{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 42023042NOPV","title":"ENABLE MISSISSIPPI RIVER TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2023-05-23","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 191.23(a)(9).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42023042nopv.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42023042nopv.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42023042nopv","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42023042NOPV","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ENABLE MISSISSIPPI RIVER TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 191.23(a)(9). The case was opened on 2023-05-23 and is reported as closed as of 2025-07-16. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n42023042NOPV_Final Order_07162025_(22-235632).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023042NOPV/42023042NOPV_Final%20Order_07162025_(22-235632).pdf\n\n42023042NOPV_Final Order_07162025_(22-235632)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023042NOPV/42023042NOPV_Final%20Order_07162025_(22-235632)_text.pdf\n\n42023042NOPV_Operator Response to Notice_06212023_(22-235632).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023042NOPV/42023042NOPV_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_06212023_(22-235632).pdf\n\n42023042NOPV_PCO_05232023_(22-235632).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023042NOPV/42023042NOPV_PCO_05232023_(22-235632).pdf\n\n42023042NOPV_PCO_05232023_(22-235632)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023042NOPV/42023042NOPV_PCO_05232023_(22-235632)_text.pdf\n\n42023042NOPV_Final Order_07162025_(22-235632)_text.pdf\n\nJuly 16, 2025\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: Eric.Amundsen@energytransfer\nEric Amundsen\nSenior Vice President Operations\nEnable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC\n1300 Main Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2023-042-NOPV\nDear Mr. Amundsen:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws the\nNotice issued May 23, 2023. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the date of\ntransmission and acknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Bryan Jeffrey Lethcoe, Office of Pipeline Safety\nSusie Sjulin, Director – Regulatory Compliance, Enable Mississippi River Transmission,\nLLC, susie.sjulin@energytransfer.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nEnable Mississippi River ) CPF No. 4-2023-042-NOPV\nTransmission, LLC, )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom April 4 through November 2, 2022, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), inspected Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC’s (Enable or Respondent) natural\ngas pipeline systems in Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas. Enable is\na subsidiary of Energy Transfer, and its natural gas pipeline system is approximately 1,600 miles\nin length.1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated May 23, 2023, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed\nCompliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 CFR § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding\nthat Enable had committed one violation of 49 CFR Part 191 and proposed ordering Respondent\nto take certain measures to correct the alleged violation.\nEnergy Transfer responded to the Notice on behalf of Enable by letter dated June 21, 2023\n(Response). Enable contested the allegation, offered additional information in response to the\nNotice, and requested an informal discussion with the Region. Respondent did not request a\nhearing and therefore has waived its right to one. An informal discussion was held on June 30,\n2023. Enable Midstream Partners submitted additional information, including its procedure\nOperations and Maintenance Procedure 250, Defect Evaluation (Ver. 3, Sep. 23, 2021) (OM-250\nDefect Evaluation), on behalf of Enable on July 10, 2023.\n1 Mississippi River Transmission Pipeline, ENABLE TRANSFER, https://www.energytransfer.com/operations-map/\n(last accessed May 9, 2025).\n\n\n\nWITHDRAWAL OF ALLEGATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR Part 192, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 191.23, which states:\n§ 191.23 Reporting safety-related conditions.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator\nshall report in accordance with § 191.25 the existence of any of the\nfollowing safety-related conditions involving facilities in service:\n(1) ….\n(9) Any safety-related condition that could lead to an imminent hazard\nand causes (either directly or indirectly by remedial action of the operator),\nfor purposes other than abandonment, a 20% or more reduction in operating\npressure or shutdown of operation of a pipeline, UNGSF, or an LNG facility\nthat contains or processes gas or LNG.\nSection 191.25(a) further states, in relevant part:\n§ 191.25 Filing safety-related condition reports.