{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 42024027NOPV","title":"SUNOCO PIPELINE L.P. — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2024-05-31","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(c)(13), 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(l)(1)(ii).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42024027nopv.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42024027nopv.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42024027nopv","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42024027NOPV","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving SUNOCO PIPELINE L.P.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(c)(13),  195.452(i)(1),  195.452(l)(1)(ii). The case was opened on 2024-05-31 and is reported as closed as of 2026-06-29. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n42024027NOPV_Closure Letter_06292026_(23-266081).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_Closure%20Letter_06292026_(23-266081).pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_Closure Letter_06292026_(23-266081)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_Closure%20Letter_06292026_(23-266081)_text.pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_Decision on Petition for Reconsideration_02042026_(23-266081).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_Decision%20on%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_02042026_(23-266081).pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_Decision on Petition for Reconsideration_02042026_(23-266081)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_Decision%20on%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_02042026_(23-266081)_text.pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_Final Order_09172025_(23-266081).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_Final%20Order_09172025_(23-266081).pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_Final Order_09172025_(23-266081)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_Final%20Order_09172025_(23-266081)_text.pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_Operator Petition for Reconsideration_10072025_(23-266081).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_Operator%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_10072025_(23-266081).pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_Operator Response to Notice_07312024_(23-266081).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_07312024_(23-266081).pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_PCO_05312024_(23-266081).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_PCO_05312024_(23-266081).pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_PCO_05312024_(23-266081)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42024027NOPV/42024027NOPV_PCO_05312024_(23-266081)_text.pdf\n\n42024027NOPV_Closure Letter_06292026_(23-266081)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n8701 S. Gessner, Suite 630\nHouston TX 77074\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: tom.long@energytransfer.com\nJune 29, 2026\nThomas Long\nChief Executive Officer\nEnergy Transfer, LP\n8111 Westchase Drive\nDallas, TX, 75225\nCPF 4-2024-027-NOPV\nDear Mr. Long:\nOn September 17, 2025, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued a Final Order to Sunoco Pipeline, LP1 (Sunoco), in the above-referenced case. Subsequent\nto the Order PHMSA issued a Decision on your petition. The Order and Decision included\ncompliance actions requiring corrective actions.\nBased on our review of the documentation you submitted, we have determined that you have\ncomplied with all the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nRod Seeley\nActing Director, Southwest Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n1 Sunoco Pipeline, LP, is a subsidiary of Energy Transfer, LP\n\n\n\ncc: Daniel Wentworth, Executive Vice President of Operations, Energy Transfer, LP,\nDaniel.wentworth@energytransfer.com\nChad Ingalls, Senior Vice President of Operations, Energy Transfer, LP,\nChad.ingalls@energytransfer.com\nTodd Stamm, Senior Vice President of Operations, Energy Transfer, LP,\ntodd.stamm@energytransfer.com\nJennifer Street, Senior Vice President of Operations Services, Energy Transfer, LP,\njennifer.street@energytransfer.com\nKeegan Pieper, Assistant General Counsel, Energy Transfer, LP,\nkeegan.pieper@energytransfer.com\nMatthew Stork, Vice President of Tech Services, Energy Transfer, LP,\nmatthew.stork@energytransfer.com\nTodd Nardozzi, Director, DOT Compliance, Energy Transfer, LP,\ntodd.nardozzi@energytransfer.com\nSusie Sjulin, Director, DOT Compliance, Energy Transfer, LP,\nsusie.sjulin@energytransfer.com\nAnne Blankenship, Chief Counsel, Energy Transfer, LP,\nanne.blankenship@energytransfer.com\n\n42024027NOPV_Final Order_09172025_(23-266081)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nSeptember 17, 