{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 42022055NOPSO","title":"OSAGE PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC — Safety Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2022-08-12","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED safety order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42022055nopso.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42022055nopso.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42022055nopso","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42022055NOPSO","body":"Safety Order involving OSAGE PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2022-08-12 and is reported as closed as of 2026-05-11. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n42022055NOPSO_Closure Letter_05112026_(22-248385).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42022055NOPSO/42022055NOPSO_Closure%20Letter_05112026_(22-248385).pdf\n\n42022055NOPSO_Closure Letter_05112026_(22-248385)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42022055NOPSO/42022055NOPSO_Closure%20Letter_05112026_(22-248385)_text.pdf\n\n42022055NOPSO_Consent Agreement and Order_10192022_(22-248385).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42022055NOPSO/42022055NOPSO_Consent%20Agreement%20and%20Order_10192022_(22-248385).pdf\n\n42022055NOPSO_Consent Agreement and Order_10192022_(22-248385)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42022055NOPSO/42022055NOPSO_Consent%20Agreement%20and%20Order_10192022_(22-248385)_text.pdf\n\n42022055NOPSO_Notice of Proposed Safety Order_08122022_(22-248385).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42022055NOPSO/42022055NOPSO_Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Safety%20Order_08122022_(22-248385).pdf\n\n42022055NOPSO_Notice of Proposed Safety Order_08122022_(22-248385)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42022055NOPSO/42022055NOPSO_Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Safety%20Order_08122022_(22-248385)_text.pdf\n\n42022055NOPSO_Notice of Proposed Safety Order_08122022_(22-248385)_text.pdf\n\nVIA E-MAIL TO: richard.voliva@hollyenergy.com\nAugust 12, 2022\nRichard Voliva\nPresident\nHolly Energy Partners, L.P.\n2828 North Harwood Street, Suite 1300\nDallas, Texas 75201\nCPF 4-2022-055-NOPSO\nDear Mr. Voliva:\nEnclosed is a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in the above-referenced case. The Notice proposes\nthat Osage Pipe Line Company, LLC take certain measures with respect to its 20-inch crude oil\nOsage pipeline. The options for responding are set forth in the Notice. Service of this Notice by\nelectronic mail is deemed effective upon the date of transmission, or as otherwise provided under\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nWe look forward to a successful resolution to ensure pipeline safety. Please direct any questions\non this matter to me at 713-272-2847.\nSincerely,\nMary L. McDaniel, P.E.\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Notice of Proposed Safety Order\nCopy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.239\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, PHMSA\nMs. Lori Coupland, Vice President, Compliance and EHS, Holly Energy Partners, LP,\nlori.coupland@hollyenergy.com\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nSOUTHWEST REGION\nHOUSTON, TX 77074\n_________________________________________ )\nIn the Matter of )\nOsage Pipe Line Company, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2022-055-NOPSO\na subsidiary of Holly Energy Partners, LP )\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n_________________________________________ )\nNOTICE OF PROPOSED SAFETY ORDER\nBackground and Purpose:\nPursuant to Chapter 601 of Title 49, United States Code, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the\nsafety of Osage Pipe Line Company, LLC’s (Osage) 136-mile, 20-inch crude oil pipeline (Osage\nPipeline) that originates in Cushing, Oklahoma, and terminates in El Dorado, Kansas following an\naccident that occurred on July 8, 2022.\nAt approximately 12:29 a.m. CDT on July 8, 2022, Osage’s control room reported a loss of suction\non the 20-inch crude oil Osage pipeline. At 12:30 a.m., the control room received a leak alarm,\nhowever both the shift foreman and controller were on a break and did not notice the alarm. At\n12:40 a.m., the controller attempted to restart the pipeline, and the control center received a third\nleak alarm. At 12:43 am, the line was shut down and block valves were closed. Control room\npersonnel blocked in the pig trap at the Cushing pump station and closed the South Cimarron valve,\ncontacted the manager of pipeline operations, then blocked in all river crossings on the Osage\npipeline.\nOsage dispatched a technician to the Cushing pump station who reported no sign of a release at\n2:26 a.m. An hour later, the technician reported signs of hydrocarbon on the ground and in and\naround Skull Creek, a tributary of the Cimarron River, and the operator confirmed discovery of\nthe accident. Osage originally estimated a release of 1,001-barrels (bbls) of crude oil. As of\nAugust 3, 2022, Osage has recovered approximately 5,700 bbls of crude oil and 12,020 bbls of\nwater and oil. The crude oil released onto land and reached Skull Creek. The release migrated\nabout 0.75 miles northeast of the accident location.