# TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP) — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 42021034NOPV
- **title:** TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP) — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2021-12-21
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.613(a), 192.613(b), 192.705(a).
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42021034nopv.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42021034nopv.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42021034nopv
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42021034NOPV
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP). PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.613(a),  192.613(b),  192.705(a). The case was opened on 2021-12-21 and is reported as closed as of 2024-05-30. Proposed civil penalty: $640,300. Assessed civil penalty: $640,300. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

42021034NOPV_Closure Letter_05302024_(20-183709).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_Closure%20Letter_05302024_(20-183709).pdf

42021034NOPV_Closure Letter_05302024_(20-183709)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_Closure%20Letter_05302024_(20-183709)_text.pdf

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_Final%20Order_02032023_(20-183709).pdf

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_Final%20Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 1)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_Op%20Resp%20to%20Notice%20and%20Req%20for%20Hearing%20and%20Stmnt%20of%20Issues%20(Part%201)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 2)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_Op%20Resp%20to%20Notice%20and%20Req%20for%20Hearing%20and%20Stmnt%20of%20Issues%20(Part%202)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf

42021034NOPV_Operator Post-Hearing Submission_07182022_(20-183709).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_Operator%20Post-Hearing%20Submission_07182022_(20-183709).pdf

42021034NOPV_Operator Pre-Hearing Submission_05272022_(20-183709).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_Operator%20Pre-Hearing%20Submission_05272022_(20-183709).pdf

42021034NOPV_PCP PCO_12212021_(20-183709).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_PCP%20PCO_12212021_(20-183709).pdf

42021034NOPV_PCP PCO_12212021_(20-183709)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_PCP%20PCO_12212021_(20-183709)_text.pdf

42021034NOPV_PHC Hearing Scheduled_03212022_(20-183709).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_PHC%20Hearing%20Scheduled_03212022_(20-183709).pdf

42021034NOPV_PHC Hearing Scheduled_03212022_(20-183709)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42021034NOPV/42021034NOPV_PHC%20Hearing%20Scheduled_03212022_(20-183709)_text.pdf

42021034NOPV_PHC Hearing Scheduled_03212022_(20-183709)_text.pdf

March 21, 2022
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: catherine.little@troutman.com and mary.mcdaniel@dot.gov
Ms. Catherine D. Little, Esq.
Counsel for Texas Eastern Transmission, LP
Troutman Pepper, LLP
600 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 3000
Atlanta, GA 30308
Ms. Mary McDaniel
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
8701 South Gessner Road, Suite 630
Houston, Texas 77074
Re: Notice of Hearing, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP
CPF No. 4-2021-034-NOPV
Dear Ms. Little and Ms. McDaniel:
In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, an informal hearing will be held regarding the Notice of
Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order issued by the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration in the above-referenced case. The hearing will take
place on June 8, 2022, beginning at 8:30 a.m. Central Time.
The hearing will be held via videoconference. I will provide the videoconference information prior
to the hearing. At least 10 calendar days prior to the hearing (or by May 31, 2022), both parties
must submit and exchange any additional written materials they intend to present at the hearing and
the name and email address of each attendee. This information should be provided electronically.
Materials not submitted by this date may be excluded.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
Larry White
Presiding Official
cc: Mr. William T. Yardley, Executive Vice President and President, Gas Transmission and
Midstream, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, bill.yardley@enbridge.com
Ms. Melanie Lampton, Esq., Counsel, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety,
melanie.lampton@dot.gov

42021034NOPV_Final Order_02032023_(20-183709)_text.pdf

February 3, 2023
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: cynthia.hansen@enbridge.com
Ms. Cynthia L. Hansen
Executive Vice President and President
Gas Transmission and Midstream
Enbridge Inc.
915 North Eldridge Parkway
Houston, Texas 77079
Re: CPF No. 4-2021-034-NOPV
Dear Ms. Hansen:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, assesses a civil penalty of $640,300, and specifies actions that need to be taken by
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty
payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the
terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this
enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the
date of transmission and acknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure (Final Order)
cc: Mr. Bryan Lethcoe, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
Ms. Catherine Little, Esq., Counsel for Enbridge Inc., Bracewell, LLP,
catherine.little@bracewell.com



