{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 42026028CAO","title":"DELFIN OFFSHORE PIPELINE LLC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2026-02-06","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42026028cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42026028cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-42026028cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/42026028CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving DELFIN OFFSHORE PIPELINE LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2026-02-06 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n42026028CAO_Corrective Action Order_02062026_(26-363822).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42026028CAO/42026028CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_02062026_(26-363822).pdf\n\n42026028CAO_Corrective Action Order_02062026_(26-363822)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/42026028CAO/42026028CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_02062026_(26-363822)_text.pdf\n\n42026028CAO_Corrective Action Order_02062026_(26-363822)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nFebruary 6, 2026\nVIA EMAIL TO: d.poston@delfinlng.com\nMr. Dudley Poston\nChief Executive Officer\nDelfin Offshore Pipeline LLC\n25 West Cedar Street, Suite 215\nPensacola, Florida 32502\nCPF 4-2026-028-CAO\nDear Mr. Poston:\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (“CAO” or “Order”) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The CAO\nrequires Delfin Offshore Pipeline, LLC (Delfin) to take certain corrective actions with respect to the\npipeline failure that occurred on February 3, 2026, on Delfin’s Offshore Gas Pipeline in Cameron\nParish, Louisiana.\nService of the CAO by email is effective upon the date of transmission and acknowledgment of\nreceipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon\ncompletion of service.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: Bryan Lethcoe, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nBill Daughdrill, President, Delfin Offshore Pipeline LLC, w.daughdrill@delfinlng.com\n\n\n\n2\nDaniel Werner, Chief Operating Officer, Delfin Offshore Pipeline LLC,\nd.werner@fairwoodlng.com\nTim Trahan, Operations Manager, Delfin Offshore pipeline LLC, timtrahan1@yahoo.com\nEmily Kimball, outside counsel for Delfin Offshore Pipeline LLC,\nEmily.kimball@hoganlovells.com\nPaige Laborde, outside counsel for Delfin Offshore Pipeline LLC,\npaige.laborde@hoganlovells.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nDelfin Offshore Pipeline, LLC, ) CPF No. 4-2026-028-CAO\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) pursuant to the authority provided in\n49 U.S.C. § 60112. The CAO requires Delfin Offshore Pipeline, LLC (Delfin or Respondent) to take\ncertain necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the environment from the\npotential hazards associated with the continued operation of Delfin’s Offshore Gas Pipeline. Delfin’s\nOffshore Gas Pipeline is a 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline that begins at the Genesis Energy\njunction platform located at West Cameron Block 167 (WC-167) in the Gulf of America and runs\napproximately 30 miles north to a termination point at Williams/Transco Station 44 located onshore\nnear Johnson Bayou, Cameron Parish, Louisiana.\nOn February 3, 2026, at approximately 11:14 AM local time, Delfin’s Offshore Gas Pipeline\nruptured (Failure) near Mae’s Beach and Johnson Bayou in Cameron Parish, Louisiana. The Failure\nresulted in a release of approximately 56 million cubic feet (mmcf) of natural gas, which\nsubsequently ignited and burned for several hours, the ejection of 4-5 feet of pipeline, and injury to\none individual. The Failure occurred in connection with Delfin’s efforts to clean and conduct an\ninternal inspection of the Offshore Gas Pipeline, which has not been in operation since 2012, prior\nto returning the line to service.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The preliminary\nfindings of that ongoing investigation are as follows:\n\n\n\n2\nPreliminary Findings\n• Delfin’s Offshore Gas Pipeline is a 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline that begins at the\nGenesis Energy junction platform located at West Cameron Block 167 (WC-167) in the Gulf of\nAmerica and runs approximately 30 miles to a termination point at Williams/Transco Station 44\nlocated onshore near Johnson Bayou, Cameron Parish, Louisiana. Approximately 29 miles of\nthe pipeline are offshore, with an approximately one-mile onshore portion that crosses State\nHighway 82 and several other hydrocarbon pipelines.\n• Delfin’s Offshore Gas Pipeline was constructed in 1978 with double submerged arc weld\n(DSAW) seam pipe. The onshore portion uses an impressed cathodic protection system. The\npipeline has a maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of 1250 psig.\n• In 2012, a prior operator purged, isolated, and filled the Delfin Offshore Gas Pipeline with\nnitrogen. The pipeline has remained out of service since that time.\n• On February 3, 2026, Delfin was running a cleaning pig with caliper in-line inspection (ILI) tool\nthrough the pipeline. Delfin injected compressed natural gas into the pipeline to facilitate the\npigging run.\n• At approximately 11:14 AM local time, the onshore portion of the pipeline ruptured near Mae’s\nBeach and Johnson Bayou in Cameron Parish, Louisiana. The Failure created a crater, ejected\napproximately 4-5 feet of pipe, and caused a fire roughly 50-80 feet wide that continued to burn\nfor an extended period of time.\n• The Failure occurred at a valve site approximately 650 feet north of the shoreline, approximately\na half-mile south of State Highway 82.\n• The Failure injured one individual, who was transported for treatment to a local hospital.\n• Pressure readings on the pipeline significantly dropped after the Failure. Subsequent\ncommunications between the offshore and onshore teams conducting the pigging run caused\npersonnel on platform WC-167 to isolate the upstream valve and to begin the process\nof depressurizing the line.