{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 420191004","title":"TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP) — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2019-03-05","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.463(a), 192.706(a), 192.911(l), 192.917(b), 192.917(c), 192.935(a), 192.935(c).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420191004.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420191004.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420191004","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420191004","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP). PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.463(a),  192.706(a),  192.911(l),  192.917(b),  192.917(c),  192.935(a),  192.935(c). The case was opened on 2019-03-05 and is reported as closed as of 2021-01-04. Proposed civil penalty: $75,600. Assessed civil penalty: $75,600. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n420191004_Closure Letter_01042021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Closure%20Letter_01042021.pdf\n\n420191004_Closure Letter_01042021_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Closure%20Letter_01042021_text.pdf\n\n420191004_Final Order_08092019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Final%20Order_08092019.pdf\n\n420191004_Final Order_08092019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Final%20Order_08092019_text.pdf\n\n420191004_NOPV PCP PCO_03052019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03052019.pdf\n\n420191004_NOPV PCP PCO_03052019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03052019_text.pdf\n\n420191004_Operator Response to Notice and Request for Time Extension_04042019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Request%20for%20Time%20Extension_04042019.pdf\n\n420191004_Closure Letter_01042021_text.pdf\n\nELECTRONIC MAIL\nJanuary 4, 2021\nWilliam T. Yardley\nExecutive Vice President and President\nGas Transmission and Midstream\nEnbridge Inc.\n1100 Louisiana Street, Suite 300\nHouston, Texas 77002\nRE: CPF 4-2019-1004\nDear Mr. Yardley:\nOn August 9, 2019, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued\na Final Order in the above-referenced case that included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty to\nTexas Eastern Transmission LP/Spectra Energy Partners (TETLP), a subsidiary of Enbridge Inc.\n(Enbridge). Based on the review of the documentation provided on December 29, 2020, and\nconfirmation of payment of the civil penalty paid on October 18, 2019, it has been determined that\nyou have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nMary L. McDaniel, P.E.\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Nathan Atanu, Manager, Operational Compliance, Nathan.Atanu@enbridge.com\nMichel Harradence, VP Gas Transmission & Midstream Operations,\nMichele.harradence@enbridge.com\n\n420191004_Final Order_08092019_text.pdf\n\nAugust 9, 2019\nMr. William Yardley\nExecutive Vice President and President\nGas Transmission and Midstream\nEnbridge Inc.\n5400 Westheimer Court\nHouston, Texas 77056\nRe: CPF No. 4-2019-1004\nDear Mr. Yardley:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case to your subsidiary,\nTexas Eastern Transmission, LP. It makes findings of violation, assesses a civil penalty of\n$75,600, and specifies actions that need to be taken to comply with the pipeline safety\nregulations. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty\nhas been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director,\nSouthwest Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by\ncertified mail is effective upon the date of mailing, as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Mary McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMs. Michele Harradence, Senior Vice President, Gas Transmission & Midstream\nOperations, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, 5400 Westheimer Court, Houston,\nTexas 77056\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nTexas Eastern Transmission, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2019-1004\na subsidiary of Enbridge Inc., )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom March 27 through December 13, 2018, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Texas\nEastern Transmission, LP/Spectra Energy Partners (TETLP or Respondent), in Texas, Louisiana,\nArkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio. In February 2017, Enbridge and Spectra\nannounced a merger and on December 18, 2018, it was completed. TETLP, now a subsidiary of\nEnbridge, Inc. (Enbridge), operates more than 9,000 miles of gas pipeline between Texas and the\nnortheastern United States, transporting approximately 12 billion cubic feet per day.1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated March 5, 2019, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice), which also included a warning pursuant to\n49 C.F.R. § 190.205. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that\nTETLP had committed five violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and proposed assessing a civil\npenalty of $75,600 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed ordering Respondent to\ntake certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The warning item required no further\naction, but warned the operator to correct the probable violations or face possible future\nenforcement action.