{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 42024016CAO","title":"CRESCENT MIDSTREAM, LLC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2024-08-02","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42024016cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42024016cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42024016cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42024016CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving CRESCENT MIDSTREAM, LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2024-08-02 and is reported as closed as of 2025-05-12. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n42024016CAO_Closure Letter_05122025_(24-315924).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024016CAO/42024016CAO_Closure%20Letter_05122025_(24-315924).pdf\n\n42024016CAO_Closure Letter_05122025_(24-315924)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024016CAO/42024016CAO_Closure%20Letter_05122025_(24-315924)_text.pdf\n\n42024016CAO_Corrective Action Order_0802024_(24-315924).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024016CAO/42024016CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_0802024_(24-315924).pdf\n\n42024016CAO_Corrective Action Order_0802024_(24-315924)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024016CAO/42024016CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_0802024_(24-315924)_text.pdf\n\n42024016CAO_Operator Request for Hearing and Request for Case File and Statement of Issues_08122024_(24-315924).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024016CAO/42024016CAO_Operator%20Request%20for%20Hearing%20and%20Request%20for%20Case%20File%20and%20Statement%20of%20Issues_08122024_(24-315924).pdf\n\n42024016CAO_Operator Withdrawal of Hearing Request_10082024_(24-315924).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024016CAO/42024016CAO_Operator%20Withdrawal%20of%20Hearing%20Request_10082024_(24-315924).pdf\n\n42024016CAO_PHC Hearing Scheduled_09052024_(24-315924).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024016CAO/42024016CAO_PHC%20Hearing%20Scheduled_09052024_(24-315924).pdf\n\n42024016CAO_PHC Hearing Scheduled_09052024_(24-315924)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024016CAO/42024016CAO_PHC%20Hearing%20Scheduled_09052024_(24-315924)_text.pdf\n\n42024016CAO_Corrective Action Order_0802024_(24-315924)_text.pdf\n\nAugust 2, 2024\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: jashcroft@crescentmid.com\nMr. Jeremiah Ashcroft III\nChief Executive Officer\nCrescent Midstream, LLC\n263 Trinity Lane\nGray, Louisiana 70359\nCPF No. 4-2024-016-CAO\nDear Mr. Ashcroft:\nEnclosed please find the Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), in the\nabove-referenced case. It requires Crescent Midstream, LLC to take certain corrective actions\nwith respect to the July 27, 2024, release of crude oil from its pipeline facilities in Raceland,\nLouisiana.\nService of the CAO by electronic transmission is deemed complete upon transmission\nand acknowledgment of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms\nand conditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nfor Alan Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: Mr. Bryan Lethcoe, Director, Southwest Region, OPS\nMr. Eric Lyons, Vice President of Engineering and Operations, Crescent\nMidstream, LLC, elyons@crescentmid.com\nMr. Daniel Pelas, Safety and Compliance Supervisor, Crescent Midstream, LLC\ndpelas@crescentmid.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nCrescent Midstream, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2024-016-CAO\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) is being issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), under the authority of 49\nU.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, to require Crescent Midstream, LLC (Crescent\nMidstream or Respondent) to take necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and\nthe environment from potential hazards associated with a July 27, 2024, accident resulting in the\nrelease of crude oil from Crescent Midstream’s hazardous liquid pipeline facilities located in\nRaceland, Louisiana (Accident).\nCrescent Midstream operates an interstate hazardous liquid pipeline system in Louisiana and the\nGulf of Mexico. Respondent operates over 900 miles of hazardous liquid pipelines, and its system\nincludes crude oil breakout tanks subject to the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 (Part 195).