\n• At 12:52 PM Eastern Time on February 3, 2026, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) notified the\nNational Response Center (NRC) of the fire. At the time of the NRC report the cause of the\nFailure was unknown. At 1:16 PM Eastern Time, USCG filed a second NRC report.\n• The fire ceased and the pipeline completed depressurization to 0 psig on the evening of February\n3, 2026.\n• On February 4, 2026, at 9:56 AM Eastern Time, Delfin filed an NRC Report. Delfin reported\nthat a release of an unknown amount of natural gas, a fire, and an injury to one individual\nrequiring hospitalization occurred during pigging activities.\n\n\n\n3\n• On February 5, 2026, at 10:49 PM Eastern Time, Delfin filed a second NRC report, and noted\nthat the Failure caused an estimated release of 56 mmcf of natural gas.\n• The release and ignition of natural gas poses a risk to public safety, people, and the environment.\nThe proximity of the pipeline to a state highway, other hydrocarbon pipelines, and the Gulf of\nAmerica increases the possible consequences of additional releases from the pipeline.\n• The cause of the Failure appears to be the cleaning pig impacting a closed valve. The pipeline\nis currently shut-in and not operating.\n• The investigation of the Failure is on-going, and information could change. These preliminary\nfindings may be amended based on further findings during the investigation.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline facility\nis or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood of serious\nharm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective action, including\nsuspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other\nappropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an opportunity for a hearing as soon\nas practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the\npopulation density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is\nlocated; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another\nlaw; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the characteristics\nof the pipeline, the nature of the Failure; the hazardous nature of the material (natural gas)\ntransported by the pipeline; the existing and potential additional impacts to life, property, or\nthe environment; the uncertainties as to the cause of the Failure; the ongoing investigations to\ndetermine the cause of the Failure; and the possibility that the same condition(s) that may have\ncaused the Failure remains present in the pipeline and could lead to additional failures, it is\nhereby determined that continued operation of Delfin’s Offshore Gas Pipeline, as defined\nbelow, without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment,\nand that failure to issue this Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm.\n\n\n\n4\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without prior\nnotice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon\ncompletion of service.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to\nthe Director, PHMSA, OPS Southwest Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in accordance\nwith 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order. To\nthe extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing\nprior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nDefinitions\nThe Failure – The “Failure” means the rupture that occurred on the Failure Segment on February\n3, 2026.\nFailure Segment – The “Failure Segment” means Delfin’s Offshore Gas Pipeline, beginning at the\nGenesis Energy junction platform located at West Cameron Block 167 (WC-167) in the Gulf of\nAmerica and running approximately 30 miles north to Williams/Transco Station 44 near Johnson\nBayou, Cameron Parish, Louisiana.\nDirector – The “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, OPS Southwest Region.\nCorrective Measures\n1. Shutdown of the Failure Segment. Delfin must not operate the Failure Segment until\nauthorized to do so by the Director.\n2. Qualified Independent Third-Party. Within 14 days of the issuance of this Order, Delfin\nmust select an independent third-party or -parties to perform the analyses, evaluations,\nassessments, and plan development as described in Corrective Actions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, and\n11 and submit its selection along with their associated qualifications to the Director for approval.\na. If Delfin has, as of receipt of this Order, already contracted with an independent third-\nparty or -parties to perform any of the actions described in Corrective Actions 3, 4, 5, 6, 9,\n10, and 11, Delfin shall receive approval for the use of the third-party or -parties unless the\nDirector determines that the third-party or -parties is not qualified to perform the actions\nselected.\n3. Assessment and Inspection. Within 15 days of issuance of this Order, Delfin must submit to\nthe Director a complete plan and schedule of inspection to determine the full extent of damage\ncaused by the Failure and associated fire. The plan must be submitted to the Director for written\napproval prior to initiation. Delfin must implement the plan according to the schedule following\n\n\n\n5\nthe Director’s approval and provide weekly written reports of findings to the Director until a\nfinal report is prepared and submitted.\n4. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 60 days of receipt of this Order, Delfin must\ncomplete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including\nan analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. The testing and analysis must be completed\nas follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section\nand other evidence from the Failure site.\nb. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and\nthe proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with\nthe scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS representative\nto witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their entirety\nto the Director at the same time they are made available to Delfin.\n5. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, Delfin must\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the\nDirector. The RCFA must be facilitated by the independent third-party and must document the\ndecision-making process and all factors contributing to the failure. Delfin must ensure that all\nreports, whether draft or final, are made available in their entirety to the Director at the same\ntime they are made available to Delfin. The final report must include findings and any lessons\nlearned and whether the findings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within\nDelfin’s pipeline system.