\nEnbridge, on behalf of TETLP, responded to the Notice by letter dated April 4, 2019 (Response).\nThe company did not contest the allegations of violation and agreed to complete the proposed\ncompliance actions. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to\none.\n1 Enbridge website, available at\nhttps://www.enbridge.com/map#map:infrastructure,search=%22texas%20eastern%20transmission%20(texas%22\n(last accessed July 18, 2019).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2019-1004\nPage 2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nIn its Response, Respondent did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49\nC.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a), which states:\n§ 192.463 External corrosion control: Cathodic protection.\n(a) Each cathodic protection system required by this subpart must\nprovide a level of cathodic protection that complies with one or more of the\napplicable criteria contained in appendix D of this part. If none of these\ncriteria is applicable, the cathodic protection system must provide a level of\ncathodic protection at least equal to that provided by compliance with one\nor more of these criteria.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a) by failing to provide an\nadequate level of cathodic protection on the Mexico to Santa Fe and the Charco to the end of the\nline pipeline segments to meet the applicable criteria contained in appendix D of Part 192.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that TETLP’s records for calendar years 2015 through 2018,\nshowed that the Appendix D criteria was not met for three inspection cycles for several test\npoints. The annual survey records showed that IR-free readings failed to meet the negative 850\nmV “ON” criteria in Sections I and II of Appendix D.\nAdditionally, the Notice noted that TETLP’s procedure, SOP 2-2200, Application of Cathodic\nProtection Criteria, states that “If acceptable levels of cathodic protection cannot be\ndemonstrated by at least one of the criteria identified in the ‘Acceptable Criterion’ sections\nbelow, take prompt remedial action to perform further testing and/or evaluations that result in\nadequate levels of cathodic protection.” Section 2-4 of the procedure further identifies three\nacceptable criteria (-.850 VDC “ON”, -.850 VDC “OFF” and 100 mVDC Polarization), which\nare the same as those specified in Appendix D. However, TETLP failed to apply any of these\nother criteria found in Appendix D or its procedure to determine adequacy of cathodic protection\nfor these two pipelines.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a) by failing to provide a\nlevel of cathodic protection that complies with, or is at least equal to, one or more of the\napplicable criteria contained in Appendix D of Part 192.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.911(l), which states:\n§ 192.911 What are the elements of an integrity management\nprogram?\nAn operator's initial integrity management program begins with a\nframework (see§ 192.907) and evolves into a more detailed and\ncomprehensive integrity management program, as information is gained\nand incorporated into the program. An operator must make continual\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2019-1004\nPage 3\nimprovements to its program. The initial program framework and\nsubsequent program must, at minimum, contain the following elements.\n(When indicated, refer to ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference,\nsee§ 192.7) for more detailed information on the listed element.)\n(a) . . .\n(l) A quality assurance process as outlined in ASME/ANSI B31.8S,\nsection 12.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.911(l) by failing to follow its\nIntegrity Management Plan (IMP), Section 10 – Quality Assurance Plan, Rev. 7, dated March 4,\n2016, for a quality assurance process, as required by ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 12.\nSpecifically, TETLP failed to analyze the results for satisfactory performance, to recommend\nchanges to improve the integrity management program, and to perform internal/external audits to\nreview overall functioning of IMP performance, in accordance with Sections 10.5.4.2, 10.5.5.1,\nand 10.5.6.1 of its IMP, respectively.\nOPS found that TETLP failed to analyze the results from each region, as identified by the\noperator, for satisfactory performance on a business unit by business unit basis, as required by\nSection 10.5.4.2 of its IMP. TETLP also failed to document recommended program changes and\ncorrective actions to improve the IMP or monitor the effectiveness of its implementation.\nFurthermore, TETLP failed to perform an internal audit of the IMP during 2017. Additionally,\nthe 2016 annual Pipeline Integrity Performance Evaluation report was inadequate. Finally,\nTETLP had yet to commission an external audit, as required by its IMP, at the time of the\ninspection.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.911(l) by failing to follow the\nquality assurance process in its IMP.