Ms. Annie Cook, Esq., Counsel for Enbridge Inc., Bracewell, LLP,
annie.cook@bracewell.com
Ms. Karen Stallings, Esq., Associate General Counsel – Permitting, ROW and
Operations, Enbridge Inc., karen.stallings@enbridge.com
Mr. David Bryson, Senior Vice President and Chief Operations Officer, Gas
Transmission and Midstream, Enbridge Inc., david.bryson@enbridge.com
Mr. Nathan Atanu, Manager, Operational Compliance, Enbridge Inc.,
nathan.atanu@enbridge.com
CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2021-034-NOPV
a subsidiary of Enbridge Inc., )
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
Following two reportable incidents that occurred on Texas Eastern Transmission, LP’s 1
(TETLP) pipeline facilities located near Danville and Hillsboro, Kentucky in August 2019 and
May 2020, respectively, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49
United States Code (U.S.C.), initiated an investigation and inspection of TETLP’s facilities and
records.
The first incident occurred on August 1, 2019, at approximately 1:23 am Eastern Daylight Time
(EDT) on TETLP’s 30-inch diameter Line 15 near Danville, Kentucky. Line 15 transports
natural gas from the Danville Compressor Station to the Tompkinsville Compressor Station in
Kentucky (Danville incident). The line failed at mile post (MP) 423.3, resulting in the release of
approximately 66 million cubic feet (MMCF) of natural gas. The release of natural gas ignited
and resulted in the death of one person and the hospitalization of six others. First responders
evacuated approximately 75 members of the public. The resulting fire destroyed multiple
structures and burned vegetation over approximately 30 acres of land. TETLP estimated
damages to exceed $19 million. On August 8, 2019, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order
(CAO) that required TETLP to take corrective actions including a root cause analysis of the
failure.
2
Approximately nine months after the Danville incident, TETLP experienced another incident on
one of the pipelines subject to the CAO. On May 4, 2020, at approximately 4:36 pm EDT
1 TETLP is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Spectra Energy Partners, LP, which is, in turn, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Enbridge Inc. Enbridge Inc. website, National Gas Transmission and Midstream, available at
https://www.enbridge.com/About-Us/Natural-Gas-Transmission-and-Midstream.aspx (last accessed January 17,
2023).
2 In the Matter of Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 2-2019-1002H (Aug. 8,
2019).



TETLP experienced a second incident on its 30-inch diameter Line 10 located near Hillsboro in
Fleming County, Kentucky (Hillsboro incident). Line 10, which transports natural gas from
Wheelersburg Compressor Station to Owingsville Compressor Station in Kentucky, failed at MP
509.898. The failure resulted in a release of approximately 52 MMCF of natural gas, which
subsequently ignited, burning a heavily wooded area on a hillside.3 TETLP estimated damages
for this incident at approximately $12 million. The CAO was amended on two occasions and the
amendments included preliminary findings that the cause of the girth weld failures appeared to
be due to land movement and that the issue of land movement was potentially system-wide.
4
As part of its investigation of these incidents, OPS reviewed the operating history of the parallel
pipelines running along TETLP’s right-of-way and inspected its operation and maintenance
procedures for selected locations related to Lines 10, 15, and 25 in Mississippi, Alabama,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
As a result of the inspections and investigations, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS
(Director), issued to Respondent, by letter dated December 21, 2021, a Notice of Probable
Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance
with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that TETLP had committed two
violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $640,300 for the
alleged violations. The Notice also proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to
correct one of the alleged violations.
TETLP responded to the Notice by letter dated February 21, 2022 (Response), as supplemented
by material submitted on May 27, 2022 (Pre-hearing submission). Respondent contested one of
the allegations and requested an informal hearing. A hearing was subsequently held on June 8,
2022, in Houston, Texas before a Presiding Official with the PHMSA Office of Chief Counsel.
At the hearing, Respondent was represented by counsel. After the hearing, Respondent provided
additional written material on July 18, 2022 (Post-hearing submission). On August 18, 2022, the
Director provided a region recommendation (Recommendation). On September 1, 2022,
Respondent submitted a Reply to the region recommendation (Reply).
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.613, which states:
§ 192.613 Continuing surveillance.
(a) Each operator shall have a procedure for continuing
surveillance of its facilities to determine and take
appropriate action concerning changes in class location,
3 PHMSA Accident Report, Form PHMSA F 7100.2 - 20200057-33836, dated June 6, 2020.
4 In the Matter of Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, Second Amended Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 2-2019-
1002H (June 1, 2020), at 5.