\nAt 10:49 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT)1 on Saturday, July 27, 2024, the National\nResponse Center (NRC) was notified1 that an unknown amount of crude oil was released at\napproximately 8:00 a.m. in Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. Two additional NRC notifications2\nwere made by Crescent Midstream on Monday, July 29, 2024, indicating that an estimated 175\nbarrels (bbl.), and subsequently 852 total bbl., of crude oil had been released from Crescent\nMidstream’s pipeline facilities in Raceland (the Accident). No fires, injuries, fatalities, or\nevacuations occurred as a result of the crude oil release. However, it appears water sources,\nwildlife, and vegetation have been affected.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA’s OPS initiated an investigation of the Accident. The\npreliminary findings of OPS’ ongoing investigation are as follows:\n1 NRC Report No. 1406083.\n2 NRC Report No.’s 1406243 and 1406258, respectively.\n\n\n\nPreliminary Findings\n• Crescent Midstream’s hazardous liquid pipeline facilities in the Raceland area are part\nof its “Bonefish” system which is composed of 12-, 16-, and 20-inch hazardous liquid\npipelines (constructed in the 1950s and 1960s), as well as an aboveground crude oil\nbreakout tank (Tank No. 2051). Respondent’s pipeline facilities near Raceland are\nlocated within a high consequence area (HCA)3 as defined by Part 195.\n• Tank No. 2051 was obtained by Crescent Midstream in 2016, and was removed from\nservice beginning on approximately June 6, 2024, for an inspection. It is unclear to\nPHMSA if Respondent has construction and inspection history records for Tank No.\n2051 as required under Part 195 and American Petroleum Institute (API) standards 650\nand 653, to establish the out of service inspection interval.\n• After removing Tank No. 2051 from service for inspection, Crescent Midstream has\nbeen utilizing two temporary frac tanks4 (250 bbl. and 500 bbl. capacities, respectively)\nand a temporary pump unit. The frac tanks were apparently being used for surge relief\npurposes, in part, do not meet applicable requirements of Part 195, and were not\nequipped with any liquid level monitoring devices.\n• As part of Crescent Midstream’s frac tank setup at Raceland Station, a 16-inch PHMSA\nregulated pipeline was temporarily connected to the two frac tanks through a Flex-Flo\nvalve set at 160 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). The temporary pump was used to\nre-inject crude oil into the 16-inch pipeline. Respondent also reportedly performed a\ntightline operation on one of its 16-inch pipelines (Raceland Station to St. James)\nwithout any surge relief at Raceland Station. Another separate operation was performed\nusing the lower pressure measurement piping at the Raceland Station to deliver crude\noil to Port Allen via the Sentinel Pipeline and using the temporary frac tanks to provide\nsurge relief.\n• The temporary pump required manual operation and needed to be in operation to pump\ncrude oil from the frac tanks back into the 16-inch pipeline to reduce the liquid level in\nthe frac tanks. According to Crescent Midstream personnel, the pump was disconnected\nprior to the Accident.\n• Respondent indicates it was manually checking the crude oil levels on the frac tanks since\ntheir recent installation. However, PHMSA is not aware of the existence of any written\nprocedures addressing this monitoring operation at Raceland Station, nor has Respondent\npresented records to confirm such monitoring was occurring. Additionally, Crescent\nMidstream has been unable to provide any specifications related to the pressure rating of\nthe hoses connecting the frac tanks, pipeline, and the temporary pump.\n• According to an EverLine5 control center log entry for June 25, 2024, the Respondent’s\n3 See 49 C.F.R. § 195.450.\n4 Frac tank are generally large, moveable, metal storage containers used for temporary storage of liquids or other bulk\nmaterials.\n5 Respondent utilizes EverLine, a third-party control center operator based out of Houston, Texas, as its control room\n\n\n\nthird-party control room was verbally informed that the operating pressure on\nRespondent’s 16-inch pipeline at Raceland Station should not exceed 120 psig. However,\nbeginning on July 26, 2024, at about 5:20 p.m. Central Daylight Time (CDT), there were\nmultiple occasions where logs indicate the pressure on that pipeline exceeded 120 psig.\nPHMSA is unaware of any documentation, procedures, or specifications addressing the\nappropriate pressures relative to the temporary arrangement involving the frac tanks and\npump. Respondent was unable to provide any written operating procedures or\nmanagement of change procedures for communications with their third-party control\ncenter (EverLine).\n• On July 27, 2024 (the date of the Accident) Tank No. 2051 was still out of service and\nthe temporary frac tanks were being used as surge relief without liquid level\nmonitoring. The pressure excursions resulted in crude oil from the pipeline flowing into\nthe frac tanks which overflowed with crude oil.