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917, which states, in\nrelevant part:\n§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline\nintegrity and use the threat identification in its integrity program?\n(a) . . .\n(b) Data gathering and integration. To identify and evaluate the\npotential threats to a covered pipeline segment, an operator must gather and\nintegrate existing data and information on the entire pipeline that could be\nrelevant to the covered segment. In performing this data gathering and\nintegration, an operator must follow the requirements in ASME/ANSI\nB31.8S, section 4. At a minimum, an operator must gather and evaluate the\nset of data specified in Appendix A to ASME/ANSI B31.8S, and consider\nboth on the covered segment and similar non-covered segments, past\nincident history, corrosion control records, continuing surveillance records,\npatrolling records, maintenance history, internal inspection records, and all\nother conditions specific to each pipeline.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2019-1004\nPage 4\n(c) Risk assessment. An operator must conduct a risk assessment that\nfollows ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and considers the identified threats\nfor each covered segment. An operator must use the risk assessment to\nprioritize the covered segments for the baseline and continual reassessments\n(§§192.919, 192.921, 192.937), and to determine what additional\npreventive and mitigative measures are needed (§192.935) for the covered\nsegment.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(b)-(c) by failing to gather,\nintegrate existing data, and validate the result of risk rankings. Additionally, the Notice alleged\nthat TETLP did not follow its own pipeline IMP, Section 13 – Risk Assessment, Rev 7, dated\nMarch 4, 2016, in particular Sections 13.1 and 13.3.\nThe Notice alleged that TETLP did not use an adequate or appropriate process to input data and\ninformation into its risk analysis process or to confirm that its output data was accurate.\nSpecifically, TETLP failed to employ the correct methodology for calculations of external\ncorrosion for one of its segments following an in-line inspection (ILI) in 2012. Despite having\nILI data for the segment, TETLP did not use the appropriate methodology to calculate external\ncorrosion under Method 2 of Section 2.1 of its Risk Algorithm Document (RAD). Furthermore,\nTETLP could not explain risk calculations in its risk model for the following:\n External Corrosion: TETLP did not consider coating age factor of 10 for 1950-vintage\npipe. Coating age is weighted 10 percent of baseline susceptible score;\n Internal Corrosion: TETLP indicated that it is in process of inputting data into the\nRisk Model and running the analysis related to internal corrosion threat;\n Third Party Damage Threat: The Modeled Impact Frequency Score (“F in the Hit\nSusceptibility Equation) (1-10) is not consistent with RAD, section 2.3. Spectra has\nnot performed a depth of cover survey for 1950-vintage pipeline and selected 2.99 feet\nof cover by default; and\n The risk score calculation spreadsheet provided for Construction threat is not\nconsistent with RAD. TETLP failed to integrate the data into RAD.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917 by failing to identify and\nevaluate the potential threats to covered pipeline segments by gathering and integrating existing\ndata and information on the entire pipeline that could be relevant to the covered segments.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935, which states, in\nrelevant part:\n§ 192.935 What additional preventive and mitigative measures must\nan operator take?\n(a) General requirements. An operator must take additional measures\nbeyond those already required by Part 192 to prevent a pipeline failure and\nto mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure in a high consequence\narea. An operator must base the additional measures on the threats the\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2019-1004\nPage 5\noperator has identified to each pipeline segment. (See §192.917) An\noperator must conduct, in accordance with one of the risk assessment\napproaches in ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see\n§192.7), section 5, a risk analysis of its pipeline to identify additional\nmeasures to protect the high consequence area and enhance public safety.\nSuch additional measures include, but are not limited to, installing\nAutomatic Shut-off Valves or Remote Control Valves, installing\ncomputerized monitoring and leak detection systems, replacing pipe\nsegments with pipe of heavier wall thickness, providing additional training\nto personnel on response procedures, conducting drills with local\nemergency responders and implementing additional inspection and\nmaintenance programs.\n(b) . . .\n(c) Automatic shut-off valves (ASV) or Remote control valves (RCV). If\nan operator determines, based on a risk analysis, that an ASV or RCV would\nbe an efficient means of adding protection to a high consequence area in the\nevent of a gas release, an operator must install the ASV or RCV. In making\nthat determination, an operator must, at least, consider the following\nfactors--swiftness of leak detection and pipe shutdown capabilities, the type\nof gas being transported, operating pressure, the rate of potential release,\npipeline profile, the potential for ignition, and location of nearest response\npersonnel.