failures, leakage history, corrosion, substantial changes in
cathodic protection requirements, and other unusual
operating and maintenance conditions.
(b) If a segment of pipeline is determined to be in
unsatisfactory condition but no immediate hazard exists,
the operator shall initiate a program to recondition or phase
out the segment involved, or, if the segment cannot be
reconditioned or phased out, reduce the maximum
allowable operating pressure in accordance with § 192.619
(a) and (b).
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.613 by failing to initiate a program
to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of
its pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition. Specifically, the Notice alleged that
TETLP did not initiate such a program to address the adverse effects of geohazards.5
At the hearing, OPS laid out the relevant operating history of the pipeline system as it involved
geohazards as follows:
• On July 3, 1990, in Gaysport, Ohio, TETLP reported that landslide movement caused its
24-inch natural gas pipeline to fail. TETLP indicated that the pipeline was located in a
major landslide area that encompassed most of the pipeline right-of-way.
• On May 6, 1998, in Beallsville, Ohio, TETLP reported that forces associated with soil
slippage along the hillside caused 30-inch natural gas pipeline to rupture at a girth weld.
• On December 8, 2015, in Trousdale County, Tennessee, TETLP reported that a slow
natural gas leak occurred on 30-inch Line 10 (MP 307.70) resulting from a crack in a
girth weld caused by a lack of penetration weld defect that was subject to secondary
loading from geohazards.
• On January 21, 2019, in Noble County, Ohio, TETLP’s Line 10 failed at a girth weld,
causing two injuries and destroying four buildings. PHMSA determined that ground
movement overstressed a girth weld and caused the failure.
• On May 4, 2020, near Hillsboro, Kentucky, TETLP’s Line 10 failed again, at a girth
weld, causing an explosion and fire. PHMSA, NTSB, and TETLP determined that
ground movement that overstressed a girth weld caused the failure.6
5 Notice, at 3.
6 Recommendation, at 3-4.



OPS noted that it had published an Advisory Bulletin in the Federal Register on May 2, 2019,
concerning geohazards.
7 The Advisory Bulletin discussed the need for comprehensive
surveillance and monitoring procedures to address geohazards including:
• Identification of areas surrounding the pipeline that may be prone to large earth
movement, including but not limited to slope instability, subsidence, frost heave, soil
settlement, erosion, earthquakes, and other dynamic geologic conditions that may pose a
safety risk;
• Utilization of geotechnical engineers during the design, construction, and ongoing
operations of a pipeline system to ensure that sufficient information is available to avoid
or minimize the impact of earth movement on the integrity of the pipeline system;
• Development of design, construction, and monitoring plans and procedures for each
identified location, based on the site-specific hazards identified; and
• Monitoring plans that may include identifying geodetic monitoring points (i.e., survey
bench marks) to track potential ground movement; conducting stress/strain analysis
utilizing in-line inspection tools equipped with Inertia Mapping Unit technology and
High Resolution Deformation in-line inspection for pipe bending and denting from
movement; and reducing the operating pressure temporarily or shutting-in the affected
pipeline segment completely.
In its Response and at the hearing, TETLP contested the allegation in the Notice, contending that
PHMSA’s allegation was “divorced from the law and the facts.”8 Respondent stated that
“PHMSA misapplies the regulation, mischaracterizes the record, and ignores the existence of
TETLP’s geohazard procedures and the extensive work being done to address geohazards while
incorporating lessons learned in the field and in the industry.”9 Respondent argued that:
49 C.F.R. § 192.613 is a performance-based regulation that
requires operators to “have a procedure for continuing
surveillance” for certain enumerated conditions including in
relevant part, “other unusual operating and maintenance
conditions.” There is no reference to the requisite specificity or
comprehensiveness of the “procedure.” There is also no specific
reference to geohazards or landslides, although TETLP agrees that
they are captured by “other unusual operating and maintenance
conditions.”10
7 Advisory Bulletin, Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and
Other Geological Hazards, 84 Fed. Reg. at 18920-21 (May 2, 2019).
8 Post-hearing submission, at 2.
9 Id.
10 Post-hearing submission, at 3.



