{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 42025058CAO","title":"ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2025-12-04","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42025058cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42025058cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42025058cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42025058CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2025-12-04 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n42025058CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_01062026_(25-358672).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42025058CAO/42025058CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(Amended)_01062026_(25-358672).pdf\n\n42025058CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_01062026_(25-358672)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42025058CAO/42025058CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(Amended)_01062026_(25-358672)_text.pdf\n\n42025058CAO_Corrective Action Order_12042025_(25-358672).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42025058CAO/42025058CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_12042025_(25-358672).pdf\n\n42025058CAO_Corrective Action Order_12042025_(25-358672)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42025058CAO/42025058CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_12042025_(25-358672)_text.pdf\n\n42025058CAO_Corrective Action Order_12042025_(25-358672)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nDecember 4, 2025\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: gbacon@eprod.com\nGraham Bacon\nExecutive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer\nEnterprise Products Operating, LLC\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2025-058-CAO\nDear Mr. Bacon,\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (Order) issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety. It requires Enterprise Products\nOperating, LLC, to take certain corrective actions with respect to a pipeline failure which\noccurred on November 27, 2025, on the Enterprise East Leg Mainline pipeline in Jefferson\nCounty, Kansas.\nService by electronic mail is effective upon the date of transmission and acknowledgment of\nreceipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: Corrective Action Order\ncc: Mr. Bryan Lethcoe, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nSuzie Davis, Senior Manager, Compliance, Enterprise Products Operating, LLC,\nsmdavis@eprod.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nEnterprise Products Operating, LLC ) CPF No. 4-2025-058-CAO\n)\nRespondent. )\n)\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) pursuant to the authority provided\nin 49 U.S.C. § 60112, to require Enterprise Products Operating, LLC (Enterprise or Respondent),\nto take necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the environment from\npotential hazards associated with the pipeline failure that occurred on the East Leg Mainline\npipeline (East Leg Pipeline or Pipeline)1 in McLouth, Jeferson County, Kansas (Failure) on\nNovember 27, 2025. The East Leg Pipeline is a hazardous liquid pipeline facility that is subject\nto PHMSA’s jurisdiction pursuant to the Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., and\nPipeline Safety Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 190 to 199.\nThe Enterprise MAPCO pipeline system is composed of two parallel pipelines (8” East Leg\nMainline and the 10” East Leg Loop) that transports liquified petroleum gas (LPG) in a northeast\ndirection from Conway, Kansas to Janesville, Wisconsin. The East Leg Pipeline includes 9 pump\nstations and one water navigable crossing. The Failure occurred at Aerial Marker (AM) 158.4 in\nan agricultural field within 0.5 mile of State Highway 16.\nOn November 27, 2025, Enterprise detected the Failure when it observed a pressure drop on the\nEast Leg Pipeline and received a public report of a vapor cloud near State Highway 16 in Jefferson\nCounty, Kansas.\nAfter detecting the Failure, Enterprise isolated a segment of the East Leg Pipeline, closing valves\nat McLouth Station (AM 156.1) and AM 168. Enterprise used flares to reduce the pressure on the\n1 Enterprise Products Operating, LLC's East Leg Mainline pipeline is part of the MAPCO pipeline system present in\n13 states. The MAPCO pipeline system is a Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) pipeline system consisting of four primary\nsegments, totaling approximately 8,074 miles in length. The 2,113-mile Conway North pipelines (East Red and Blue\nlines) link the NGL hub at Conway, Kansas, to refineries, petrochemical plans and propane markets in the upper-\nMidwest.\n\n\n\npipeline segment. Enterprise located the Failure at AM 158.4, cut out the failed section, and\ntransported that section to Magnolia, Texas for inspection and metallurgical analysis by a third\nparty, Acuren. The pipe at the location of the failure is pre-1970 low-frequency electric resistance\nwelded (LF-ERW). The failure was along the longitudinal seam.\nEnterprise notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the release on the East Leg Pipeline at\n21:59 Eastern Time on November 27, 2025. A second report to the NRC was made on November\n29, 2025, at 11:45 Eastern Time. Enterprise provided an estimated release amount of 3900 barrels\nof propane.\nThe segment of the East Leg Pipeline remains shut-in and not in operation.