2025\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: tom.long@energytransfer.com\nThomas Long\nChief Executive Officer\nEnergy Transfer, LP\n8111 Westchester Drive\nDallas, TX, 75225\nRe: CPF No. 4-2024-027-NOPV\nDear Mr. Long:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and specifies actions that need to be taken by Sunoco Pipeline, LP (Sunoco), to comply\nwith the pipeline safety regulations. When the terms of the compliance order have been\ncompleted, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement action will be\nclosed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the date of transmission and\nacknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Bryan Jeffrey Lethcoe, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nKeegan Pieper, Assistant General Counsel, Energy Transfer, LP,\nkeegan.pieper@energytransfer.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\\\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nSunoco Pipeline, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2024-027-NOPV\na subsidiary of Energy Transfer, LP, )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom March 13 to July 14, 2023, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\ninspected Sunoco Pipeline, LP’s1 (Sunoco) hazardous liquid pipeline in Houston, Delmont, and\nMontello, Pennsylvania. The pipeline transports approximately 350 miles of natural gas liquid\n(NGL) and refined products from Delmont to Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated May 31, 2024, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed\nCompliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 CFR § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding\nthat Sunoco had committed three violations of 49 CFR Part 195 and proposed ordering\nRespondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nEnergy Transfer, LP (Energy Transfer or Respondent), on behalf of Sunoco, responded to the\nNotice by letter dated July 31, 2024 (Response).2 Energy Transfer contested one of the\nallegations, requested modification of the compliance order, and offered additional information\nin response to the Notice. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its\nright to one.\n1 Sunoco Pipeline, LP, is a subsidiary of Energy Transfer, LP. See Ownership Structure, ENERGY TRANSFER,\nhttps://www.energytransfer.com/ownership-\nstructure/#:~:text=SUN's%20general%20partner%20is%20owned,more%20information%2C%20visit%20Sunoco%\n20LP.&text=(NYSE%3A%20USAC)%20is%20a,of%20total%20compression%20fleet%20horsepower (last\naccessed October 21, 2024).\n2 The Region granted Energy Transfer’s request for an extension of the 30-day deadline in 49 CFR § 190.208 for\nresponding to the Notice.\n\n\n\n2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR Part 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 195.452(i)(1), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) ….\n(i) What preventative and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area? –\n(1) General requirements. An operator must take measures to prevent\nand mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high\nconsequence area. These measures include conducting a risk analysis of the\npipeline segment to identify additional actions to enhance public safety or\nenvironmental protection. Such actions may include, but are not limited to,\nimplementing damage prevention best practices, better monitoring of\ncathodic protection where corrosion is a concern, establishing shorter\ninspection intervals, installing EFRDs on the pipeline segment, modifying\nthe systems that monitor pressure and detect leaks, providing additional\ntraining to personnel on response procedures, conducting drills with local\nemergency responders and adopting other management controls.\nThe Notice alleged that Sunoco violated 49 CFR § 195.452(i)(1) by failing to take measures to\nprevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high consequence\narea (HCA). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to consider or recommend\npreventative and mitigative measures (P&MMs) at the Beckersville, Elverson, Marcus Hook, and\nMontello Stations to address dead legs or lightning strikes.\nEnergy Transfer “neither admit[ted] nor denie[d] the allegation” of violation in Item 1 of the\nNotice in its Response.\n3 Instead, Energy Transfer offered additional information to support its\ndecision not to implement P&MMs at the Beckersville, Elverson, Montello, and Marcus Hook\nStations and requested that PHMSA withdraw the Proposed Compliance Order (PCO) associated\nwith Item 1. In particular, Energy Transfer explained that:\nThe purpose of the meetings identified in Section 5.3 of Sunoco’s Pipeline\nIntegrity Management Plan (Rev. 7, Oct. 5, 2022) of the IMP that generated the\nDOT 195 HCA Facility Analysis documents previously provided to PHMSA is to\nreview a series of questions pertaining to potential threats/risks at the facilities.