# TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP) — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 420191004
- **title:** TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP) — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2019-03-05
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.463(a), 192.706(a), 192.911(l), 192.917(b), 192.917(c), 192.935(a), 192.935(c).
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420191004.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420191004.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-420191004
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420191004
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP). PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.463(a),  192.706(a),  192.911(l),  192.917(b),  192.917(c),  192.935(a),  192.935(c). The case was opened on 2019-03-05 and is reported as closed as of 2021-01-04. Proposed civil penalty: $75,600. Assessed civil penalty: $75,600. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420191004_Closure Letter_01042021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Closure%20Letter_01042021.pdf

420191004_Closure Letter_01042021_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Closure%20Letter_01042021_text.pdf

420191004_Final Order_08092019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Final%20Order_08092019.pdf

420191004_Final Order_08092019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Final%20Order_08092019_text.pdf

420191004_NOPV PCP PCO_03052019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03052019.pdf

420191004_NOPV PCP PCO_03052019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03052019_text.pdf

420191004_Operator Response to Notice and Request for Time Extension_04042019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420191004/420191004_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Request%20for%20Time%20Extension_04042019.pdf

420191004_Closure Letter_01042021_text.pdf

ELECTRONIC MAIL
January 4, 2021
William T. Yardley
Executive Vice President and President
Gas Transmission and Midstream
Enbridge Inc.
1100 Louisiana Street, Suite 300
Houston, Texas 77002
RE: CPF 4-2019-1004
Dear Mr. Yardley:
On August 9, 2019, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued
a Final Order in the above-referenced case that included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty to
Texas Eastern Transmission LP/Spectra Energy Partners (TETLP), a subsidiary of Enbridge Inc.
(Enbridge). Based on the review of the documentation provided on December 29, 2020, and
confirmation of payment of the civil penalty paid on October 18, 2019, it has been determined that
you have complied with the terms of this Order.
Accordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the
matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Mary L. McDaniel, P.E.
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc: Nathan Atanu, Manager, Operational Compliance, Nathan.Atanu@enbridge.com
Michel Harradence, VP Gas Transmission & Midstream Operations,
Michele.harradence@enbridge.com

420191004_Final Order_08092019_text.pdf

August 9, 2019
Mr. William Yardley
Executive Vice President and President
Gas Transmission and Midstream
Enbridge Inc.
5400 Westheimer Court
Houston, Texas 77056
Re: CPF No. 4-2019-1004
Dear Mr. Yardley:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case to your subsidiary,
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP. It makes findings of violation, assesses a civil penalty of
$75,600, and specifies actions that need to be taken to comply with the pipeline safety
regulations. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty
has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director,
Southwest Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by
certified mail is effective upon the date of mailing, as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Mary McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
Ms. Michele Harradence, Senior Vice President, Gas Transmission & Midstream
Operations, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, 5400 Westheimer Court, Houston,
Texas 77056
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2019-1004
a subsidiary of Enbridge Inc., )
)
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
From March 27 through December 13, 2018, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Texas
Eastern Transmission, LP/Spectra Energy Partners (TETLP or Respondent), in Texas, Louisiana,
Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio. In February 2017, Enbridge and Spectra
announced a merger and on December 18, 2018, it was completed. TETLP, now a subsidiary of
Enbridge, Inc. (Enbridge), operates more than 9,000 miles of gas pipeline between Texas and the
northeastern United States, transporting approximately 12 billion cubic feet per day.1
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated March 5, 2019, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice), which also included a warning pursuant to
49 C.F.R. § 190.205. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that
TETLP had committed five violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and proposed assessing a civil
penalty of $75,600 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed ordering Respondent to
take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The warning item required no further
action, but warned the operator to correct the probable violations or face possible future
enforcement action.
Enbridge, on behalf of TETLP, responded to the Notice by letter dated April 4, 2019 (Response).
The company did not contest the allegations of violation and agreed to complete the proposed
compliance actions. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to
one.
1 Enbridge website, available at
https://www.enbridge.com/map#map:infrastructure,search=%22texas%20eastern%20transmission%20(texas%22
(last accessed July 18, 2019).