With respect to the alleged inadequacy of its procedures, Respondent argued that the lack of
specifics prescribing the content of an operator’s procedures for continuing surveillance in
§192.613 should mean that its failure to initiate a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce
the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an
unsatisfactory condition was permissible under the regulations. In other words, Respondent
argued that if its procedures met the applicable requirements and did not trigger the initiation of
such a program, its failure to initiate and conduct the program could not constitute non-
compliance regardless of the series of operating failures that were occurring.
TETLP argued that its pre-May 2020 procedures did meet the
minimum standards in the regulation and provided fourteen of its
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that TETLP stated covered
geohazard management for its pipeline systems. Respondent
explained that it was also taking steps in its field work in the
months prior to the Hillsboro incident to address geohazards.
TETLP stated that it implemented revised procedures for
geohazards in May 2020 that had substantially more specificity
and explained that it had been developing these revised procedures
(which it called “interim” procedures) for geohazards prior to the
Hillsboro incident, but they were not provided to OPS during the
inspection because OPS did not ask for them. 11
Finally, Respondent argued that if the failure incidents involving geohazards constituted a basis
for the need to initiate a remedial program, it would mean that PHMSA was applying a strict
liability standard in this case. Respondent stated “The existence of an incident does not infer or
equate to the absence of a program or actions in the field to address certain conditions. Neither
the Pipeline Safety Act nor PHMSA regulations provide for strict liability because an incident
occurred.”12
Having carefully considered Respondent’s arguments, I find them to be unpersuasive. With
regard to the fourteen procedures that were in effect prior to the May 2020 revisions, they were
not focused on geohazards and addressed several operational topics, such as integrity
management, pipeline patrolling, direct assessment, in-line tool inspections, mining, right-of-way
maintenance, and encroachment. Some of these procedures either applied only to High
Consequence Areas, only to long-mining areas, or were general patrolling procedures not
specifically covering continuing surveillance of areas prone to geohazards.
Notably, the Director reviewed all fourteen of these procedures and determined that they did not
provide Respondent’s personnel with effective guidance for monitoring and addressing the threat
of geohazards causing an unsatisfactory condition on its pipeline. With respect to what
Respondent referred to as the “most pertinent” five procedures, the Director explained that:
11 Post-hearing submission, at 8.
12 Post-hearing submission, at 12.



