{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 42023052NOPV","title":"PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2023-10-16","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.605(a), 192.731(b), 192.905(a), 192.905(b)(1), 192.907(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42023052nopv.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42023052nopv.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42023052nopv","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42023052NOPV","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.605(a),  192.731(b),  192.905(a),  192.905(b)(1),  192.907(a). The case was opened on 2023-10-16 and is reported as closed as of 2025-12-29. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n42023052NOPV_ Final Order_12292025_(22-235649).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023052NOPV/42023052NOPV_%20Final%20Order_12292025_(22-235649).pdf\n\n42023052NOPV_ Final Order_12292025_(22-235649)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023052NOPV/42023052NOPV_%20Final%20Order_12292025_(22-235649)_text.pdf\n\n42023052NOPV_Operator Response to Notice_01152024_(22-235649).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023052NOPV/42023052NOPV_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_01152024_(22-235649).pdf\n\n42023052NOPV_PCO_10162023_(22-235649).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023052NOPV/42023052NOPV_PCO_10162023_(22-235649).pdf\n\n42023052NOPV_PCO_10162023_(22-235649)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42023052NOPV/42023052NOPV_PCO_10162023_(22-235649)_text.pdf\n\n42023052NOPV_ Final Order_12292025_(22-235649)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nDecember 29, 2025\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: tom.long@energytransfer.com\nThomas Long\nChief Executive Officer\nEnergy Transfer Company\n8111 Westchester Drive\nDallas, Texas 75225\nRe: CPF No. 4-2023-052-NOPV\nDear Mr. Long:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws one of the\nallegations of violation, makes other findings of violation, and finds that Panhandle Eastern\nPipeline Company has completed the actions specified in the Notice to comply with the pipeline\nsafety regulations. Therefore, this case is now closed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is\neffective upon the date of transmission and acknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49\nCFR § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Bryan Lethcoe, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. Greg McIlwain, Executive Vice President of Operations, Energy Transfer, LP,\ngregory.mcilwain@energytransfer.com\nMr. Eric Amundsen, Senior Vice President of Operations, Energy Transfer, LP,\neric.amundsen@energytransfer.com\nMs. Heidi Murchison, Chief Counsel, Energy Transfer, LP,\nheidi.murchison@energytransfer.com\nMr. Leif Jensen, Vice President of Tech Services, Energy Transfer, LP,\n\n\n\n2\nleif.jensen@energytransfer.com\nMs. Susie Sjulin, Director, Regulatory Compliance, Energy Transfer, LP,\nsusie.sjulin@energytransfer.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nPanhandle Eastern Pipeline Company, )\na subsidiary of Energy Transfer Co., ) CPF No. 4-2023-052-NOPV\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom February 28 through June 24, 2022, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Panhandle\nEastern Pipeline Company (PEPL or Respondent) in Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated October 16, 2023, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed\nCompliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 CFR § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding\nthat PEPL had committed three violations of 49 CFR Part 192 and proposed ordering\nRespondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nPEPL responded to the Notice by letter dated January 15, 2024 (Response). Respondent\ncontested one of the allegations and offered additional information in response to the Notice.\nRespondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR Part 192 as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 192.605(a), which states:\n§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance\n\n\n\n2\nactivities and for emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual\nmust also include procedures for handling abnormal operations. This\nmanual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at intervals not\nexceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. This manual\nmust be prepared before operations of a pipeline system commence.\nAppropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations where operations\nand maintenance activities are conducted.