CPF No. 4-2019-1004
Page 2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
In its Response, Respondent did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49
C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a), which states:
§ 192.463 External corrosion control: Cathodic protection.
(a) Each cathodic protection system required by this subpart must
provide a level of cathodic protection that complies with one or more of the
applicable criteria contained in appendix D of this part. If none of these
criteria is applicable, the cathodic protection system must provide a level of
cathodic protection at least equal to that provided by compliance with one
or more of these criteria.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a) by failing to provide an
adequate level of cathodic protection on the Mexico to Santa Fe and the Charco to the end of the
line pipeline segments to meet the applicable criteria contained in appendix D of Part 192.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that TETLP’s records for calendar years 2015 through 2018,
showed that the Appendix D criteria was not met for three inspection cycles for several test
points. The annual survey records showed that IR-free readings failed to meet the negative 850
mV “ON” criteria in Sections I and II of Appendix D.
Additionally, the Notice noted that TETLP’s procedure, SOP 2-2200, Application of Cathodic
Protection Criteria, states that “If acceptable levels of cathodic protection cannot be
demonstrated by at least one of the criteria identified in the ‘Acceptable Criterion’ sections
below, take prompt remedial action to perform further testing and/or evaluations that result in
adequate levels of cathodic protection.” Section 2-4 of the procedure further identifies three
acceptable criteria (-.850 VDC “ON”, -.850 VDC “OFF” and 100 mVDC Polarization), which
are the same as those specified in Appendix D. However, TETLP failed to apply any of these
other criteria found in Appendix D or its procedure to determine adequacy of cathodic protection
for these two pipelines.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.463(a) by failing to provide a
level of cathodic protection that complies with, or is at least equal to, one or more of the
applicable criteria contained in Appendix D of Part 192.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.911(l), which states:
§ 192.911 What are the elements of an integrity management
program?
An operator's initial integrity management program begins with a
framework (see§ 192.907) and evolves into a more detailed and
comprehensive integrity management program, as information is gained
and incorporated into the program. An operator must make continual



CPF No. 4-2019-1004
Page 3
improvements to its program. The initial program framework and
subsequent program must, at minimum, contain the following elements.
(When indicated, refer to ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference,
see§ 192.7) for more detailed information on the listed element.)
(a) . . .
(l) A quality assurance process as outlined in ASME/ANSI B31.8S,
section 12.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.911(l) by failing to follow its
Integrity Management Plan (IMP), Section 10 – Quality Assurance Plan, Rev. 7, dated March 4,
2016, for a quality assurance process, as required by ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 12.
Specifically, TETLP failed to analyze the results for satisfactory performance, to recommend
changes to improve the integrity management program, and to perform internal/external audits to
review overall functioning of IMP performance, in accordance with Sections 10.5.4.2, 10.5.5.1,
and 10.5.6.1 of its IMP, respectively.
OPS found that TETLP failed to analyze the results from each region, as identified by the
operator, for satisfactory performance on a business unit by business unit basis, as required by
Section 10.5.4.2 of its IMP. TETLP also failed to document recommended program changes and
corrective actions to improve the IMP or monitor the effectiveness of its implementation.
Furthermore, TETLP failed to perform an internal audit of the IMP during 2017. Additionally,
the 2016 annual Pipeline Integrity Performance Evaluation report was inadequate. Finally,
TETLP had yet to commission an external audit, as required by its IMP, at the time of the
inspection.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.911(l) by failing to follow the
quality assurance process in its IMP.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917, which states, in
relevant part:
§ 192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline
integrity and use the threat identification in its integrity program?
(a) . . .
(b) Data gathering and integration. To identify and evaluate the
potential threats to a covered pipeline segment, an operator must gather and
integrate existing data and information on the entire pipeline that could be
relevant to the covered segment. In performing this data gathering and
integration, an operator must follow the requirements in ASME/ANSI
B31.8S, section 4. At a minimum, an operator must gather and evaluate the
set of data specified in Appendix A to ASME/ANSI B31.8S, and consider
both on the covered segment and similar non-covered segments, past
incident history, corrosion control records, continuing surveillance records,
patrolling records, maintenance history, internal inspection records, and all
other conditions specific to each pipeline.