\n(a) Each report of a safety-related condition under § 191.23(a)(1)\nthrough (9) must be filed (received by the Associate Administrator) in\nwriting within 5 working days (not including Saturday, Sunday, or Federal\nholidays) after the day a representative of an operator first determines that\nthe condition exists, but not later than 10 working days after the day a\nrepresentative of an operator discovers the condition. . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 191.23(a)(9) by failing to file a safety-\nrelated condition (SRC) report within five working days of reducing the operating pressure on\nthe Black River Pipeline by 20 percent in response to an SRC that could lead to an imminent\nhazard.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that on July 6, 2021, Enable received a preliminary magnetic\nflux leakage axial (MFL-A) report for the Black River Pipeline, the results of which indicated the\npresence of a 79 percent metal wall loss anomaly within 220 yards of a dwelling. The Notice\nfurther alleged that on July 8, 2021, Enable reduced the operating pressure of the Black River\nPipeline by 20 percent (i.e., from 619 pounds per square inch (psi) to 495 psi) in response to that\nanomaly, triggering the obligation to file an SRC report within five working days (i.e., by July\n15, 2021) under § 191.23(a)(9). The Notice alleged that Enable did not file an SRC report within\nfive working days; instead, Respondent filed an SRC report on August 2, 2021, for different\nanomalies (i.e., corrosion with a depth of 96.1 percent and 92.9 percent), the presence of which\nRespondent verified on July 24, 2021, while excavating certain portions of the Black River\nPipeline based on the results of the preliminary in-line inspection (ILI) vendor report.\n\n\n\nEnable contested the allegation in the Notice in its Response. Enable explained that its\nprocedure, Enable Midstream Partners Analysis Reporting Criteria for Magnetic Flux Leakage,\nGeometry, and IMU, requires ILI vendors to report any metal loss greater than or equal to 70\npercent of nominal wall thickness. That procedure also requires the ILI vendor to report any\nmetal loss anomalies over 50 percent that are within fifty feet of any metal loss anomaly that\nsatisfies the 70 percent wall-loss threshold. In addition, for the specific ILI run at issue, Enable\nasked the ILI vendor to report any metal loss anomalies over 50 percent in the joints immediately\nupstream and downstream of the 79 percent metal loss anomaly for purposes of including the\nformer in the preliminary dig schedule. Per Enable’s procedures, preliminary anomalies are\ninvestigated and assessed in the ditch for calibration and confirmation of tool calls.\nEnable explained that the ILI vendor identified one metal loss anomaly with a calculated wall\nloss greater than or equal to 70 percent in its July 6, 2021 preliminary report. The anomaly detail\nin the preliminary report showed a depth of 79 percent and RSTRENG Pburst -0.85dL of 1726\npsi. Based on that and other information from the report, Enable scheduled three preliminary\ndigs (P01, P02, and P03) to allow for an in-the-ditch analysis of four anomalies. Respondent\nexplained that it implemented the 20 percent pressure reduction on July 8, 2021, “to prepare for\nexcavations and analysis of preliminary dig locations P01 and P02.”\nEnable completed excavations for dig locations P01 and P02, as well as the ML3 pipeline\ncrossing in the dig area, on July 23, 2021. The direct examination technician who observed the\nP02 anomaly location requested that the pressure of the isolated section be further reduced to\npermit additional evaluation. After reducing the pressure to 90 psi, Respondent completed the\nanomaly analysis and determination for digs P01 and P02 on July 24, 2021. That analysis\nindicated that the dig P01 anomalies, which were initially called as 52 percent metal loss\nanomalies in the preliminary ILI report, were corrosion with a depth of 96.1 percent and 92.9\npercent. Enable determined both anomalies to be SRCs based on that information. The dig P02\nanomaly, which was initially called as a 79 percent metal loss anomaly in the preliminary ILI\nreport, was corrosion with a depth of 71.2 percent, which according to Respondent, demonstrated\nthe latter was not an SRC.\nBecause July 24, 2021 was a Saturday, Enable marked the date of determination of the SRCs at\nP01 as Monday, July 26, 2021. Respondent filed the SRC report with PHMSA on August 2,\n2021. Based on these facts, Respondent argued that it timely filed the SRC report within five\nbusiness days after the date of field verification of the SRC at P01 and that no SRC report was\nrequired for the anomaly at P02.\nAnalysis\nThe primary question in this case is whether the P02 anomaly that the ILI vendor identified in its\npreliminary report as 79 percent wall loss, and Enable’s subsequent 20 percent reduction in the\noperating pressure of the Black River Pipeline, qualified as an SRC under § 191.23(a)(9). If so,\nEnable had an obligation to submit an SRC report within 5 working days of discovering that\ncondition. If not, Enable had no obligation to file an SRC report.