{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520025003","title":"ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2002-02-07","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.401(a), 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(3), 195.418(a), 195.422(a), 195.424(a), 195.428(a), 195.432(b).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520025003.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520025003.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520025003","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520025003","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.401(a), 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(3), 195.418(a), 195.422(a), 195.424(a), 195.428(a), 195.432(b). The case was opened on 2002-02-07 and is reported as closed as of 2005-07-01. Proposed civil penalty: $80,000. Assessed civil penalty: $45,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520025003_Final Order_04282004.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520025003/520025003_Final%20Order_04282004.pdf\n\n520025003_Final Order_04282004.pdf\n\nU.SDeporhent\not Tronsportolbn\nReseorch dnd\nSpeciol Progroms\nAdmanislraiion\n400 Sevenlh SI . S W\nWashinglon D C 20590\nAPR 2 8 2004\nMr. Robert Shoaf\nVice President\nRegulatory Affairs\n900 East Benson Boulevard\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Anchorage, AK 99508\nCompany\nRe: CPFNo.5-2002-5003\nDear Mr. Shoat\nEnclosed is the Final Order issued by the Associate Administrator for Pipe line Safety in the\nabove-referenced case. The Final Order -\nmnkes findings of violation with respect to Items 7, 4, and 5 (Item # as alleged in the\nNotice of Probable Violation dated February 7,2002);\nwithdraws the allegations of violation with respect to Items 2a andT1'\nmakes a finding of inadequate procedures for Items 3a, 3b, 8a and 8b and requires\namendment of those procgdures\nwithdraws the allegation of inadequate procedures for Item 3c and 8c;\nfinds that you have completed the actions specified in Items land 4 required to\ncomply with the pipeline safety regulations; and\nassesses a civil penalty of $45,000.\nYour receipt ofthe Final Orderconstitutes service ofthat document under 49 C.F.R. $ 190.5.\nSincerely,\nfi fAn\nfr-^ r t/ t*=-'\nXmes Reynolds\nPipeline Compliance Registry\nOffice of Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Sheila Doody Bishop\nAttomey\nP.O. Box 60469\nFairbanks, Alaska 99706\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REOUESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nRESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION\nWASHINGTON. DC 20590\nIn the Matter of\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company,\nRespondent.\nCPF No. 5-2002-5003\n)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn July 17-28, September 13-17, October 7-17 and October 30-31, 2000, representatives of the\nOffice of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to 49 U.S.C. $ 60117, conducted on-site pipeline safety\ninspections of Respondent's facilities and records from Pump Station #l to Valdez on the Trans\nAlaska Pipeline System (TAPS).\nAs a result of the inspections, the Director, Westem Region, OPS, issued to Respondent, by letter\ndated February 7, 2002, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, Proposed\nCompliance Order and Notice of Amendment (Notice). ln accordance with 49 C.F'R. $ 190'207,\nthe Notice proposed finding that Respondent had violated 49 C.F.R. $$ 195.401(a), 195'402(a),\n1 95.418(a), 195.422and 1 95.428(a), proposed assessing a civil penalty of$80,000 for several ofthe\nalleged violations, and proposed that Respondent take certain measures to correct the alleged\nviolations. The Notice also proposed, in accordance with 49 C.F.R. $ 190.237, that Respondent\namend its procedures for Operations, Maintenance and Emergencies.\nRespondent responded to the Notice by letter dated M arch8,2002 (Response). Respondent did not\ncontest one of the allegations (Item 5, $ 195.422) and submitted payment for the proposed civil\npenalty via wire transfer. Respondent requested an extension to respond to the other allegations in\nthe Notice. The Westem Region granted an extension on March 15,2002. On April 16,2002'\nRespondent notified OPS that it was voiding the $25,000 check for the civil penalty amount and\nwould include a response to Item 5 when it responded to the other allegations. On May 13' 2002,\nRespondent submitted its response to the Notice. Respondent contested the allegations, submitted\ninformation to address the aliegations and reserved the right to a hearing if OPS did not withdraw\nthe allegations based on the submitted information. An informal hearing was held in the Western\nRegion, OlS, on April 8, 2003. After the hearing, Respondent submitted a Closing Response dated\nJune 6, 2003.