CPF No. 4-2019-1004
Page 4
(c) Risk assessment. An operator must conduct a risk assessment that
follows ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and considers the identified threats
for each covered segment. An operator must use the risk assessment to
prioritize the covered segments for the baseline and continual reassessments
(§§192.919, 192.921, 192.937), and to determine what additional
preventive and mitigative measures are needed (§192.935) for the covered
segment.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(b)-(c) by failing to gather,
integrate existing data, and validate the result of risk rankings. Additionally, the Notice alleged
that TETLP did not follow its own pipeline IMP, Section 13 – Risk Assessment, Rev 7, dated
March 4, 2016, in particular Sections 13.1 and 13.3.
The Notice alleged that TETLP did not use an adequate or appropriate process to input data and
information into its risk analysis process or to confirm that its output data was accurate.
Specifically, TETLP failed to employ the correct methodology for calculations of external
corrosion for one of its segments following an in-line inspection (ILI) in 2012. Despite having
ILI data for the segment, TETLP did not use the appropriate methodology to calculate external
corrosion under Method 2 of Section 2.1 of its Risk Algorithm Document (RAD). Furthermore,
TETLP could not explain risk calculations in its risk model for the following:
 External Corrosion: TETLP did not consider coating age factor of 10 for 1950-vintage
pipe. Coating age is weighted 10 percent of baseline susceptible score;
 Internal Corrosion: TETLP indicated that it is in process of inputting data into the
Risk Model and running the analysis related to internal corrosion threat;
 Third Party Damage Threat: The Modeled Impact Frequency Score (“F in the Hit
Susceptibility Equation) (1-10) is not consistent with RAD, section 2.3. Spectra has
not performed a depth of cover survey for 1950-vintage pipeline and selected 2.99 feet
of cover by default; and
 The risk score calculation spreadsheet provided for Construction threat is not
consistent with RAD. TETLP failed to integrate the data into RAD.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.917 by failing to identify and
evaluate the potential threats to covered pipeline segments by gathering and integrating existing
data and information on the entire pipeline that could be relevant to the covered segments.
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935, which states, in
relevant part:
§ 192.935 What additional preventive and mitigative measures must
an operator take?
(a) General requirements. An operator must take additional measures
beyond those already required by Part 192 to prevent a pipeline failure and
to mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure in a high consequence
area. An operator must base the additional measures on the threats the