\n\n\n\nThe answer to this question begins with the text of the applicable regulation.2 Section\n191.23(a)(9) states, in relevant part, that an operator must report any “safety-related condition\nthat could lead to an imminent hazard and causes (either directly or indirectly by remedial action\nof the operator) . . . a 20% or more reduction in operating pressure . . . of a pipeline.” Id. The\nplain text of section 191.23(a)(9) thus prescribes two criteria that must be satisfied to require the\nsubmission of an SRC report: (1) the SRC must be a condition “that could lead to an imminent\nhazard” and (2) the SRC must “cause” the operator (either directly or indirectly) to reduce the\noperating pressure of the pipeline by 20 percent or more. The violation alleged in the Notice can\nbe resolved solely on the basis of the first criterion.\nPHMSA has not defined the phrase “imminent hazard” for purposes of the SRC reporting\nrequirements in 49 CFR Part 191,\n3 but contemporaneous4 dictionaries defined the term\n“imminent” as “impending,”5 and “hazard” as “risk.”6,7 The term “could,” which is also used in\n§ 191.23(a)(9), was defined as “should or would be able to,”8 and “lead” was defined as “result\n(in).”9 Taken together, these definitions suggest that the phrase “could lead to an imminent\nhazard” in § 191.23(a)(9) should be understood to mean the condition would result in an\nimpending risk.\nThe regulatory history supports that basic understanding. PHMSA adopted the SRC reporting\nrequirements in response to a 1986 congressional mandate.\n10 That mandate, as codified at 49\nU.S.C. § 60102(h), directed PHMSA to:\n[P]rescribe regulations requiring each operator of a pipeline facility\n(except a master meter) to submit to [PHMSA] a written report on any—\n(A) condition that is a hazard to life, property, or the environment; and\n(B) safety-related condition that causes or has caused a significant change\nor restriction in the operation of a pipeline facility.\n2 Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 573-579 (2019).\n3 The phrase “imminent hazard” is defined in 49 CFR § 190.3 for purposes of the emergency order requirements in\n49 CFR § 190.236. That definition parrots the text of 49 U.S.C. § 60117(p)(8) (2016), which states, “[i]mminent\nhazard means the existence of a condition relating to a gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility that presents a\nsubstantial likelihood that death, serious illness, severe personal injury, or a substantial endangerment to health,\nproperty, or the environment may occur before the reasonably foreseeable completion date of a formal proceeding\nbegun to lessen the risk of such death, illness, injury or endangerment.”\n4 49 CFR 191.23 was promulgated on July 1, 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 24942.\n5 Imminent, CHAMBERS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1988), at 712, available at Archive.org.\n6 Hazard, CHAMBERS NEW SCHOOL DICTIONARY (1990), at 443, available at Archive.org.\n7 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43 (1979) (“A fundamental cannon of statutory construction is that, unless\notherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”).\n8 Could, NEW CONCISE WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (1988), at 72.\n9 Lead, COLLINS REFERENCE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1992), at 277, available at Archive.org.\n10 Pipeline safety reauthorization act for fiscal year 1987, Pub. L. 99-516, 100 Stat. 2965 (Oct. 22, 1986).\n\n\n\nAs PHMSA explained in the subsequent rulemaking proceeding, Congress enacted § 60102(h) to\nensure that operators would notify PHMSA of conditions that, if left unaddressed, might\npotentially cause a pipeline failure. Congress expected that such notifications would allow\nPHMSA to investigate the condition and ensure that the operator took appropriate remedial\naction.\n11 In other words, one of Congress’s purposes in enacting § 60102(h) was to “incite\ngovernment action in time to prevent unsafe conditions from turning into an ‘incident’ or\n‘accident.’”12 That understanding of the SRC reporting requirements remains unchanged.