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The\npreliminary findings of the Agency’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\nPreliminary Findings\n• The 8” East Leg Pipeline is an 8-inch diameter pipeline that transports liquified petroleum gas\n(LPG) from Conway, Kansas to Janesville, Wisconsin. The East Leg Pipeline includes 9 pump\nstations and one navigable water crossing.\n• The East Leg Pipeline was originally constructed in 1960. The pipe at the failure location is\n0.219 inches thick, API 5L grade X-52, with low frequency electric resistance welding (LF-\nERW) seams, and was manufactured by Bethlehem Steel. The Pipeline has coal tar enamel\n(CTE) coating and cathodic protection. The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the\nPipeline is 1650 psig. When the Failure occurred, the operating pressure was 1562 psig.\n• On the evening of November 27, 2025, Enterprise observed a pressure drop on the East Leg\nPipeline and received a public report of a vapor cloud near State Highway 16. After detecting\nthe Failure, Enterprise shut in a segment of the East Leg Pipeline, closing valves at McLouth\nStation (AM 156.1) and AM 168. Enterprise used flares to reduce the pressure on the pipeline\nsegment.\n• Enterprise notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the Failure at 21:59 Eastern Time\non November 27, 2025.\n• Enterprise provided a supplemental NRC notification at 11:45 Eastern Time on November 29,\n2025. In its second NRC report, Enterprise estimated a release of 3900 barrels of propane.\n• The Failure occurred around AM 158.4, about 1.3 miles southeast of McLouth, Kansas, in an\nagricultural field within 0.5 mile of State Highway 16. The 2020 United States census counted\n859 people, 346 households, and 232 families in McLouth.\n• At the point of failure, the pipe was observed to have a 12-foot-long fish-mouth rupture along\nthe longitudinal seam.\n\n\n\n• Enterprise cut out the failed section of the East Leg Pipeline and transported the pipe to Acuren\nin Magnolia, Texas, for inspection and metallurgical analysis.\n• The release of LPG poses a risk to public safety, property, and the environment. The Failure\ncaused the creation of a vapor cloud over State Highway 16 which passers-by drove through,\nrisking ignition of the vapor and severe harm to people in the vicinity. Emergency responders\nestablished an evacuation zone of one-half mile requiring the evacuation of 15-20 residences\nand the closure of State Highway 16.\n• Previously, on November 29, 2016, a failure occurred on Enterprise’s 10-inch East Leg Loop\npipeline, which runs parallel to the East Leg Mainline pipeline, resulting in the release of\napproximately 5,000 barrels of ethane-propane mixture in Platte County, Missouri. The\nreleased product ignited and caused a fire. The cause of the failure was determined to be\nexternal near-neutral stress corrosion cracking along and adjacent to the ERW seam.\n• The failed East Leg Pipeline segment is currently shut-in and not operating.\n• The investigation of the Failure is on-going, and information could change. These preliminary\nfindings may be amended based on further findings during the investigation.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the hazardous liquid pipeline facility is located to environmentally\nsensitive areas; (5) the population density and population and growth patterns of the area in which\nthe pipeline facility is located; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety\nBoard made under another law; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered age of the pipe,\nthe circumstances surrounding the Failure, the hazardous nature of the product being transported,\nthe pressure required for transporting the material, the method of manufacture, the uncertainties as\nto the cause of the Failure, the prior failure on the pipeline system, the ongoing investigations to\ndetermine the cause of the Failure, and the possibility that the same condition(s) that may have\n\n\n\ncaused the failure remain present in the pipeline and could lead to additional failures, it appears\nthat the continued operation of the pipeline without corrective measures would pose a pipeline\nintegrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment. Accordingly, corrective measures are\nnecessary to mitigate the pipeline integrity risk of the pipeline system to protect public safety,\nproperty, and the environment.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, PHMSA, OPS Southwest Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider amending this Order. To\nthe extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nDefinitions:\nAffected Segment – “Affected Segment” means the segment of Respondent's 8-inch East Leg\nMainline pipeline running from Conway, Kansas to Bosworth, Missouri.\nIsolated Segment – “Isolated Segment” means the segment of Respondent's 8-inch East Leg\nMainline Pipeline running from McLouth Station (AM 156.1) to AM 168.\nFailure Site – “Failure Site” means the pipeline section on the Affected Segment where the failure\noccurred on November 27, 2025, at AM 158.4.\nDirector – “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety, Southwest Region.\nThe Director’s address is 8701 South Gessner Road, Suite 630, Houston, TX 77074.