\nThe questions are to drive discussions to identify concerns, and potentially\nrecommend preventive of mitigative measures, but P&M activities are not\nmandated simply by a question being answered as “Yes”. For example, if the\nitems were historic (past issues previously addressed), are being addressed\nthrough existing efforts or procedures, and/or are not considered to be a\n3 Response at 3.\n\n\n\n3\nsignificant enough threat/concern to warrant a P&MM, they are not\n“recommended’ through this document.\nRegarding the alleged failure to implement P&MMs to address lightning strikes, Energy Transfer\nacknowledged that the Beckersville, Elverson, Montello, and Marcus Hook Stations had\npreviously experienced power outages due to this phenomenon as indicated in the DOT 195\nHCA Facility Analysis documents. However, Energy Transfer explained that the issue was not\nconsidered an integrity threat given existing procedures and processes to initiate a station\nshutdown in the event of a power outage and the installation of protective equipment at the\nstation to address lightning strikes. Energy Transfer also noted that weather and outside force\ndamage were “considered a relatively low risk overall” on the pipeline system.\nAs for the alleged failure to implement P&MMs for dead legs, Energy Transfer provided the\nfollowing additional information about its efforts to address the issue at the Elverson, Montello,\nand Marcus Hook Stations.\nElverson Station. Energy Transfer explained that the piping identified as a dead\nleg is an above grade pig trap bypass line that operates when receiving inline\ninspection tools. Energy Transfer noted that this piping can be flushed, is\nregularly monitored, presents little or no internal corrosion threat, and is\nscheduled to be removed in 2025.\nMontello Station. Energy Transfer explained that the identification of dead legs\nas a potential integrity threat in the DOT 195 HCA Facility Analysis documents\nwas based on an assumption given the size and complexity of the station.\nHowever, subsequent visual inspections and corrosion monitoring performed by a\nthird-party consultant did not identify any dead legs at the station.\nMarcus Hook Station. Energy Transfer explained that the identification of dead\nlegs as a potential integrity threat in the DOT 195 HCA Facility Analysis\ndocuments was based on an assumption given the size and complexity of the\nstation. Energy Transfer further explained that subsequent visual inspections and\ncorrosion monitoring performed by a third-party consultant identified dead legs at\nthe station. Energy Transfer explained that these dead legs were being addressed\nthrough an integrity management program.\nIn the Region Recommendation (Recommendation), the Director of the Southwest Region\nrecommended that the allegation of violation in Item 1 of the Notice be sustained for two\nreasons.4 First, the Director stated that Energy Transfer “admitted that it failed to recommend\nP&MMs to address dead legs and lightning strikes at the facilities listed in the Notice” in its\nResponse.5 Second, the Director stated “[w]hile [Energy Transfer] contended it had elements in\nplace that rendered P&MMs unnecessary, it nonetheless acknowledged that it failed to\n4 Recommendation at 3-4.\n5 Recommendation at 3.\n\n\n\n4\nimplement P&MMs for the identified issues of lightning strikes and dead legs.”6 With respect to\nlightning strikes, the Director noted that Energy Transfer had not mentioned any of the reasons\noffered in its Response for concluding that this issue was not an integrity threat during the onsite\ninspection, nor had Energy Transfer provided any records to support that conclusion. The\nDirector similarly noted that Energy Transfer had not provided any records to support the\nstatements made in its Response about the treatment of dead legs at the Elverson, Montello, or\nMarcus Hook Stations, including any documents related to the subsequent visual inspections and\ncorrosion monitoring performed by the third-party consultant.\nAfter considering all of the evidence, I find that Sunoco violated 49 CFR § 195.452(i)(1) by\nfailing to take measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could\naffect an HCA. While I do not agree with the Director’s contention that Energy Transfer\nadmitted the violation alleged in Item 1 of the Notice, I find that OPS sustained its burden of\nproof on the merits.