{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 42020007NOA","title":"ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2020-08-26","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.446(b)(3), 195.446(b)(5), 195.446(c)(4), 195.446(h), 195.446(h)(6).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42020007noa.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42020007noa.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42020007noa","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42020007NOA","body":"Notice of Amendment involving ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.446(b)(3),  195.446(b)(5),  195.446(c)(4),  195.446(h),  195.446(h)(6). The case was opened on 2020-08-26 and is reported as closed as of 2021-01-08. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n42020007NOA_Closure Letter_01082021_(20-173056).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42020007NOA/42020007NOA_Closure%20Letter_01082021_(20-173056).pdf\n\n42020007NOA_Closure Letter_01082021_(20-173056)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42020007NOA/42020007NOA_Closure%20Letter_01082021_(20-173056)_text.pdf\n\n42020007NOA_Notice of Amendment_(20-173056)_08262020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42020007NOA/42020007NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_(20-173056)_08262020.pdf\n\n42020007NOA_Notice of Amendment_(20-173056)_08262020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42020007NOA/42020007NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_(20-173056)_08262020_text.pdf\n\n42020007NOA_Operator Response to Notice_10262020_(20_173056).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42020007NOA/42020007NOA_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_10262020_(20_173056).pdf\n\n42020007NOA_Notice of Amendment_(20-173056)_08262020_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nELECTRONIC MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nAugust 26, 2020\nTerry K. Spencer\nPresident and CEO\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LLC\n100 West Fifth Street\nTulsa, Oklahoma 74103\nCPF 4-2020-007-NOA\nDear Mr. Spencer:\nFrom March 23 – March 27, 2020, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LLC (ONEOK) procedures and records for Control Room Management\nvia a remote inspection. On the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the apparent\ninadequacies found within ONEOK’s plans or procedures, as described below:\n1. §195.446 Control room management.\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to operating\nconditions, an operator must define each of the following:\n(1) . . .\n(3) A controller’s role during an emergency, even if the controller is not the first to\ndetect the emergency, including the controller’s responsibility to take specific actions and\nto communicate with others;\nThe ONEOK Level 2 Control Room Management Plan (CRM Plan), Version Reviewed/Revised\n9/6/2019, Effective dates Calendar Year 2019 - 2020 is inadequate as it does not include a\ndetailed process for controllers' roles and responsibilities when they move or evacuate to a\nbackup control room nor does it reference applicable documents in a manner that is readily\naccessible in the event of evacuation as required by §195.446(b)(3).\n\n\n\n2\nDuring the inspection, PHMSA inspectors reviewed the following three documents provided by\nONEOK: the CRM Plan; the Business Continuation Plan (BC Plan) - Control Room; and the\nManual Mode Operation Procedure. The Manual Mode Operation Procedure titled “Internal\nCommunications Plan-Manual Mode Operations/Back up Control Centers” includes instructions\nfor controllers to start up the ancillary (basement) control room and directions to the Broken\nArrow back up facility site. The BC Plan also provides similar procedures to close down the\nprimary control room and start up the back up control room, in addition to limited guidance on\nactions required for communication and authorization to evacuate the control room.\nFurthermore, the CRM Plan references both the BC Plan and The ONEOK Pipeline Control\nEvacuation Plan (PCE Plan), thus providing a controller with a choice between the BC Plan or\nthe PCE Plan, whichever is applicable, should the control room need to be evacuated. The\nONEOK PCE Plan was not available for review.\nWhile the three plans reviewed address evacuation, the overall process appears disjointed and\nrequires reference of three different procedures to define the roles, responsibilities, directions,\nand processes to leave the primary control room and start up the back up control room.\nONEOK must amend its procedure(s) to provide controllers with one clear procedure to\nreference that covers all the requirements to evacuate the control room and transition to the back\nup control room.\n2. §195.446 Control room management.\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to operating\nconditions, an operator must define each of the following:\n(1) . . .\n(5) The roles, responsibilities and qualifications of others who have the authority to\ndirect or supersede the specific technical actions of controllers.