\nAs a result of the preliminary investigation, it appears that conditions exist on the Osage Pipeline\nthat pose an integrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment. Accordingly, pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA OPS issues this Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice), notifying\n\n\n\nyou of the preliminary findings of the investigation, and proposing that you take certain measures\nto ensure that the public, property, and the environment are protected from this integrity risk.\nPreliminary Findings:\nThe preliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\n• Osage operates a 136-mile, 20-inch crude oil pipeline (Osage Pipeline) that originates at a\npump station in Cushing, Oklahoma, and terminates in El Dorado, Kansas. There are three\nintermediate pump stations along the pipeline (Ralston, Hardy, and Wilmont). At the\ntermination point, the pipeline connects with a tank farm owned by Holly Energy Partners\n- Operating, L.P. This 11-tank farm has a total capacity of 1.1 million barrels.\n• On July 8, 2022, at 12:29 a.m. CDT, Osage’s control room reported a loss of suction on\nthe Osage Pipeline. Osage confirmed discovery of the leak at 3:26 am after observing\nhydrocarbons on the ground in and around Skull Creek. As of August 8, 2022, Osage\nestimated a release of 5,700 bbls of crude oil and 12,020 bbls of water and oil. There were\nno injuries or fatalities.\n• The Osage Pipeline released crude oil onto land and into a creek in a remote area of\nCushing, Oklahoma on the tribal land of the Sac and Fox Nation. Additionally, the oil\nreached Skull Creek, a tributary of Cimmaron River. The release migrated about 0.75\nmiles northeast of the accident location.\n• After the accident, Osage voluntarily provided a restart and repair plan to the Southwest\nRegion, OPS. After review and approval by the SWR, the pipeline resumed operation under\na 20% pressure reduction restriction (660 psi) on July 17, 2022.\n• Although the root cause of the failure has yet to be confirmed, preliminary evidence\nsuggests that longitudinal seam failure is the probable cause of the failure. During the\nrepair process, Osage had to dig back and expose more pipe to find an area acceptable to\nperform the cut to install a pipe replacement segment due to crack-like features in the weld.\nAt this time, Osage is performing additional testing and analysis to identify the potential\nthreats to the safe operations of its pipeline.\n• The 20-inch crude oil steel pipeline was installed in 1975. Its maximum operating pressure\n(MOP) is 1,080 psi. At the time of the accident, the operating pressure was 825 psi. The\nOsage Pipeline is coated with coal tar enamel and has an impressed current cathodic\nprotection system.\n• The pipeline has experienced four previous releases on this unit since 2002. Two were\ncaused by internal corrosion and two were caused by material failures.\n• In 2014, Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P. (Magellan), the previous operator, conducted\nan In-Line Inspection (ILI) using a T.D. Williamson (TDW) Magnetic Flux Leakage\n\n\n\nCircumferential (MFL-C) tool. The ILI reported 85 seam variation anomalies. TDW\nclassified the 85 seam variations as “Other anomalies” in the final report and described\nthem as “[n]on-detrimental irregularit[ies] due to the manufacturing of the seam weld.” In\n2016, Osage purchased the pipeline from Magellan. In 2018, Osage performed an ILI of\nthe pipeline using an Enduro tool. Osage determined during the post-accident examination\nthat one of the reported seam variation anomalies was in the area of the failure location.\n• Osage contacted the previous ILI vendor, TDW, to request a reassessment of the 2014 data\nto find defects similar to those of the accident site. TDW claims, that with the benefit of\nan improved analysis process, they have reclassified 54 of the original 85 anomalies as\n“Axial Planar” features with depths ranging from 10-36% wall thickness.\n• On July 15, 2022, Osage received the reassessment from TDW. Based upon proximity to\nupstream pump stations (ten miles or less), and percent of anomaly depth (greater than\ntwenty percent wall thickness), Osage chose to do validation digs at six locations for nine\naxial planar anomalies. On July 25, 2022, Osage began the validation digs.\n• On August 5, 2022, Osage completed an ILI run using a Xylem smart ball ILI tool along\nthe Osage Pipeline route to assist Osage in obtaining pressure and temperature data for the\nentire line to confirm the absence of small leaks and improve their hydraulic modeling.\n• Osage plans to perform two additional inspections with Baker Hughes (BH) ILI tools\nstarting mid to late August 2022 with an Ultra Sonic crack tool, followed by High\nResolution MFL/Caliper/Inertial Measuring Unit combination tool.\n• Osage sent the failed joint of pipe and a contiguous joint to a Quest Integrity metallurgical\nlaboratory for further analysis.\nProposed Issuance of Safety Order:\nSection 60117(m) of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Safety Order\n(Order), after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate.\nThe basis for making the determination that a pipeline facility has a condition or conditions that\npose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment is set forth both in the\nabove-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, a copy of which is enclosed.