While SOP 1-6060, “Mining Subsidence and Soil Slippage” did
mention geohazards, this procedure is only applicable to areas
affected by longwall mining yet dozens of other geohazard sites on
TETLP’s system are also not in longwall mining areas.
TETLP also cited two sentences from SOP 1-5010, “Right-of-Way
Maintenance,” only one of which refers to geohazards. This
single sentence refers to noting evidence of “erosion, scour,
subsidence, or slides,” during right-of-way patrols. A visual
observation, however, cannot detect all types of hazardous land
movement, nor does this procedure require any follow-up or
mitigative actions for land movement such as scour, subsidence, or
landslides.
TETLP also cited one sentence from SOP 1-6040, “Aerial Pipeline
Patrol,” in support of its argument that this was part of its
geohazard procedures. It required pilots to observe and document
“soil slippage” and “landslide areas” once per year. However, in
practice, this procedure failed to identify geohazards. For
example, TETLP personnel were aware of potential land
movement prior to both incidents through an aerial patrol report
but “did not feel [the slope] was enough of a concern to call
Central Region Operations integrity engineers.” TETLP did not
have technical criteria to determine when to report land
movements or geohazards because there were no procedures with
such criteria. Nor did TETLP have specific training for patrolling
pilots to identify the preliminary signs of land movement or
precursors to a landslide. Absent these critical geohazard
procedures, TETLP personnel were forced to make arbitrary,
uniformed decisions when reporting land movement and
geohazards.
TETLP also cited SOP 1-6010, “Pipeline Patrol and Leakage
Survey Frequency Criteria,” because it references “scour, seismic
activity, soil slides, [and] subsidence,” once. One reference to
geohazards does render this procedure a geohazard procedure. As
is the case with all fourteen SOPs, this was a general operating
procedure not intended to monitor and manage geohazards.
TETLP also cites its Integrity Management Program - Threat
Response Guidance – Section 490 (TRDG 490), as evidence it had
existing geohazard procedures. However, this procedure only
applies to High Consequence Areas (HCAs), which account for
only eight percent of TETLP’s pipeline facilities. Most of the
identified geohazards sites were not in HCAs, and the Fleming and
Noble County incidents did not occur in HCAs. A procedure



addressing geohazards only in HCAs does not meet the continuing
surveillance requirements of § 192.613.13
The other nine SOPs are general operating procedures and do not mention geohazards. TETLP
failed to identify any portion of these procedures that are relevant to managing and monitoring
geohazards.
In its response and at the hearing, Respondent discussed at length its efforts to work with leading
technical experts and Enbridge personnel, leading a joint industry project, and its intention to
further develop revised procedures in the months prior to the adoption of the revised procedures
in May of 2020.14 Respondent also discussed at length various field activities it had voluntarily
undertaken and how it was incorporating lessons learned.15 While Respondent certainly deserves
credit for these efforts, this information does not overcome the absence of effective procedures
actually being in place for geohazards along the subject pipelines for purposes of determining
compliance.
This conclusion is also evidenced by the NTSB report issued on May 31, 2022 which states:
In 2018, Enbridge identified the rupture location as a potential
geohazard. They took action to analyze the active landslide and
started taking steps to mitigate the hazard before the rupture.
However, Enbridge’s pre-rupture analysis estimated a girth weld
tensile strain demand that was at least three times lower than post-
rupture analysis later indicated. The post-rupture analysis
demonstrated that in April 2018 or earlier Enbridge could have
foreseen the likelihood that the tensile strain demand would exceed
the strain capacity due to documented land movement at the site.
16
Moreover, even if adequate procedures has been in effect, as of the time of the May 2020 failure,
the actual failure incident history of the pipelines, including the analysis of prior failures, should
have played a central role in Respondent’s decisions concerning the need to initiate a program to
recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its
pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition as required by the regulations. Three
major pipeline ruptures involving geohazards in a relatively short time span cannot be considered
to be a satisfactory condition for a pipeline that transports hazardous products. Contrary to
Respondent’s argument, this is not a matter of strict liability. The mere fact that the pipeline had
one or more failures and released natural gas does not in-and-of itself constitute a violation.
However, when a regulation such as §192.613 that requires certain actions in the presence of an
unsatisfactory condition (such as a series of failures that involve similar causes) is allegedly
13 Recommendation, at 7-8.
14 Post-hearing submission, at 7-9.
15 Post-hearing submission, at 10.
16 NTSB, Accident Report PIR–22/01, Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture, Hillsboro, Kentucky, May 4,
2020 (May 31, 2022), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PIR2201.pdf (NTSB Report).