\n6. Restart Plan. Prior to initiating operation of the Failure Segment, Delfin must develop\nand submit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\na. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the entire\nplan, but the Failure Segment cannot resume operation until the Restart Plan is approved\nin its entirety.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Failure Segment during the\nrestart process and must include incremental pressure increases during start up, with each\nincrement to be held for at least 8 hours.\nd. The Restart Plan must include sufficient surveillance of the pipeline during each pressure\nincrement to ensure that no leaks are present when operation of the line resumes.\ne. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance communications\nwith local emergency response officials.\nf. The Restart Plan must provide for a review of the Failure Segment for conditions similar\nto those of the Failure, including a review of construction, operating and maintenance\n(O&M) and integrity management records, such as in-line inspection (ILI) results,\nhydrostatic tests, root cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial and ground patrols,\ncorrosion, cathodic protection, excavations and pipe replacements. Delfin must address any\nfindings that require remedial measures to be implemented prior to restart.\n\n\n\n6\ng. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all mandated\nactions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural modifications are\nincorporated into Delfin’s operations and maintenance procedures manual.\nh. The Restart Plan must provide for hydrostatic pressure testing of the Failure Segment.\ni. Prior to restart, submit to the Director a contingency plan to operate and monitor the Failure\nSegment during flooding conditions, including enhanced patrolling and surveillance.\n7. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, Delfin may return the\nFailure Segment to service but the operating pressure must not exceed twenty percent (20%) of\nthe maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline.\n8. Removal of Pressure Restriction.\na. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction under Item\n7 upon a written request from Delfin demonstrating that restoring the pipeline to its pre-\nfailure operating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that\nthe pressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and operating\nparameters of the pipeline.\nb. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restrictions\nupon a written request from Delfin demonstrating that temporary mitigative and preventive\nmeasures are implemented prior to and during the temporary removal or modification of\nthe pressure restriction. The Director's determination will be based on the Failure cause\nand provision of evidence that preventive and mitigative actions taken by the operator\nprovide for the safe operation of the Failure Segment during the temporary removal or\nmodification of the pressure restriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director in this\nregard will be decided by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n9. Records Verification. Delfin must verify the records for the Failure Segment that were used\nto establish the MAOP in accordance with § 192.619, including any adjustments needed for the\ncurrent class locations per §§ 192.609 and 192.611. Delfin must submit documentation of this\nrecords verification to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order.\n10. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review. Delfin must review and assess the\neffectiveness of its emergency response plan with regards to the Failure. The review and\nassessment must include the on-scene response and support, coordination, and communication\nwith emergency responders and public officials. Delfin must also include a review and\nassessment of the effectiveness of its emergency training program. Delfin must amend its\nemergency response plan and emergency training, if necessary, to reflect the results of this\nreview. The documentation of this Emergency Response Plan and Training Review must be\navailable for inspection by OPS or provided to the Director, if requested.\n11. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, Delfin must submit a Remedial\nWork Plan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\n\n\n\n7\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial\nmeasures Delfin will use to verify the integrity of the Failure Segment. It must\naddress all known or suspected factors and causes of the Failure. Delfin should\nconsider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to\ndevelop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Failure Segment.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Failure Segment with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the Failure.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test\nfailures) of the Failure Segment and to prepare a written report containing all the\navailable information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis, and\nother corrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-existing\noperational and assessment data for the Failure Segment. Pre-existing operational\ndata includes, but is not limited to, construction, operations, maintenance, testing,\nrepairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and any third-party consultation information.\nPre-existing assessment data includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs,\nhydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close interval surveys, and\nDCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Failure are likely to\nexist elsewhere on the Failure Segment.