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact and considering the hazardous nature\nof the product, the unknown cause of the failure, the identification of additional anomalies that\nmay be similar to the failed anomaly, the characteristics of the geographical area of the pipeline,\nincluding its proximity to Tribal lands, and the likelihood that the additional weld issues exist\nthroughout the 136-mile pipeline, it appears that continued operation of the Osage Pipeline without\n\n\n\ncorrective measures may pose an integrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment.\nAccordingly, PHMSA issues this Notice to notify Osage of the proposed issuance of an Order and\nto propose that Osage take measures specified herein to address the potential risks identified in the\nPreliminary Findings and other risks that may be determined as a result of the proposed corrective\nmeasures.\nProposed Corrective Actions:\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117(m) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, PHMSA proposes to issue to Osage\nPipe Line Company, LLC a Safety Order incorporating the following remedial requirements with\nrespect to its Osage Pipeline that originates in Cushing, Oklahoma and terminates in El Dorado,\nKansas:\nNote: For the purposes of this Notice, “Director” means the Director, Southwest Region,\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety,\n8701 S. Gessner, Suite 630, Houston, Texas, 77074.\nDefinitions:\nAffected Pipeline – The “Affected Pipeline” means Osage’s entire 136 mile 20-inch pipeline\nthat originates in Lincoln County, Oklahoma and terminates in El Dorado, Kansas, where it\nconnects with Holly Energy Partners – Operating, L.P.\n1. Operating Pressure Restriction. Osage must maintain a twenty percent (20%) pressure\nreduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected\nPipeline such that the Affected Pipeline will not exceed eighty percent (80%) of the\nactual operating pressure in effect at the failure location immediately prior to the failure\non July 8, 2022.\na. This pressure restriction will remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from\nthe Director.\nb. Within 15 days of receipt of this Order, Osage must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of the Cushing, Ralston, Hardy, and Wilmont pump stations at\nthe time of failure and the reduced pressure restriction set-points at these same\nlocations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to\nbe adjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, Osage must consider any in-\nline inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected Pipeline to\nprovide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are completed.\n\n\n\ne. Osage must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating\npressure data, taking into account any ILI features or anomalies present in the\nAffected Pipeline. Osage must immediately reduce the operating pressure further\nto maintain the safe operations of the Affected Pipeline, if warranted by the monthly\nreview.\nf. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestriction upon a written request from Osage demonstrating that temporary\nmitigative and preventive measures are implemented prior to and during the\ntemporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The Director’s\ndetermination will be based on available information, including the failure cause\nand evidence that preventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide\nfor the safe operation of the Affected Pipeline during the temporary removal or\nmodification of the pressure restriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director\nin this regard will be decided by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n2. Review of Prior In-line Inspection (ILI) Results. Within 30 days of receipt of this\nOrder, Osage must conduct a review of any previous ILI results of the Affected\nPipeline. In its review, Osage must re-evaluate all ILI results from the past 10 calendar\nyears, including a review of the ILI vendors’ raw data and analysis. Osage must\ndetermine whether prior ILI runs indicated any anomalies at the failure location. Also,\nOsage must determine if any features with similar characteristics are present elsewhere\non the Affected Pipeline. Osage must submit documentation of this ILI review to the\nDirector within 45 days of receipt of this Order as follows:\na. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs.\nb. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all\nILI features present in the failed joint and other pipe removed.\nc. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all\nILI features with similar characteristics present elsewhere on the Affected Pipeline.\nd. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the reevaluation.\n3. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, Osage\nmust complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed\npipe, including an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Mechanical and\nmetallurgical testing must be conducted by the previously approved independent third-\nparty. Osage must complete the testing and analysis and ensure the testing laboratory\ndistributes all reports whether draft or final in their entirety to the Director at the same\ntime they are made available to Osage.\n4. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, Osage\nmust complete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this\nRCFA to the Director. The RCFA must be supplemented or facilitated by an\nindependent third-party approved by the Director. The RCFA must document the\ndecision-making process and all factors contributing to the failure. The final report\nmust include findings and any lessons learned and whether the findings and lessons\nlearned are applicable to other locations within Osage’s pipeline system.