\n\n\n\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nItem I in the Notice alleged that Respondent had violated 49 C.F.R. g 195.401(a), which provides\nthat an operator may not operate or maintain its pipeline system at a level of safety lower than that\nrequired by subpart F (Operation and Maintenance) and by the procedures the operator is required\nto establish under $ 195.a02@). The Notice alleged that Respondent had operated the pipeline\nunsafely from August 1999 to April 2000. According to the Notice, on August 22, 1 999, Respondent\nhad modified the opening logic of Remote Gate Valve (RGV) #31 at Milepost 1 70 to open at 1 00%\nduring pipeline startup, and on November 13, 1999 and February 10, 2000, Respondent had\nexperienced large magnitude, abnormal hydraulic pulses at RGV 3l during pipeline startup. The\nNotice firther alleged that during start up on April 17,2000, the rapid opening of the valve caused\nunstable flow conditions to occw, creating a vapor pocket collapse immediately south of RGV 3 l.\nThis collapse caused the resuhant pressure pulse to exert excessive hydraulic forces and movernent\nof the pipeline, tripping pipeline anchors near Mile post I 70, shearing off support bracket bolts on\naboveground anchors and raising the pipeline pressure to 793 psi.\nRespondent maintained that the pipeline was operated safely from August I 999 until April 2000 and\nthat the aboveground pipe and support and anchoring system performed as designed. Respondent\ndisagreed with the allegations that it had not experienced the large-magnitude pressure variations\nbeforemodif ingtheopeninglogicofRGV3l,thattheeventonApril lT,2}}lgeneratedexcessive\nhydraulic forces and that the modified opening logic resulted in excessive pressure pulses.\nRespondent acknowledged that a pressure pulse occurred and that the modified opening logic of\nRGV 3l was responsible for an increase in the magnitude of the hydraulic surges in that area.\nHowever, Respondent explained that the aboveground pipe is designed to respond to seismic and\nhydraulic events by absorbing energy through movement of the support and anchoring system.\nRespondent maintained that the aboveground pipe has experienced movement due to hydraulic\nsurges but none of the pressure surges, including the one on April 17, exceeded I l0% of MOP or\nresultedinanydamagetothepipeline. Respondentacknowledgedthattheabovegroundpipemoved\non its support and damaged the support system but argued that the pipeline remained supported and\nwas undamaged. Respondent explained that the anchors were designed to prevent the pipeline from\nbeing subjected to forces above 105 kips.\nThe incident on April 17,2000 was a bubble collapse that occurred at a slack line interface at MP\n170. The PAULA program, which assessed the raised pressure at 109.8% of maximum operating\npressure, assesses pressure pulses. However, this was not a high pressure pulse that can be analyzed\nby the PAULA surge model but a fast transient pressure bubble collapse. When a transient pressure\nspike occurs at stafiup, the pipeline and its components receive a significant shock. The shock\ncannot be measured by conventional hydraulic programs. Moreover, those pressure spikes were due\nto Respondent's own actions in modifying the opening logic of RGV 31. Respondent made the\nmodification without analyzing the potential for surge. When a transient pressure spike occurs at\nstartup, the pipeline and components receive a significant shock and are stressed beyond their metal\nductility. The changing of the opening logic for RGV 31 caused the pipeline to be subject\nunnecessarily to high surge pressure events.\n\n\n\noJ\nAlthough this was a fast transient pressure spike, the suppofi system supported the aboveground\npipeline as it had been designed to do for seismic and thermal events. The smashing of the\nhoneycornb barriers rn'as within the design as were the sliding bolts. But normal design was\nexceeded when the support bracket bolts on aboveground anchors were sheared offdue to the force\nofbetween 120 and 130 kips.\nAccordingly, I find that Respondent violated $ 195.401(a), because the pipeline was operated\nunsafely between August 1999, rvhen Respondent changed the opening logic fbr RGV 31 and\nApril 17, 2000, when the incident involving the vapor pocket collapse occurred.\nItem 2A alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. 0 195.402(a) because it did not follow its\nproceduiesin excavatingthepipeline atmilepost 710.77 r,-hen awall loss of 62o/ohadbeen identified\nty a magnetic flux leakage (MFL) in-line inspection in 1992. Respondent's procedures require\nexcavation of the anomaly if the penetration threshold exceeds 507o of nominal wall thickness, but\nRespondent did not excavate the pipeline until May 2000. The regulation requires an operator to\npr\"p-\" and follow for its pipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nRespondent disagreed that it had knowledge of wall loss at this location in 1992 and that it had not\nfoiiowed its procedures in inspecting the anomaly. Respondent explained that the analysis of the\n1992 MFL pig data identified a nonspecific indicator or pipeline feature at MP 710.7, but did not\nidentify any wal1 loss with that feature. It was not until the smart pig inspection in 1998 and the\n1999 data analysis from that run that a43o/owall loss was identified