\nAs to the procedural question, section 190.208(b) prescribes the requirements for responding to a\nnotice of probable violation that contains a proposed compliance order.7 It states, in relevant\npart, that “[i]f the respondent is contesting one or more of the allegations of probable violation or\ncompliance terms, but is not requesting a hearing under § 190.211, the respondent may object to\nthe proposed compliance order and submit written explanations, information, or other materials\nin answer to the allegations in the notice of probable violation.”8 Section 190.208(d) further\nstates, in relevant part, that a respondent’s “[f]ailure to respond in accordance with . . . paragraph\n(b) of this section, constitutes a waiver of the right to contest the allegations in the notice of\nprobable violation and authorizes the Associate Administrator, without further notice to the\nrespondent, to find the facts as alleged in the notice of probable violation and to issue a final\norder under § 190.213.”9\nIn this case, Energy Transfer “neither admit[ted] nor denie[d] the allegation” of violation in Item\n1 of the Notice in its Response. However, Energy Transfer also clearly “object[ed] to the\nproposed compliance order and submit[ted] written explanations, information, or other materials\nin answer to the allegations in the notice of probable violation.”10 While arguably inconsistent,\nthe statements made by Energy Transfer in its Response were sufficient to preserve its rights\nunder § 190.208(b)(3) to contest the allegations in Item 1 of the Notice and avoid a waiver under\n§ 190.208(d).\nTurning to the merits, section 195.452(k) prescribes the recordkeeping requirements that\napply to hazardous liquid pipeline facilities that are subject to the integrity management\nprogram requirements, including the provisions for P&MMs in § 195452(i). Section\n6 Recommendation at 3.\n7 49 CFR § 190.208(b).\n8 49 CFR § 190.208(b)(3).\n9 49 CFR § 190.208(d).\n10 49 CFR § 190.208(b)(3).\n\n\n\n5\n195.452(k) states, in relevant part:\nAn operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At a minimum, an\noperator must maintain the following records for review during an inspection:\n(i) A written integrity management program in accordance with paragraph (b) of\nthis section.\n(ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications,\njustifications, deviations and determinations made, variances, and actions taken, to\nimplement and evaluate each element of the integrity management program listed\nin paragraph (f) of this section.\nSection 195.452(f), the regulation that prescribes the basic elements of an IM program, lists\nP&MMs as one of those elements. As such, Sunoco had an obligation under § 195.452(k) to\n“maintain . . . records for review during” OPS’s “inspection” documenting the “decisions and\nanalyses . . . and actions taken” to address the integrity threats identified in the DOT 195 HCA\nFacility Analysis, including through the implementation of P&MMs.\nAs the Director explained in the Region Recommendation, Sunoco did not provide any records\nrelated to addressing the integrity threats identified in the DOT 195 HCA Facility Analysis\nduring the inspection. Nor did Energy Transfer provide any such records in responding to the\nNotice. Energy Transfer simply offered statements to demonstrate that lightning strikes are not\nan integrity threat to the Beckersville, Elverson, Montello, and Marcus Hook Stations, and to\ndescribe the actions taken to address the integrity threat posed by dead legs at the Elverson,\nMontello, and Marcus Hook Stations. These statements are not sufficient to satisfy the\nrecordkeeping requirements in § 195.452(k), or to substantiate Sunoco’s compliance with the\nP&MM provisions in § 195.452(i). For these reasons, I find that Sunoco committed the violation\nalleged in Item 1 of the Notice.\nEnergy Transfer’s request for withdrawal of the PCO for this item will be discussed below in the\nCompliance Order section.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 195.452(l)(1)(ii), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) ….\n(l) What records must an operator keep to demonstrate compliance?\n(1) An operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records\nthat demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At a\nminimum, an operator must maintain the following records for review\nduring an inspection:\n(i) ….\n(ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any\nmodifications, justifications, deviations, and determinations made,\nvariance, and actions taken, to implement and evaluate each elements of the\n\n\n\n6\nintegrity management program listed in paragraph (f) of this section.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 195.452(l)(1)(ii) by failing to maintain\ndocuments to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications, justifications,\ndeviations and determinations made, variances, and actions taken, to implement and evaluate\neach element of the integrity management program. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco\nfailed to maintain documentation showing that recommended preventative measures were\nimplemented for line segments 11190.2 (BECK-TWIN-8) and 12124.1 (DELM-HOLL-8).11\nIn its Response, Energy Transfer again neither admitted nor denied the allegation of violation in\nItem 2 of the Notice. Rather, it provided additional information regarding the steps it had taken\nto address PHSMA’s finding and asked that PHMSA find the PCO associated with this item\nsatisfied. As with Item 1 of the Notice, the Director states that Energy Transfer did not contest\nthe allegation in Item 2 of the Notice its Response. The Director further states that information\nprovided in the Response, including the actions taken by Sunoco after receiving the Notice,\ndemonstrate that its failure to comply with the requirements in § 195.452(l)(1)(ii).\nAfter considering all of the evidence, I find that Sunoco violated 49 CFR § 195.452(l)(1)(ii) by\nfailing to maintain documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications,\njustifications, deviations and determinations made, variances, and actions taken, to implement\nand evaluate each element of the integrity management program. While I do not agree that\nEnergy Transfer waived its right to contest the allegations in Item 2 of the Notice for the reasons\ndiscussed in addressing Item 1 of the Notice, I agree with the Director that the information\nprovided in the Response is sufficient to substantive the alleged violation, particularly with\nrespect to the actions taken to update the provisions in its IM program. Energy Transfer’s\nrequest that PHMSA find the PCO for this item satisfied will be discussed below in the\nCompliance Order section.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 195.402 (c)(13), which states:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) ….\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following\nto provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(1) ….\n(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to\ndetermine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation\nand maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are\nfound.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 CFR § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to periodically\nreview the work done by operator personnel to determine the effectiveness of the procedures\n11 49 CFR § 195.452(f)(6) requires the identification of P&MMs to protect an HCA in accordance with the\nrequirements of § 195.452(i).\n\n\n\n7\nused in normal operation and maintenance and take corrective action where deficiencies are\nfound, in accordance with the regulation and Sunoco’s procedure, Guiding Principles for\nStandard Operating Procedures, A-HLA.02 (Rev. September 1, 2023). Sunoco’s Guiding\nPrinciples for Standard Operating Procedures, A-HLA.02 (Rev. September 1, 2023) stated that\nthe document explains the need to perform the periodic review required by § 195.402(c)(13).12\nHowever, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to provide records showing that periodic reviews\nof the work performed by personnel were conducted and corrective actions taken to correct\ndeficiencies in the procedures used for normal operation and maintenance where found.\nThe periodic effectiveness review required by § 195.402(c)(13) should be “a comprehensive or\norganized review of all company procedures to evaluate their overall effectiveness.”13 To\ndemonstrate compliance, “an operator should be able to produce documentation showing that it\nhad conducted an actual analysis of its procedures used in normal operation and maintenance,\nthat it implemented a process by which it had determined whether its procedures were adequate\nor not, and that it had corrected any procedures found to be deficient.”14 Such documentation\nmust show an effectiveness review was “performed for the purpose of determining the\neffectiveness of the…procedures themselves,”15 and not for any other reason. PHMSA\nprecedent is clear that a periodic effectiveness review is separate and distinct from evaluation of\nindividual job performance.16\nIn its Response, Energy Transfer contested the allegation of violation and the terms of the PCO\nassociated with the Item. It asserted that Sunoco complies with § 195.402(c)(13) via a collective\nprocess that consists of: (1) Quality Job Reviews (QJRs), (2) Annual Work History Reviews\n(AWHRs), (3) methods by which company personnel may request modifications to procedures,\nand (4) Annual Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)\nReviews. Sunoco included documentation of this collective process as Attachment C to its\nResponse.\n12 PHMSA Violation Report, CPF 4-2024-027-NOPV, Exhibit C-2, Energy Transfer’s SOP HLA.02 “Guiding\nPrinciple for Standard Operating Procedures, Section 1, Revision Date 09/02/2023.\n13 In the Matter of ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP, Final Order, CPF No. 3-2012-5012 (June 12, 2014),\nhttps://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125012/320125012_Final%20Order_06122014.pdf.\n14 Id. (citing PHMSA Operations and Maintenance Enforcement Guidance, Part 195,\nhttps://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/regulatory-compliance/pipeline/enforcement/5781/o-m-\nenforcement-guidance-part-195-7-21-2017.pdf.