\n• The discharge valve in the impoundment area in which the frac tanks were located was\nopen, and crude oil overflowing the frac tanks left the impoundment area and flowed into\nan adjacent ditch and eventually into nearby Bayou Lafourche.6 Bayou Lafourche is a\nwater supply for three Louisiana parishes and a city.7\n• According to Respondent, at approximately 9:00 a.m. CDT on July 27, 2024, the discharge\nvalve in the impoundment area was closed upon discovery of the crude oil release. The\ncontrol room was also instructed to shut down the Raceland Station and the pipelines\nentering and leaving the facility. Respondent has not provided information indicating what\nsteps the control room took to shut down the pipeline.\n• As a result of the crude oil release, Bayou Lafourche, nearby residents, wildlife, and\nvegetation have been affected.\n• Respondent’s pipeline facilities at Raceland Station remain shut down. PHMSA’s\ninvestigation is ongoing and the circumstances leading to the release of crude oil has not\nyet been determined.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous\nto life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood of serious harm, to expeditiously\norder to the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective action, including suspended or\nrestricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other appropriate\naction. An order issued expeditiously must provide an opportunity for a hearing as soon as\npracticable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ncontractor.\n6 Bayou Lafourche is an over 100-mile waterway that flows into the Gulf of Mexico.\n7 Assumption Parish, Terrebonne Parish, Lafourche Parish, and Thibodeaux (a city located in Lafourche Parish).\n\n\n\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material are transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the pipeline facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas;\n(5) the population density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made\nunder another law; and (7) other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact and having considered the lack of\nprocedures governing the Respondent’s current operations with respect to the temporary frac\ntanks and related equipment at the Raceland facility; Crescent Midstream’s current pipeline\nfacility and tank arrangement at Raceland Station that appears to be outside of that allowed under\nrelevant PHMSA hazardous liquid pipeline facility regulations; the unknown status of the\nrequired records applicable to Tank No. 2051 illustrating its safety; the hazardous nature of the\nproduct transported; the proximity of the pipeline facilities to HCAs, drinking water sources, and\nhuman populations; the uncertainty as to the cause of the crude oil release; the uncertainty of\npotential impacts of the Accident to other of Respondent’s pipelines and facilities as presently\narranged at Raceland Station; and because the same condition(s),tank, and pipeline facility\nequipment arrangement that may have caused the crude oil release remain present at\nRespondent’s Raceland facilities, I find that continued operation of the pipeline without\ncorrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment, and that\nfailure to issue this Order without notice would result in the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, under 49 C.F.R. § 190.233(b), this Order mandating immediate corrective action is\nissued expeditiously without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions\nof this Order are effective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, OPS Southwest Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be\nheld in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider amending this Order. To\nthe extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nDefinitions:\nAffected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means the 12-, 16-, and 20-inch pipelines\nfrom Manila Junction to the Crescent Midstream Raceland Station; all piping, pump units,\nmeasurement facilities, tanks, and appurtenant facilities at Raceland Station; the Crescent\nMidstream-operated facilities used to deliver commodity to the Sentinel Pipeline; and the\nCrescent Midstream-operated pipeline between Raceland Station and the St. James\nTerminal.\n\n\n\nIsolated Facility – The \"Isolated Facility\" means all piping, pump units, measurement\nfacilities, tanks, valves, actuators, control devices, pressure relief devices, SCADA\nequipment, sensors, fabricated assemblies, and appurtenant facilities at the Crescent\nMidstream Raceland Station.\nDirector – The \"Director\" means the Director, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Southwest Region. The\nDirector’s address is 8701 S. Gessner, Suite 630, Houston, Texas 77074.