\nThe ONEOK Level 2 CRM Plan is inadequate because it does not define the roles and\nresponsibilities of the authorized individual(s) who can supersede the technical actions of a\ncontroller such as the conditions under which they may supersede, the required communication\nwith a controller, and the documentation requirements when they do supersede the technical\nactions of the controller.\nThe ONEOK CRM Plan provides two references to superseding and controller. The first\nreference is Section 11.4 of the CRM Plan, which references Control Room Supervisors being\nfully trained and qualified. The plan states that Supervisors “have access to the controllers and\nhave the ability and authority to influence or supersede the actions of the on-duty Controller\nshould the need arise. Anyone who is not operator-qualified and has not been fully trained to\noperate ONEOK pipeline system is not authorized to supersede or otherwise influence Controller\nactions.” The second reference is Addendum F of the CRM Plan, which provides an\ninterpretation taken from PHMSA CRM FAQ B.03. This procedure does not provide any\n\n\n\n3\nguidance about when it may be appropriate or acceptable for an authorized individual to\nsupersede, nor does it provide guidance on how to document in the event it does occur.\nONEOK must amend its procedure to provide clear guidance and process to address the\ninadequacies related to superseding a controller.\n3. §195.446 Control room management.\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with\nthe information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to carry out\nthe roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each of the\nfollowing:\n(4) Test any backup SCADA systems at least once each calendar year, but at\nintervals not to exceed 15 months;\nThe ONEOK Level 2 CRM Plan is inadequate as it does not provide its controllers with\ninformation, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to carry out their roles\nand responsibilities when conducting the test of backup SCADA systems.\nSection 6.5 of the CRM Plan states that “Testing will be performed and documented by the\nONEOK SCADA Group or the Pipeline Control Group.” The ONEOK SCADA Group\ndocument describes a very thorough check of the SCADA system in conjunction with a test of\nthe enterprise servers for business continuity. The CRM Plan delegates all responsibility for the\nbackup test to the SCADA Group as it relates to detail of systems to be tested, date of tests,\nfrequency of the tests, and results of test. The bullet points provided in Section 6.5 are generic\nrequirements for testing, findings/modifications and documentation, and does not provide the\nminimum requirements for the performance test, criterion to determine if the test was a success\nand determination whether the controller’s performance was acceptable. For example, one\nguideline states, “Each operator shall coordinate with SCADA to test the backup system\noperation.” This needs to be expanded to provide guidance as to what must be included in the\nbackup test.\nA test of the SCADA system servers is not the only requirement. The SCADA system is more\nthan just software and servers. It includes the consoles and the processes used to operate the\ncontrol room including, system logon, phone transfers, shift change, printers, phone lists, maps,\nand logistics of getting to the backup site and access the facility. The testing procedure needs to\nprovide all the steps required by the Pipeline Control Group to ensure all aspects of changing the\noperation to the backup system and testing of and returning operations to the main control room.\nIt should also include alternatives for those controllers that may not have an opportunity to\nparticipate in the annual drill. A detail procedure is needed to conduct an acceptable test and\nshould provide all the information required to complete a thorough test of switching to the\nbackup facility and returning to the primary control room. The ONEOK Pipeline Control\nBusiness Continuation Plan, referenced in the procedure, provides some instruction for\nevacuation of the control room, however, it is not complete and is not integrated into the backup\n\n\n\n4\ntest in the procedure.\nONEOK must amend its procedure to provide clear guidance to address the inadequacies related\nto providing controllers with information, tools, processes, and procedures necessary for\nperforming bests on backup SCADA systems.\n4. §195.446 Control room management.\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator’s program must\nprovide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities defined by\nthe operator. In addition, the training program must include the following elements:\nThe ONEOK Level 2 CRM Plan does not provide adequate procedures for reviewing the training\nprogram content to identify potential improvements as required by §195.446(h).