{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 42023021WL","title":"NUSTAR PIPELINE OPERATING PARTNERSHIP L.P. — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2023-04-03","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.446(b)(4), 195.446(d)(2), 195.446(d)(4), 195.446(e)(2), 195.446(h)(6), 195.446(j)(1).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42023021wl.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42023021wl.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42023021wl","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42023021WL","body":"Warning Letter involving NUSTAR PIPELINE OPERATING PARTNERSHIP L.P.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.446(b)(4),  195.446(d)(2),  195.446(d)(4),  195.446(e)(2),  195.446(h)(6),  195.446(j)(1). The case was opened on 2023-04-03 and is reported as closed as of 2023-04-03. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n42023021WL_Operator Response to Notice_06072023_(20-173936).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023021WL/42023021WL_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_06072023_(20-173936).pdf\n\n42023021WL_Warning Letter_04032023_(20-173936).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023021WL/42023021WL_Warning%20Letter_04032023_(20-173936).pdf\n\n42023021WL_Warning Letter_04032023_(20-173936)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023021WL/42023021WL_Warning%20Letter_04032023_(20-173936)_text.pdf\n\n42023021WL_Warning Letter_04032023_(20-173936)_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL\nApril 3, 2023\nMr. Brad Barron\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nNuStar Pipeline Operating Partnership L.P.\n19003 IH-10 West\nSan Antonio, Texas 78257\nCPF 4-2023-021-WL\nDear Mr. Barron,\nFrom December 7 through December 11, 2020, and on January 13, 2021, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety,\npursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.), virtually inspected NuStar Pipeline\nOperating Partnership L.P.’s (NuStar) control room in San Antonio, Texas.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that NuStar has committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n1. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must\nhave a written alarm management plan to provide for effective\ncontroller response to alarms. An operator’s plan must include\nprovisions to:\n(1) . . . .\n(2) Identify at least once each calendar month points affecting safety\nthat have been taken off scan in the SCADA host, have\nhad alarms inhibited, generated false alarms, or that have had forced\nor manual values for periods of time exceeding that required for\nassociated maintenance or operating activities;\n\n\n\nNuStar failed to identify at least once each calendar month points affecting safety that have had\nalarms inhibited for a period of time exceeding that which would be required for associated\nmaintenance or operating activities in accordance with § 195.446(e)(2) and its procedures.\nNuStar’s October 2020 REV 6 Alarm Management Plan (AMP) procedures sections 2.3.3, 9.3,\nand 9.4 require the operator to record specific data on inhibited alarms and review these alarms at\nleast once each calendar month. NuStar must identify the reason for inhibiting the alarm, ensure\na tag is associated with a point/alarm, record the date and time it was inhibited, include a\ndescription for the point/alarm, document the name of the controller/operator responsible and\nreview them at least once each calendar month.\nNuStar failed to include the required information for numerous alarms inhibited:\n• July 16, 2020 - July 31, 2020. NuStar identified 21 alarms inhibited and 14\nanalog points that had been inhibited without providing a reason for inhibiting\nthem and without tagging each point. 38 alarms failed to include one or more of\nthe following required details: no date/time recorded for when they inhibited, no\nalarm descriptions, and no operator/controller names.\n• November 1, 2019 - November 15, 2019. NuStar identified 34 alarms and 5\nanalog points that had been inhibited without providing a reason for the inhibiting\nand without tagging each point. 32 alarms failed to include one or more of the\nfollowing required details: no date/time recorded for when they inhibited, no\nalarm descriptions, and no operator/controller names.\n• February 16, 2017 - February 28, 2017. NuStar identified 15 alarms and one\nanalog point that had been inhibited without providing a reason for the inhibiting\nand without tagging each point. Nine alarms failed to include one or more of the\nfollowing required details: no date/time recorded for when they inhibited, no\nalarm descriptions, and no operator/controller names.\nAfter the inspection NuStar conducted an investigation and identified the issue. Shift supervisors\nwere removing inhibited points from the inhibited list without realizing this removed\ndocumentation of the inhibited point on the monthly report.\nNuStar created a new SCADA screen environment to prevent this and similar issues from\nrecurring. NuStar reviewed supervisory training on inputting/documenting inhibited points in the\nnew SCADA screen environment and its monthly reports to ensure the issue had been corrected.\nPHMSA finds that the corrective actions resolved the identified issues.\nTherefore, NuStar failed to identify at least once each calendar month points affecting safety that\nhave had alarms inhibited for a period of time exceeding that which would be required for\nassociated maintenance or operating activities in accordance with § 195.446(e)(2) and its\nprocedures.\n\n\n\n2. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles\nand responsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and\nemergency operating conditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt\nand appropriate response to operating conditions, an operator must\ndefine each of the following:\n(1) . . . .\n(4) A method of recording controller shift-changes and any hand-\nover of responsibility between controllers; and\nNuStar failed to define a method of recording controller shift-changes and any hand-over of\nresponsibility between controllers in its control room management plan in accordance with\n§ 195.446(b)(4) and its procedures. Specifically, NuStar’s controllers failed to include all required\ninformation in the shift change records, as required by NuStar’s procedures, General Systems\nManual Section 3 (9/2020).\nNuStar’s Console 1 controller shift-change records failed to document the status of several facility\nlocations including, the Alamose Pumping Station in the August 1, 2017 shift change records.\nAfter the inspection NuStar demonstrated new features to its electronic shift change\ndocumentation. NuStar added a Safety Issues section which requires documentation of any safety\nissues. PHMSA finds that the corrective actions resolved the identified issues.