at that location. Respondent\nmaintained that it took prompt action to excavate the location in May 2000 although the 43o/\"\ncorrosion wall loss did not match the criterion for required excavation. Respondent explained that\nwhen it excavated at the location, it found an actual wall loss of 600/o'\nAlthough the records, if the data had been analyzed correctly' may have showed the 60Vo wall loss\nbefore Respondent excavated the location in 2000, those charged with interpreting the data failed\nto identify ihe location as one requiring excavation under Respondent's procedures' Rather than a\nfailure to follow procedures, the failure was in interpreting the data corectly and responding\naccordingly. Accordingly, I am withdrawing the allegation of violation'\nItem 4 alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. $ 195.418(a), which provides that an operator\nmust not transport any hazardous liquid that would corrode the pipe or other components of its\npipeline system unless the operator his invcstigatecl the corrosive effect ofthc hazardous liquid on\nihl system and taken adequaie steps to mitigate corrosion. The Notice alleged that Respondent had\nnot investigated the internal conosive effects ofthe hazardous liquids on its six-inch bypass piping\noncheckvalves6, 1,g,13,18,29,29A,30,68Aand71 althoughRespondenthadnotedsubstantial\ninternalwalllossinundergroundcheckvalves4, 10, 12, 16, 17,75,83 and34andinthebypasses\nof abovesround check valves 1 9,A., 32 and 3l .\n\n\n\nRespondent agreed that at the July 2000 inspection Respondent had not inspected utt oftn\" .n\"cj\nvaive bypasses. Respondent noted that in 1997 it had proposed a five-year schedule to excavate all\nthe non-inspected buried check valves, and that it kept government agencies apprised ofthe status\nof its activities. Respondent stated that all check valves have now been inspected and there are\nprocedures in place to ensure an adequate checking schedule.\nRespondent did not have a 49 U.S.C. $ 60118 (c) waiver from the requirement to investigate the\ninternal corrosive effects ofthe hazardous liquids it was transporting on its check valve bypasses.\nAccordingly, I find that Respondent violated $ 195 .a 1 8(a) with respect to the cited check valves.\nItem 5 alleged that Respondent had not insured repairs it made to its pipeline were made in a safe\nmanner,inviolationof49C.F.R. $195.a22@). TheNoticeallegedthatinexcavatingandexamining\nsevere mechanical damage atMP 710.76 on May 15, 2000, Respondent had blpassed pump station\nL2, whichincreased thepressure atthe defect location from approximately 330psig to approximately\n670 psig. The Notice further alleged that because Respondent could not determine accurately the\nremaining wall strength at the location of the defect, Respondent should have lowered the pressure\nat the location, or at least not mised the pressure.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation but explained that it had taken steps to ensure that in the\nfuture pressure is not raised on a known defect. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated\n$ 195.a22@) when it made this repair on May 15,2000.\nItem 7 alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. $ 195.a28(a) because Respondent could not\nprovide records demonstrating the standard maintenance procedures for all pressure safety valves\nat Pump station 3 had been completed for calendar year 1999. Respondent's maintenance records\nshowed that pressure safety valves 304 A, B and C and 305 A, B and C were scheduled for\nmaintenance on October 30, 1999 but that Respondent did not inspect valves 304 A, B and C until\nNovembcr2,2000, valve 305Auntil October24,2000 and valves 305 B and C untii September 16,\n2000. The regulation requires an operator to inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief\nvalve, pressure regulator or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is\nfunctioning properly at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.\nRespondent contested this allegation and maintained that it had tested the Pump station 3 suction and\ndischarge valves at the required interval in 1999. At the hearing Respondent provided documents\n(Modei Work Orders and Prevenlive Maintenance Work Orders) demonstrating that it had inspected\nand tested the cited valves at the required intervals. The records showed that pump station valvcs\n3054, B and C were tested on September 28,1999 and that Pump station valves 304 A, B and C\nwere teste d on December 31,, 1999, all within the requirecl interval from the previous inspection and\ntest. Accordingly, I am withdrawing this allegation of violation.\n\n\n\n5\nPENALTY ASSESSMENT\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 per\nviolation for each day of the violation up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any related series of\nviolations. The Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $80,000 for violation of §§ 195.401(a),\n195.422 and 195. 428(a). (Items 1, 5 and 7.)