\n15 In the Matter of Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., Final Order, CPF 3-2008-5011 (August 17, 2010),\nhttps://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085011/320085011_Final%20Order_08172010.pdf.\n16 In the Matter of TransMontaigne Operating Company, LP, Final Order, CPF 3-2013-5025 (May 8, 2014)\n(“[Respondent] was able to provide documentation that the performance of individual personnel was regularly\nreviewed, but no systematic steps were take to ensure that overall operations and maintenance procedures were\neffective.”), https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-\ndocuments/320135025/320135025_Final%20Order_05082014.pdf; see also Enbridge, supra note 5.\n\n\n\n8\nRespondent stated that Sunoco’s QJR process involves supervisors, managers, and/or directors\ntraveling to the field to witness employees at work. The results of the QJRs range from\nacknowledgement of adequately performed tasks, identification of an update to procedure(s),\nthe need for additional training, and any other areas for improvement. In addition, Respondent\nstated that AWHRs are conducted by supervisors and consist of a review of the Operator\nQualification (OQ) tasks performed to determine effectiveness of procedures and identify any\nquestions or need for changes or updates to any of the procedures utilized in performing tasks.\nEnergy Transfer further stated that it has a process, described in A-HLA.02, Guiding Principles\nfor Standard Operating Procedures, Sections 1.0, 4.0, 7.2, and Appendix C, by which company\npersonnel may request modifications to procedures. Under this procedure, Sunoco subject matter\nexperts review these requests for potential implementation. Lastly, Sunoco’s Annual O&M SOP\nReviews identify any changes that may be necessary to its O&M SOPs, along with considering\nchanges offered by other personnel.\nRespondent suggested that the collective process described in its Response satisfies §\n195.402(c)(13). Energy Transfer contended that its QJRs satisfied the regulatory requirements.\nHowever, the QJRs are not evidence of compliance. The QJRs are focused on reviewing the job\nperformance of individual personnel. Indeed, in Attachment C provided with the Response,\nsome of the comments in the QJRs are solely related to job performance, such as stating all\nemployees “worked safely”17 and “[w]ork was done satisfactorily.”18 Section 195.402(c)(13) is\n“directed to procedures refinement, not employee evaluation.”19\nEnergy Transfer also contended that the AWHRs conducted as part of its Operator Qualification\n(OQ) program satisfied the requirements of § 195.402(c)(13). Like QJRs, the AWHRs are meant\nto review the job performance of personnel, specifically OQ-qualified personnel. The AWHRs\nstate that the purpose of the work history review is to “determine whether the individual has\nknowledge and skills required to continue to perform these tasks.”20 AWHRs are training and\nqualification reviews performed for the purpose of evaluating an individual’s knowledge and\nability to perform a task. Such reviews do not constitute compliance with § 195.402(c)(13).21\nEnergy Transfer also asserted in its Response that its process by which personnel could, “at any\ntime…request amendments to procedures” demonstrated compliance with § 195.402(c)(13).\nHowever, encouraging personnel to comment on procedures on an ad hoc basis does not meet the\nregulatory requirement in 195.402(c)(13), which requires a comprehensive or organized review\nof all company procedures to evaluate their overall effectiveness.22 Respondent further asserted\n17 Response, Attachment C, at page 21.\n18 Response, Attachment C, at page 28.\n19 PHMSA Operations and Maintenance Enforcement Guidance, Part 195, supra.\n20 Response, Attachment C, at 30; see also PHMSA Violation Report, CPF 4-2024-027-NOPV, Exhibit C-1, Energy\nTransfer’s OQ Task Review Records.\n21 Enbridge, supra note 6; see also PHMSA Operations and Maintenance Enforcement Guidance, Part 195, supra.\n22 ONEOK NGL Pipeline, supra at note 4.\n\n\n\n9\nthat its SOP annual reviews demonstrate compliance with § 195.402(c)(13). However, operators\nare required to conduct annual procedural reviews under § 195.402(a). This is a separate\nrequirement from the periodic effectiveness reviews in § 195.402(c)(13). When promulgating §\n192.605(b)(8), which contains a verbatim periodic effectiveness review requirement for\noperators of gas pipeline facilities, PHMSA stated that changes identified during the periodic\neffectiveness review can be executed during the annual review required by § 192.605(a).23\nHowever, the agency distinguished periodic effectiveness reviews from the annual review of the\nmanual of written procedures for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n24 The same\ndistinction applies to the periodic effectiveness review and annual review required by §§\n195.402(c)(13) and 195.402(a), respectively. As such, the annual SOP review does not\nconstitute a periodic effectiveness review for the purpose of satisfying § 195.402(c)(13).