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935 by failing to identify and take\nadditional preventative and mitigative (P&M) measures to mitigate the consequences of a\npipeline failure in a high consequence area (HCA). Specifically, the Notice stated that TETLP\nprovided a technical documentation to define the company’s methodology for determining the\nlocation of remote control valves (RCV) for the purpose of improving response time and\nminimizing consequences of pipeline emergencies. This methodology is applicable to both\nexisting facilities and new construction as well as applies to both covered and non-covered\nsegments. However, when OPS requested to review the finalized list of the RCV site candidates,\nit was found that TETLP considered and addressed only the Priority 1 RCV selection criteria.\nAccording to TETLP’s methodology for selection of RCV sites, Priority 1 is valve sites isolating\nClass 3 or HCAs with a response time greater than 2 hours.\nTETLP was unable to provide documentation showing it had conducted analysis that considers\nswiftness of leak detection and pipe shutdown capabilities, the types of gas being transported,\noperating pressure, the rate of potential release, pipeline profile, and the potential for ignition.\nAdditionally, TETLP did not consider the factors beyond immediate injury such as prolonged\nflame exposure to emergency responders and the public, danger to people caught in difficult to\nevacuate areas, impact on key transportation corridors, and the risk of wildfires.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935 by failing to identify and\ntake additional preventative and mitigative (P&M) measures to mitigate the consequences of a\npipeline failure in a high consequence area (HCA).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2019-1004\nPage 6\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.2 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that\nthe penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent\nin attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the\neconomic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent\ndamages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil\npenalty of $75,600 for the violation cited above.\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $75,600 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.463(a), for failing to provide a level of cathodic protection that complies with, or is at least\nequal to, one or more of the applicable criteria contained in Appendix D of Part 192. TETLP\nneither contested the allegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying a reduction in\nor elimination of the proposed penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered\nthe assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $75,600 for violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.463(a).\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations (49\nC.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169.\nThe Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.\nFailure to pay the $75,600 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate\nin accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\n2 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223; Revisions to Civil Penalty Amounts,\n83 Fed. Reg. 60732, 60744 (Nov. 27, 2018).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2019-1004\nPage 7\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1, 3, 4, and 5 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.463(a), 192.911(l), 192.917, and 192.935, respectively. Under 49\nU.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns or\noperates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established\nunder chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217,\nRespondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety\nregulations applicable to its operations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 192.463(a) (Item 1), Respondent must test,\nevaluate and, where necessary, enhance its cathodic protection system to comply with\nAppendix D criteria and submit to the Director, Southwest Region, adequate\ndocumentation to demonstrate compliance within 90 days of this Order.\n2. With respect to the violation of § 192.911(l) (Item 3), Respondent must analyze\nthe result from each region for satisfactory performance on a business unit by\nbusiness unit basis; identify specific program performance improvements; and\ndetermine the need for improvements in its program, procedures, guidelines or\nspecifications and provide program enhancements based on multilevel review. In\naddition, TETLP must conduct an annual internal audit as well as commission an\nexternal audit team to review the overall functioning of its IMP as required by its\nprocedures. TETLP must complete this item within 90 days following the issuance of\nthis Order.\n3. With respect to the violation of § 192.917 (Item 4), Respondent must ensure the\ndata for the Risk Model is accurate for all pipelines that impact a high consequence\narea. TETLP must ensure its risk rankings are logical and consistent with industry\npractice. TETLP must complete this item by December 31, 2020.