CPF No. 4-2019-1004
Page 5
operator has identified to each pipeline segment. (See §192.917) An
operator must conduct, in accordance with one of the risk assessment
approaches in ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see
§192.7), section 5, a risk analysis of its pipeline to identify additional
measures to protect the high consequence area and enhance public safety.
Such additional measures include, but are not limited to, installing
Automatic Shut-off Valves or Remote Control Valves, installing
computerized monitoring and leak detection systems, replacing pipe
segments with pipe of heavier wall thickness, providing additional training
to personnel on response procedures, conducting drills with local
emergency responders and implementing additional inspection and
maintenance programs.
(b) . . .
(c) Automatic shut-off valves (ASV) or Remote control valves (RCV). If
an operator determines, based on a risk analysis, that an ASV or RCV would
be an efficient means of adding protection to a high consequence area in the
event of a gas release, an operator must install the ASV or RCV. In making
that determination, an operator must, at least, consider the following
factors--swiftness of leak detection and pipe shutdown capabilities, the type
of gas being transported, operating pressure, the rate of potential release,
pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, and location of nearest response
personnel.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935 by failing to identify and take
additional preventative and mitigative (P&M) measures to mitigate the consequences of a
pipeline failure in a high consequence area (HCA). Specifically, the Notice stated that TETLP
provided a technical documentation to define the company’s methodology for determining the
location of remote control valves (RCV) for the purpose of improving response time and
minimizing consequences of pipeline emergencies. This methodology is applicable to both
existing facilities and new construction as well as applies to both covered and non-covered
segments. However, when OPS requested to review the finalized list of the RCV site candidates,
it was found that TETLP considered and addressed only the Priority 1 RCV selection criteria.
According to TETLP’s methodology for selection of RCV sites, Priority 1 is valve sites isolating
Class 3 or HCAs with a response time greater than 2 hours.
TETLP was unable to provide documentation showing it had conducted analysis that considers
swiftness of leak detection and pipe shutdown capabilities, the types of gas being transported,
operating pressure, the rate of potential release, pipeline profile, and the potential for ignition.
Additionally, TETLP did not consider the factors beyond immediate injury such as prolonged
flame exposure to emergency responders and the public, danger to people caught in difficult to
evacuate areas, impact on key transportation corridors, and the risk of wildfires.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935 by failing to identify and
take additional preventative and mitigative (P&M) measures to mitigate the consequences of a
pipeline failure in a high consequence area (HCA).



CPF No. 4-2019-1004
Page 6
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
action taken against Respondent.
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed
$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any
related series of violations.2 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.
§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,
circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the
degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that
the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent
in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the
economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent
damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil
penalty of $75,600 for the violation cited above.
Item 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $75,600 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 192.463(a), for failing to provide a level of cathodic protection that complies with, or is at least
equal to, one or more of the applicable criteria contained in Appendix D of Part 192. TETLP
neither contested the allegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying a reduction in
or elimination of the proposed penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered
the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $75,600 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 192.463(a).
Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations (49
C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal
Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed
instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be
directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169.
The Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.
Failure to pay the $75,600 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate
in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to
those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if
payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty
may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district
court of the United States.
2 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223; Revisions to Civil Penalty Amounts,
83 Fed. Reg. 60732, 60744 (Nov. 27, 2018).



CPF No. 4-2019-1004
Page 7
COMPLIANCE ORDER
The Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1, 3, 4, and 5 in the Notice for
violations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.463(a), 192.911(l), 192.917, and 192.935, respectively. Under 49
U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns or
operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established
under chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217,
Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety
regulations applicable to its operations:
1. With respect to the violation of § 192.463(a) (Item 1), Respondent must test,
evaluate and, where necessary, enhance its cathodic protection system to comply with
Appendix D criteria and submit to the Director, Southwest Region, adequate
documentation to demonstrate compliance within 90 days of this Order.
2. With respect to the violation of § 192.911(l) (Item 3), Respondent must analyze
the result from each region for satisfactory performance on a business unit by
business unit basis; identify specific program performance improvements; and
determine the need for improvements in its program, procedures, guidelines or
specifications and provide program enhancements based on multilevel review. In
addition, TETLP must conduct an annual internal audit as well as commission an
external audit team to review the overall functioning of its IMP as required by its
procedures. TETLP must complete this item within 90 days following the issuance of
this Order.
3. With respect to the violation of § 192.917 (Item 4), Respondent must ensure the
data for the Risk Model is accurate for all pipelines that impact a high consequence
area. TETLP must ensure its risk rankings are logical and consistent with industry
practice. TETLP must complete this item by December 31, 2020.
4. With respect to the violation of § 192.935 (Item 5), Respondent must conduct an
evaluation/risk analysis of its pipelines to determine if automatic shut off valves or
remote-control valves would be an efficient means of adding protection to each high
consequence area in the event of a release of gas to reduce the risks. This study must
consider factors such as swiftness of leak detection and pipe shutdown capabilities,
the type of gas being transported, operating pressure, the rate of potential release,
pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, and location of nearest response personnel.
The study should also consider factors beyond immediate injury such as: prolonged
flame exposure to emergency responders and public, danger to people caught in
difficult-to-evacuate areas, impact on key transportation corridors, and the risk of
wildfires. TETLP must complete this item within 90 days following the issuance of
this Order.
The Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a
written request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an
extension.