\nONEOK's Level 2 CRM Plan Section 11 does not reference the Level 4 CRM Controller\nTraining procedure that offers a short section on Annual Effectiveness Review of Training\nProgram Content. The Level 4 procedure also does not describe what is to be considered in such\na review, but rather defines what the review should verify. During the inspection, ONEOK\nprovided records related to a review of controller responses to different log entries, as well as\ncollected controller opinions gathered through an annual survey. From this review, ONEOK\nexplained that they concluded that the training is adequate. Additionally, the procedure does not\ninclude a review of the training program content which in their case would be a review of the\nmilestones and training curriculum of classroom, computer-based training, and mentor on-the-\njob training. Consequently, ONEOK’s procedure does not link how the effectiveness review\ntranslates to training content adequacy and changes needed to address inadequacies.\nONEOK must amend its procedure to address the inadequacies to ensure a thorough review of\nthe training program content as discussed above is conducted.\n5. §195.446 Control room management.\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator’s program must\nprovide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities defined by\nthe operator. In addition, the training program must include the following elements:\n(1) . . .\n(6) Control room team training and exercises that include both controllers and other\nindividuals, defined by the operator, who would reasonably be expected to operationally\ncollaborate with controllers (control room personnel) during normal, abnormal or\nemergency situations. Operators must comply with the team training requirements under\nthis paragraph no later than January 23, 2018.\n\n\n\n5\nThe ONEOK Level 2 CRM Plan is inadequate because it does not describe the what, when and\nhow of the team training for controllers and those who would reasonably be expected to\noperationally collaborate with controllers (control room personnel) during normal, abnormal or\nemergency situations.\nThe Level 2 CRM Plan does not address the frequency of training, does not define the expected\ncontent of the training, nor does it define the expectations for conducting combined training with\nthe “others” and controllers. Team training should include not only mock drills, but also review\nof lessons learned from accidents and near misses. There should also be an element that includes\nsome type of interpersonal skill training. Interpersonal skill training can include team building\nexercises, topics related to behavioral styles, communication styles, leadership or conflict\nresolution as examples. They can also include a review of drill performance related to\nleadership, communication styles, problem solving or role changing as examples and how these\nmay be the same or different under different operating conditions.\nONEOK must amend its procedure to address the inadequacies of the control room team\ntraining, especially as it relates to those that would be reasonably expected to operationally\ncollaborate with controllers (control room personnel) during normal, abnormal, or emergency\nsituations.\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as\npart of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in\nthis Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your\nplans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend\nyour plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not\ncontesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within\n60 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good\ncause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended\nprocedures, this enforcement action will be closed.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LLC maintain documentation of the\n\n\n\n6\nsafety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment\n(preparation/revision of plans, procedures) and submit the total to Mary McDaniel, Director,\nSouthwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence\nconcerning this matter, please refer to CPF 4-2020-007M and, for each document you submit,\nplease provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nMary L. McDaniel, P.E.\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n\n42020007NOA_Closure Letter_01082021_(20-173056)_text.pdf\n\nELECTRONIC MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nJanuary 8, 2021\nTerry K. Spencer\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LLC\nPresident and CEO\n100 West Fifth Street\nTulsa, Oklahoma 74103\nCPF 4-2020-007 NOA\nDear Mr. Spencer:\nOn March 23 – March 27, 2020, a representative from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted an\ninspection of ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LLC (ONEOK) procedures and records for Control Room\nManagement (CRM), in Tulsa, Oklahoma, via a remote inspection. As a result of the inspection,\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LLC was issued a Notice of Amendment on August 26, 2020, which\nproposed amendment of your procedures.\nONEOK submitted its amended procedures on November 11, 2020 followed by a December 3,\n2020 submittal. My staff reviewed the amended procedures, and it appears that the inadequacies\noutlined in this Notice of Amendment have been corrected.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you\nfor your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nMary L. McDaniel, P.E.\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Gary Numendahl, Director DOT Compliance, ONEOK, gary.nunedahl@oneok.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":17367}