\n4. With respect to the violation of § 192.935 (Item 5), Respondent must conduct an\nevaluation/risk analysis of its pipelines to determine if automatic shut off valves or\nremote-control valves would be an efficient means of adding protection to each high\nconsequence area in the event of a release of gas to reduce the risks. This study must\nconsider factors such as swiftness of leak detection and pipe shutdown capabilities,\nthe type of gas being transported, operating pressure, the rate of potential release,\npipeline profile, the potential for ignition, and location of nearest response personnel.\nThe study should also consider factors beyond immediate injury such as: prolonged\nflame exposure to emergency responders and public, danger to people caught in\ndifficult-to-evacuate areas, impact on key transportation corridors, and the risk of\nwildfires. TETLP must complete this item within 90 days following the issuance of\nthis Order.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 4-2019-1004\nPage 8\nIt is requested (not mandated) that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the\nDirector. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated\nwith preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated\nwith replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nnot to exceed $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (49 C.F.R. § 190.223), for each violation for\neach day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a\ndistrict court of the United States.\nWARNING ITEM\nWith respect to Item 2, the Notice alleged a probable violation of Part 192 but did not propose a\ncivil penalty or compliance order for this item. Therefore, this is considered to be a warning\nitem. The warning was for:\n49 C.F.R. § 192.706(a) (Item 2) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to conduct\nleakage surveys using leak detector equipment in a Class 3 location on Line 16 at\nintervals not exceeding 7 1/2 months, but at least twice each calendar year.\nIn its Response, TETLP presented information showing that it had taken certain actions to\naddress the cited item. Specifically, TETLP acknowledged that process improvements were\nneeded to its Class location survey program to ensure field personnel are immediately notified\nfollowing a change in Class location. As a result, TETLP has implemented a work management\nprocess in SAP to general a work order task that will notify the Area Management of a new Class\n3 or 4 locations and create a task to perform leak survey. If OPS finds a violation of this\nprovision in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be subject to future enforcement action.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final\nOrder to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey\nAvenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of\nChief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address, no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this\nFinal Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a statement of the issue(s) and\nmeet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically stays\nthe payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including corrective\naction, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay. The\nterms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\nAugust 9, 2019\n___________________________________ __________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n420191004_NOPV PCP PCO_03052019_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMarch 5, 2019\nMichele Harradence\nVP Gas Transmission & Midstream Operations\nTexas Eastern Transmission, LP\n5400 Westheimer Court\nHouston, Texas 77056\nCPF 4-2019-1004\nDear Ms. Harradence:\nOn multiple dates beginning March 27, 2018 through December 13, 2018, representatives of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49\nUnited States Code (U.S.C.) inspected Texas Eastern Transmission, LP/Spectra Energy Partners,\nLP (Spectra) – West Pipeline and associated facilities in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Illinois,\nMissouri and Ohio.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n\n\n\n1. §192.463 External corrosion control: Cathodic protection.\n(a) Each cathodic protection system required by this subpart must provide a level of\ncathodic protection that complies with one or more of the applicable criteria\ncontained in Appendix D of this part. If none of these criteria is applicable, the\ncathodic protection system must provide a level of cathodic protection at least equal\nto that provided by compliance with one or more of these criteria.\nAppendix D – Criteria for Cathodic Protection and Determination of Measurements\nII. Interpretation of voltage measurement. Voltage (IR) drops other than those across\nthe structural electrolyte boundary must be considered for valid interpretation of the\nvoltage measurement in paragraphs A(1) and (2) and paragraph B(1) of Section I of\nthe Appendix.\nSpectra failed to provide an adequate level of cathodic protection on the Mexico to Santa\nFe (approximately 55.736 miles), and the Charco to End of Line (approximately 70 miles)\npipelines to meet the applicable criteria contained in Appendix D of Part 192.