CPF No. 4-2019-1004
Page 8
It is requested (not mandated) that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety
improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the
Director. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated
with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated
with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties
not to exceed $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (49 C.F.R. § 190.223), for each violation for
each day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a
district court of the United States.
WARNING ITEM
With respect to Item 2, the Notice alleged a probable violation of Part 192 but did not propose a
civil penalty or compliance order for this item. Therefore, this is considered to be a warning
item. The warning was for:
49 C.F.R. § 192.706(a) (Item 2) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to conduct
leakage surveys using leak detector equipment in a Class 3 location on Line 16 at
intervals not exceeding 7 1/2 months, but at least twice each calendar year.
In its Response, TETLP presented information showing that it had taken certain actions to
address the cited item. Specifically, TETLP acknowledged that process improvements were
needed to its Class location survey program to ensure field personnel are immediately notified
following a change in Class location. As a result, TETLP has implemented a work management
process in SAP to general a work order task that will notify the Area Management of a new Class
3 or 4 locations and create a task to perform leak survey. If OPS finds a violation of this
provision in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be subject to future enforcement action.
Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final
Order to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of
Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address, no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this
Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a statement of the issue(s) and
meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically stays
the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including corrective
action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay. The
terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R.
§ 190.5.
August 9, 2019
___________________________________ __________________________
Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

420191004_NOPV PCP PCO_03052019_text.pdf

NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
March 5, 2019
Michele Harradence
VP Gas Transmission & Midstream Operations
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP
5400 Westheimer Court
Houston, Texas 77056
CPF 4-2019-1004
Dear Ms. Harradence:
On multiple dates beginning March 27, 2018 through December 13, 2018, representatives of the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49
United States Code (U.S.C.) inspected Texas Eastern Transmission, LP/Spectra Energy Partners,
LP (Spectra) – West Pipeline and associated facilities in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Illinois,
Missouri and Ohio.
As a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the
Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected
and the probable violations are:



1. §192.463 External corrosion control: Cathodic protection.
(a) Each cathodic protection system required by this subpart must provide a level of
cathodic protection that complies with one or more of the applicable criteria
contained in Appendix D of this part. If none of these criteria is applicable, the
cathodic protection system must provide a level of cathodic protection at least equal
to that provided by compliance with one or more of these criteria.
Appendix D – Criteria for Cathodic Protection and Determination of Measurements
II. Interpretation of voltage measurement. Voltage (IR) drops other than those across
the structural electrolyte boundary must be considered for valid interpretation of the
voltage measurement in paragraphs A(1) and (2) and paragraph B(1) of Section I of
the Appendix.
Spectra failed to provide an adequate level of cathodic protection on the Mexico to Santa
Fe (approximately 55.736 miles), and the Charco to End of Line (approximately 70 miles)
pipelines to meet the applicable criteria contained in Appendix D of Part 192.
PHMSA reviewed the annual cathodic protection monitoring records for the Mexico to
Santa Fe, and the Charco to End of Line pipelines for the calendar years 2015, 2016, 2017
and 2018. The records show that the Appendix D criteria was not met for three inspection
cycles for several test points. The annual survey records show that IR free readings failed
to meet the negative 850 mV “ON” criteria and Spectra did not apply any other Appendix
D criteria to determine adequacy of cathodic protection for these two pipelines.
Spectra’s Standard Operating Procedure Number 2-2200 (12/19/2017), Section 3.0: -850
VDC “ON” Criterion states, “A negative (cathodic) potential of at least 0.850 V with the
CP applied. This potential is measured with respect to a saturated copper/copper sulfate
reference electrode contacting the electrolyte with the protective current applied. Voltage
drops other than those across the structure-to-electrolyte boundary must be determined
and appropriately compensated for valid interpretation of this voltage measurement.”
2. §192.706 Transmission Lines: Leakage surveys.
Leakage surveys of a transmission line must be conducted at intervals not exceeding
15 months, but at least once each calendar year. However, in the case of a
transmission line which transports gas in conformity with §192.625 without an odor
or odorant, leakage surveys using leak detector equipment must be conducted–
(a) In Class 3 locations, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months, but at least twice each
calendar year;
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3. Spectra failed to conduct leakage surveys using leak detector equipment in a Class 3
location on Line 16 at intervals not exceeding 7½ months, but at least twice each calendar
year.
During the April 2017 Class location survey, Spectra identified an increased number of
trailers and other structures near their Line 16 (between station 1392+27 and 1430+15).
The increased number of structures resulted in a reclassification of the Line from a Class 2
to a Class 3 location; however, Spectra did not adjust the leak survey frequency based on
this Class location change.
Although Spectra was aware of the newly identified Class location upgrade in April of
2017, the company failed to include this section of pipeline for the leakage survey in
September 2017. Further review revealed that this section of the pipeline was not leak
surveyed until March 7, 2018. In the event such surveys were performed, the operator
could not provide records of the inspection as required by §192.709(c) by failing to
maintain the record of a survey required by the regulations.
§192.911 What are the elements of an integrity management program?
(l) A quality assurance process as outlined in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 12.
Spectra failed to follow their written Integrity Management Plan, Section 10, Rev 7 to
complete a performance analysis. Spectra failed to analyze the results for 1.)satisfactory
performance, 2,) failed to recommend changes to improve the integrity management
program and 3.) failed to perform internal/external audits to review overall functioning of
IMP performance.
1.) While reviewing the 2016 Annual Pipeline Integrity Performance Evaluation Report,
PHMSA learned that Spectra failed to analyze the results from each Region for
satisfactory performance on a business unit by business unit basis as described in their
IMP, Section 10.5.4.2.
Spectra’s IMP, Section 10.5.4.2: Performance Analysis states“The Pipeline
Operational Risk Management Committee (PORMC) will analyze the results from each
Region for satisfactory performance on a business unit by business unit basis. The
analysis will include a determination whether specific results for each metric were
achieved or not an identification of favorable or unfavorable trends that might be
developing. The PORMC will make an overall Program performance evaluation and
distribute these results in accordance with the Company’s Internal Communications
Plan.”
2.) Spectra’s 2016 Annual Pipeline Integrity Performance Evaluation Report failed to
provide Program Enhancements based on multilevel review. Spectra failed to
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4. document recommended program changes or corrective actions to improve IMP or
monitored effectiveness of their implementation.
Spectra’s IMP, Section 10.5.5.1: Developing Improvements states, “The PORMC will
utilize results from its analysis to identify specific Program performance
improvements. These improvements may be the result of exceptional performance
achieved by a particular Region relative to one or more metrics or unsatisfactory
performance on a similar scale. The PORMC analysis may identify the need for
improvements in the Program, procedure, guideline or specification. The MOC