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Crescent Midstream to immediately\ntake the following corrective actions:\n1. Operating and Pressure Restrictions.\na. b. c. All pipelines within the Crescent Midstream Raceland Station (Isolated Facility) will\nremain shut-in and out of operation until approval to restart is given by the Director\npursuant to Corrective Action Item 3.\nUpon approval to restart partial operations, such operations will be restricted to those\nspecifically illustrated in the attached diagram, titled “Raceland Station Valve Chart”\n(attached as Appendix A), with the proposed flow path specified as the Empire to St.\nJames “tight line” operation and highlighted on the diagram. Only the identified piping\nand pump units reflected on the diagram at the Isolated Facility will be operated. No\nlow-pressure measurement piping is included in the operation. The initial approval will\nlimit the discharge pressure at the Isolated Facility to 350 psig. This permitted\noperation is only to deliver crude oil from Manila Junction to the breakout tanks located\nat the Crescent Midstream St. James terminal. Any changes to this operation must be\napproved in writing by the Director before they occur during the effective period of this\nOrder.\nPrior to requesting approval to restart operations of the Isolated Facility, Respondent\nmust contract with a properly qualified independent third-party vendor to identify the\ncause and circumstances that resulted in the Accident and communicate the cause and\ncircumstances in writing to the Director. Prior to initiating the investigation, the\nRespondent must submit the proposed third-party vendor and its qualifications to the\nDirector in writing for approval. Respondent must also review its reporting and\nemergency response procedures, and accurately determine and report the release volume\nthat occurred during the Accident as required by 49 C.F.R. § 195.52. Respondent must\nalso identify any issues or actions with regard to the operation of the Isolated Facility\nthat were taking place at the time of the Accident that prevented the immediate\nidentification of the crude oil release and the timely required reporting of such release\nby Crescent Midstream operations personnel. This information must be submitted in\nwriting to the Director prior to the initial request to restart operations, or in any event no\nlater than 60 days from issuance of this Order.\n2. Actions Prior to Restart\n\n\n\nPrior to submitting the Restart Plan under Corrective Action Item 3 below, Respondent\nmust:\na. Perform a thorough review of its operations for the entire Affected Segment to ensure\ncompliance with applicable Part 195 requirements, and provide the Director with a\nsigned affidavit from the Chief Executive Officer of Crescent Midstream attesting to\nRespondent’s compliance with applicable PHMSA regulations;\nb. Conduct a review of the Affected Segment to identify any abnormal operating\nconditions, deficient operating practices, or lessons learned requiring corrections, and\naddress any such conditions that require remedial action implementation prior to\nsubmitting the Restart Plan. Respondent must identify in writing to the Director all\noperations reviewed in the Affected Segment and any corrective actions/changes made,\nor that Respondent plans to make, to such operations, and receive approval for such\nchanges in writing from the Director;\nc. Review its emergency response procedures and oil spill response plan (49 C.F.R. Part\n194) with all personnel involved in operating the Affected Segment, identify any\ndeficiencies with the procedures or following the procedures, and ensure all operating\npersonnel are prepared to respond appropriately as required by their emergency\nresponse procedures and Part 194;\nd. Submit its complete Management of Change and Lockout/Tagout procedures to the\nDirector for review and approval;\ne. Provide its written procedures for determining a leak or release has occurred on the\nAffected Segment to the Director for review and approval.\n3. Restart Plan.\na. b. Respondent must submit a detailed written Restart Plan to the Director and receive\napproval from the Director prior to operating any pipeline facilities in the Isolated\nFacility.\nAll pressure relief and overpressure protection devices within the Isolated Facility must\nbe set no higher than maximum operating pressure identified by Crescent Midstream’s\nRestart Plan. All relief and overpressure protection devices must be reset to the\npressure restrictions in the Crescent Midstream Restart Plan and confirmed by written\ndocumentation according to Respondent’s written procedures. A copy of the\ndocumentation must be submitted to, and approved by, the Director in writing prior to\nthe restart.