\nSunoco failed to provide evidence of a comprehensive review of its procedures “performed for\nthe purpose of determining the effectiveness of the…procedures themselves.”25 Respondent\nfailed to provide documentation of an “actual analysis of its procedures [that] determined\nwhether its procedures were adequate.”26 Nor was documentation provided demonstrating that\nSunoco analyzed its procedures used in normal operation and maintenance, that it implemented a\nprocess by which it determined whether its procedures were adequate or not, or that it corrected\nany procedures found to be deficient.27 Respondent submitted no evidence to demonstrate it has\never concluded that its procedures are effective. No documentation was provided to show that an\n“effectiveness review” of any procedure was carried out.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 CFR\n§ 195.402(c)(13) by failing to periodically review the work done by operator personnel to\ndetermine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and take\ncorrective action where deficiencies are found, in accordance with the regulation and Sunoco’s\nprocedure, Guiding Principles for Standard Operating Procedures, A-HLA.02 (Rev. September\n1, 2023).\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\n23 Both § 192.605(a) and § 195.402(a) require an operator to review annually its manual of written procedures for\noperations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n24 Operation and Maintenance Procedures for Pipelines, Final Rule: Response to Petition for Reconsideration, 60\nFed. Reg. 14,379 14,379 (March 17, 1995).\n25 Enbridge, supra note 6.\n26 ONEOK NGL Pipeline, supra note 4.\n27 Id.\n\n\n\n10\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1, 2, and 3 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 CFR §§ 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(l)(1)(ii) and 195.402(c)(13), respectively. Under\n49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids or who\nowns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards\nestablished under chapter 601.\nWith regard to the violation of § 195.452(i)(1) (Item 1), Respondent argued the compliance\nterms should be withdrawn.\nAs stated in the Notice, PHMSA reviewed Sunoco’s DOT 195 Facility HCA Analysis (May 21,\n2022) that analyzed these stations. The analysis identified as issues historic call-outs due to\nlightning strikes at Beckersville, Elverson, and Marcus Hook. The analysis also identified as\nissues operational dead legs at Elverson, Marcus Hook, and Montello Station. Section 5.3 of\nSunoco’s Pipeline Integrity Management Plan (Rev. 7, October 5, 2022)28 stated that after the\nDOT 195 Facility HCA Analysis is completed, operator personnel will list all threat concerns\nprioritized by risk for the facility and develop proposed preventative and/or mitigative measures\nand time frame to address each concern. However, Sunoco did not develop proposed\npreventative and/or mitigative measures for each threat/concern (historic call outs due to\nlightning strikes and dead legs) and develop time frames to address each concern determined in\nthe DOT 195 Facility HCA analysis.\nIn its Response, Respondent provided additional information related to the P&MMs at\nBeckersville, Elverson, Montello, and Marcus Hook facilities. Energy Transfer stated that the\npurpose of the integrity management plan (IMP)’s section 5.3 meetings is to review a series of\nquestions pertaining to potential threats/risks at the facilities, and that the questions drive\ndiscussions to identify concerns and potentially recommend P&MMs. Respondent stated that\nP&MMs are not mandated by a question being answered in the affirmative. For example,\nEnergy Transfer stated that if the items were historic, are being addressed through existing\nefforts, or are not significant, P&MMs would not be developed.\nEnergy Transfer stated that at the Beckersville, Elverson, Montello, and Marcus Hook Stations,\nlightning strikes had occurred resulting in power loss. However, Respondent further stated that\nthese were not considered to be a threat to integrity and are already sufficiently addressed by its\nprocedures. Specifically, Energy Transfer stated:\n• “If the systems lose facility transmitters, communication procedures exist for the system\nto initiate a station shut down or the station is programmed to shut down automatically.”\n• “There are lightening arrestors across all insulating gaskets and lightning protection at the\nfacilities/tanks to meet NEC code.”