process controls changes to procedure, guideline or specification.
3.) Spectra failed to perform an internal audit of the IMP during 2017. Spectra provided a
draft copy of the 2016 annual Pipeline Integrity Performance Evaluation report which
is deemed inadequate by the PHMSA inspection team. Further, as of today Spectra has
not commissioned an external audit team to review the overall functioning of the
Company’s IMP and as a result no external audit was performed as required by their
own procedure.
Spectra’s IMP, Section 10.5.6.1: Internal Audits states,“The Director, Pipeline
Integrity (Houston), will initiate an annual internal audit of the IMP. The audit team
will forward its audit results to the Vice President, Transportation Services within
ninety days of completing the audit. Internal audits are not required in those years’
external audit occur.
Spectra’s IMP, Section 10.5.6.2: External Audits states,“At intervals not to exceed
three years, the Vice President, Transmission Services will commission an external
audit team to review the overall functioning of the Company’s IMP. The audit will
review results for the lesser of the three pervious calendar years and the previous
external audit. The audit team will forward its audit results to the Vice President,
Transmission within thirty days of the completing its audit work.
§192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline integrity and
use the threat identification in its integrity program?
(b) Data gathering and integration. To identify and evaluate the potential threats to
a covered pipeline segment, an operator must gather and integrate existing data and
information on the entire pipeline that could be relevant to the covered segment. In
performing this data gathering and integration, an operator must follow the
requirements in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 4. At a minimum, an operator must
gather and evaluate the set of data specified in Appendix A to ASME/ANSI B31.8S,
and consider both on the covered segment and similar non-covered segments, past
incident history, corrosion control records, continuing surveillance records,
patrolling records, maintenance history, internal inspection records, and all other
conditions specific to each pipeline.
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(c) Risk assessment. An operator must conduct a risk assessment that follows
ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and considers the identified threats for each covered
segment. An operator must use the risk assessment to prioritize the covered segments
for the baseline and continual reassessments (§§192.919, 192.921, 192.937), and to
determine what additional preventive and mitigative measures are needed (§192.935)
for the covered segment.
Spectra failed to follow their written Integrity Management Plan, Section 13, Rev 7 by
failing to gather, integrate existing data and validate the result of risk rankings as required
by§192.917.
Spectra’s IMP, Section 13.2 states the first step in performing a risk assessment is to
identify which threat(s) exist within a covered segment. A review of each new or expanded
HCA that identifies any HCA segments susceptible to any of the threats occurs once each
calendar year, as part of the annual IMP update process.
Spectra’s IMP, Section 13.3 states,“The next step in the Risk Assessment process is to
determine the relative risk level for all threats identified in a covered segment. All nine
threats identified in B31.8S use an algorithm based on failure likelihood to determine the
relative risk level. Within each failure likelihood algorithm, each threat is assigned a
weighting that is based on its expected contribution to the overall failure susceptibility.
The Company refers to its Risk Algorithm Document (RAD) that defines the algorithms for
each threat in more detail. This section provides a high level overview of the risk
evaluation for each threat.”
PHMSA inspectors reviewed Risk Algorithm Document (RAD), section 2.1: External
Corrosion states, “There are two different methodologies employed in the calculation of
external corrosion scores. Method 1 is used when there is no in-line inspection data available
for the pipeline segment. Method 2 is used where in-line inspection data is available for the
pipeline segment.”
The PHMSA inspectors reviewed 2016 HCA risk ranking (run date: March 3, 2017) and
selected HCA #7-00955L (DONA – NLRK segment) with a risk ranking of 34 and HCA
#7-00955 (DONA – NLRK segment) with a risk ranking of 270 for further review.
Spectra stated that HCA #7-00955 was last assessed by in-line inspection
(MFL/Deformation) in 2012 and Spectra did not use Method 2 to calculate external
corrosion threat.
PHMSA inspectors further reviewed Spectra’s External Corrosion (EC), Internal Corrosion
(IC), Third Party Damage (TPD), and Construction Threat failure likelihood score on HCA
#7-00955 and #7-00955L. Spectra could not explain risk calculations in their risk model,
for example:
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5. - External Corrosion: Spectra did not consider coating age factor of 10 for 1950
vintage pipe. Coating age is weighted 10% of baseline susceptible score;
- Internal Corrosion: Spectra indicated that they are in process of inputting data into
the Risk Model and run the analysis related to internal corrosion threat;
- Third Party Damage Threat: The Modeled Impact Frequency Score (“F in the Hit
Susceptibility Equation) (1-10) is not consistent with Risk Algorithm Document
(RAD), section 2.3. Spectra has not performed depth of cover survey for 1950
vintage pipeline and selected 2.99 feet of cover by default; and
- The risk score calculation spreadsheet provided for Construction threat is not
consistent with Risk Algorit
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