\n\n\n\n5. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, Osage must submit a remedial work\nplan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire\nRWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and\nremedial measures Osage will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Pipeline.\nIt must address all known or suspected factors and causes of the July 8, 2022,\nfailure. Osage must consider the risks and consequences of another failure to\ndevelop a prioritized schedule for RWP- related work along the Affected Pipeline.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Pipeline with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the July 8, 2022, failure.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and\npressure test failures) of the Affected Pipeline and to prepare a written report\ncontaining all the available information such as the locations, dates, and\ncauses of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis,\nand other corrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-\nexisting operational and assessment data for the Affected Pipeline. Pre-\nexisting operational data includes, but is not limited to, design, construction,\noperations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and\nany third-party consultation information. Pre-existing assessment data\nincludes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing,\ndirect assessments, close interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the failure on July\n8, 2022, are likely to exist elsewhere on the Affected Pipeline.\nv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the\nfailure on July 8, 2022, and other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii)\nabove) or any other integrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected\nPipeline. At a minimum, this process must consider all failure causes and\nspecify the use of one or more of the following:\n1) ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the pipeline\nsystem based on the cause of failure on July 8, 2022, and that can\nreliably detect and identify anomalies;\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing;\n3) Close-interval surveys;\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in\n\n\n\ncoordination with other utilities (e.g. underground utilities, overhead\npower lines, etc.) in the area;\n5) Coating surveys;\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys;\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations\nappropriate for the failure causes.\nNote: Osage may use the results of previous tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations if approved by the Director, provided the\nresults of the tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations are\nanalyzed with regard to the factors known or suspected to have caused\nthe July 8, 2022, failure.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria Osage will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\nintegrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be graded\nand a schedule for repairs or replacement.\nvii. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Pipeline, describe\nthe methods Osage will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective\nmeasures to remediate the conditions associated with the pipeline failure on\nJuly 8, 2022, and to address other known integrity threats along the Affected\nPipeline. The repair, replacement, or other corrective measures must meet\nthe criteria specified in (e)(vi) above.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\nmeasures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Pipeline\nconsidering the results of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and\ncorrective measures undertaken pursuant to the Order.\nf. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\ng. Osage must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and to incorporate modifications required\nby the Director.\nh. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval, the Director may\napprove plan revisions incrementally as needed.\ni. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to\nthe plan.\nOther Requirements:\n6. Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval\nof the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b)\napprove the submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any\n\n\n\ndeficiencies; (d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that\nRespondent modify the submission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event\nof approval, approval upon conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent\nshall proceed to take all action required by the submission as approved or modified by\nthe Director. If the Director disapproves all or any portion of the submission,\nRespondent must correct all deficiencies within the time specified by the Director and\nresubmit it for approval.\n7. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\n8. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data\nand results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the\nprogress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly\nreport is due on September 30, 2022. The Director may change the interval for the\nsubmission of these reports.\n9. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation\nof the costs associated with implementation of this Notice of Proposed Safety Order.\nInclude in each monthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1)\npreparation and revision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to\npipeline infrastructure, including repairs, replacements and other modifications; and\n(3) environmental remediation, if applicable.\nThe actions proposed by this Notice are in addition to, and do not waive, any requirements that\napply to Osage’s pipeline facilities under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any other order\nissued to Osage under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other provision of\nfederal or state law.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this proceeding, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that the Osage must perform. In that event, Osage will be\nnotified of any additional measures required and any amendments to the final Safety Order. To\nthe extent consistent with safety, Osage will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing\nprior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nResponse to this Notice:\nIn accordance with § 190.239, you have 30 days following receipt of this Notice to submit a written\nresponse to the Director. If you do not respond within 30 days, this constitutes a waiver of your\nrights to contest this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find\nfacts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a final Safety Order. In\nyour response, you may indicate that you intend to comply with the terms of the Notice as\nproposed, or you may request that an informal consultation be scheduled (you will also have the\nopportunity to request an administrative hearing before a final Safety Order is issued). Informal\nconsultation provides you with an opportunity to explain the circumstances associated with the\nrisk conditions alleged in the Notice and, as appropriate, to present a proposal for a work plan or\nother remedial measures without prejudice to your position in any subsequent hearing.\n\n\n\nIf you and PHMSA agree within 30 days of the informal consultation on a plan and schedule for\nyou to address each identified risk condition, the parties may enter into a written consent\nagreement, in which case PHMSA would then issue an administrative Consent Order incorporating\nthe terms of the agreement. If a consent agreement is not reached, or if you have elected not to\nrequest informal consultation, you may request an administrative hearing in writing within 30 days\nfollowing receipt of the Notice or within 10 days following the conclusion of an informal\nconsultation that did not result in a consent agreement, as applicable. Following a hearing, if the\nAssociate Administrator finds the facility to have a condition that poses a pipeline integrity risk to\nthe public, property, or the environment in accordance with § 190.239, the Associate Administrator\nmay issue a final Safety Order.\nBe advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to public\navailability. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential\ntreatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document, you must provide\na second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment\nredacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential\ntreatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 4-2022-055-NOPSO, and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\n_________________________________ _____________________\nMary L. McDaniel, P.E. Date Issued\nDirector, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n42022055NOPSO_Consent Agreement and Order_10192022_(22-248385)_text.pdf\n\nOctober 19, 2022\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: richard.voliva@hollyenergy.com\nRichard Voliva\nPresident\nHolly Energy Partners, L.P.\n2828 North Harwood Street, Suite 1300\nDallas, Texas 75201\nRe: CPF 4-2022-055-NOPSO\nDear Mr. Voliva:\nEnclosed please find a Consent Order incorporating the terms of the fully executed Consent\nAgreement between the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and\nOsage Pipe Line Company, LLC, which was executed on October 19, 2022. Service of the Consent\nOrder and Consent Agreement by e-mail is deemed effective upon the date of transmission, or as\notherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosures: Consent Order and Consent Agreement\ncc: Mr. Bryan Lethcoe, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. Rob Jamieson, VP of Operations, Holly Energy Partners, LP,\nrobert.jamieson@hollyenergy.com\nMs. Lori Coupland, Vice President, Compliance and EHS, Holly Energy Partners, LP,\nlori.coupland@hollyenergy.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n__________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nOsage Pipe Line Company, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2022-055-NOPSO\na subsidiary of Holly Energy Partners, LP, )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n__________________________________________)\nCONSENT ORDER\nBy letter dated August 12, 2022, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety, issued a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) to Osage\nPipe Line Company, LLC, a subsidiary of Holly Energy Partners, LP.