are conducted.\nEagle failed to ensure their maps and manual of written procedures for conducting operations and\nmaintenance activities and for emergency response are readily available to appropriate operating,\nmaintenance, and emergency response personnel.\nAt the time of inspection, the PHMSA inspector observed one of the two field technicians for LA-\nTX Ethylene pipeline struggling to retrieve the Operations, Maintenance, and Emergency (OME)\nResponse Manual (dated 2015) from his work laptop without coaching from his supervisor. The\nfield tech stated he relied on the hard copy located in his company truck (dated 2014). The current\nOME manual used during this inspection had a revision date of November 9, 2017.\n3. §192.909 How can an operator change its integrity management program?\n(a) General. An operator must document any change to its program and the reasons\nfor the change before implementing the change. (b) Notification. An operator must\nnotify OPS, in accordance with §192.949, of any change to the program that may\nsubstantially affect the program's implementation or may significantly modify the\nprogram or schedule for carrying out the program elements. An operator must also\nnotify a State or local pipeline safety authority when either a covered segment is\nlocated in a State where OPS has an interstate agent agreement, or an intrastate\ncovered segment is regulated by that State. An operator must provide the notification\nwithin 30 days after adopting this type of change into its program.\n2\n\n\n\nEagle failed to follow procedure #2305-IM-1000, revision date 1/15/18 Section 43.0 – 45.0\nregarding Management of Change, notifications, and significant changes which requires Eagle to\ndefine a “significant change”, document the reason for changes along with management authority\nfor approving changes, as well as notifying PHMSA and appropriate state agencies as necessary.\nEagle failed to notify PHMSA within 30 days of adopting changes to their IMP that substantially\naffected the program's implementation or significantly modify the program or schedule for\ncarrying out the program elements. Eagle revamped their risk model and switched from method\n1 HCA determination to method 2 in 2015. Subsequently, as a result of this inspection, on\nDecember 8, 2017 Eagle submitted a notification of change to PHMSA and initiated the MOC\nprocess.\n4. §192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline integrity and use\nthe threat identification in its integrity program?\n(b) Data gathering and integration. To identify and evaluate the potential threats to\na covered pipeline segment, an operator must gather and integrate existing data and\ninformation on the entire pipeline that could be relevant to the covered segment. In\nperforming this data gathering and integration, an operator must follow the\nrequirements in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 4. At a minimum, an operator must\ngather and evaluate the set of data specified in Appendix A to ASME/ANSI B31.8S,\nand consider both on the covered segment and similar non-covered segments, past\nincident history, corrosion control records, continuing surveillance records,\npatrolling records, maintenance history, internal inspection records and all other\nconditions specific to each pipeline.\nEagle failed to develop a process to gather data and integrate existing data to identify and evaluate\npotential threats on covered segments and similar non-covered segments.\nEagle’s Integrity Management Program (IMP), document #2305-IM-1000, revision date 1/15/18,\nSection 18 Threat Identification and Risk Evaluation refers to procedure 2305-IM-C201,\nGathering Data for Threats and Risk however at the time of inspection this procedure was not\nprovided.\nEagle does not have a process describing the requirements of data gathering and integrating\ninformation for LA-TX Ethylene pipeline.\n5. §192.935 What additional preventive and mitigative measures must an operator\ntake?\n(c) Automatic shut-off valves (ASV) or Remote-control valves (RCV). If an operator\ndetermines, based on a risk analysis, that an ASV or RCV would be an efficient means\n3\n\n\n\nof adding protection to a high consequence area in the event of a gas release, an\noperator must install the ASV or RCV. In making that determination, an operator\nmust, at least, consider the following factors--swiftness of leak detection and pipe\nshutdown capabilities, the type of gas being transported, operating pressure, the rate\nof potential release, pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, and location of nearest\nresponse personnel.\nDuring the inspection, the PHMSA inspector found that Eagle did not conduct an analysis which\nconsiders the swiftness of leak detection and pipe shutdown capabilities, the type of gas being\ntransported, operating pressure, the rate of potential release, pipeline profile, the potential for\nignition, and location of nearest response personnel.\nEagle’s IMP manual, document #2305-IM-1000, revision date 1/15/18, Section 33.4 ASV’s /\nRCV’s states:\n“33.4.1 Westlake’s currently uses Remote Control Valves (RCVs) where they have been\ndetermined to be needed. Pipelines can be isolated at the supply in cases of leak or over-pressure.\nThe need for additional RCV’s is considered along with other P&M’s during the P&M Annual\nReview.\n33.4.2 Westlake considered the following factors if it is determined that installing an Automatic\nShutoff Valve (ASV) or RCV would be an effective way to protect a high consequence area against\na gas release:\n• Swiftness of leak detection\n• Pipe shutdown capabilities\n• Type of gas being transported\n• Operating pressure\n• Rate of potential release\n• Pipeline profile\n• Potential for ignition\n• Location of nearest response personnel”\nAt the time of inspection Eagle could not provide the analysis where they considered the need for\nASV or RCV to determine if additional ASV or RCV would add protection to potentially affected\nhigh consequence areas.\n6. §192.945 What methods must an operator use to measure program effectiveness?\n(a) General. An operator must include in its integrity management program methods\nto measure whether the program is effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity\nof each covered pipeline segment and in protecting the high consequence areas.\nThese measures must include the four overall performance measures specified in\n4\n\n\n\nASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see §192.7 of this part), section 9.4,\nand the specific measures for each identified threat specified in ASME/ANSI B31.8S,\nAppendix A. An operator must submit the four overall performance measures as\npart of the annual report required by §191.17 of this subchapter.\nEagle has failed to adequately demonstrate the effectiveness of their integrity management\nprogram. In assessing and evaluating the integrity of its LA-TX Ethylene pipeline and in\nprotecting HCAs, Eagle did not demonstrate that periodic self-assessments, internal and/or\nexternal audits, management reviews, or other evaluations to measure program effectiveness were\nperformed.\nEagle did not demonstrate that its IMP effectiveness performance measures were trended over time\nor an analysis of these trends.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$213,268 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,132,679 for a related\nseries of violations. For violation occurring on or after November 2, 2015 and before November\n27, 2018, the maximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per violation per day, with a maximum\npenalty not to exceed $2,090,022. For violations occurring prior to November 2, 2015, the\nmaximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to\nexceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and\nsupporting documents involved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional\nenforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the\nitems identified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in Eagle US 2, LLC being subject to\nadditional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer to\nCPF 4-2019-1002W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement\naction is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your\nresponsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the\ncomplete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions\nyou believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the\nredacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nSincerely,\nMary L. McDaniel, P.E.\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n5","truncated":false,"body_characters":12187}