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, Enterprise is ordered to immediately take the following corrective\nactions:\n1. Shutdown of the Isolated Segment. The 8\" Enterprise East Leg Pipeline from the valve\nat McLouth Station (AM 156.1) to AM 168 is currently out of service. This Isolated\nSegment must remain shut down until the Director has provided written approval to\nEnterprise to resume operations. The Affected Segment is subject to the pressure\nrestriction set forth in Item 2 below.\n2. Operating Pressure Restriction. Enterprise must reduce and maintain a twenty percent\n\n\n\n(20%) pressure reduction in the operating pressure on the Affected Segment, such that\nthe operating pressure does not exceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual operating\npressure in effect immediately prior to the Failure on November 27, 2025.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase\nthe pressure or return the pipeline to its pre-Failure operating pressure is\nobtained from the Director.\nb. Prior to resuming operation, Enterprise must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of each pump station and each main line pressure regulating\nstation on the Affected Segment at the time of the Failure and the reduced pressure\nrestriction set-points at these same locations. Since portions of the Affected\nSegment are capable of bi-directional operation, the reduced pressure pump\nstation set-points should be specified for both directions of flow where\napplicable.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits,\nsoftware programming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure\ndevices to be adjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, Enterprise must take into\naccount any in-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected\nSegment to provide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions\nare completed. A description of how any ILI features or anomalies were\naccounted for in the determination of pressure restriction set-points shall be\nprovided with the information .\ne. Enterprise must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the\noperating pressure data, taking into account any ILI features or anomalies present\nin the Affected Segment. Enterprise must immediately reduce the operating\npressure to maintain the safe operations of the Affected Segment, if warranted by\nthe monthly review. Enterprise must submit the results of the monthly review to\nthe Director including, at a minimum, the current discharge set-points (including\nany additional pressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-\npoints.\n3. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, Enterprise must\ndevelop and submit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\na. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the\nentire plan, but the Isolated Segment cannot resume operation until the Restart Plan\nis approved in its entirety.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference\ninto this Order.\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Isolated Segment\nduring the restart process and must include incremental pressure increases during\nstart up, with each increment to be held for at least two (2) hours.\nd. The Restart Plan must include sufficient surveillance of the pipeline during each\npressure increment to ensure that no leaks are present when operation of the line\nresumes.\ne. The Restart Plan must specify a daylight restart and include advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials.\nf. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all\n\n\n\nmandated actions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural\nmodifications are incorporated into Enterprise’s O&M procedures manual.\n4. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, Enterprise may return\nthe Isolated Segment to service, but the operating pressure must not exceed eighty percent\n(80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the Failure on\nNovember 27, 2025 in accordance with Item 2 above.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification\nof the pressure restriction upon a written request from Enterprise demonstrating that\nrestoring the pipeline to its pre-Failure operating pressure is justified based on a reliable\nengineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known\ndefects, anomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.\n6. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days after this Order is issued,\nEnterprise must complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the\nfailed pipe, including an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Mechanical\nand metallurgical testing must be conducted by an independent third-party acceptable to\nthe Director and must document the decision-making process and all factors contributing\nto the failure. Respondent must complete the testing and analysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the Failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol\nand the proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director\nwith the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS\nrepresentative to witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to Respondent.\n7. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 90 days after this Order is issued, Enterprise must submit a Remedial Work\nPlan (RWP) to the Director for prior approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire\nRWP.\nc. Upon approval by the Director, the RWP becomes incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\nd. The RWP must include qualification of the Welding Procedure Specification(s)\nused in the repair of the failed pipe.