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 192.605(a) by failing to follow its manual\nof written procedures and promptly repair or replace defective or inadequate equipment in\naccordance with section 192.731(b)1 and section 4.0 of its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP),\nRelief Valves Testing Inspection and Maintenance: M.05 (dated June 28, 2022). Specifically, the\nNotice alleged that PEPL failed to promptly repair or replace relief valve 5RV-3S, used for\nsecondary overpressure protection at the Olpe Compressor, which drifted above the set point four\ntimes since 2017.\nIn its Response, PEPL contested Item 1. PEPL argued that annual inspections are done to ensure\nthe device is set properly and to adjust or repair the device as needed. PEPL stated that annual\nmaintenance and checks allow the operator to adjust the setpoint if there is a plus or minus drift.\nPEPL stated that minor fluctuations in setpoint are to be expected for a mechanical device and\nthat every time valve 5RV-3S was found to have drifted it was reset. PEPL stated that relief\nvalve 5RV-3S was replaced in October 2019. Finally, PEPL argued that it had adhered to the\nrequirements of its SOP as demonstrated by the timely performance and adjustment, as needed,\nof the relief device during testing and inspections.\nThe facts in the record show that Respondent installed the subject relief valve in 2019. The\nsetpoint of the valve, or the pressure at which the valve starts to relieve, was set at 809 psig.\nPhotographs show this setpoint value stamped on the body of the valve. Respondent performed a\nroutine inspection of the valve in 2020 and determined the setpoint had drifted to 832 psig, or\napproximately 2.8 percent above the initial value. Respondent reset the setpoint to 809 psig. At\nthe next annual inspection in 2021, the setpoint was found to be 814 psig, or roughly 0.6 percent\nabove the original value and was reset. In 2022, Respondent inspected the relief valve during the\nPHMSA inspection in May and determined the setpoint was at 813 psig, or 0.5 percent above the\noriginal value. Respondent reset the setpoint and inspected the relief valve again in August and\nDecember 2022, finding the setpoint at 808 psig and 809 psig, representing differences of 0.1\npercent and 0.0 percent, respectively.\nThe Notice alleged the drifting of the setpoint that occurred between 2020 and 2022 proved the\nrelief valve was defective or inadequate, requiring Respondent to repair or replace the valve.2\nThis allegation appears to be based on an implied assertion that the relief valve must be defective\nor inadequate whenever the setpoint is found to have drifted. The record in this case, however,\ndoes not prove such an inference was necessarily the case. Respondent noted that “minor\nfluctuations . . . are typical for such a mechanical device.” In addition, the record is absent any\n1 Section 192.731(b) states: “Any defective or inadequate equipment found must be promptly repaired or replaced.”\n2 The Notice also referenced drifting in 2018, but that was a different valve than the one installed in 2019.\n\n\n\n3\nauthoritative source upon which a conclusion must be drawn that the drift identified, which was\nas little as one-half of one percent (or less), could not be within the acceptable tolerance of the\ndevice at issue.\n3 Without additional evidentiary support to show Respondent was required to\nfollow its procedures to repair or replace the valve, the allegation of violation fails.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, the alleged violation of 49 CFR § 192.605(a)\nis hereby withdrawn. This withdrawal does not preclude PHMSA from determining, based on a\nfinding of sufficient evidence, that a relief valve with set point drift is defective or inadequate in\na future case. Likewise, this withdrawal does not remove any obligation an operator may have to\naccount for set point drift in its inspection and operating procedures to ensure pressure on a\npipeline does not exceed prescribed limits\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 192.905(a), which states:\n§ 192.905 How does an operator identify a high consequence area?\n(a) General. To determine which segments of an operator’s transmission\npipeline system are covered by this subpart, an operator must identify the\nhigh consequence areas. An operator must use method (1) or (2) from the\ndefinition in § 192.903 to identify a high consequence area. An operator\nmay apply one method to its entire pipeline system, or an operator may\napply one method to individual portions of the pipeline system. An operator\nmust describe in its integrity management program which method it is\napplying to each portion of the operator’s pipeline system. The description\nmust include the potential impact radius when utilized to establish a high\nconsequence area. (See appendix E.I. for guidance on identifying high\nconsequence areas.)\n(b)(1) Identified sites. An operator must identify an identified site, for\npurposes of this subpart, from information the operator has obtained from\nroutine operation and maintenance activities and from public officials with\nsafety or emergency response or planning responsibilities who indicate to\nthe operator that they know of locations that meet the identified site criteria.