\nTherefore, NuStar failed to define a method of recording controller shift-changes and any hand-\nover of responsibility between controllers in its control room management plan in accordance with\n§ 195.446(b)(4) and its procedures.\n3. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for\nreview during inspection:\n(1) Records that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of\nthis section; and\n§ 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following\nmethods to reduce the risk associated with controller fatigue that could\ninhibit a controller’s ability to carry out the roles and responsibilities\nthe operator has defined:\n(1) . . . .\n(2) Educate controllers and supervisors in fatigue mitigation\nstrategies and how off-duty activities contribute to fatigue;\n\n\n\nNuStar failed to provide records that demonstrate compliance with § 195.446 in accordance with\n§ 195.446(j)(1). Specifically, NuStar failed to provide records for 2018 demonstrating it had\neducated controllers and supervisors in fatigue mitigation strategies and how off-duty activities\ncontribute to fatigue in accordance with § 195.446(d)(2).\n4. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for\nreview during inspection:\n(1) Records that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of\nthis section; and\n§ 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following\nmethods to reduce the risk associated with controller fatigue that could\ninhibit a controller’s ability to carry out the roles and responsibilities\nthe operator has defined:\n(2) . . . .\n(4) Establish a maximum limit on controller hours-of-service, which\nmay provide for an emergency deviation from the maximum limit if\nnecessary for the safe operation of a pipeline facility.\nNuStar failed to maintain records that demonstrate compliance with § 195.446(d)(4) in accordance\nwith § 195.446(j)(1). Specifically, NuStar failed to provide records demonstrating it followed its\ndeviation procedures to reduce the risk of controller fatigue in accordance with § 195.446(d)(4)\nand its control room management (CRM) Plan.\nNuStar’s procedure for deviations from a controller’s hours of service (HOS) require the Shift\nSupervisor to perform multiple steps in the review and documentation for planned and emergency\ndeviations and they must provide this information to NuStar’s Fatigue Risk Manager for approval.\nFor HOS deviations, NuStar’s procedures require written approval, and the Fatigue Risk Manager\nmust determine and substantiate how the increased risk of fatigue will be mitigated. NuStar’s\nCRM Plan, in Appendix B.3.3, lists acceptable hours of service (HOS) deviations, and refers to\nthe review and approval process for each deviation.\nHowever, NuStar approved HOS deviations for other, non-emergency reasons, such as the\nunavailability of other controllers due to vacation and inadequate staffing levels. Between March\n19, 2017, and November 16, 2020, NuStar failed to approve 16 HOS deviations using one of the\nlisted acceptable deviations. These records cited non-listed, non-emergency reasons to justify the\nHOS deviation.\n\n\n\nFor those 16 HOS deviations, NuStar also failed to document why the deviation was necessary for\nsafe operation of the facility, why the deviation was an emergency, and how the increased risk of\nfatigue would be mitigated.\nAfter the inspection, NuStar revised and clarified the documentation and approval requirements\nfor HOS emergency deviations and mitigation in its CRM Plan. PHMSA finds that the corrective\nactions resolved the identified issues.\nTherefore, NuStar failed to provide records that demonstrate compliance with § 195.446 in\naccordance with § 195.446(j)(1).\n5. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for\nreview during inspection:\n(1) Records that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of\nthis section; and\n§ 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training\nprogram and review the training program content to identify potential\nimprovements at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to\nexceed 15 months. An operator’s program must provide for training\neach controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities defined by the\noperator. In addition, the training program must include the following\nelements:\n(1) . . . .\n(6) Control room team training and exercises that include both\ncontrollers and other individuals, defined by the operator, who would\nreasonably be expected to operationally collaborate with controllers\n(control room personnel) during normal, abnormal or emergency\nsituations. Operators must comply with the team training requirements\nunder this paragraph no later than January 23, 2018.\nNuStar failed to maintain records that demonstrate compliance with § 195.446(h)(6) in accordance\nwith § 195.446(j)(1). Specifically, NuStar failed to provide team training records for one of its\ncontrollers.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$225,134 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,251,334 for a related\nseries of violations. For violation occurring on or after January 11, 2021 and before May 3, 2021,\nthe maximum penalty may not exceed $222,504 per violation per day the violation persists, up to\na maximum of $2,225,034 for a related series of violations. For violation occurring on or after\n\n\n\nJuly 31, 2019 and before January 11, 2021, the maximum penalty may not exceed $218,647 per\nviolation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,186,465 for a related series of\nviolations. For violation occurring on or after November 27, 2018 and before July 31, 2019, the\nmaximum penalty may not exceed $213,268 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to\nexceed $2,132,679. For violation occurring on or after November 2, 2015 and before November\n27, 2018, the maximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per violation per day, with a maximum\npenalty not to exceed $2,090,022.\nWe have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents involved in this case, and have\ndecided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this\ntime. We advise you to correct the items identified in this letter. Failure to do so may result in\nNuStar Logistics, L.P. being subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer to\nCPF 4-2023-021-WL. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement\naction is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your\nresponsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the\ncomplete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions\nyou believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the\nredacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nSincerely,\nBryan Lethcoe\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","truncated":false,"body_characters":13968}