\ne. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and\nremedial measures Respondent will use to verify the integrity of the Affected\nSegment. It must address all known or suspected factors and causes of the Failure.\nEnterprise must consider the risks and consequences of another failure to develop\na prioritized schedule for RWP- related work along the Affected Segment.\n\n\n\nf. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to\nthe contributing factors identified for the Failure.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service\nand pressure test failures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a\nwritten report containing all the available information such as the\nlocations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure\nanalysis, and other corrective actions required by this Order with all\nrelevant pre-existing operational and assessment data for the Affected\nSegment. Pre-existing operational data includes, but is not limited to,\ndesign, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior\nmetallurgical analyses, and any third-party consultation information.\nPre-existing assessment data includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool\nruns, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close interval\nsurveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Failure\nare likely to exist elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and\nevaluations to determine whether, and to what extent, the conditions\nassociated with the Failure and other failures from the failure history\n(see (e)(ii) above) or any other integrity threats are present elsewhere\non the Affected Segment. At a minimum, this process must consider\nall failure causes and specify the use of one or more of the following:\n1) ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the\npipeline system based on the cause of Failure and that can\nreliably detect and identify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Close-interval surveys,\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys\nin coordination with other utilities (e.g., underground\nutilities, overhead power lines, etc.) in the area,\n5) Coating surveys,\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys,\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations\nappropriate for the failure causes.\nNote: Enterprise may use the results of previous tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations if approved by the Director, provided the results\nof the tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard\nto the factors known or suspected to have caused the Failure.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria Enterprise will use to\nprioritize, excavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections,\n\n\n\nand other identified integrity threats. Include a description of how any\ndefects will be graded and a schedule for repairs or replacement.\nvii. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment,\ndescribe the methods Enterprise will use to repair, replace, or take\nother corrective measures to remediate the conditions associated with\nthe Failure, and to address other known integrity threats along the\nAffected Segment. The repair, replacement, or other corrective\nmeasures must meet the criteria specified in (e)(vi) above.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity\nverification measures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the\nAffected Segment considering the results of the analyses, inspections,\nevaluations, and corrective measures undertaken pursuant to the\nOrder.\ng. Enterprise must include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\nh. Enterprise must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information\nobtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate\nthe results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate\nmodifications required by the Director.\ni. Enterprise must submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior\napproval.\nii. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\ni. Enterprise must implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director,\nincluding any revisions to the plan.\n8. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 180 days after this Order is issued, Enterprise must\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to\nthe Director. The RCFA must be supplemented or facilitated by an independent third-\nparty approved by the Director. Enterprise must ensure that all reports, whether draft or\nfinal, are made available in their entirety to the Director at the same time they are made\navailable to Enterprise. The final report must include findings and any lessons learned and\nwhether the findings and lessons learned are applicable to other locations within\nEnterprise’s pipeline system.\n9. Public Awareness Program Review. Within 180 days after this Order is issued,\nEnterprise must review and assess the effectiveness of its Public Awareness program with\nregards to the Failure. Enterprise must amend its Public Awareness Program, if necessary,\nto reflect the results of this review. The documentation of this Public Awareness Plan\nProgram Review must be available for inspection by OPS or provided to the Director, if\nrequested.