\nHowever, Energy Transfer did not provide records to show how each facility is mitigating the\nthreat of lightning strikes. Without such records, PHSMA cannot determine if these elements\n28 PHMSA Violation Report, CPF 4-2024-027-NOPV, Exhibit A-2, Energy Transfer’s Pipeline Integrity\nManagement Plan, Section 5.3, Revision Date 10/05/2022.\n\n\n\n11\nadequately address the threat of lightning strikes.\nRegarding dead legs at Elverson, Montello, and Marcus Hook Stations, Energy Transfer stated\nthe following:\n• At Elverson, the pipe identified as a potential dead leg was a pig trap bypass line that\noperates when receiving ILI tools and can be flushed. The pipe is above grade,\nmonitored during weekly site visits, has security cameras, and has little to no internal\ncorrosion threat. Further, the pipe is scheduled to be removed in 2025.\n• At Montello, no specific P&MM was recommended because, following third-party API\n570 visual inspection and corrosion monitoring in 2022 for all the piping within the\nfacility, no dead leg piping was discovered.\n• At Marcus Hook, following third-party API 570 visual inspection and corrosion\nmonitoring in 2022 for all the piping within the facility, a list of dead legs at the facility\nwas updated within the Asset Integrity’s SHIELD program and any recommendations are\nbeing managed as a part of that program.\nWith regard to the dead legs identified at Marcus Hook Station, Sunoco did not develop any\nP&MMs, despite identifying dead legs, and Respondent failed to provide records supporting the\nstatements it made in its Response. Energy Transfer failed to provide the API 570 inspection\nreport and failed to include material facts, such as the number of identified dead legs and their\nlocations. Respondent also failed to include analyses of flowrates and design features at this\nfacility to eliminate the possibility of dead legs.\nWith respect to Montello and Elverson Stations, Energy Transfer failed to adequately explain\nwhy it initially believed dead legs were present at these facilities. Nor did it provide\ndocumentation of the API 570 inspection and corrosion monitoring that concluded no dead legs\nexisted. Without records to corroborate the absence of dead legs at both facilities, PHMSA\ncannot determine if the PCO should be withdrawn.\nFor the above reasons, the Compliance Order for Item 1 is not withdrawn.\nWith regard to the violation of § 195.452(l)(1)(ii) (Item 2), Respondent argued the compliance\nterms should be deemed satisfied. With its Response, Energy Transfer provided documentation\nof the actions it has to complete the recommended P&MMs.29 In a recommendation from\nSouthwest Region, the Region Director recommended that the PCO be deemed satisfied.\nFollowing review of the submitted documentation, I agree that the terms of the PCO have been\ncompleted. For this reason, a compliance actions associated with Item 2 is not included in this\nOrder.\nWith regard to the violation of § 195.402(c)(13) (Item 3), Energy Transfer requested withdrawal\nof the underlying allegation of violation and the PCO associated with this item. In its Response,\nRespondent did not provide argument for withdrawal or modification of the PCO other than\nwithdrawal of the underlying allegation of violation. For the reasons discussed above, in the\n29 Response, Attachments A & B.\n\n\n\n12\nFindings of Violation section of this Order, I determined that Item 3 should not be withdrawn.\nFor this reason, the Compliance Order for Item 3 is not withdrawn or modified.\nTherefore, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 CFR § 190.217, Respondent\nis ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations\napplicable to its operations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 195. 452(i)(1) (Item 1), Sunoco must implement\npreventative and mitigative measures to address operational dead legs and lightening\nstrikes, and provide records of the implemented measures to the Director, Southwest\nRegion, within 60 days of receipt of the Final Order.\n2. With respect to the violation of § 195.402(c)(13) (Item 3), Sunoco must develop\nand establish a process for periodically conducting and documenting reviews of work\nperformed by personnel to determine the effectiveness of the procedures used in\nnormal operation and maintenance and take corrective action where deficiencies are\nfound and submit the plan to the Director, Southwest Region, for approval within 60\ndays of receipt of the Final Order.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nPHMSA requests that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs\nassociated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the Director. It is\nrequested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated with\npreparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated with\nreplacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nexceeding $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (see 49 CFR § 190.223 for adjusted amounts), for\neach violation for each day ","truncated":true,"body_characters":62821}