\n49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 require that, in determining the amount of the civil\npenalty, I consider the following criteria: nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation, degree\nof Respondent's culpability, history of Respondent's prior offenses, Respondent's ability to pay the\npenalty, good faith by Respondent in attempting to achieve compliance, the effect on Respondent's\nability to continue in business, and such other matters as justice may require.\nThe Notice proposed a civil penalty of $25,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(a) - operating\nthe pipeline unsafely because of the modification of RGV 31's opening logic. Respondent\nacknowledged that the incident on April 17, 2000, was due to its having changed the valve's opening\nlogic. The incident generated sufficient force to move the pipeline on its supports and to shear the\nanchors. Although it was fortunate the pipeline was not damaged, the pipeline, nonetheless, was\nstressed unnecessarily. As mitigating factors, Respondent noted that it had voluntarily notified OPS\nabout the event and, on its own initiative, taken steps to identify the cause and reduce the magnitude\nof future surge events. I assess a civil penalty of $20,000 for this violation.\nThe Notice proposed a civil penalty of S25,000 for Respondent's violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a)\nfor not ensuring that repairs made to the pipeline were done in a safe manner. Respondent said that\nit had implemented new procedures to avoid unsafe repairs in the future. I assess a civil penalty of\n$25,000 for this violation.\nThe Notice proposed a civil penalty of $30,000 for not testing the Pump station 3 valves at the\nrequired intervals. I withdrew this allegation of violation.\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent\na total civil penalty of $45,000.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require this payment be made by wire transfer, through the Federal Reserve\nCommunications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed instructions are\ncontained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be directed to: Financial\nOperations Division (AMZ-120), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike Monroney Aeronautical\nCenter, P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma City, OK: 73125; (405) 954-8893.\nFailure to pay the $45,000 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate\nin accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to those\nsame authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if payment is\nnot made within 110 days of scrvice. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty may result in\nreferral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a United States District Court.\n\n\n\nWARNING ITEM\nThe Notice issued a waming for Item 2B - not following normal operating procedures in removing\nthe RGV-35A control card for maintenance without requesting the Operation Control Center to\ninhibit the RGV controi logic. Respondent said that its operator qualification program is structured\nto prevent a recurrence. Respondent is again wamed that enforcement action will be taken if a\nsubsequent inspection reveals a violation.\nThe Notice also issued a waming for Item 6 for exceeding the maximum pressure when moving an\naboveground section on the pipeline. Respondent contended that the regulation did not apply\nbecause it was written ior belowground pipe and Respondent's pipeiine at Squirrel Creek is\naboveground. Respondent stated that it is preparing a request for a waiver {iom the regulation.\nRespondent must ensure that, while the waiver is pending, it complies with $ I 95.424(a) by reducing\npressure when moving any line pipe.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nTheNoticeproposedacomplianceorderwithrespecttoltems l,2Aand4. Under49U'S.C.\nI 601 1 8(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids or who owns or\noperates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established\nunder chapter 601.\nWith respect to the violation of $ 195.401(a) (Item 1), the Notice proposed that Respondent provide\nan engineering/surge analysis ancl modify its start-up procedures. Respondent reported that it\nreviewed its records to determine what caused the largest pressure surge. It analyzed the April 17,\n2000 event, recommended corrective action, and implemented a revised opening sequence for RGV\nWith respect to the violation of $195.418(a) (Item 4), the Notice proposed that Respondent\ninvestigate the 6-inch bypass piping on the cited check valves for internal corrosion. Respondent\nreported that it had inspected all of its check valve bypass lines.\nAccordingly, since compliance has been achieved with respect to these violations, the compliance\nterms are not included in this Order.\nFor Item 2A, the Notice proposed that Respondent integrate all of its pigging information to provide\nan engineering analysis on the condition of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System - Because I withdrew\nthis allegation of violation. corrective action is not rcquired.\nAMENDMENT OF PROCEDLIITES\nThe Notice (Items 3 and 8) allege