\nOther Requirements:\n10. Approvals. With respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval\nof the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b)\n\n\n\napprove the submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any\ndeficiencies; (d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent\nmodify the submission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval,\napproval upon conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to\ntake all action required by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the\nDirector disapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all\ndeficiencies within the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n11. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\n12. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data\nand results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the\nprogress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly\nreport is due on March 1, 2026. The Director may change the interval for the submission\nof these reports.\n13. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of\nthe costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each monthly report\nsubmitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including\nrepairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 4-2025-058-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 CFR Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued\nto Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of federal\nor state law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral\nto the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR §\n190.5.\n\n\n\n_____________________________ __________________________\nLinda Daugherty Date Issued\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n42025058CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_01062026_(25-358672)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nJanuary 06, 2026\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: gbacon@eprod.com\nGraham Bacon\nExecutive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer\nEnterprise Products Operating, LLC\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 4-2025-058-CAO\nDear Mr. Bacon,\nEnclosed please find an Amended Corrective Action Order (Order) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety. It requires Enterprise\nProducts Operating, LLC, to take certain corrective actions with respect to a pipeline failure\nwhich occurred on November 27, 2025, on the Enterprise East Leg Mainline pipeline in\nJefferson County, Kansas.\nService by electronic mail is effective upon the date of transmission and acknowledgment of\nreceipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: Corrective Action Order\ncc: Mr. Bryan Lethcoe, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nSuzie Davis, Senior Manager, Compliance, Enterprise Products Operating, LLC,\nsmdavis@eprod.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nEnterprise Products Operating, LLC ) CPF No. 4-2025-058-CAO\n)\nRespondent. )\n)\n____________________________________)\nAMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), is issuing this Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO or Order)1 pursuant to the\nauthority provided in 49 U.S.C. § 60112, to require Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\n(Enterprise or Respondent), to take necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property,\nand the environment from potential hazards associated with the pipeline failure that occurred on\nthe East Leg Mainline pipeline (East Leg Pipeline or Pipeline)2 in McLouth, Jeferson County,\nKansas (Failure) on November 27, 2025. The East Leg Pipeline is a hazardous liquid pipeline\nfacility that is subject to PHMSA’s jurisdiction pursuant to the Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §\n60101 et seq., and Pipeline Safety Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 190 to 199.\nThe Enterprise MAPCO pipeline system is composed of two parallel pipelines (8” East Leg\nMainline and the 10” East Leg Loop) that transports liquified petroleum gas (LPG) in a northeast\ndirection from Conway, Kansas to Janesville, Wisconsin. The East Leg Pipeline includes 9 pump\nstations and one water navigable crossing. The Failure occurred at Aerial Marker (AM) 158.4 in\nan agricultural field within 0.5 mile of State Highway 16.\n1 To the extent this ACAO is modified from the original CAO issued to Respondent under CPF No. 4-2025-058-\nCAO on December 4, 2025, this ACAO supersedes and replaces the original CAO. To the extent this ACAO is\nunmodified from the original CAO, this ACAO retains the full force and effect of the original CAO. All deadlines\nnoted in the order which refer to the date “this Order is issued” or “receipt of this Order” refer to the issuance of the\noriginal CAO on December 4, 2025.\n2 Enterprise Products Operating, LLC's East Leg Mainline pipeline is part of the MAPCO pipeline system present in\n13 states. The MAPCO pipeline system is a Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) pipeline system consisting of four primary\nsegments, totaling approximately 8,074 miles in length. The 2,113-mile Conway North pipelines (East Red and Blue\nlines) link the NGL hub at Conway, Kansas, to refineries, petrochemical plans and propane markets in the upper-\nMidwest.\n\n\n\nOn November 27, 2025, Enterprise detected the Failure when it observed a pressure drop on the\nEast Leg Pipeline and received a public report of a vapor cloud near State Highway 16 in Jefferson\nCounty, Kansas.