\nThese public officials could include officials on a local emergency planning\ncommission or relevant Native American tribal officials.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 192.905(a) by failing to identify a high\n3 In Explorer Pipeline Company, Order Directing Amendment, CPF No. 3-2013-5010M, 2015 WL 4882526, at *3\n(July 9, 2015), PHMSA determined an operator’s written procedures were inadequate because they did not require\nrecording the “as-found” and “as-left” setpoints when inspecting overpressure safety devices. In the decision,\nPHMSA explained the importance of recording these values, noting among other things that “operators must be able\nto detect if the set point for an overpressure safety device is drifting because if that was occurring, the device would\nnot be functioning properly.” It is important to recognize the statement in Explorer about drifting was not essential\nto the finding of inadequate procedures in that case. While drifting of a setpoint could be an indication that a\nmechanical relief valve is defective, the question of whether a small degree of drift might be within the acceptable\ntolerance of a particular device was neither raised nor adjudicated in Explorer. Therefore, Explorer is not\nauthoritative on this question for purposes of the present case.\n\n\n\n4\nconsequence area in order to determine which segments of the operator’s transmission pipeline\nsystem are covered by subpart O. Specifically, the Notice alleged that PEPL failed to identify a\nchild development center adjacent to the Jefferson City pipeline right-of-way, and within its\npotential impact radius (PIR), as an “identified site” in accordance with section 192.905(b)(1).\nIn its Response, PEPL did not contest Item 2. PEPL submitted records to demonstrate the center\nis now identified as a high consequence area in its integrity management program, as of April 29,\n2022.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 CFR\n§ 192.905(a) by failing to identify a high consequence area in order to determine which segments\nof the operator’s transmission pipeline system are covered by subpart O.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 192.907(a), which states:\n§ 192.907 What must an operator do to implement this subpart?\n(a) General. No later than December 17, 2004, an operator of a covered\npipeline segment must develop and follow a written integrity management\nprogram that contains all the elements described in § 192.911 and that\naddresses the risks on each covered transmission pipeline segment. The\ninitial integrity management program must consist, at a minimum, of a\nframework that describes the process for implementing each program\nelement, how relevant decisions will be made and by whom, a time line for\ncompleting the work to implement the program element, and how\ninformation gained from experience will be continuously incorporated into\nthe program. The framework will evolve into a more detailed and\ncomprehensive program. An operator must make continual improvements\nto the program.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 192.907(a) by failing to follow its written\nintegrity management program. Specifically, the Notice alleged that PEPL failed to conduct a\npreventive and mitigative (P&M) measure study for three pipeline segments in accordance with\nsection 9 of its Pipeline Integrity Management Plan (Rev. 12; April 1, 2021).\nIn its Response, PEPL did not contest Item 3. PEPL submitted reports to demonstrate it had\ncompleted preventative and mitigative measures between October 2022 and December 2023.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 CFR\n§ 192.907(a) by failing to follow its written integrity management program.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\n\n\n\n5\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1, 2, and 3 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 CFR §§ 192.605(a), 192.905(a), and 192.907(a), respectively. Under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns or operates a\npipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established under\nchapter 601.\nAs discussed above, Item 1 has been withdrawn. Therefore, the compliance terms proposed in\nthe Notice for that Item are not included in this Order.\nWith regard to the violation of section 192.905(a) (Item 2), the Director has indicated that\nPEPL satisfied the proposed compliance terms associated with Item 2.\nWith regard to the violation of section 192.907(a) (Item 3), the Director has indicated that PEPL\nsatisfied the proposed compliance terms associated with Item 3.\nAccordingly, I find that compliance has been achieved with respect to these violations.\nTherefore, the compliance terms proposed in the Notice for Items 2 and 3 are not included in this\nOrder.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nCFR § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nLinda Daugherty Date Issued\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":15748}