\nPHMSA reviewed the annual cathodic protection monitoring records for the Mexico to\nSanta Fe, and the Charco to End of Line pipelines for the calendar years 2015, 2016, 2017\nand 2018. The records show that the Appendix D criteria was not met for three inspection\ncycles for several test points. The annual survey records show that IR free readings failed\nto meet the negative 850 mV “ON” criteria and Spectra did not apply any other Appendix\nD criteria to determine adequacy of cathodic protection for these two pipelines.\nSpectra’s Standard Operating Procedure Number 2-2200 (12/19/2017), Section 3.0: -850\nVDC “ON” Criterion states, “A negative (cathodic) potential of at least 0.850 V with the\nCP applied. This potential is measured with respect to a saturated copper/copper sulfate\nreference electrode contacting the electrolyte with the protective current applied. Voltage\ndrops other than those across the structure-to-electrolyte boundary must be determined\nand appropriately compensated for valid interpretation of this voltage measurement.”\n2. §192.706 Transmission Lines: Leakage surveys.\nLeakage surveys of a transmission line must be conducted at intervals not exceeding\n15 months, but at least once each calendar year. However, in the case of a\ntransmission line which transports gas in conformity with §192.625 without an odor\nor odorant, leakage surveys using leak detector equipment must be conducted–\n(a) In Class 3 locations, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months, but at least twice each\ncalendar year;\n2\n\n\n\n3. Spectra failed to conduct leakage surveys using leak detector equipment in a Class 3\nlocation on Line 16 at intervals not exceeding 7½ months, but at least twice each calendar\nyear.\nDuring the April 2017 Class location survey, Spectra identified an increased number of\ntrailers and other structures near their Line 16 (between station 1392+27 and 1430+15).\nThe increased number of structures resulted in a reclassification of the Line from a Class 2\nto a Class 3 location; however, Spectra did not adjust the leak survey frequency based on\nthis Class location change.\nAlthough Spectra was aware of the newly identified Class location upgrade in April of\n2017, the company failed to include this section of pipeline for the leakage survey in\nSeptember 2017. Further review revealed that this section of the pipeline was not leak\nsurveyed until March 7, 2018. In the event such surveys were performed, the operator\ncould not provide records of the inspection as required by §192.709(c) by failing to\nmaintain the record of a survey required by the regulations.\n§192.911 What are the elements of an integrity management program?\n(l) A quality assurance process as outlined in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 12.\nSpectra failed to follow their written Integrity Management Plan, Section 10, Rev 7 to\ncomplete a performance analysis. Spectra failed to analyze the results for 1.)satisfactory\nperformance, 2,) failed to recommend changes to improve the integrity management\nprogram and 3.) failed to perform internal/external audits to review overall functioning of\nIMP performance.\n1.) While reviewing the 2016 Annual Pipeline Integrity Performance Evaluation Report,\nPHMSA learned that Spectra failed to analyze the results from each Region for\nsatisfactory performance on a business unit by business unit basis as described in their\nIMP, Section 10.5.4.2.\nSpectra’s IMP, Section 10.5.4.2: Performance Analysis states“The Pipeline\nOperational Risk Management Committee (PORMC) will analyze the results from each\nRegion for satisfactory performance on a business unit by business unit basis. The\nanalysis will include a determination whether specific results for each metric were\nachieved or not an identification of favorable or unfavorable trends that might be\ndeveloping. The PORMC will make an overall Program performance evaluation and\ndistribute these results in accordance with the Company’s Internal Communications\nPlan.”\n2.) Spectra’s 2016 Annual Pipeline Integrity Performance Evaluation Report failed to\nprovide Program Enhancements based on multilevel review. Spectra failed to\n3\n\n\n\n4. document recommended program changes or corrective actions to improve IMP or\nmonitored effectiveness of their implementation.\nSpectra’s IMP, Section 10.5.5.1: Developing Improvements states, “The PORMC will\nutilize results from its analysis to identify specific Program performance\nimprovements. These improvements may be the result of exceptional performance\nachieved by a particular Region relative to one or more metrics or unsatisfactory\nperformance on a similar scale. The PORMC analysis may identify the need for\nimprovements in the Program, procedure, guideline or specification. The MOC\nprocess controls changes to procedure, guideline or specification.\n3.) Spectra failed to perform an internal audit of the IMP during 2017. Spectra provided a\ndraft copy of the 2016 annual Pipeline Integrity Performance Evaluation report which\nis deemed inadequate by the PHMSA inspection team. Further, as of today Spectra has\nnot commissioned an external audit team to review the overall functioning of the\nCompany’s IMP and as a result no external audit was performed as required by their\nown procedure.