\nAfter detecting the Failure, Enterprise isolated a segment of the East Leg Pipeline, closing valves\nat McLouth Station (AM 156.1) and AM 168. Enterprise used flares to reduce the pressure on the\npipeline segment. Enterprise located the Failure at AM 158.4, cut out the failed section, and\ntransported that section to Magnolia, Texas for inspection and metallurgical analysis by a third\nparty, Acuren. The pipe at the location of the failure is pre-1970 low-frequency electric resistance\nwelded (LF-ERW). The failure was along the longitudinal seam.\nEnterprise notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the release on the East Leg Pipeline at\n21:59 Eastern Time on November 27, 2025. A second report to the NRC was made on November\n29, 2025, at 11:45 Eastern Time. Enterprise provided an estimated release amount of 3900 barrels\nof propane.\nThe segment of the East Leg Pipeline remains shut-in and not in operation.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The\npreliminary findings of the Agency’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\nPreliminary Findings\n• The 8” East Leg Pipeline is an 8-inch diameter pipeline that transports liquified petroleum gas\n(LPG) from Conway, Kansas to Janesville, Wisconsin. The East Leg Pipeline includes 9 pump\nstations and one navigable water crossing.\n• The East Leg Pipeline was originally constructed in 1960. The pipe at the failure location is\n0.219 inches thick, API 5L grade X-52, with low frequency electric resistance welding (LF-\nERW) seams, and was manufactured by Bethlehem Steel. The Pipeline has coal tar enamel\n(CTE) coating and cathodic protection. The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the\nPipeline is 1650 psig. When the Failure occurred, the operating pressure was 1562 psig.\n• On the evening of November 27, 2025, Enterprise observed a pressure drop on the East Leg\nPipeline and received a public report of a vapor cloud near State Highway 16. After detecting\nthe Failure, Enterprise shut in a segment of the East Leg Pipeline, closing valves at McLouth\nStation (AM 156.1) and AM 168. Enterprise used flares to reduce the pressure on the pipeline\nsegment.\n• Enterprise notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the Failure at 21:59 Eastern Time\non November 27, 2025.\n• Enterprise provided a supplemental NRC notification at 11:45 Eastern Time on November 29,\n2025. In its second NRC report, Enterprise estimated a release of 3900 barrels of propane.\n\n\n\n• The Failure occurred around AM 158.4, about 1.3 miles southeast of McLouth, Kansas, in an\nagricultural field within 0.5 mile of State Highway 16. The 2020 United States census counted\n859 people, 346 households, and 232 families in McLouth.\n• At the point of failure, the pipe was observed to have a 12-foot-long fish-mouth rupture along\nthe longitudinal seam.\n• Enterprise cut out the failed section of the East Leg Pipeline and transported the pipe to Acuren\nin Magnolia, Texas, for inspection and metallurgical analysis.\n• The release of LPG poses a risk to public safety, property, and the environment. The Failure\ncaused the creation of a vapor cloud over State Highway 16 which passers-by drove through,\nrisking ignition of the vapor and severe harm to people in the vicinity. Emergency responders\nestablished an evacuation zone of one-half mile requiring the evacuation of 15-20 residences\nand the closure of State Highway 16.\n• Previously, on November 29, 2016, a failure occurred on Enterprise’s 10-inch East Leg Loop\npipeline, which runs parallel to the East Leg Mainline pipeline, resulting in the release of\napproximately 5,000 barrels of ethane-propane mixture in Platte County, Missouri. The\nreleased product ignited and caused a fire. The cause of the failure was determined to be\nexternal near-neutral stress corrosion cracking along and adjacent to the ERW seam.\n• The failed East Leg Pipeline segment is currently shut-in and not operating.\n• The investigation of the Failure is on-going, and information could change. These preliminary\nfindings may be amended based on further findings during the investigation.\nAmended Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the hazardous liquid pipeline facility is located to environmentally\nsensitive areas; (5) the population density and population and growth patterns of the area in which\n\n\n\nthe pipeline facility is located; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety\nBoard made under another law; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered age of the pipe,\nthe circumstances surrounding the Failure, the hazardous nature of the product being transported,\nthe pressure required for transporting the material, the method of manufacture, the uncertainties as\nto the cause of the Failure, the ongoing investigations to determine the cause of the Failure, and\nthe possibility that the same condition(s) that may have caused the failure remain present in the\npipeline and could lead to additional failures, it appears that the continued operation of the pipeline\nwithout corrective measures would pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the\nenvironment. Accordingly, corrective measures are necessary to mitigate the pipeline integrity\nrisk of the pipeline system to protect public safety, property, and the environment.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, PHMSA, OPS Southwest Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, P","truncated":true,"body_characters":56127}