violated, the fact that the failures occurred is of course a relevant fact. Therefore, nothing in this
Order should be construed as the application of a strict liability standard.
With regard to TETLP’s argument that it was developing “interim” procedures with substantially
more specificity on geohazards, it must be recognized that only one set of procedures is in effect
at any one time and the relevant procedures for purposes of determining compliance were the
ones in place prior to the May 2020 revisions. For a revised procedure to be operative, it must be
finalized by the appropriate company official, have an effective date, and formally replace the
old procedure in the operating and maintenance manual of procedures so that all personnel know
to follow it. That did not occur here. Thus, even if Respondent had provided the “interim”
procedures that were under development prior to the Hillsboro incident, they would not have
negated the allegation.
Finally, it should be noted that if PHMSA were to adopt Respondent’s position that the
application of its procedures such as they existed did not call for the initiation of a remedial
program under §192.613 and thus were effectively exculpatory, it would have the perverse effect
of incentivizing operators to have inordinately sparse procedures that lacked appropriate criteria
and steps for taking appropriate action to address unsatisfactory conditions. Vague procedures
that lack the specificity needed to accomplish the purpose of the underlying regulations can
impede an operator from taking needed action even when repeated failure incidents manifestly
indicate such a need. This would be entirely at odds with the purpose and intent of the Pipeline
Safety Act and the Part 192 regulations issued thereunder.
Respondent did not demonstrate that it had initiated a program to recondition, phase out, or
reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to
an unsatisfactory condition prior to the issuance of the Notice as required by the plain language
of §192.613. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence and the legal issues presented, I
find that a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.613
by failing to initiate a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the maximum allowable
operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an unsatisfactory condition,
specifically the adverse effects of geohazards.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.705(a), which states:
§ 192.705 Transmission lines: Patrolling.
(a) Each operator shall have a patrol program to
observe surface conditions on and adjacent to the
transmission line right-of-way for indications of leaks,
construction activity, and other factors affecting safety and
operation.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.705(a) by failing to patrol in order
to observe the surface conditions on and adjacent to its transmission line rights-of-way for
indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors affecting safety and operation.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that TETLP failed to maintain its rights-of-way to allow for the
observation of surface conditions on and adjacent to the transmission line rights-of-way when



viewed via aerial patrols.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.705(a) by failing to patrol in
order to observe the surface conditions on and adjacent to its transmission line rights-of-way for
indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors affecting safety and operation.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
action taken against Respondent.
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed
$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any
related series of violations.17
In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I
must consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,
including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history
of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue
doing business; the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety
regulations; and self-disclosure or actions to correct a violation prior to discovery by PHMSA.
In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction
because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice
proposed a total civil penalty of $640,300 for the violations cited above.
Item 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $552,900 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 192.613, for failing to initiate a program to recondition, phase out, or reduce the
maximum allowable operating pressure for segments of its pipeline systems subject to an
unsatisfactory condition.
Respondent argued that the proposed civil penalty amount in the Notice should be reduced or
eliminated. With respect to the nature, circumstances, gravity, and culpability factors, one of
Respondent’s witnesses maintained that there was no causal link between the alleged violation
and the Hillsboro incident in Fleming County, Kentucky.18
As discussed during the hearing, however, TETLP determined there was an increase in strain
demand at the Fleming County site, a known landslide location in September 2019 based on June
2019 inertial measurement unit (IMU) strain data, yet TETLP concluded that urgent action was
not required and opted to wait for warmer weather to address the issue.19 While TETLP was
17 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223 for adjusted amounts.
18 Post-hearing submission, at 14.
19 Transcript, at 62-63.