\nIn accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, the Notice alleged that conditions exist on the Osage\nPipeline that pose an integrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment. The Notice also\nproposed that Respondent take certain corrective measures to remedy the alleged conditions and\nensure that the public, property, and the environment are protected from the potential risk.\nIn response to the Notice, Respondent requested an informal consultation, whereupon the parties\nengaged in good-faith settlement discussions that have resulted in the Consent Agreement attached\nto this Consent Order that settles all of the allegations in the Notice.\nAccordingly, the Consent Agreement is hereby approved and incorporated by reference into this\nConsent Order. The Respondent is hereby ordered to comply with the terms of the Consent\nAgreement, effective immediately.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., failure to comply with this Consent Order may result in the\nassessment of civil penalties as set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 190.223, or in referral to the Attorney\nGeneral for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States.\nThe terms and conditions of this Consent Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nOctober 19, 2022\n_____________________________ ________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n__________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nOsage Pipe Line Company, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2022-055-NOPSO\na subsidiary of Holly Energy Partners, LP, )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n__________________________________________)\nCONSENT AGREEMENT\nOn August 12, 2022, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety, Southwest Region, issued a Notice of\nProposed Safety Order (Notice) to Osage Pipe Line Company, LLC, a subsidiary of Holly Energy\nPartners, (Osage or Respondent). The Notice was issued after a reportable accident1 occurred on\nJuly 8, 2022, on Osage’s 136-mile, 20-inch crude oil pipeline (Osage Pipeline) that originates in\nCushing, Oklahoma, and terminates in El Dorado, Kansas.\nAt approximately 12:29 a.m. CDT on July 8, 2022, Osage’s control room reported a loss of suction\nat the Cushing pump station on the 20-inch crude oil Osage pipeline, and the Cushing pump station\nautomatically shut down. At 12:30 a.m., the control room received a leak alarm, however both the\nshift foreman and controller were on a break and did not notice the alarm. The downstream Ralston\nPump Station shut down automatically at 12:30 a.m. and the Hardy Pump Station shut down\nautomatically at 12:32 a.m. Other controllers in the control room noticed the leak alarm and a\nsenior controller phoned the upstream shipper at 12:33 a.m. to request that it shut down the booster\npump feeding the Cushing mainline pump, which the shipper then did. The control room received\na second leak alarm at 12:35 a.m. The Osage controller and shift foreman then returned and\ninvestigated the cause of the loss of suction. At 12:40 a.m., the controller and shift foreman\nattempted to restart the Cushing mainline pump, and the control center received a third leak alarm.\nAt 12:43 a.m., the controller shut down the line and began the block in sequence. As part of this\nprocess, control room personnel blocked in the pig trap at the Cushing pump station and closed\nthe South Cimarron valve, contacted the manager of pipeline operations, then blocked in all river\ncrossings on the Osage Pipeline.\nOsage dispatched a technician to the Cushing pump station at 12:50 a.m. who reported no sign of\na release at 2:26 a.m. The technician began to move down the line, and an hour later, the technician\nreported signs of hydrocarbon on the ground in and around Skull Creek, a tributary of the Cimarron\nRiver, and the operator confirmed discovery of the accident. On July 8, 2022, Osage originally\nestimated a release of 1,001-barrels (bbls) of crude oil. On August 5, 2022, Osage reported the\n1 See 49 C.F.R. § 195.50.\n\n\n\nestimated volume of commodity released on Form PHMSA F 7000-1 as 5,769 bbls and noted that\nthe total volume may range between 6,000 to 8,000 bbls. The crude oil released onto land and\nreached Skull Creek. The release migrated about 0.75 miles northeast of the accident location.\nAs a result of a preliminary investigation, PHMSA issued the Notice, which alleged that conditions\nexist on the Osage Pipeline that pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the\nenvironment, and proposed that Respondent take certain corrective measures to remedy the alleged\nconditions to ensure that the public, property, and the environment are protected from the potential\nrisk.\nOn August 26, 2022, Osage responded to the Notice requesting an informal consultation. An\ninformal consultation was held virtually on September 1 and continued on September 22, 2022.\nAs a result of the informal consultation, PHMSA and Respondent (the Parties) agreed that\nsettlement of this proceeding will avoid further administrative proceedings or litigation of the\nNotice and that entry into this Consent Agreement (Agreement) is the most appropriate means of\nresolving the issues raised in the Notice and is generally in the public interest. Therefore, pursuant\nto 49 C.F.R. Part 190, without adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent and\nagreement of the Parties, PHMSA and Osage agree as follows:\nI. General Provisions\n1. Respondent acknowledges that as the operator of the Osage Pipeline, Respondent\nand the Osage Pipeline are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal pipeline safety laws, 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60101, et seq., and the regulations and administrative orders issued thereunder. For purposes of\nthis Agreement, Respondent acknowledges that it received proper notice of PHMSA’s action in\nthis proceeding and that the Notice states claims upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 49\nU.S.C. § 60101, et seq., and the regulations and orders issued thereunder.