\nv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the Failure\nand other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or any other\nintegrity threats are present elsewhere on the Failure Segment. At a minimum,\nthis process must consider all failure causes and specify the use of one or more of\nthe following:\n1) Inline inspection (ILI) tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the\npipeline system based on the cause of the Failure and that can reliably detect and\nidentify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Close-interval surveys,\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in coordination\nwith other utilities (e.g. underground utilities, overhead power lines, etc.) in the\narea,\n5) Coating surveys,\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys,\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and,\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the\nFailure causes.\nNote: Delfin may use the results of previous tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations if approved by the Director, provided the\nresults of the tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed\nwith regard to the factors known or suspected to have caused the Failure.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria Delfin will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\n\n\n\n8\nintegrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be graded and a\nschedule for repairs or replacement.\nvii. Based on the known history and condition of the Failure Segment, describe the\nmethods Delfin will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective measures to\nremediate the conditions associated with the pipeline failure on February 3, 2026,\nand to address other known integrity threats along the Failure Segment. The repair,\nreplacement, or other corrective measures must meet the criteria specified in\n(e)(vi) above.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\nmeasures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Failure Segment\nconsidering the results of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective\nmeasures undertaken pursuant to the Order.\nf. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\ng. Delfin must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and to incorporate modifications required\nby the Director. Delfin must submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior\napproval. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally. Any and all revisions\nto the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by reference into this Order will\nbe fully described and documented in the CAO Documentation Report (CDR).\nh. Delfin must implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any\nrevisions to the plan.\n12. CAO Documentation Report (CDR). Delfin must create and revise, as necessary, a\nCAO Documentation Report (CDR). When Delfin has concluded all the items in this Order\nit will submit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to\ncomplete a thorough review of all actions taken by Delfin with regards to this Order prior\nto approving the closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities\nand documentation associated with this Order in one document.\na. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire CDR.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nc. The CDR must include but not be limited to:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. Summary of the pipeline failure of February 3, 2026, and the response activities;\niii. Summary of pipe data and properties and all prior assessments of the Failure\nSegment;\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis required\nby the Order;\nv. Summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by the Order;\nvi. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nvii. Documentation of all actions taken by Delfin to implement the RWP, the\nresults of those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever\nnecessary to incorporate new information obtained during the failure\n\n\n\n9\ninvestigation and remedial activities;\nix. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\nx. A path forward describing specific actions Delfin will take on its entire\npipeline system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order; and\nxi. Appendices (if required).\nOther Requirements:\n13. Approvals. With respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of\nthe Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the\nsubmission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the submission,\nor (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon conditions, or\nmodification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action required by the\nsubmission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any\nportion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies within the time specified by\nthe Director and resubmit it for approval.\n14. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause\nfor an extension.\n15. Reporting. Delfin must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all\navailable data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe\nthe progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report\nis due on April 1, 2026. The Director may change the interval for the submission of these\nreports.\n16. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of\nthe costs associated with implementation of this CAO. Include in each quarterly report\nsubmitted the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of procedures,\nstudies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including repairs,\nreplacements, and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.\nBe advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to being made\npublicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you must\nprovide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 4-2026-028-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 CFR Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued to\n\n\n\n10\nRespondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of federal or\nstate law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §\n60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR\n§ 190.5.\n__________________________ _______________________\nLinda Daugherty Date Issued\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":29603}