\nSpectra’s IMP, Section 10.5.6.1: Internal Audits states,“The Director, Pipeline\nIntegrity (Houston), will initiate an annual internal audit of the IMP. The audit team\nwill forward its audit results to the Vice President, Transportation Services within\nninety days of completing the audit. Internal audits are not required in those years’\nexternal audit occur.\nSpectra’s IMP, Section 10.5.6.2: External Audits states,“At intervals not to exceed\nthree years, the Vice President, Transmission Services will commission an external\naudit team to review the overall functioning of the Company’s IMP. The audit will\nreview results for the lesser of the three pervious calendar years and the previous\nexternal audit. The audit team will forward its audit results to the Vice President,\nTransmission within thirty days of the completing its audit work.\n§192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline integrity and\nuse the threat identification in its integrity program?\n(b) Data gathering and integration. To identify and evaluate the potential threats to\na covered pipeline segment, an operator must gather and integrate existing data and\ninformation on the entire pipeline that could be relevant to the covered segment. In\nperforming this data gathering and integration, an operator must follow the\nrequirements in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 4. At a minimum, an operator must\ngather and evaluate the set of data specified in Appendix A to ASME/ANSI B31.8S,\nand consider both on the covered segment and similar non-covered segments, past\nincident history, corrosion control records, continuing surveillance records,\npatrolling records, maintenance history, internal inspection records, and all other\nconditions specific to each pipeline.\n4\n\n\n\n(c) Risk assessment. An operator must conduct a risk assessment that follows\nASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and considers the identified threats for each covered\nsegment. An operator must use the risk assessment to prioritize the covered segments\nfor the baseline and continual reassessments (§§192.919, 192.921, 192.937), and to\ndetermine what additional preventive and mitigative measures are needed (§192.935)\nfor the covered segment.\nSpectra failed to follow their written Integrity Management Plan, Section 13, Rev 7 by\nfailing to gather, integrate existing data and validate the result of risk rankings as required\nby§192.917.\nSpectra’s IMP, Section 13.2 states the first step in performing a risk assessment is to\nidentify which threat(s) exist within a covered segment. A review of each new or expanded\nHCA that identifies any HCA segments susceptible to any of the threats occurs once each\ncalendar year, as part of the annual IMP update process.\nSpectra’s IMP, Section 13.3 states,“The next step in the Risk Assessment process is to\ndetermine the relative risk level for all threats identified in a covered segment. All nine\nthreats identified in B31.8S use an algorithm based on failure likelihood to determine the\nrelative risk level. Within each failure likelihood algorithm, each threat is assigned a\nweighting that is based on its expected contribution to the overall failure susceptibility.\nThe Company refers to its Risk Algorithm Document (RAD) that defines the algorithms for\neach threat in more detail. This section provides a high level overview of the risk\nevaluation for each threat.”\nPHMSA inspectors reviewed Risk Algorithm Document (RAD), section 2.1: External\nCorrosion states, “There are two different methodologies employed in the calculation of\nexternal corrosion scores. Method 1 is used when there is no in-line inspection data available\nfor the pipeline segment. Method 2 is used where in-line inspection data is available for the\npipeline segment.”\nThe PHMSA inspectors reviewed 2016 HCA risk ranking (run date: March 3, 2017) and\nselected HCA #7-00955L (DONA – NLRK segment) with a risk ranking of 34 and HCA\n#7-00955 (DONA – NLRK segment) with a risk ranking of 270 for further review.\nSpectra stated that HCA #7-00955 was last assessed by in-line inspection\n(MFL/Deformation) in 2012 and Spectra did not use Method 2 to calculate external\ncorrosion threat.\nPHMSA inspectors further reviewed Spectra’s External Corrosion (EC), Internal Corrosion\n(IC), Third Party Damage (TPD), and Construction Threat failure likelihood score on HCA\n#7-00955 and #7-00955L. Spectra could not explain risk calculations in their risk model,\nfor example:\n5\n\n\n\n5. - External Corrosion: Spectra did not consider coating age factor of 10 for 1950\nvintage pipe. Coating age is weighted 10% of baseline susceptible score;\n- Internal Corrosion: Spectra indicated that they are in process of inputting data into\nthe Risk Model and run the analysis related to internal corrosion threat;\n- Third Party Damage Threat: The Modeled Impact Frequency Score (“F in the Hit\nSusceptibility Equation) (1-10) is not consistent with Risk Algorithm Document\n(RAD), section 2.3. Spectra has not performed depth of cover survey for 1950\nvintage pipeline and selected 2.99 feet of cover by default; and\n- The risk score calculation spreadsheet provided for Construction threat is not\nconsistent with Risk Algorit","truncated":true,"body_characters":50242}