\n2. Respondent does not admit or deny any of the alleged integrity risks identified in\nthe Notice but agrees, for purposes of this Agreement, to address the alleged integrity risks\nidentified in the Notice by completing the actions specified in Section II of this agreement\n(Corrective Measures) and to abide by the terms of this Agreement. This Agreement does not\nconstitute a finding of violation of any Federal law or regulation and may not be used in any civil\nor administrative proceeding of any kind as evidence or proof of any fact, fault or liability, or as\nevidence of the violation of any law, rule, regulation or requirement, except in a proceeding to\nenforce the provisions of this Agreement.\n3. After Respondent returns this signed Agreement, a representative of PHMSA will\npresent it to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, recommending that the Associate\nAdministrator adopt the terms of this Agreement by issuing an administrative order (Consent Order)\nincorporating the terms of this Agreement. The terms of this Agreement constitute an offer of\nsettlement until accepted by the Associate Administrator. Once accepted, the Associate\nAdministrator will issue a Consent Order incorporating the terms of this Agreement.\n4. Respondent consents to the issuance of the Consent Order, and hereby waives any\nfurther procedural requirements with respect to its issuance. Respondent waives all rights to\n\n\n\ncontest the adequacy of notice, or the validity of the Consent Order or this Agreement, including\nall rights to administrative or judicial hearings or appeals, except as set forth herein.\n5. This Agreement will apply to and be binding upon PHMSA, and upon Respondent,\nits officers, directors, and employees, and its successors, assigns, or other entities or persons\notherwise bound by law. Respondent agrees to provide a copy of this Agreement and any\nincorporated work plans and schedules to all of Respondent’s officers, employees, and agents\nwhose duties might reasonably include compliance with this Agreement.\n6. For all transfers of ownership or operating responsibility of Respondent’s Osage\nPipeline, Respondent will provide a copy of this Agreement to the prospective transferee at least\n30 days prior to such transfer and provide written notice of the transfer within 30 days after the\ntransfer to the PHMSA Southwest Region Director (Director) who issued the Notice.\n7. This Agreement constitutes the final, complete, and exclusive agreement and\nunderstanding between the Parties with respect to the settlement embodied in this Agreement. The\nParties acknowledge that there are no representations, agreements or understandings relating to\nsettlement other than those expressly contained in this Agreement, except that the terms of this\nAgreement may be construed by reference to the Notice.\n8. Nothing in this Agreement affects or relieves Respondent of its responsibility to\ncomply with all applicable requirements of the Federal pipeline safety laws, 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et\nseq., and the regulations and orders issued thereunder. Nothing in this Agreement alters PHMSA's\nright of access, entry, inspection, and information gathering or PHMSA’s authority to bring\nenforcement actions against Respondent pursuant to the Federal pipeline safety laws, the\nregulations and orders issued thereunder, or any other provision of Federal or State law.\n9. This Agreement does not waive or modify any Federal, State, or local laws or\nregulations that are applicable to Respondent’s pipeline systems. This Agreement is not a permit,\nor a modification of any permit, under any Federal, State, or local laws or regulations. Respondent\nremains responsible for achieving and maintaining compliance with all applicable Federal, State,\nand local laws, regulations and permits.\n10. This Agreement does not create rights in, or grant any cause of action to, any third\nparty not party to this Agreement. The U.S. Department of Transportation is not liable for any\ninjuries or damages to persons or property arising from acts or omissions of Respondent or its\nofficers, employees, or agents carrying out the work required by this Agreement. Respondent\nagrees to hold harmless the U.S. Department of Transportation, its officers, employees, agents,\nand representatives from any and all causes of action arising from any acts or omissions of\nRespondent or its contractors in carrying out any work required by this Agreement.\nII. Corrective Measures\n11. Upon issuance of the Consent Order, Respondent agrees to perform the Corrective\nMeasures set forth below.\n\n\n\nDefinitions:\nAffected Pipeline – The “Affected Pipeline” means Osage’s entire 136 mile 20-inch pipeline\nthat originates in Lincoln County, Oklahoma and terminates in El Dorado, Kansas, where it\nconnects with Holly Energy Partners – Operating, L.P.\n12. Operating Pressure Restriction. Osage must maintain a twenty percent (20%)\npressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along ","truncated":true,"body_characters":57382}