\n13\nIn addition, PHMSA published an interpretation and statement of policy concerning the\ndiscovery of safety-related conditions from the results of ILI tool runs shortly after adopting the\noriginal SRC reporting requirements. Because the time period for reporting begins to run when\nan operator “discovers” a potentially reportable condition, operators had asked PHMSA to\nexplain when discovery occurs in connection with the use of ILI tools. In the statement of\npolicy, PHMSA explained that:\nDiscovery of a potentially reportable condition occurs when an operator’s\nrepresentative has adequate information from which to conclude the probable\nexistence of a reportable condition. An operator would have adequate\ninformation for each anomaly that is physically examined. Absent physical\nexamination, discovery may occur after the data are calibrated if the “adequate\ninformation” test is met. However, the adequacy of the information that pig data\nprovide about anomalous conditions is contingent on a concurrent indication from\na number of factors which an operator could conclude the probable existence of a\nreportable condition. Among these are the sophistication of the pig being used,\nthe reliability of the data, the accuracy of data interpretation, and any other factors\nknown by the operator relative to the condition of the pipeline.14\nReturning to the question presented, the issue here is whether the preliminary ILI report provided\nEnable with sufficient information to conclude that the P02 anomaly was an “imminent hazard”\nfor purposes of the SRC reporting requirements in § 191.23(a)(9). As previously discussed, the\npreliminary ILI report indicated that the P02 anomaly was a 79 percent pipe wall loss anomaly\nlocated within 220 yards of a dwelling.\n15 OPS did not allege in the Notice that the P02 anomaly\n11 Reporting Unsafe Conditions on Gas and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities,\nNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 36068 (Sep. 25, 1987).\n12 Reporting Unsafe Conditions on Gas and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities, Notice\nof Proposed Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 36068, 36069 (Sep. 25, 1987).\n13 Reporting Unsafe Conditions on Gas and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities, 53\nFed. Reg. 24942 (Jul. 1, 1988).\n14 Transportation of Gas and Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline; Reporting Safety-Related Conditions; Discovery of\nConditions by Smart Pigs; Enforcement Rules, Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,342, 32343 (Aug. 7, 1989); see also In\nthe Matter of ANR Pipeline Company, CPF No. 3-2011-1011, Final Order (Dec. 31, 2012) (stating that ILI data\nalone can support a finding of a probable SRC, depending upon the sophistication of the pig being used, the\nreliability of the data, the accuracy of data interpretation, and any other factors known relative to the condition of the\npipeline).\n15 Region Recommendation, Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC, CPF 4-2023-042-NOPV, dated May 22,\n2024, on file with PHMSA.\n\n\n\nqualified as an immediate (or even a one-year) repair condition under the integrity management\nregulations at 49 CFR § 192.933(d), nor does the record suggest that Enable had any other\nevidence indicating that the P02 anomaly “could lead to an imminent hazard” or would result in\nan impending risk to the Black River Pipeline. Moreover, Enable’s subsequent excavation and\nin-the-ditch analysis revealed that the P02 anomaly was corrosion with a depth of 71.2 percent, a\ncondition less severe than originally indicated in the preliminary ILI report.16 In these\ncircumstances, Enable did not have sufficient information to conclude that the P02 anomaly\nsatisfied the imminent hazard requirement in § 191.23(a)(9), either on the basis of the\ninformation provided in the preliminary ILI report or as a result of the information obtained\nduring the subsequent excavation and in-the-ditch analysis.17 OPS has not met its burden of\nproof to sustain the violation alleged in the Notice.\n18\nConclusion\nOPS has not presented a sufficient factual or legal basis to support the allegation that the July 6,\n2021 preliminary ILI report provided Enable with sufficient information to conclude that the P02\nanomaly was a condition that “could lead to an immediate hazard” within the meaning of §\n191.23(a)(9).\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find there is no basis for finding a violation\nof § 191.23(a)(9). Based upon the foregoing, I hereby order that the Notice be withdrawn.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nLinda Daugherty Date Issued\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n16 The fact that Enable implemented a 20 percent pressure reduction to perform the excavation and in-the-ditch\nanalysis does not mean that the P02 anomaly was an imminent hazard under § 191.23(a)(9). The imminent hazard\nand 20 percent pressure reduction criteria are separate and distinct requirements. Both must be satisfied to require\nthe submission of an SRC report.\n17 Enable did discover that the P01 anomalies had corrosion at depths of 96.1 percent and 92.9 percent. The P01\nanomalies constituted conditions that “could lead to an imminent hazard” or would result in an impending risk, and\nEnable appropriately filed an SRC report within the required timeframe following that discovery.\n18 49 U.S.C. § 60117(b)(1)(F).","truncated":false,"body_characters":19492}