\nc. The Restart Plan must specify how the Isolated Facility will be protected from surge\nevents as required by §195.406(b). All alarm setpoints must be adjusted and confirmed\nusing Respondent’s written Management of Change procedures, submitted to the\nEverLine control center, and confirmed by written documentation. The EverLine\ncontrollers and Respondent’s operations personnel must also be trained on any revisions\nprior to the restart. Confirmation of the training and the additional documentation\ndescribed above in this Corrective Action Item 3.c. must be submitted in writing, and\napproved by, the Director prior to the restart.\n\n\n\nd. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. Any Isolated Facility piping not included in Respondent’s proposed restart plan must\nremain isolated by written Lock Out/Tag Out procedures. These Lock Out/Tag Out\nprocedures must be submitted to the Director and approved in writing prior to restart.\nPressure relief and overpressure protection may not be accomplished via use of\nadministrative controls only.\nThe Restart Plan must provide for continuous in-person monitoring of the Isolated\nFacility by Respondent’s personnel during the restart process, and continuing for a\nminimum of 24 hours thereafter. If any abnormal operating conditions or other safety\nconcerns occur during the restart, operations must immediately be shut down and the\ncause of any abnormal operating conditions or safety issues determined and reported to\nthe Director in writing, along with any proposed corrective actions identified.\nRespondent must not restart operations again until receiving written approval to do so\nfrom the Director.\nThe Restart Plan must be initiated only during daylight hours and must describe its plan\nto ensure sufficient in-person monitoring to ensure no abnormal operating conditions\noccur.\nThe Restart Plan must include provisions for communications with local emergency\nresponse officials prior to restart of the Isolated Facility, and such communications\nmust be made by Respondent prior to restart.\nThe Restart Plan must include procedures requiring more frequent (at a minimum, at\nleast once every seven (7) days during the effective period of this Order) leak detection\npatrolling than normally required by Part 195 regulations for the Affected Segment\nduring the effective period of this Order, and must identify the methods and frequencies\nof such patrolling.\nThe Restart Plan must specify reduced leak detection thresholds for the Affected\nSegment during the effective period of this Order. The Restart Plan must specify how\nRespondent will perform leak detection activities to account for such reduced thresholds\nand address the adjusted leak detection alarming to the new limits. Respondent’s\namended procedures governing leak detection at reduced thresholds must be submitted\nto the Director and approved in writing prior to restart.\nThe Restart Plan must identify the EverLine control center points of contact and must\nalso be included in the EverLine control room shift change information. A copy of the\nshift change information must be provided daily for the first 72 hours, and then weekly\nthereafter, to the Director in writing during the effective period of this Order.\nThe Restart Plan must identify and specify the position of each valve in the Isolated\nFacility, and those positions must be confirmed with the EverLine control center. The\nvalve positions and evidence of the control center confirmation of such information\nmust be provided to the Director in writing prior to restart.\nThe Restart Plan must include a description of the communications process with the\nEverLine control center. The Restart Plan must also include applicable Management of\nChange procedures (including documentation) that will be used for any changes made to\nthe portions of the Crescent Midstream system affected by this Order, including all\nspecified operational and pressure restrictions. The communications plan must also\nidentify how any operation issues will be communicated between the EverLine control\ncenter and Crescent Midstream, including identification of specific personnel making\nsuch notifications.\n\n\n\nm. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the entire\nplan, but the Isolated Facility cannot resume any operations until the Restart Plan is\napproved in its entirety.\nn. Once approved by the Director in its entirety, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by\nreference into this Order.\no. After any portion of the Isolated Facility identified in the approved Restart Plan has\noperated without any abnormal conditions for a minimum of 72 hours, Respondent may\nrequest from the Director approval for a full return to service (without the 350 psig\npressure restriction specified in Corrective Action Item 1.b. above) of such portion of\nthe Isolated Facility.