waiting to take action, it experienced the Hillsboro incident due to geohazards on May 4, 2020,
at the very location previously identified as unsatisfactory in September 2019. As OPS pointed
out, this second pipeline failure that occurred is expressly the risk § 192.613 is designed to
prevent.
As to good faith, Respondent argued that the Company was undertaking good faith efforts to
comply with the minimal performance-based regulation, in the absence of express regulatory
requirements, prior enforcement, and industry standards on geohazard management. Notably,
the NTSB identified the probable cause of the Hillsboro incident as TETLP’s “analysis of an
active landslide that did not fully address uncertainties associated with pipeline defects, landslide
movement, and corresponding pipeline response.”20 Such a finding is consistent with the
culpability level reflected in the proposed penalty amount and the circumstances do not justify a
good faith credit. It should also be noted that none of the penalty consideration factors reflected
in the proposed civil penalty amount in the Notice reflected any heightened level of
egregiousness or deliberate decision not to comply. Regarding “other matters as justice may
require,” TETLP cited the work it did with experts to address its programs and procedures, to
implement those changes in the field, and leading the joint industry program to establish an
industry standard to management geohazards. These efforts, however, are not circumstances
beyond the operator’s control that prevented compliance with this important regulation and do
not implicate this factor. I find that the record supports the civil penalty amount proposed in the
Notice. Respondent presented no information that would warrant a reduction in the civil penalty
proposed in the Notice for this item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil
penalty of $552,900 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.613.
Item 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $87,400 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 192.705(a), for failing to patrol in order to observe the surface conditions on and adjacent to its
transmission line rights-of-way for indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors
affecting safety and operation. With regard to the nature, circumstances, and gravity of this
violation, observing surface conditions to address any potential right-of-way encroachments is a
key part of safely operating a pipeline. With respect to the culpability and good faith factors, the
Notice did not reflect any heightened level of egregiousness or deliberate decision not to comply
and I find that the record supports the civil penalty amount proposed in the Notice. Respondent
presented no information that would warrant a reduction in the civil penalty proposed in the
Notice for this item. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment
criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $87,400 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.705.
In summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the
Items cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $640,300.
Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days after receipt of this Final Order.
Federal regulations (49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer
through the Federal Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S.
Treasury. Detailed instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire
transfers should be directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation
20 NTSB Report, at 6.



Administration, Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma 79169. The Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.
Failure to pay the civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate in
accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to those
same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if payment
is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty may result
in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district court of the
United States.
COMPLIANCE ORDER
The Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Item 2 in the Notice for violation of 49
C.F.R. § 192.705(a). Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the
transportation of gas or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the
applicable safety standards established under chapter 601.
With regard to the violation of §192.705(a) (Item 2), Respondent argued the compliance terms
should be withdrawn/modified. [Summarize and address Respondent’s argument.]
For the above reasons, the Compliance Order is not withdrawn/modified as set forth below.
Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217, Respondent is
ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations
applicable to its operations:
1. With respect to the violation of § 192.705(a) (Item 2) pertaining to TETLP’s failure to
patrol in order to observe the surface conditions on and adjacent to its transmission line
rights-of-way for indications of leaks, construction activities, and other factors affecting
safety and operation, TETLP must:
(a) Review right-of-way maintenance programs, to include personnel training
across the TETLP system, to ensure surface conditions are maintained in a manner
appropriate for observations during patrols. The review must examine instances that
may have obstructed personnel in past maintenance efforts; and
(b) Develop and implement a program to identify and address locations of the
TETLP system that impede personnel from observing the surface conditions on and
adjacent to the right-of-way for indications of ground movement, indications of leaks,
or other factors that may affect the safe operation of the pipeline. The program must
define timeframes to complete all planned implementation.
2. TETLP must submit the review and written program required by this Compliance
Order to Mary L. McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration within 45 days of receipt of this Order.



The Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a
written request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an
extension.
PHMSA requests that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs
associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the Director. It is
requested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated with
preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated with
replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties
not to exceed $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (see 49 C.F.R. § 190.223), for each violation for
each day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a
district court of the United States.
Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final
Order to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of
Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. The written petition must be received no later than
20 days after receipt of the Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a
statement of the issue(s) and meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a
petition automatically stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the
order, including corrective action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon
request, grants a stay.
The terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49
C.F.R. § 190.5.
February 3, 2023
___________________________________ __________________________
Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

42021034NOPV_Op Resp to Notice and Req for Hearing and Stmnt of Issues (Part 2)_02212022_(20-183709).pdf

Before the
U.S. Department of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Office of Pipeline Safety
Washington, D.C.
In the Matter of )
) CPF No. 4-2021-034-NOPV
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP ) Notice of Probable V
- **truncated:** true
- **body characters:** 60751