\nOther Requirements\n4. Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of\nthe Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve\nthe submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies;\n(d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the\nsubmission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n5. Reporting. Respondent must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all\navailable data and the results of any testing and evaluations, and of any other reviews (to\ninclude of Respondent’s procedures and regulatory compliance evaluations) required by this\nOrder; (2) include and describe the progress of the repairs or any other remedial actions\nbeing undertaken by Respondent on the Affected Segment and Isolated Facility and at the\nRaceland Station under this Order. The first quarterly report is due on September 30, 2024.\nThe Director may amend the interval for the submission of these reports.\n6. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\n7. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of the\ncosts associated with implementation of this Corrective Action Order. Include in each\nquarterly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and\nrevision of procedures, studies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure,\nincluding repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation,\nif applicable.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\n\n\n\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 4-2024-016-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any other order\nissued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of\nfederal or state law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\nfor Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n42024016CAO_Closure Letter_05122025_(24-315924)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: jashcroft@crescentmid.com\nMay 12, 2025\nJeremiah Ashcroft III\nChief Executive Officer\nCrescent Midstream, LLC\n263 Trinity Lane\nGray, Louisiana 70359\nRE: CPF 4-2024-016-CAO\nDear Mr. Ashcroft:\nOn August 2, 2024, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued\nto Crescent Midstream, LLC, a Corrective Action Order in the above-referenced case. This Order\nincluded a requirement to take corrective actions on your pipeline. Based on our review of the\ndocumentation you provided, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this\nOrder.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nBryan Lethcoe\nDirector, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Eric Lyons, Vice President of Engineering and Operations, Crescent Midstream, LLC,\nelyons@crescentmid.com\nKayley Gautreaux, Compliance Coordinator, Crescent Midstream, LLC\nkgautreaux@crescentmid.com\n\n42024016CAO_PHC Hearing Scheduled_09052024_(24-315924)_text.pdf\n\nSeptember 5, 2024\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: emallen@akingump.com and bryan.lethcoe@dot.gov\nMs. Emily P. Mallen\nCounsel to Crescent Midstream, LLC\nAkin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP\nRobert S. Strauss Tower\n2001 K Street, NW\nWashington, DC 20006\nMr. Bryan Lethcoe\nDirector, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n8701 South Gessner Road, Suite 630\nHouston, Texas 77074\nRe: Notice of Hearing, Crescent Midstream, LLC\nCPF No. 4-2024-016-CAO\nDear Ms. Mallen and Mr. Lethcoe:\nIn accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, an informal hearing will be held regarding the\nCorrective Action Order issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nin the above-referenced case. The hearing will take place on November 13th, 2024, beginning at\n8:30 a.m. Central Time.\nThe hearing will take place at the PHMSA Southwest Region office, 8701 South Gessner Road,\nSuite 630, Houston, TX 77074. Upon arrival at the building, attendees will be required to\npresent photo identification to security personnel. A contact phone number for the day of the\nhearing is (713) 272-2859.\nAt least 10 calendar days prior to the hearing (or by November 4th, 2024), both parties must\nsubmit and exchange any additional written materials they intend to present at the hearing and\nthe name and email address of each attendee. This information should be provided\nelectronically. Materials not submitted by this date may be excluded.\n\n\n\nIf you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.\nSincerely,\nLarry White\nPresiding Official\ncc: Mr. Jeremiah Ashcroft III, Chief Executive Officer, Crescent Midstream, LLC,\njashcroft@crescentmid.com\nMr. Ian Curry, Esq., Counsel, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA,\nian.curry@dot.gov\nMs. Kelsey Gagnon, Counsel, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA,\nkelsey.gagnon@dot.gov","truncated":false,"body_characters":32026}